able-it is not a false imprisonment, and no liability is incurred by any person whomsoever, whether immediately or only remotely connected therewith. And the rule applies, no matter how corrupt or unfounded or mistaken the motives which induced the issuance or execution of the warrant may have been": 12 Am. & Eng. Ency. of Law, 2d ed., 739, 740, and cases there cited. The ruling in 86 Georgia, supra, does not in any manner conflict with the decision in Thorpe v. Wray, 68 Ga. 359. While the headnote in the latter case says that the unlawful detention of another, though under a warrant, will give a right of action, if done in bad faith, an examination of the facts of the case and the opinion will show that the decision was placed upon the distinct ground that the warrant was void. Even in a case where the warrant is defective or void, the imprisonment thereunder would not give rise to an action for false imprisonment, if the party suing out the warrant acted in good faith, and the officer executing the same acted in like manner: Civ. Code, sec. 3852. The court below committed no error in sustaining the demurrer to the petition, so far as the count which claimed damages for false imprisonment was concerned. 8. Error is assigned in the bill of exceptions upon the refusal of the court to strike the answer of the defendants. No ruling will be now made on the question as to whether the answer set up a sufficient defense to the action. If the court below passed upon this question at all, it was in an irregular way. It must have passed on the question either before considering the demurrers to the petition, which would have been irregular, or he must have heard demurrers to the answer after the petition was dismissed, which would have been without authority. When the petition was dismissed the whole case went out, and there was nothing left to answer. In either view, the question is not properly before this court for decision. The proper practice, where there are demurrers filed to both the petition and 87 the answer, is to first consider the demurrer to the petition; if this is sustained, the demurrer to the answer need not be considered. Direction will be given that all questions relating to the sufficiency of the answer be left open until another hearing. 9. The court erred in sustaining the demurrers so far as the counts for malicious prosecution and malicious arrest were concerned. These counts were not subject to any of the objections set up in the demurrers thereto, either general or special. There was no error in sustaining the demurrers to the count for false imprisonment. Direction will be given that the case be reinstated as to the counts for malicious prosecution and malicious arrest, and that the count for false imprisonment stand as stricken. Judgment reversed, with direction. All the justices concurring, except Fish, J., absent. TO CONSTITUTE A PROSECUTION MALICIOUS, for which a civil action may be maintained, it must have been prosecuted with malice, without probable cause, and have terminated in acquittal or discharge: See the monographic note to Ross v. Hixon, 26 Am. St. Rep. 128. A MALICIOUS PROSECUTION IS TERMINATED, in the sense that a civil action will lie therefor, by the failure of the prosecutor to appear or by entry of dismissal. Any mode by which the prose cution may be dismissed or ended, though without trial, is sufficient: See the monographic note to Ross v. Hixon, 26 Am. St. Rep. 135-137. IF ONE PARTNER MALICIOUSLY PROSECUTES an action in relation to the firm property, his copartners are not liable therefor unless they are privy to such prosecution: See the extended notes to Williams v. Hendricks, 67 Am. St. Rep. 40; Tryon v. Pingree, 67 Am. St. Rep. 413; Ross v. Hixon, 26 Am. St. Rep. 133. A PARTNERSHIP IS ANSWERABLE FOR SLANDER or libel committed by one of its members in the course of the firm business: See the extended note to Williams v. Hendricks, 67 Am. St. Rep. 39. FALSE IMPRISONMENT.-IT IS A DEFENSE to an action for false imprisonment that the arrest was under lawful and valid process: See the monographic note to Tryon v. Pingree, 67 Am. St. Rep. 412. BRADLEY v. STATE. CONTEMPT.-THE POWER to punish for contempts is inherent in every court of justice. COURTS CONTEMPT OF POWER LEGISLATIVE ABRIDGMENT.-Where a court is established by the constitution, the legislature has no right, without express constitutional authority, by defining what are contempts, to limit such court to treating as contempts such acts only as are embraced in the legislative definition. CONTEMPT-POWER OF LEGISLATURE.-A CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION which says that "the power of the courts to punish for contempts shall be limited by legislative acts," empowers the legislature simply to fix the limit of the punishment which the courts could inflict for contempts, and does not authorize such body to limit the inherent power of courts to decide what are contempts and to punish for contempts. Hence, an act which seeks to limit the jurisdiction of a constitutional court to punish contempts to certain specified acts is not binding on such courts. CONTEMPT - POWER OF COURT-INDICTABLE OFFENSE.-That a given act is indictable under the penal laws of a state does not deprive a court of the power of punishing such act as a contempt. Information for contempt, charging that the defendant improperly and corruptly approached one of the attorneys engaged in the trial of the case of Malone v. Adams, and stated in substance that a member of the jury could be approached and illegally influenced in obtaining a verdict, or a mistrial, and offered, directly or by intimation, to approach such juror or have it done, and corruptly influence the juror in order to obtain a verdict or mistrial. King & Anderson, Lewis W. Thomas, Rosser & Carter, and J. H. Porter, for the plaintiffs in error. C. D. Hill, solicitor general, contra. 100 SIMMONS, C. J. Information under oath was filed before the judge of the superior court of the Atlanta circuit, charging Bradley and Looney with contempt of court. The specifications of the charges will be found in the official report. Neither Bradley nor Looney was an officer orjuror of the court or connected with the case on trial. Both filed demurrers on the grounds that the facts set out did not show that they were guilty of any contempt of court; that the allegations did not show that the contempt, if any was committed, was in the presence 170 of the court or so near thereto as to obstruct the administration of justice; and that, if the facts alleged were true, they were liable to be indicted for the violation of a criminal statute. These were, in substance, the grounds of demurrer argued before this court. The court overruled the demurrers; trials were had, Bradley and Looney were adjudged in contempt, and both fines and imprisonment were imposed. To this judgment and sentence, and to the overruling of their demurrers, Bradley and Looney excepted. A separate information was filed against each, and they were tried separately, but the cases were argued together here, and we will treat them together, as they present the same questions. The power to punish for contempts is inherent in every court of justice. It is absolutely necessary that a court should possesз this power in order that it may carry on the administration of justice and preserve order and decorum in the court. As far as we can ascertain, this power has existed since courts were first established. Judge Wilmot, in 1795, in a treatise up on the subject, said he had been unable to find where it was first exercised, but in his opinion it was as old as the courts themselves. All the courts, in their decisions, and all the text-writers lay down the same doctrine-that this power is necessary to all courts and is inherent in them. It is so well established that we deem it unnecessary to cite authorities upon the subject. This power being inherent and necessary, can the legislature, by defining what are contempts, limit the courts to treating as contempts such acts only as are embraced in the legislative definition? In the formation of our government, federal and state, the three departments of government were in each constitution ordained to be separate, distinct, and independent of each other. No one of them had any right or power to infringe upon the power or jurisdiction of the other, without an express constitutional provision granting this right or power. The legislature cannot take away, restrict, or modify any of the powers conferred by the constitution upon the executive. Nor can the executive infringe upon the powers of the legislature. Nor can either the legislature or executive abridge the powers conferred by the constitution upon the courts, unless express authority is given. Each of these departments represents the sovereignty 171 of the people. Indeed, the executive, the legislature, and the judiciary are but the servants and agents of the people. To each department the people have given certain powers, and have declared that neither of the other departments shall interfere therewith. The people have intrusted these servants or agents with the duty of carrying out their will, and for that purpose, in one of these departments, they have by their organic law established certain courts. Among these are the superior courts. When these courts were established by the constitution, they were established with all the rights and powers possessed by all courts of record prior to that time. Among these powers was that of defining and punishing contempts of court, whether such contempts were direct, that is, committed in the presence of the court, or constructive, interfering indirectly with the administration of justice. This power was incident to the court itself and belonged, not to the judges as individuals, but to the court. The courts established by the constitution were established by the people and represented the majesty of the people. Whoever disobeyed an order of such a court, or was in contempt of its proceedings, or did anything which tended to impede or corrupt the administration of justice committed a contempt against the majesty of the peo ple. Without power and ability to preserve order and decorum, to preserve the purity of jury trial and to enforce their own orders, and the like, courts could not carry out the wishes of the people. The courts established by the constitution were therefore vested with all these necessary powers-powers which were at common law possessed by all courts of record. Whatever a court of record could, under the common law, punish as a contempt, these courts had power to deal with as a contempt. This power came to them as much as did the common law. Indeed, it is a part of the common law: 1 Bailey on Jurisprudence, sec. 297. When the constitutional convention established our courts, it vested in them all the power necessary to carry out the purposes for which they were designed. Such a court, established with such powers, is not, in the exercise of these powers, subject to legislative control. The superior court is a constitutional court, established with these powers, and the legislature has no right, without express constitutional authority, to abridge, restrict, or modify either its jurisdiction 172 or its powers: 1 Bailey on Jurisprudence, sec. 397; State v. Morrill, 16 Ark. 384; Carter v. Commonwealth, 96 Va. 791; Ex parte Robinson, 19 Wall. 505; 7 Am. & Eng. Ency. of Law, 2d ed., 33, and cases cited. These points were conceded by the able and learned counsel who argued these cases here; but they claimed that the constitution of this state had granted to the legislature the express power to define what are contempts, to classify them, and to take away from the courts jurisdiction to punish as contempts any act not mentioned in the statute which is now codified as section 4046 of the Civil Code. Paragraph 20 of section 1 of article 1 of the constitution of our state (Civ. Code, sec. 5717), in the bill of rights, says: "The power of the courts to punish for contempts shall be limited by legislative acts." We think that neither a literal nor a liberal construction of this paragraph can make it mean what counsel for the plaintiffs in error insisted it did mean. The word "power," used in this connection and as applied to courts, means "the right, ability, or faculty of doing something": Bouvier's Law Dictionary, 2d ed., tit. "Power"; it is "the ability to act, regarded as latent or inherent; the faculty of doing or performing something; capacity for action or performance": Webster's Dictionary. The word "punish" is defined by Webster to mean "to impose a penalty upon; to afflict with pain, loss, or suffering for a crime or fault; . . . . to inflict a penalty for [an offense] upon the of |