96.

James Madison to Messrs. Livingston & Monroe, at Paris. From the Instructions for the Purchase of the Territory of Louisiana. Extract.

Washington, March 2, 1803. If, France shall inflexibly insist on an express recognition to the above effect, (to wit: the right to exclude all nations, other than the United States, from navigating the Mississippi,) it will be better to acquiesce in it, than to lose the opportunity of fixing an arrangement, in other respects satisfactory, taking care to put the recognition into a form, not inconsistent with our treaties with Great Britain, or with an explanatory article, that may not improbably be desired by her."- "It is hoped that the idea of a guaranty of the country West of the Mississippi reserved to France may not be brought into the negotiation. Should France propose such a stipulation, it will be expedient to avade it, if possible, as more likely to be a source of disagreeable questions between the parties concerning the actual casus fœderis, than of real advantage to France. There will be less reason in the demand of such an article, as the United States would set little value on a guaranty of any part of their territory, and consequently there would be no just reciprocity in it. Should France, notwithstanding these considerations, make a guaranty an essential point, it will be better to accede to it, than to abandon the object of the negotiation, mitigating the evil, as much as possible, by requiring for the casus fœderis a great and manifest danger, threatened to the territory guarantied, and by substituting for an indefinite succour, or even a definite succour, in military force a fixed sum of money payable at the Treasury of the United States."—"The instructions, thus far given, suppose that France may be willing to cede to the United States the whole of the Island of New Orleans and both the Floridas. As she may be inclined to dispose of a part or parts, and of such only, it is proper for you to know, that the Floridas, together, are estimated at one fourth the value of the whole Island of New Orleans, and East Florida at half that of West Florida. In case of a partial cession, it is expected that the regulations of every other kind, so far as they are onerous to the United States, will be more favourably modified."

97. Mr Livingston to the Secretary of State, on the Louisiana Purchase.

Disclosure of the Conversations. Extract.

Paris, April 11, 1803.-M. Talleyrand asked me this day, when pressing the subject, whether we wished to have the whole of Louisiana. I told him no; that our wishes extended only to New Orleans and the Floridas, that the policy of France, however, should dictate.-He said, that if they gave New Orleans, the rest would be of little value, and that he would wish to know, what we would give for the whole?' I told him it was a subject I had not thought upon, but I supposed we should not object to twenty millions, provided our citizeus were paid. He told me this was too low an offer that he would be glad, I would reflect upon it and tell him to-morrow. I told him that, as Mr Monroe would be in town in two days, I would delay any further offer, until I had the pleasure of introducing him.

Paris, April 13, 1803. While we were taking coffee, the Minister [of the Treasury, Marbois,] came in, and after being some time in the room, we strolled into the next room, when he told me, he heard that I had been at his house two days before, when he was at St. Cloud; that he thought I might have something particular to say to him, and had taken the first opportunity to call on

ine. I saw that this was meant as an opening to one of those free conversations, which I had frequently had with him. I accordingly began on the subject of the debt, and related to him the extraordinary conduct of the minister, &c. He told me, that this led to something important, that had been cursorily mentioned to him at St. Cloud, but as my house was full of company, he thought I had better call upon him any time before eleven that night. He went away, and a little after, when Mr Monroe took leave, I followed him, he told me he wished me to repeat, what I had said relative to M. Talleyrand's requesting a proposition from me, as to the purchase of Louisiana. I did so, and concluded with the extreme absurdity of his evasions of that day, and stated the consequence of any delay on this subject, as it would enable Britain to take possession, who would readily relinquish it to us. He said that this proceeded upon a supposition of her making so successful a war, as to be enabled to retain her conquests. I told him that it was probable, that the same idea might suggest itself to the United States, in which case, it would be their interest to contribute to render her successful, and I asked whether it was prudent to throw us into her scale? This led to long discussions of no moment to repeat; we returned to the point; he said that, what I had told him, led him to think, that what the Consul had said to him on Sunday at St. Cloud (the day on which, as I told you, the determination had been taken to sell) had more of earnest than he thought at the time; that the Consul had asked him what news from England? as he knew he read the papers attentively: he told him that he had seen in the London papers the proposition for raising 50,000 men to take New Orleans; the Consul said, he had seen it too, and had also seen, that something was said about 2,000,000 of dollars being to be disposed of among the people about him to bribe them, &c. and then left him; that afterwards, when walking in the garden, the Consul came again to him, and spoke to him about the troubles, that were excited in America, and enquired how far I was satisfied with this last note." "He (Marbois) then took occasion to mention his sorrow that any cause of difference should exist between our countries. The Consul told him in reply, 'Well you have the charge of the treasury, let them give you one hundred millions, and pay their own claims and take the whole country.' Seeing by my looks, that I was surprised at so extravagant a demand, he added that he considered the demand as exorbitant, and had told the first Consul that the thing was impossible; that we had not the means of raising that. The Consul told him, we might borrow it. I now plainly saw the whole business-first the Consul was disposed to sell; next he distrustedTalleyrand on account of the business of the supposed intention to bribe, and meant to put the negociation into the hands of Marbois, whose character for integrity is established. I told him that the United States were anxious to preserve peace with France, that for that reason they wished to remove them to the west side of the Mississippi, that we would be perfectly satisfied with NewOrleans and the Floridas,and had no disposition to extend across the river, that of course we would not give any great sum for the purchase, that he was right in his idea of the extreme exorbitancy of the demand, which would not fall short of one hundred and twenty-five millions, that, however, we would be ready to purchase, provided the sum was reduced to reasonable limits; he then pressed me to name the sum. I told him that this was not worth while, because as he only treated the enquiry as a matter of curiosity, any

declarations of mine would have no effect. If a negociation was to be opened, we should, Mr Monroe and myself, make the offer, after mature reflection. This compelled him to declare, that though he was not authorized expressly to make the inquiry from me, yet, that, if I would mention any sum, that came near the mark, that could be accepted, he would communicate it to the First Consul. I told him we had no sort of authority to go to a sum, that bore any proportion to what he mentioned, but that as he, himself, considered the demand as too high, he would oblige me by telling me, what he thought would be reasonable; he replied, that if I would name sixty millions, and take upon us the American claims to the amount of twenty more, he would try how far it would be accepted. I told him that it was in vain to ask any thing, that was so greatly beyond our means; that true policy would dictate to the First Consul not to press such a demand; that he must know, that it would render the present government unpopular, and have a tendency, at the next election, to throw the power into the hands of men, who were hostile to a connexion with France, and that this would probably happen in the midst of a war. I asked him, whether the few millions acquired at this expense would not be too dearly bought? He frankly confessed, that he was of my sentiments, but that he feared the Consul would not relax. I asked him to press this argument upon him, together with the danger of seeing the country pass into the hands of Britain. I told him that he had seen the ardour of the Americans to take it by force, and the difficulty, with which they were restrained by the prudence of the President—that he must easily see how much the hands of the war party would be strengthened, when they learned that France was upon the eve of a rupture with England; he admitted the weight of all this, 'but,' says he, 'you know the temper of a youthful conqueror; every thing he does is as rapid as lightning; we have only to speak to him, as opportunity presents itself, perhaps in a crowd, when he bears no contradiction. When I am alone with him, I can speak more freely, and he attends; but this opportunity seldom happens, and is always accidental; try then, if you cannot come up to my mark, consider the extent of the country, the exclusive navigation of the river, and the importance of having no neighbour to dispute you no war to dread.' I told him that I had considered all these as important considerations, but, there was a point beyond which we could not go, and that fell far short of the sum he mentioned."

Paris, April 17, 1803. On waiting upon the minister, we found M. Marbois there, who told me that he had come to communicate to the minister what had passed between us, and that he greatly regretted the not being able to bring us to such an offer as he might mention to the first Consul. We were very graciously received by the minister, whom I pressed to obtain, as early a day as possible, for the reception of Mr Monroe, as time pressed, and we were anxious to conclude our business, for reasons arising out of the present disturbed state of America-he told me, he would speak to the first Consul that night on the subject, and that he hoped some person would be appointed to treat with us, even before Mr Monroe was presented. After a little general conversation, we took leave in expectation, that Mr Monroe would be presented this day, (Sunday) being a day of reception for the civil officers of the government.

The next day, Mr Monroe and myself, after spending some time in consultation, determined to offer 50 millions, including our debts, but presumed it would be best only to mention 40 in the first instance; this I accordingly did. In a conference I had the 15th, with M. Marbois, he expressed great sorrow, that we could not go beyond that sum, because he was sure that it would not be accepted, and that, perhaps, the whole business would be defeated; which he the more feared, as he had just received a note from the minister, indicative of the Consul's not being quite pleased, that he had so greatly lowered his original proposition. He said that he saw our situation, and he knew there was a point beyond which we could not go, with safety to ourselves or the President; but he wished us to advance to that point. He said that he would, if I wished, go that very day to St. Cloud, and let me know the result. I reminded him of the Consul's promise to pay the debt. I placed in a stronger light his personal obligation on this subject, and desired him to urge it as an additional reason to conclude an agreement, which would facilitate the means of doing it. The next morning, which was yesterday, I again called to see him, he told me that he had been to St. Cloud-that the Consul received his proposition very coldly, and that I might consider the business no longer in his hands, since he had given him no further powers-that he had urged the Consul's promise, relative to the debt, which he admitted, but said, at the same time, he did not think it had exceeded three millions, though my letter expressly mentioned twenty. He expressed great sorrow upon the occasion, and advised me to press M. Talleyrand to present Mr Monroe the next day, (that is this day) that he hoped, that if the Consul saw me, as he had a very particular esteem for me, that he would renew the subject with me himself.

Paris, May 13, 1803. Extract. We found, as we advanced in the negotiation, that M. Marbois was absolutely restricted to the disposition of the whole, that he would treat for no less portion, and, of course, that it was useless to urge it. On mature consideration, therefore, we finally concluded a treaty on the best terms we could obtain for the whole.*

By this measure we have sought to carry into effect, to the utmost of our power, the wise and benevolent policy of our government, on the principles laid down in our instructions. The possession of the left bank of the river, had it been attainable alone, would, it is true, have accomplished much in that respect; but it is equally true, that it would have left much still to accomplish. By it our people would have had an outlet to the ocean, in which no power would have a right to disturb them; but while the other bank remained in possession of a foreign power, circumstances might occur to make the neighbourhood of such power highly injurious to us in many of our most important concerns. A divided jurisdiction over the river might beget jealousies, discontents and dissentions, which the wisest policy on our part could not prevent or control. With a train of colonial governments established along the western bank, from the entrance of the river far into the interior, under the command of the military men, it would be difficult to preserve that state of things, which would be necessary to the peace and tranquillity of our country. A single act of a capricious, unfriendly or unprincipled

* See treaty, vol. 1. page 84.

subaltern, might wound our best interests, violate our most unquestionable rights. and involve us in war. But by this acquisition, which comprises within our limits, this great river and all the streams, that empty into it from their sources to the ocean, the apprehension of these disasters is banished, for ages, from the United States. We adjust by it the only remaining known cause of variance with this very powerful nation: we anticipate the discontent of the great rival of France, who would probably have been wounded at any stipulation of a permanent nature, which favored the latter, and which it would have been difficult to avoid, had she retained the right bank. We cease to have a motive of urgency, at least, for inclining to one power to avert the unjust pressure of another. We separate ourselves in a great measure from the European world and its concerns, especially its wars, and intrigues; we make, in fine, a great stride to real and substantial independence, the good effect whereof will, we trust, be felt essentially aud extensively in all our foreign and domestic relations. Without exciting the apprehensions of any power, we take a more imposing attitude with respect to all. The bond of our union will be strengthened, and its movements become more harmonious by the increased parity of interest, which it will communicate to the several parts, which compose it.

In deliberating on this subject in a financial view, we were strongly impressed with the idea, that while we had only a right of deposite, or, indeed while the right bank remained in the possession of a foreign power, it was always to be expected that we should at some time or other, be involved in war on questions, resulting from that cause. We were well satisfied, that any war would cost us more than hereby is stipulated to be given for this territory; that none could produce a more favorable result, while it might especially in the present disturbed state of the world, prove the ruin of our affairs.

There were other considerations which, though of minor importance, had' nevertheless their due weight in our decision on this great question. If France or any other power holding the right bank of the river, imposed lighter duties than comport with the revenue system of the United States, supposing even that we had acquired the left bank, all the supplies destined for our extensive and populous settlements on the other side, would be smuggled in through that channel, and our revenue, thereby, considerably diminished. Should such power open offices for the sale of lands on the western bank, our population might be drained to the advantage of that power, the price of our lands be diminished, and their sale prevented. But by the possession of both banks, these evils are averted.

Louisiana was acquired of Spain by France in exchange for Tuscany, which latter is settled by treaty on the son in law of the king of Spain, with the title of king of Etruria, and was estimated in the exchange, in consideration of its reve nue, at 100,000,000 francs. The First Consul thought he had made an advantageous bargain in that exchange, as appears from the high idea, which he entertained of its value, as shown on many occasions. Louisiana was the territory, which he promised in his proclamation at the peace as an asylum to those, who had become unfortunate by the revolution, and which he spoke of as vast and fertile. When he made up his mind to offer the cession of it to the United States, it was contemplated to ask for it 100,000,000 exclusive of the debts, they owed to our citizens, which