may be expected, however, that the friendship and mutual interest between them will produce a continuance on both sides, of such regulations as are just and equal, and an accommodation to those principles of such as, on either side, are otherwise than just and equal. On the side of the United States, their commercial regulations place Great Britain in every respect, on the footing of the most favored nation. Great Britain cannot say as much with respect to hers. One instance at least is explained in a letter from this Department to Mr King, of which a copy is enclosed, in which you will see, that, although the act of parliament to which it refers be no longer a breach of stipulation, it is not less a violation of equality than it is of sound policy. With respect to the British West Indies, it is not known that the United States are on a worse footing than other nations, whatever want of reciprocity there may be to the liberal regulations of the United States. With respect to the East India trade, it is understood that the treaty of 1794, by denying to American vessels both the coasting branch of it, and a direct intercourse between India and foreign countries, other than American, the United States were in both instances placed on a worse footing than other nations, and even on a worse footing than they themselves enjoyed prior to the treaty. The expiration of the treaty, and the friendly and favorable equality allowed by the United States to Great Britain in every branch of their trade, ought certainly to restore what the treaty suspended.

In my letter of . I stated the reasonableness of admitting American consuls in the dependencies of Great Britain, whenever and wherever the American commerce should be admitted. The principle urged in this case is applicable to the East as well as to the West Indies.-During the last war an American agent was informally at least allowed to reside at Calcutta and take care of the trade of his countrymen. Mr Jacob Lewis, who was appointed to succeed him, proceeded to London on his way thither, but peace having intervened, his application for an exequatur was refused. It is of real importance to our trade with that country, that such a functionary should be permitted to reside in it; the more so if it be true that the rule forbidding foreign factors to do so be enforced there. Be so good as to sound the British government on this subject, and communicate its sentiments for the information of the President.

90. Mr Madison to Messrs. Monroe and Pinckney, at London.

Blockades. Extract. Department of State, February 3, 1807.

Sir, On this subject, it is fortunate that G.Britain has already, in a formal communication, admitted the principle for which we contend. It will be only necessary, therefore, to hold her to the true sense of her own act. The words of the communication are,“that vessels must be warned not to enter." The term warn, technically imports a distinction between an individual notice to vessels, and a general notice by proclamation, or diplomatic communication; and the terms not to enter, equally distinguishes a notice at, or very near, the blockaded port, from a notice directed against the original destination or the apparent intention of a vessel, nowise approaching such a port.

Marginal Jurisdiction on the High Seas.

There could surely be no pretext for allowing less than a marine league from the shore, that being the narrowest allowance found in any authorities on the law

of nations. If any nation can fairly claim a greater extent, the United States have pleas which cannot be rejected; and if any nation is more particularly bound by its own example not to contest our claim, Great Britain must be so by the extent of her own claims to jurisdiction on the seas which surround her. It is hoped, at least, that within the extent of one league you will be able to obtain an effectual prohibition of British ships of war from repeating the irregularities which have so much vexed our commerce, and provoked the public resentment; and against which an article in your instructions emphatically provides. It cannot be too earnestly pressed on the British government, that in applying the remedy copied from regulations heretofore enforced against a violation of the neutral rights of British harbours and coasts, nothing more will be done than what is essential to the preservation of harmony between the two nations.

91. Mr Madison to Mr Thornton, British Chargé des Affaires.

Blockades.

Department of State, October 27, 1803. Sir, It will not escape your attention, that commodore Hood's letter is dated no less than three months before it could have the effect of a notification, [of Blockade] and that besides this remarkable delay, the alleged blockade is computed from a date more than one month prior to that of the letter itself. But these circumstances, however important it may be, do not constitute the main objection to the proceeding of the British commander.— His letter, instead of stating that a particular port or ports were blockaded, by a force actually before them, declares, generally, two entire and considerable islands to be in a state of blockade. It can never be admitted that the trade of a neutral nation in articles not contraband can be legally obstructed to any place not actually blockaded, or that any notification or proclamation can be of force, unless accompanied with an actual blockade. The law of nations is perhaps more clear on no other point than of that of a seige or blockade, such as will justify a belligerent nation in restraining the trade of neutrals. Every term, used in defining the case, imports the presence and position of a force, rendering access to the prohibited place manifestly difficult and dangerous. Every jurist of reputation, who treats with precision this branch of the law of nations, refers to an actual and particular blockade. Not a single treaty can be found which undertakes to define a blockade, in which the definition does not exclude a general or nominal blockade,by limiting it to the case of a sufficient force so disposed as to amount to an actual and particular blockade. To a number of such treaties Great Britain is a party. Not to multiply references on the subject, I confine myself to the fourth article of the convention, of June, 1801, between Great Britian and Russia, which having been entered into for the avowed purpose "of settling an invariable determination of their principles upon the rights of neutrality," must necessarily be considered as a solemn recognition of an existing and general principle and right, not as a stipulation of any new principle or right limited to the parties themselves. The article is in the words following: "That in order to determine what characterizes a blockaded port, that denomination is given only to a port where there is, by the dispositions of the power which attacks it with ships stationary or sufficiently near, an evident danger of entering." It cannot be necessary to dwell on the inconsistency of the kind of blockade declared by commodore Hood, with the principle laid down concerning the rights of neu

trality; or on the consequences of the principle on which a blockade of whole islands by a few ships is founded, to the commerce and interests of neutral nations.

If the islands of Martinique and Guadaloupe, the latter not less than two hundred and fifty, and the former nearly one hundred and fifty miles in circumference, and each containing a variety of ports, can be blockaded by detachments from a commodore's squadron, it is evident that a very inconsiderable portion of the British fleet may blockade all the maritime countries with which she is at war. In a word such a principle completely sacrifices the rights of neutral commerce to the pleasure or the policy of the parties at war. But it deserves to be particularly remarked, that a power, to proclaim general blockades, or any blockade not formed by the real presence of a sufficient force, to be exercised by officers at a distance from the control of their government, and deeply interested in enlarging the field of captures which they are to share, offers a temptation that must often aggravate the evils incident to the principle itself. You will infer, sir, from these observations, the serious light in which the President regards the proceeding which is the subject of them; and will perceive the grounds on which the injuries accruing from it to our commerce, will constitute just claims of indemnification from the British government. To diminish the extent of these injuries as much as possible, and to guard the good understanding and friendly relations of every sort which are so desirable to both nations, against the tendency of such measures, will, I venture to assure myself, be sufficient motive with you to employ the interpositions with commodore Hood, which you may judge best adapted to the nature of the case. I have the honor to be, &c. JAMES MADISON. Edward Thornton, Esq. &c. &c. &c.

92. Mr Smith to Mr Pinkney, at London.

Paper Blockades.

Department of State, July 19, 1810. Sir From the complexion of the British prints not to mention other considerations, the paper blockades may not be abandoned. There is hence a prospect that the United States may be brought to issue with Great Britain on the legality of such blockades. In such case, as it cannot be expected that the United States, founded as they are in law and in right, can aequiesce in the validity of the British practice; it lies with the British government to remove the difficulty. In addition to the considerations heretofore stated to you in former letters, you may bring to the view of the British government the retrospective operation of those diplomatic notifications of blockades, which consider a notice to the minister as a notice to his government, and to the merchants, who are at a distance of three thousand miles. It will recur to your recollection, that the present ministry, in the debates of parliament, in opposition to the authors of the orders of January, 1807, denied that they were warranted by the law of nations. The analogy between these orders and the blockade of May, 1806, in so far as both relate to a trade between enemy ports, furnishes an appeal to the consistency of those now in office, and an answer to attempts by them to vindicate the legality of that blockade.

NOTE-Extract. Brit. Adm. Office, Jan. 5, 1804. Sir, I have their lordships' commands to acquaint you, that they have sent orders to Com. Hood, not to consider any blockade of Martinique and Guadaloupe, as existing, unless in respect of particular ports which may be actually invested, and then not to capture vessels bound to such ports, unless they shall previously have been warned not to enter them. I am, &c. E. NEPEAN. G. Hammond, Esq.

You may refer the British government to the characteristic definition of a blockaded port, as set forth in their treaty with Russia, of June, 1801, the preamble of which declares, that one of its objects was to settle "an invariable determination of their principles upon the rights of neutrality."

Should the British government unexpectedly resort to the pretext of an acquiesence on the part of the United States in their practice, it may be remarked, that prior to, as well as during the present administration, this government has invariably protested against such pretensions; and in addition to other instances heretofore communicated to you, I herewith transmit to you an extract of a letter to the department of state, of July 15, 1799, from Mr King, our minister at London, and also such part of Mr Marshall's letter to him, of the 20th September, 1800, as relates to the subject of blockades. And it may moreover be urged, that the principle now contended for by the United States was maintained against others, as well as Great Britain, as appears from the accompanying copy of the letter to our minister at Madrid in the year 1801. To this principle the United States also adhered when a belligerent, as in the case of the blockade of Tripoli, as will be seen by the annexed letter from the navy department. You will press on the justice, friendship and policy of Great Britain,such a course of proceeding as will obviate the dilemma resulting to the United States from a refusal to put an end to the paper blockades, as well as the orders in council. I have the honour to be, &c. R. SMITH.

William Pinkney, &c. &c. &c.

93. Extract of a letter from Mr King to Lord Grenville.

Interpretation of the law of Blockade.

Downing Street, London, May 23, 1799. It seems scarcely necessary to observe, that the presence of a competent force is essential to constitute a blockade; and although it is usual for the belligerent to give notice to neutral nations when he institutes a blockade, it is not customary to give any notice of its discontinuance; and that,consequently, the presence of the blockading force is the natural criterion by which the neutral is enabled to ascertain the existence of the blockade; in like manner as the actual investment of a beseiged place is the only evidence by which we decide whether the seige is continued or raised. A seige may be commenced, raised, recommenced, and raised again, but its existence at any precise time must always depend upon the fact of the presence of an investing army. This interpretation of the law of blockade is of peculiar importance to nations situated at a great distance from each other, and between whom a considerable length of time is necessary to send and receive information.

94.

Mr Marshall,

Secretary of State, to Mr King, at London.
Principle of Blockade.

September 20, 1800. 2ndly. The right to confiscate vessels bound to a blockaded port, has been unreasonably extended to cases not coming within the rule, as heretofore adopted.

On principle it might well be questioned, whether this rule can be applied to a place not completely invested by land as well as by sea. If we examine the reasoning on which is founded the right to intercept and confiscate supplies designed for a blockaded town, it will be difficult to resist the conviction, that its extension to towns invested by sea only is an unjustifiable encroachment on the rights of neutrals. But it is not of this departure from principle, a departure which has

received some sanction from practice, that we mean to complain. It is, that ports, not effectually blockaded by a force capable of completely investing them, have yet been in a state of blockade, and vessels attempting to enter therein have been seized, and on that account confiscated.

This is a vexation proceeding directly from the government, and which may be carried, if not resisted, to a very injurious extent. Our merchants have greatly complained of it with respect to Cadiz and the ports of Holland.

If the effectiveness of the blockade be dispensed with, then every port of all the belligerent powers may, at all times, be declared in that state, and the commerce of neutrals be thereby subjected to universal capture. But if this principle be strictly adhered to, the capacity to blockade will be limited by the naval force of the belligerent, and, of consequence, the mischief to neutral commerce cannot be very extensive. It is, therefore, of the last importance to neutrals, that this principle be maintained unimpared.

I observe that you have pressed this reasoning on the British minister, who replies, that an occasional absence of a fleet from a blockaded port ought not to change the state of the place.

Whatever force this observation may be entitled to, where that occasional absence has been produced by accident, as a storm, which for a moment blows off the the fleet, and forces it from its station, which station it immediately resumes, I am persuaded, that where a part of the fleet is applied, though only for a time, to other objects, or comes into port, the very principle, requiring an effective blockade, which is, that the mischief can then only be co-extensive with the naval force of the belligerent, requires, that during such temporary absence the commerce of neutrals to the place should be free."

95. Mr Smith, Secretary of the Navy, to Commodore Preble.

What characterizes a Blockade. Extract.

Navy Department, Feb. 4, 1804. Sir, I am charged by the President to state to you, what, in his opinion, characterizes a blockade, I have, therefore, to inform you, that the trade of a neutral, in articles not contraband, cannot be rightfully obstructed to any port, not actually blockaded by a force so disposed before it, as to create an evident danger of entering it. Whenever, therefore, you shall have thus formed a blockade of the port of Tripoli, you will have a right to prevent any vessel from entering it, and to capture for adjudication, any vessel that shall attempt to enter the same, with a knowledge of the existence of the blockade. You will however, not take as prize any vessel, attempting to enter the port of Tripoli, without such knowledge; but in every case of an attempt to enter, without a previous knowledge of the existence of the blockade, you will give the ecmmanding officer of such vessel notice of such blockade, and forewarn him from entering.— And if, after such a notification, such vessel should again attempt to enter the same port, you will be justifiable in sending her into port for adjudication. You will. sir, hence perceive that you are to consider your circular communication to the neutral powers, not as an evidence that every person attempting to enter has previous knowledge of the blockade, but merely as a friendly notification to them of the blockade, in order that they might make the necessary arrangements for the discontinuance of all commerce with such blockaded ports.

Commodore Preble.