We cannot countenance this doctrine of the right of a parent to make prospective obligations for his minor children. No parent has the right to bind his son to perform such duties. The obligation is of no force, and should be treated as such. I await the views of the department upon these questions.

I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant, JOSEPH A. WRIGHT.

Hon. LEWIS CASS, Secretary of State.

[Translation.]

Inquiry by the "Royal Public Attorney,

Royal Public Attorney," at Stralsund, Prussia,
October 14, 1858.

1. The tanner, Henry Robert Plettner, of Stralsund.
2. The seaman, John C. H. Schiffman, of Stralsund.
3. The seaman, John Joach Fred. Witt, of Damgarten.
4. The seaman, Anton Hans Fred. Dübb, of Damgarten.

5. The weaver, John Chris. Theodore Galitz, of Papenhagen.
6. The seaman, Charles Peter Ebert, of Zingst.

Note.-Nos. 1 to 6 were born in the year 1828, in Prussia.
7. The seaman, Ernst Brassen, of Bisdorf.

8. The shoemaker, John Lewis Ulrich Lustig, of Stralsund.
9. The seaman, Rudolph William Adolf Borman, of Stralsund.
11. The seaman, John Henry Kraefft, of Prerow.

Note.-Nos. 7 to 11 were born in the year 1829, in Prussia.
12. The seaman, Charles Ernst Wilde, of Cummerow.
13. The goldsmith, John Burmeister, of Stralsund.
14. The seaman, Charles Chr. Bründler, of Stralsund.
15. The shoemaker, Henry G. Groth, of Stralsund.
16. The seaman, John Charles Grey, of Stralsund.
17. The seaman, John Fred. Schutt, of Bartelshagen.
18. The seaman, Charles Hermann Schutt, of Born.
19. The seaman, Hans Nich. Vierow, of Damgarten.
20. The seaman, Gus. Henry Gottschalk, of Fuhlendorf.
21. The seaman, Joachim Peter Utech, of Prerow.
22. The seaman, John Henry Mierke, of Zingst.
23. The sailor, John Daniel Schutt, of Zingst.

Note.-Nos. 12 to 23 were born in Prussia, A. D. 1830.

These have left the kingdom without permission, in order to avoid the performance of their military duty.

The late quartermaster, William Haase, of the second class of landwehr, of Stralsund.

The sub-officer of the second class of landwehr, of Stralsund, John Ehrbecker.

The soldier of the second class of landwehr, Gundlach, of Starkow. These landwehrmen had leave of absence temporarily, but they emigrated in 1857 without permission.

All those persons herein named are summoned to appear at midday

on the 21st of February, 1859, before this court, (royal,) first section, and to bring with them all evidence which can serve for their defense. Against those who do not appear the sentence of disobedience will be passed.

ROYAL DISTRICT COURT, FIRST SECTION,

Stralsund, October 14, 1858.

Mr. Cass to Mr. Wright.

No. 14.]

DEPARTMENT OF STATE, Washington, December 10, 1858.

SIR: Your several dispatches concerning the cases of Eugene Dullyé and of John Henne, and also conveying your views respecting the condition of American citizens, natives of Prussia, returning to that country, have been under consideration of the department.

Cases have heretofore occurred, and have been brought before this government for its action, which involved the question of the power of European governments over their returned subjects, who had acquired the character of American citizens, and the views of the United States upon some of the points were made known in dispatches from Mr. Webster and Mr. Everett. A copy of the communication of Mr. Everett will be found in the archives of your legation; and they must also contain the views of Mr. Wheaton, arising out of a case, in which application was made for his official aid, while he was minister at Berlin. In these several communications it is admitted, indeed, it cannot well be contested, that obligations may be imposed by the law, and actually existing at the time of expatriation, which are not canceled by naturalization, but which may be enforced against the party in the event of his return.

There are serious practical difficulties connected with this whole subject, which the government is very desirous entirely to remove, and if that cannot be effected, to render less annoying and unacceptable. Some of these are indicated in your correspondence, and they exhibit pretensions on the part of Prussia so contrary to our notions of political rights, that they are calculated to excite strong feelings of disapprobation in this country, as well as much sympathy for those who have suffered by their enforcement. If it depended upon this government alone, adequate protection would soon be provided against these acts of hardship. But in dealing with foreign governments, our first duty is to ascertain our rights, and after being satisfied upon that subject, then it becomes us to maintain and enforce them, and especially when they concern the personal security of our citizens, whether nativeborn or naturalized. And even where we are not entitled to make a peremptory demand, we may be justified in appealing to the sense of justice and the friendly feelings of another power for a change of measures which press with undue severity upon our citizens.

It was the case of Eugene Dullyé-who was charged with having disturbed the proceedings at a public banquet, by hissing when a toast

was given to the King's health-which first occasioned your interposition with the Prussian government; and you appear surprised that you did not receive the views of this government concerning the position taken by you immediately after you had reported the circumstances. Upon this subject, it is proper to inform you that your report of this case, and copies of your correspondence with the Prussian minister of foreign affairs, were received at this department on the 16th of February last. The note of Baron Manteuffel evinced no disposition on the part of the Prussian government to make any change in the decision of Mr. Dullyé's case, nor to recognize the principles you contended for; and the spirit manifested did not indicate that the time was favorable for urging those modifications in the Prussian system which circumstances called for. Repeated conversations with the Prussian minister here confirmed this impression. The last note of Baron Manteuffel, dated January 12, 1858, was a positive denial of the existence of any just claim in this case upon the Prussian government, and a distinct avowal that no action in favor of Mr. Dullyé would take place. This position was so decided, that you considered any further efforts on your part useless, and therefore you referred the matter to your government and awaited its instructions.

The first consideration which presented itself was, whether the application to the Prussian government was an appeal to its justice, in which the treaty rights of the United States were involved, or an appeal to its comity, conveying the views of a friendly power in a matter in which it felt an interest. On a careful consideration of the case, I felt myself compelled to differ from you in opinion, and became satisfied that, as a matter of right, Prussia could not be required to reverse the proceedings against Mr. Dullyé. Had the conclusion been otherwise, you would have been instructed to present the firmest representations to the Prussian government against its action, and to make a peremptory demand for redress. Not being entitled, therefore, to urge this case as a violation of a treaty stipulation, the government felt unwilling to invoke the favorable action of the Prussian government at that time, in the face of the manifestation of its indisposition to make any such change as we desire in its established policy. The subject had been presented by you with much force, and little could be added to the considerations you had urged showing the hardship of such cases.

With respect to the question of right involved in the proceedings against Mr. Dullyé I have to observe, that it is connected with certain general principles of administration which require a brief notice. Every independent state has the right to regulate its internal concerns in its own way, taking care to avoid giving just cause of offense to other nations. In almost all the European states there are police and administrative powers exercised by the governments, which enable them to exert a very arbitrary authority over residents, whether natives or foreigners. When our citizens enter those countries, they enter them subject to the operation of the laws, however arbitrary these may be, and responsible for any violation of them. Our treaty with Prussia recognizes this obligation, and provides that the inhabitants of each of the said countries shall be at liberty to reside in the territories of the other party, and shall enjoy the same security and protection as

natives, "on condition of their submitting to the laws and ordinances there prevailing."

The Prussian secretary of foreign affairs, in answer to your representations, informed you that Mr. Dullyé committed an act which, by the laws of Prussia, subjects him to the jurisdiction of the administrative authority, with power to order him out of the country. Baron Manteuffel, as you remark, stated that Mr. Dullyé had not been accused of an act which the law makes a crime or offense. I do not understand with you, however, that this admission concedes that Mr. Dullyé had [not] offended against the laws of Prussia, but that the act with which he was charged does not constitute a crime or offense cognizable by the judicial tribunals, whose proceedings are public, but that it was a violation of public order, for which he was responsible to the administrative tribunals to whose proceedings publicity is not given. I do not perceive that you call in question these principles of Prussian law, either with regard to their prohibitions or administration. The Prussian law being thus laid down authoritatively, this government has no right, especially in the absence of all other information, to doubt the accuracy of the statement. It must consider that point established.

With respect to the application of the law to the facts, in the exercise of the power of the administrative tribunal, I have no hesitation in saying that the considerations you present strongly incline me to believe that Mr. Dullyé was an injured man, and was not guilty of the conduct which was so severely visited. But his guilt or innocence was a subject for the determination of the Prussian authorities, necessarily resulting from the jurisdiction conferred upon them. It appears by the statement of Baron Manteuffel, that the Prussian government investigated this subject with a good deal of care, and became convinced that Mr. Dullyé had rendered himself obnoxious to the administration of the law.

In your dispatch of August 7, which was received here on the 28th, you present the case of John Henne, and again call the attention of the department to that of Dullyé, and it appears by your dispatch of September 21 following, which reached here October 11, that you had then expected the reception of the views formed here respecting those cases. Such an expectation was hardly compatible with these dates, even had there been no obstacle to prevent an immediate reply from the department sustaining you in your views, as you desired. Such an obstacle however, did exist. You had asked of the ministers of foreign affairs that Mr. Henne, born a Prussian subject, but become an American citizen, should be permitted to return to Prussia to revisit his friends and relatives. To this the Prussian minister answered that he had consulted two of his colleagues of the cabinet, whose administrative duties embraced this application, and they reported that Mr. Henne was a "refractaire," a person owing military service, and not having performed it, and that it was an established principle that no person in that situation should be permitted to return to Prussia without being compelled to fulfill his military obligation. You correctly remark that this decision is in accordance with the views previously held by the Prussian government, and which have not been

contested by the United States. If Mr. Henne actually owed an existing service at the time he left Prussia, from which duty he had not been absolved, it was hardly to be expected that the government would adopt a principle of action which would free him from the consequences of an obligation already commenced.

You informed me a short time since that the expected inauguration of a regency in Prussia would probably afford a favorable opportunity to bring this subject of the condition of our citizens in that country to the attention of the government, with the hope that modifications in the present police and administrative systems might be assented to, which would remove some of the inconveniences now complained of. That event, which has already taken place, may render it expedient to submit to the consideration of the present government the desire of the United States that some changes may be introduced into the Prussian administration which will meliorate the condition of our citizens. Upon this subject, I shall communicate further with you after the receipt of your answer to this dispatch. In one of your communications you state, that some of our citizens are serving against their will in the Prussian army, but you omit to mention the circumstances of this compulsory service. I am not, therefore, able to form a judgment whether the course of the Prussian government in this respect gives just cause of offense to the United States. Cases may occur in which such service may be claimed and enforced without any violation. of our rights, as when it is the consequence of obligations, legally imposed and existing at the time of emigration. Under such circumstances, an emigrant by becoming an American citizen does not free himself from preexisting liabilities in the event of his return. I have the same difficulty in forming a judgment upon the case of Captain Paul Bonner, reported in your letter of September 25, 1858, because the facts are not stated, and I have no means of ascertaining what were the reasons which induced the Prussian authorities to give him notice not to leave the country until his military duties were discharged. I should feel obliged by your transmitting me a statement of the facts in all these cases, that we may be able to judge whether the interposition of the government is called for by the violation of obligations which Prussia has contracted with the United States. I desire, also, to know whether the notice to Captain Bonner has been followed by any coercive act compelling his service.

The Constitution of the United States, with one exception, makes no difference between a native-born and a naturalized citizen, nor does the government recognize any difference between them in the treaties into which it enters. Obligations of the nature adverted to may create liabilities on the return of Prussian-born subjects, but we have a right to expect that these will be enforced with as little individual injury as may be consistent with a just system of administration, and especially as the doctrine of inalienable allegiance has been abandoned by Prussia, and therefore this general subject cannot be embarrassed by any question arising out of that pretension.

I regret to see in Baron Manteuffel's note to you of November 9, 1857, a disposition unfavorable to the return, under any circumstances, of Prussian emigrants, who have been naturalized in the United