Gambar halaman
PDF
ePub

from Old England, so much the more able to reduce New Netherland under English authority, and, from all appearance, in case of war, New Netherland was to be conquered by the English; yet it did not follow that the aforesaid place must be surrendered on that account, but on the contrary; and this is the Company's conclusion: It ought to have been defended until the English had reduced it by their overwhelming force. And hereupon the Company will willingly abide by your Honble Mightinesses' decision. But as the aforesaid Stuyvesant cyphers everywhere so amply the greatness of the English force, and relies on it in divers places, the Company, therefore, will, on this occasion, lay before your Honble Mightinesses its experience and observations, from which 'twill be found that even his above stated supposition is false. In order to show distinctly the true state of the abovementioned force, let us consider the strength of the New England English and that of the English reinforcement which came from Old England. As regards the former, the Director will never prove that, previous to the arrival of the English frigates, those of New England, both foot and horse, numbered any more than 150 men; nor that, by the arrival of the English frigates, the aforesaid troop became stronger, or numbered more, than 84 foot and 50 horse. According to the reports of those who had any knowledge of the matter and came into the city, and especially according to the assurance of the inhabitants of Midwout who came into the city on the 4th of September, the New Englanders were not more than the aforesaid S4 foot, quartered in Amersfoort, and 50 horse at Midwout, having no knowledge of any other accession. And this alone is what must be considered, and not how many people are in New England and how many in New Netherland, because the New Englanders, being farmers and planters, did not stand prepared to commence the war, but would, without doubt, have met the English frigates with the same answer the Dutch farmers gave Director Stuyvesant when he made a requisition on them for every 3d man-howbeit the New Netherlanders were thoroughly resolved to come up altogether, in order, when the third man was called on, not to leave the rest to the mercy of the English, had it not been for the exaggerations of the aforesaid Stuyvesant respecting the approach of the English from New England-for, the Company knows sufficiently well what cannot serve him as an excuse, that he hath no information in the world save his own imagination, and, having sent no person out for information, hath laid hold of those rumors which appeared to him most plausible, in order to surrender the place. For, the cowardice of the Burghers mostly proceeded from the circumstance that the boors on the aforesaid Stuyvesant's bouwerie, having been to the English General for a safeguard for the Director's bouwerie, came and reported that the English were full 800 strong, which, had good spies been sent out, would have been found to be false, and, on the contrary, that the English, who had come to the assistance of the frigates, did not number more than 150 strong, without there being any appearance of a reinforcement. Now, as regards the second force, which came from Old England, the aforesaid Director never can prove, in the course of his whole life, that it numbered more than four frigates of the following rates: One of 36, one of 30, one of 16 and the fourth of ten guns, the heaviest being twelve pounders; nor, that more than three companies of soldiers had come, viz., General Nicols', Colonel Cartwright's and Sir Carr's, making together about 250 men; nor that on board the aforesaid 4 ships were there more than 180 matrosses. Were the aforesaid Director disposed to obtain reliable information hereof, he could have had plenty; but he took no information on the point. The Company is well informed that one Isaack de Foreest, having been released, with a wounded soldier, by the English on the 31st of August, the soldier was not examined, but rather the aforesaid Foreest, who, greatly

exaggerating the English force, was believed, and that, on the 4th of September, some persons being in the city from Amersfoort and Midwout, sufficiently divulged and affirmed that the number of the English was as small as is above truly stated. This is also to be inferred, from the fact that the aforesaid frigates could not carry a thousand men; every one conversant with navigation, knowing well the capacity of a brig of 10 and one of 16 guns, and that the aforesaid ships have had in all 400 men on board, which number sufficiently incumbered them. The Company, therefore, plainly asserts (and 'tis also the truth) that all the rhodomontades of thousands and thousands of men have nothing substantial to cover them, and were fictions with which men have deceived, first, the people yonder, and now would wish to impose on your Honble Mightinesses, had not the truth been made manifest after the surrender of the fort, when the English (as the Company reasserts and proves by certificate La K.), did not have the courage to look at the Company's garrison marching out, whilst rage, which possessed the men for having abandoned such a fortress without striking a blow, had so far carried them away, that they would, without doubt, have attacked the English in the open field, who (the Company repeats and defies proof of the contrary), marched in with only two companies, scarcely or hardly as strong as those which marched out, viz., Nicols' and Carr's companies, each in three divisions of three files each, the first and last of which marched 5, the centre 4, men abreast, being therefore 168 men strong; the third company, under Cartwright, being the remainder of all the troops that came from Old England, lay at The Ferry until the ship Gideon had sailed with the Company's garrison, when it went first to Fort Orange, through fear that if it left sooner, the Company's soldiers, seeing themselves as strong as the others, would have made an attack on the Fort. To prevent this, the aforesaid Stuyvesant took, also, good care that the soldiers should not be furnished with powder, which was intrusted to Captain Kreyger until they would sail.

Wherewith, coming to the conclusion drawn by the Company in its Observations, which consists of acts of omission whereof the Director has been guilty, it will pass over the first, second and fourth, which are herein before equally answered in the last, and the remainder are not of much importance, consisting only of acts that are susceptible of a favorable as well as of an unfavorable interpretation, according to particulars of history and circumstances, all which the Company cannot find exactly conformable to the truth; observing only, on the second, that it could not perceive, from the Report of the Commissioners who were deputed to the English, that they were sent to collect information; and on the fourth, that 'tis, indeed, true that the English had given a promise of freedom to all the villages, and that such was known in the city, which, however, did not know that the English would treat it in this manner until the letter had been communicated. But, coming to the third: Is it to be wondered at, that such a poor defence was made? for he, himself, admits that he had neither ordered nor forbad firing. In truth, whether this becomes a Director-General or not, the Company need not add any more; it only says, that 'tis an action that never can be palliated in a Director-General, to stand between the gabions looking at two hostile frigates passing the fort and the mouths of 20 pieces of cannon, several of them demi-cartoons,1 and not give an order to prevent them, but, on the contrary, lend an ear to Clergymen and other cravenhearted people, pretending that he was wishing to order fire, yet will allow himself to be led in from the rampart between the Clergymen, and then, for the first time, give himself any trouble after the frigates have passed, when, for the first time, he will march forth to prevent a

1 24 pounders. Ed.

landing. The excuse he gives, that it was resolved not to commence the first act of hostility, is a very poor one; for, the English had committed all acts of hostility, carrying off the city's cattle and the boat in which the slaves were, taking one of the soldiers who was with them, prisoner after he had been wounded, capturing Claes Verbraeck's sloop, afterwards taking Isaac de Foreest prisoner, forbidding the farmers furnishing supplies, firing shot at the St. Jacob's boat, and lastly, summoning the city and fort, in order to save the shedding of blood, and committing many other acts, too many to be here related; so that there was no difficulty to answer them in the same manner. The instance with which he supports the above cited resolution, is not applicable in the present case; for, in that the Company being the aggressor, 'twas considered best to receive an attack first and then, being constrained, to defend; it had rather that no attack had been made and the place been left at peace. The two cases being different, the reasoning cannot apply.

The Company considers all those Observations, heretofore submitted, amply sufficient to convict the aforesaid Stuyvesant of neglect. But the two following points having been afterwards laid before the Company, whereof it had had no knowledge, it will submit them to your Honble Mightinesses, and then close:

To wit: first, When the first frigate had previously come alone, the Director sent for the Captain of the ship Gideon, to ascertain whether he was fully determined to attack her? The skipper declared, Yes, whenever he should be supplied with some soldiers and munitions of war. The Director, having it in his power to employ not only that ship but also the others, yea, when requested by Secretary Van Ruyven to do so, would not consent, and shamefully berated and abused the aforesaid Secretary for such advice, whereby the whole English design would have been easily broken up.

Secondly the English having committed all acts of hostility possible, the aforesaid Director did not take into consideration that they had come to The Ferry with only two companies, very tired and feeble, and that their ammunition being also conveyed there, the finest opportunity in the world presented itself to determine whether they could not be attacked there, in which case the ammunition and all could be set on fire. The night afforded sufficient opportunity, and the military was strong enough for this exploit, and no doubt they would be seconded from the Dutch villages, but this with other opportunities was allowed to slip, in order not to give offence to the English.

The Company now believing that it has fulfilled your Honble Mightinesses' intention, will only again say, in conclusion, that the sole cause and reason for the loss of the aforesaid place, were these: The Authorities (Regenten), and the chief officer, being very deeply interested in lands, bouweries and buildings, were unwilling to offer any opposition, first, at the time of the English encroachments, in order thereby not to afford any pretext for firing and destroying their properties; and, having always paid more attention to their particular affairs than to the Company's interests, New Amsterdam was found, on the arrival of the English frigates, as if an enemy was never to be expected. And, finally, that the Director, first following the example of heedless interested parties, gave himself no other concern than about the prosperity of his bouweries, and, when the pinch came, allowed himself to be rode over by Clergymen, women and cowards, in order to surrender to the English what he could defend with reputation, for the sake of thus saving their private properties. And the Company will further leave to your Honble Mightinesses' good and prudent wisdom, what more ought to be done in this case, hoping that you will take care that the remembrance of such examples in

future shall not serve as a precedent or a justification to others; as the examples of Brasil and Angola were made by this Director so incorrectly and unjustly to apply to his defence. Which doing, &c.

Appendix A.

(Signed),

MICH TEN HOVE.

Extract of a letter from the Director-General and Council of New Netherland to the Directors of the West India Company, Chamber at Amsterdam, dated 10th June, 1664; on file in the West India Company's office, Cahier, No. 12.

Agriculture and husbandry are in a better state than we could or dare imagine. The distant lands in and around Esopus, which last year could not be mown or sown, except with great danger and expense, by reason of the war, have as good and abundant an appearance as if they had been ploughed and sown last fall. Those newly planted this spring, being blessed, not long since, by God with a copious and good rain, for which His mercy must be thankt, will, we hope and expect through His bounty, produce a good and plentiful harvest.

Appendix B.

Extract of a letter from the Director-General and Council of New Netherland to the Directors of the West India Company, Chamber at Amsterdam, dated 16th September, 1664; on file in the West India Company's office, Cahier, No. 12.

Meanwhile we entertain the hope that your Honors will not disapprove of us, your faithful servants and subscribers, continuing here for a short time until further orders and your answer hereunto, for the arrangement of your Honors' business, both outstanding debts and credits, your Honors' debtors being somewhat increased and the outstanding debts augmented by the Negroes. The ship Gideon arrived here at such an unseasonable moment, to our great embarrassment and your Honors' greater loss, with 290 slaves even before the arrival of the frigates, whereby we have been not a little straitened and troubled on account of the want of provisions, having, on the assured hope of the new crop already harvested, but not threshed, consumed and sent off the old both to Fatherland by the ship 't Gecruyste Hart and to Curaçao by the bark Musch.

Appendix C.

Extract of a letter from the Director-General of New Netherland to the Directors of the West India Company, Chamber at Amsterdam, dated the 10th June, 1664; on file in the West India Company's office, Cahier, No. 12.

Here supervenes a third difficulty, to wit: the last letters and advices from Old England to Boston, in New England, by divers ships, seven in number, agree in stating that matters between our State and the King of England did not wear too good and peaceable an aspect, but seemed to be drifting towards a rupture, which, if it happen,

Appendix D.

Extract of a letter from the Director-General and Council of New Netherland to the Directors of the West India Company, Chamber at Amsterdam, dated the 4th of August, 1664; on file in the West India Company's office, Cahier, No. 12.

In regard to your Honors' despatch and your impressions created by the advices which you have received from Old England: That England's Majesty being disposed to reduce all his Kingdoms under one form of government in Church and State, and that some Commissioners (and, as it leaked out here, 2 @. 3 frigates, sufficiently provided with ammunition and military) were ready in England to proceed to New England and to install Bishops there, the same as in Old England; and your Honors' further opinion and advice for our interest and encouragement and that of your inhabitants, we shall not at present discuss, much less contradict, but rather wish and hope, if it promote the advantage of God's church as it apparently may ours, that it may turn out according to your Honors' anticipation and meaning. Meanwhile we cannot omit communicating to your Honors and respectfully submitting what we have, on the contrary, been informed and are still daily warned of, both verbally and in writing, on this point; partly to be deduced from the accompanying Declaration, No. 14, and more fully to be perceived by your Honors from the verbal information of the skippers and passengers returning home, to wit: that the design of those Commissioners, frigates and warlike force is directed rather against Long Island and these your Honors' possessions, than to the imagined reform of New England. The probability is presumed and inferred, from various circumstances, among others from the patent granted last year to Rhode Island, whereby England's Majesty grants freedom of conscience, in Spiritual matters, to every one; yea, even to the Quakers and Anna-Baptists, who are the most numerous and principal there. Secondly, we have heretofore communicated to your Honors what is now confirmed de novo, that Long Island and all the adjacent islands, Rhode Island excepted, are conveyed by patent to the Duke of York, and, therefore, are the frigates provided with so many people and so much ammunition. And although the issue and result are in the hands of time, these and similar reports not only continuing but being so repeatedly confirmed by every letter and passenger from England, make us very circumspect, anxious and guarded to keep the intrusted military together as much as possible; to increase the height of our fort and to furnish it all around with gabions, and to provide for all possible resistance, respecting which the slightest anxiety does not exist.

Appendix E.

Extract of a letter from the Director-General and Council of New Netherland to the Directors of the West India Company, Chamber at Amsterdam, dated the 16th September, 1664; on file in the West India Company's office, Cahier, No. 12.

Certainly it is deducible herefrom that, two years ago, the equipment and design of the four frigates against this place were not only thus clearly and punctually notified and known in England, but also here from New England, and information and warning thereof were communicated to your Honors by us, your servants.

[blocks in formation]
« SebelumnyaLanjutkan »