his quality of subject, but remains bound to perform his military duty as such subject, and cannot, of himself, escape this obligation by becoming a citizen of the United States. For such an abandonment of duty, he is liable to be visited by the penalties of the law; and if he, or a part of his property, can be laid hold of, legal proceedings must be instituted against him. There is, however, nothing to prevent his return to this country; and a summary arrest will be dispensed with, in case he receive "free escort" from his Royal Highness the Grand Duke, or give satisfactory security that he will hold himself ready, at all times, to meet the requirements of the law.

2. According to existing laws, the only son of a widow is not exempt from performing military duty; and this rule was, under the former laws, only otherwise when the son supported his mother in such a manner that she, in the event of his entering the service, must have fallen a burden upon the "general poor box;" but even this ground of exemption is wanting to those who have not properly announced themselves, or have been condemned for avoiding duty.

3. Permission from the Grand Duke to return to their native land, without the infliction of legal punishment, cannot be granted to those subjects who have violated the laws for the military service. A remission or mitigation of the legal punishment, by sovereign grace, can only be taken into consideration after the party in question has submitted to legal proceedings, followed by judgment. Department of foreign affairs, represented by

Mr. O. THYEN,

VON BERG.

Consul of the Grand Duke of Oldenburg at Bremen.

No. 57.]

SIR:

I omitted to inform the department, in my last dispatch, that, among others who have lately been placed in the Prussian army, with American passports, are Joseph Orthaus and Raphael Fisher. The latter has been relieved by the clemency of the Prince Regent. The application of Mr. Orthaus for relief has not yet been decided. They both left the country, I am advised, after their liability for military service had accrued.

I have the honor to be, &c., &c., &c.,

Hon. LEWIS CASS, Secretary of State.

JOSEPH A. WRIGHT.

Since my dispatch of the 18th of January, (No. 56,) several cases have come before me in relation to "military service." I have presented two of these, by petition to the Prince Regent, for relief, but have received no definite answer yet.

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JOSEPH A. WRIGHT.

Mr. Wright to Mr. Cass.

[Extract.]

LEGATION OF THE UNITED STATES,

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Berlin, April 9, 1859.

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SIR: Numerous cases have been presented, since my dispatch of January 18, 1859, No. 56, on the subject of military service claimed from our citizens. I have presented petititions, in some of them, to the Prince Regent. In reply to one of them, he reduced a sentence of nine months' imprisonment to three, for a case of desertion.

At this time, the application of Francis A. Hoffmann, a distinguished citizen of Chicago, Illinois, is before the Prince Regent, and I have strong hopes of his receiving a full pardon. Mr. Hoffmann has not been arrested.

I have not, thus far, presented any case for clemency where the party left this country before any liability accrued.

I have the honor to be, &c., &c., &c.,

I am just in receipt of your dispatch No. 18, dated May 12. It shall

receive my most earnest and constant attention.

During the present crisis, it will be impossible to turn the attention of the government to these interesting and, to us, deeply important questions. As an evidence of the disposition of the Prince Regent to avoid this class of subjects at present, I cite the case of Francis A. Hoffmann, mentioned in my dispatch No. 66. In this case, the ministers of war, justice, interior, and foreign affairs, have all united in favor of his petition; but the Prince Regent has, as yet, not acted, although his attention has been frequently solicited. I feel armed, on this subject, with the views, opinions, and arguments so well and forcibly expressed in the instructions of the President. I cannot doubt of the ultimate To accomplish this end, I will devote most faithfully my time

success.

and abilities.

It is impossible to engage the attention of the government of Prussia, at the present time, upon the subject mentioned in your dispatch No. 18, dated May 12, 1859.

I have the honor to be, &c., &c., &c.,

SIR: I am directed by the President to call your immediate attention to the case of Christian Ernst, a naturalized American citizen, who is said to have been recently forced into the service of the King of Hanover, and to be now performing military duty in his army. According to the representations of his friends, Mr. Ernst is a native of Hanover, but left that country some eight or ten years ago, and came to the United States, where he declared his intention to become an American citizen, and where he was legally naturalized on the 24th of February, A. D. 1859. His oath of allegiance to this government was administered in the court of common pleas for Scioto county, Ohio, and nearly all his relatives reside in that State. They allege that at the

time of his departure from Hanover, he was neither in actual service in the Hanoverian army nor had been drafted to serve in it, and that consequently he was under no military obligation to that kingdom. Under these circumstances, having occasion to visit Germany, he obtained a passport from this department on the 24th of March last, and in the following April he proceeded to his destination. Soon after his arrival there, he is said to have been arrested by the authorities of Hanover, and compelled to do military service in the Hanoverian army. If the facts thus stated by his friends are correct, there is reason to believe that a great wrong has been done to an American citizen, which requires the prompt intervention of this government.

Inasmuch as in discussing this case with the government of Hanover the rights of our naturalized citizens may be drawn in question, and you may find it necessary to maintain them, I am instructed by the President to present to you the following as his views upon this important subject:

The right of expatriation cannot at this day be doubted or denied in the United States. The idea has been repudiated ever since the origin of our government, that a man is bound to remain forever in the country of his birth, and that he has no right to exercise his free will and consult his own happiness by selecting a new home. The most eminent writers on public law recognize the right of expatriation. This can only be contested by those who, in the nineteenth century, are still devoted to the ancient feudal law with all its oppression. The doctrine of perpetual allegiance is a relic of barbarism which has been gradually disappearing from Christendom during the last century.

The Constitution of the United States recognizes the natural right of expatriation by conferring upon Congress the power "to establish an uniform rule for naturalization." Indeed, it was one of the grievances alleged against the British King, in the Declaration of Independence, that he had "endeavored to prevent the population of these States, for that purpose obstructing the laws of naturalization of foreigners, refusing to pass others to encourage their migration hither," &c., &c. The Constitution thus clearly recognizes the principle of expatriation in the strongest manner. It would have been inconsistent in itself, and unworthy of the character of the authors of that instrument, to hold out inducements to foreigners to abandon their native land, to renounce their allegiance to their native government, and to become citizens of the United States, if they had not been convinced of the absolute and unconditional right of expatriation. Congress have uniformly acted upon this principle ever since the commencement of the federal government. They established "a uniform rule of naturalization" nearly seventy years ago. There has since been no period in our history when laws for this purpose did not exist, though their provisions have undergone successive changes. The alien, in order to become a citizen, must declare on oath or affirmation that he will support the Constitution of the United States, and at the same time he is required to "absolutely and entirely renounce and abjure all allegiance and fidelity to every foreign prince, potentate, State, or, sovereignty whatever, and particularly, by name, the prince, potentate, State or sovereignty whereof he was before a citizen."

The exercise of the right of naturalization, and the consequent recognition of the principle of expatriation, are not confined to the government of the United States. There is not a country in Europe, I believe, at the present moment, where the law does not authorize the naturalization of foreigners in one form or other. Indeed, in some of these countries this law is more liberal than our own towards foreigners.

The question then arises, what rights do our laws confer upon a foreigner by granting him naturalization? I answer: All the rights, privileges, and immunities, which belong to a native-born citizen, in their full extent, with the single qualification that, under the Constitution, "no person, except a natural-born citizen, is eligible to the office of President." With this exception, the naturalized citizen, from and after the date of his naturalization, both at home and abroad, is placed upon the very same footing with the native citizen. He is neither in a better nor a worse condition. If a native citizen chooses to take up his residence in a foreign country for the purpose of advancing his fortune, or promoting his happiness, he is, whilst there, bound to obey its municipal laws equally with those who have lived in it all their lives. He goes abroad with his eyes open, and, if these laws be arbitrary and unjust, he has chosen to abide by the consequences. If they are administered in an equal spirit towards himself and towards native subjects, this government have no right to interfere authoritatively in his behalf. To do this, would be to violate the right of an independent nation to legislate within its own territories. If this government were to undertake such a task, we might soon be involved. in trouble with nearly the whole world. To protect our citizens against the application of this principle of universal law, in its full extent, we have treaties with several nations securing exemption to American citizens, when residing abroad, from some of the onerous duties required from their own subjects. Where no such treaty exists, and an Âmerican citizen has committed a crime, or incurred a penalty, for violating any municipal law whatever of the country of his temporary residence, he is just as liable to be tried and punished for his offense as though he had resided in it from the day of his birth. If this has not been done before his departure, and he should voluntarily return under the same jurisdiction, he may be tried and punished for the offense upon principles of universal law. Under such circumstances, no person would think of contending that an intermediate residence in his own. country for years would deprive the government whose laws he had violated of the power to enforce their execution. The very same principle, and no other, is applicable to the case of a naturalized citizen, should he choose to return to his native country. In that case, if he had committed an offense against the law before his departure, he is responsible for it in the same manner as the native American citizen, to whom I have referred. In the language of the late Mr. Marcy, in his letter of the 10th January, 1854, to Mr. Jackson, then our chargé d'affaires to Vienna, when speaking of Tousig's case, "every nation, whenever its laws are violated by any one owing obedience to them, whether he be a citizen or a stranger, has a right to inflict the penalties incurred upon the transgressor, if found within its jurisdiction.”