GRAIN OPTIONS.

See Police Power, 3; Statutes, 19.

GUARDIAN AND WARD.

1. GUARDIAN AND WARD-INCOMPETENTS-JURISDICTION TO APPOINT GUARDIAN.-In case of application for guardianship of an incompetent person, he must be served with proper notice of the time and place of the hearing, in order to give the court jurisdiction to make the appointment. An order and notice merely specifying the day of hearing without naming the hour or place is insufficient. (McGee v. Hayes, 57.)

2. GUARDIAN AND WARD-INCOMPETENTS-NOTICE OF HEARING-WAIVER-PRESENCE OF INCOMPETENT.-Proper notice of the time and place of hearing of an application for the appointment of a guardian for an incompetent person, necessary to give the court jurisdiction to act, is not waived by the presence of such incompetent at the hearing. (McGee v. Hayes, 57.) 3. GUARDIAN AND WARD INCOMPETENTS COLLATERAL ATTACK UPON JURISDICTION.-If proceedings for the appointment of a guardian for an incompetent person show upon their face that the court was without jurisdiction to make the order appointing such guardian, it is subject to collateral attack. (McGee v. Hayes, 57.)

HEALTH INSPECTOR.
See Officers, 12.

HIGHWAY.

1. LAW OF ROAD.-The driver of a team taking the left-hand side of the highway assumes the risk of consequences which may arise from his inability to get out of the way of another team approaching on the right side of the road, and is responsible for injury sustained by the latter while exercising ordinary care. (Angell v. Lewis, 881.)

2. LAW OF ROAD.-One who violates the law of the road by driving on the left side assumes the risk of such experiment, and is required to use greater care than if he had kept to the right, and if, under such circumstances, a collision takes place, the presumption is against the person on the left side of the road, especially if the accident occurs in the dark. (Angell v. Lewis, 881.)

3. LAW OF THE ROAD.-The driver of a team has the right to presume that the driver of a team coming in an opposite direction will observe the law of the road and keep to the right, as he himseif is doing. (Angell v. Lewis, 881.)

4.

LAW OF ROAD.-If the driver of a team observing the law of the road discovers a team approaching in an opposite direction in time to prevent a collision, by stopping or otherwise, it is his duty to do so, although the driver of the other team is guilty of negligence in violating the law of the road. (Angell v. Lewis, 881.)

5. NEGLIGENCE-BICYCLES-LAW OF ROAD.-The rights and duties of a person on a bicycle and a driver of a wagon on the highways in a city are reciprocal; each is required to obey the law of the road, and conform to its requirements by passing to the right. (Foote v. American Product Co., 806.)

6. LAW OF ROAD-By the law and custom of the land, it is the duty of persons traveling in wagons or other vehicles meeting

each other on the public road to pass to the right. (Foote v. Amer!can Product Co., 806.)

7. LAW OF ROAD-BICYCLES.-The fact that a person is riding a bicycle does not deprive him of the protection of the law of the road, but requires the driver of a wagon to accord him the same privileges and rights in the highway as though he were using a carriage. (Foote v. American Product Co., 806.)

S. NEGLIGENCE-LAW OF ROAD-BICYCLES.-If a person riding a bicycle on the right-hand side of the street, at an ordinary rate of speed, and ringing his bell as he approaches a crossing, is there met by a wagon driven at a moderate rate of speed around the corner in such way as to show an intention to drive along the street on the same side as the bicyclist, and the latter, in attempting to prevent a collision and to dismount, is thrown under the wagon and injured, the question of the negligence of the parties is for the jury to determine under proper instructions, and binding instructions for the defendant is error. (Foote v. American Product Co., 806.)

9. NEGLIGENCE-LAW OF ROAD-BICYCLES.—If a bicyclist, observing the law of the road, acts on the assumption that the driver of a wagon will conform thereto, and, without any fault of the former, he is placed in a dangerous position by the negligence or carelessness of the driver of the wagon, he cannot be held to the same strict measure of care as under ordinary circumstances in attempting to relieve himself from the perilous situation. (Foote v. American Product Co., 806.)

10.

NEGLIGENCE-EVIDENCE-LAW OF ROAD-BICYCLES. In an action by a bicyclist against the owner of a wagon to recover for personal injury suffered in a collision, while the bicyclist was conforming to the law of the road, and the driver of the wagon was not, a municipal ordinance requiring all vehicles, including bicycles, to keep to the right is admissible in evidence, not as proof. of negligence, but to be considered with other evidence in ascertaining whether the defendant is guilty of negligence. (Foote v. American Product Co., 806.)

HOMESTEAD.

HOMESTEADS-CONVEYANCE OF.-A deed executed by the head of the family pending the continuance of the homestead estate and purporting to convey the reversionary interest in the property therein embraced is valid and effective. (Huntress v. Anderson, 105.)

See Judgment, 13.

HOMICIDE.

1. HOMICIDE-RECKLESS USE OF FIREARMS.-The mere fact that a person handles a gun in a careless and reckless manner and death results to another therefrom does not necessarily make the person handling the gun guilty of murder. To constitute the killing murder it must appear that there was an intention on the part of the slayer to discharge the gun, and that the circumstances were such that an act of that character naturally tended to destroy human life. (Austin v. State, 134.)

2. HOMICIDE-RECKLESS USE OF FIREARMS.-If a person recklessly discharges a gun at another, and death results therefrom, or if he recklessly discharges a gun into a crowd, although at no particular person, and death results to some one, such killing is murder. (Austin v. State, 134.)

3. HOMICIDE-RECKLESS USE OF FIREARMS.-If death
results to one from the discharge of a gun in the hands of an-
other, without an intention to kill or to discharge the gun, the
person in whose hands the gun was held is not guilty of murder,
although the gun may have been handled in a careless and negli-
gent, or even reckless, manner. In such case the slayer is guilty
of involuntary manslaughter only, and the particular grade of that
crime depends upon whether it was lawful for the slayer to be in
possession of a deadly weapon at the time and place of the kill-
ing. (Austin v. State, 134.)

HUSBAND AND WIFE.

1. HUSBAND AND WIFE-NECESSARIES-LOAN TO WIFE.
A husband is not liable for money loaned to his wife with which to
buy necessaries. (Marshall v. Perkins, 841.)

2. HUSBAND AND WIFE-GIFT BY DEPOSIT IN BANK.-A
deposit of money, the separate property of a wife, in a bank, and
the taking of a pass-book showing an account in her name and
that of her husband, "payable to the order of either of them,"
does not of itself show any gift to him, nor any joint interest in
the deposit with right of survivorship; and the burden of proof is
upon the husband's donee of such deposit to show that it did not
continue to be the separate property of the wife. (Denigan v. San
Francisco Sav. Union, 35.)

3. HUSBAND AND WIFE-DEPOSIT IN BANK.-JOINT IN-
TEREST in money, the separate property of the wife, with right
of survivorship therein, cannot be established by showing a deposit
of such money in bank, and the taking of a pass-book in the names
of the husband and wife, "payable to either of them," without any
express declaration between the parties that the money should be
held by them in joint tenancy. (Denigan v. San Francisco Sav.
Union, 35.)

4. HUSBAND AND WIFE-HER RIGHT OF ACTION FOR
ALIENATION OF HIS AFFECTIONS.-Under statutes which
recognize the separate property rights of a wife and permit
her to sue without joining her husband, she has a right of action
against a third party for alienating her husband's affections. (Bet-
ser v. Betser, 303.)

5. HUSBAND AND WIFE—PARTIES.-The statutory right of
action of a wife for a wrong done to her is her separate property,
and her husband cannot control or interfere with the conduct of
the suit or appeal from the decision therein. (Walker v. Philadel-
phia, 801.)

6. NEGLIGENCE-EVIDENCE-VALUE OF SERVICES AS
NURSE.-In an action by a husband to recover for the loss of his
wife's services resulting from a personal injury to her, evidence of
his daughter as to what she was earning in her employment given
up by her in order to nurse her mother after such injury is inad-
missible. The liability of the defendant in such case is the ordinary
wages of such attendance. (Walker v. Philadelphia, 801.)

7. HUSBAND AND WIFE-SEPARATE ACTIONS FOR NEG-
LIGENCE ESTOPPELSTATUTE OF LIMITATIONS.-If a wife
maintains her statutory action and recovers judgment for personal
injury, and a settlement is effected by which the defendant with-
draws its motion for a new trial, and as part of the consideration
for prompt payment without further contest, the husband's right of
action for the loss of his wife's services resulting from such injury
is barred by the issue of a writ and its discontinuance and the set-

tlement of the action of record, the husband is thereby extopped from maintaining an action, even by leave of court, especially after his right is barred by limitation. In such case the action of the court in striking off such discontinuance and permitting him to sue is improvident and erroneous. (Walker Philadelphia, 801.)

See Dower; Judgment, 10.

HYPOTHETICAL QUESTION.
See Witness, 5.

IMPRISONMENT FOR DEBT.
See Bastardy.

IMPROVEMENTS.

See Vendor and Purchaser.

INDEPENDENT CONTRACTOR.
See Master and Servant, &

INDICTMENT.

See Contempt, 4; Pleading, 10.

INFANTS.

1. INFANTS-TORT LIABILITY-FRAUD INDUCING CONTRACT.-An infant cannot be held liable for fraud or conversion, where to maintain the action the plaintiff must show that there was a contract, which was part and parcel of the fraudulent transaction. (Slayton v. Barry, 510.)

2. INFANCY-CONTRACT OF MINORS.-A minor may bind himself by contract for necessaries, if reasonable, or by a contract beneficial to him. (Pardey v. American Ship Windlass Co., 844.)

3. INFANCY.-CONTRACT OF APPRENTICESHIP entered into by a minor, with the consent of his father, containing reasonable provision for his compensation and instruction in a useful art, and that a certain sum per week shall be retained from his wages and paid to him at the end of the term, or forfeited if he shall leave the employment before the end of the term, or be discharged before that time for cause, is beneficial to the infant, and in all respects binding on him, and if, after reaching majority, he voluntarily leaves the employment before the end of his apprenticeship, the wages retained under the contract are forfeited by him. (Pardey v. American Ship Windlass Co., 844.)

4. ACTION BY MINOR-WHO MAY MAINTAIN.-If the father of a minor child has disappeared and abandoned the matrimonial domicile, the mother may appear in court in behalf of such minor and assert the rights of the latter. (Williams v. Pope Mfg. Co., 390.)

INHERITANCE TAX,
See Taxes.

INJUNCTION.

1. INJUNCTION-EXECUTION IN REPLEVIN.—Injunction is the proper remedy to restrain the enforcement of an alternative

money judgment in an action for the recovery of personalty after
tender of the property. (Marks v. Willis, 752.)

2. INJUNCTION-STOCKHOLDER'S RIGHT TO INSPECT
BOOKS AND RECORDS.-The proper remedy to enforce the statu-
tory right of a stockholder in a corporation to inspect the books
and records thereof is by injunction. (Cincinnati etc. Co. v. Hoff-
meister, 707.)

See Equity, 2; Officers, 1, 2; Replevin, 7; Waters, 2.

INSANE PERSONS.

1. INSANITY.-DELUSION IS A BELIEF that something ex-
ists which does not exist, and which no rational person, in the
absence of evidence, would believe to exist. (Hemingway's Estate,
815.)

2. INSANE DELUSION MAY EXIST, although the belief enter-
tained is not a physical impossibility. If, however, such belief is
entertained against all evidence and probability, and after argument
to the contrary, it affords ground for the inference that the person'
entertaining it labors under an insane delusion. (Medill v. Snyder,
307.)

See Guardian and Ward, 1-3; Wills, 7, 8.

INSOLVENCY.

See Bankruptcy; Banks, 4-6; Corporations, 13, 14; Creditor's Bill;
Fraudulent Conveyances, 5-8.

INSTRUCTIONS.

1. TRIAL INSTRUCTIONS.-If, in an action for an account
and settlement, the defendant pleads payment, and introduces evi-
dence in support of such defense, the failure of the court to in-
struct the jury thereon is error. (Teasley v. Bradley, 113.)

2. TRIAL-INSTRUCTIONS AS TO EFFECT OF WRITTEN
INSTRUMENT.-If a written instrument sufficient in form and
execution is in evidence, it is the duty of the court to instruct the
jury as to its legal effect. (Capital Lumbering Co. v. Learned, 792.)
3. TRIAL INSTRUCTIONS.-If binding instructions are given
to the jury, or where the court refuses to take off a compulsory
nonsuit, the reason for such action should be at least briefly stated,
as an aid to counsel as well as to the appellate court. (Foote v.
American Product Co., 806.)

1.

See Agency; Appeal; Mobs, 8.

INSURANCE.

INSURANCE-BENEFIT SOCIETIES-VESTED

RIGHTS.

The right of a legally designated beneficiary to insurance under a
certificate of membership in a benefit society becomes vested upon
the death of the member, and no subsequent action of the society
can change, nor affect, such rights. (Independent Foresters v. Kel-
iber, 785.)

RIGHTS.

2. INSURANCE-BENEFIT SOCIETIES-VESTED
Under a benefit certificate issued by a benevolent association the
beneficiary therein usually has no vested interest until the death
of the member, and until then the latter can change the beneficiary
without his consent by complying with the by-laws and rules of the
organization. (Independent Foresters v. Keliher, 785.)