31 Or. 463 (49 Pac. 876), must somewhere show that the cause of action arose in the county in which the action was brought. The complaint states that at Roseburg, Oregon, the defendant "there executed and delivered" to plaintiff's father a contract of insurance. The benefit certificate shows that it was signed by the officer of the defendant corporation at Portland, Oregon, April 12, 1901. Eight days thereafter it was countersigned by the master artisan and secretary of Umpqua Assembly, No. 105. Immediately below their approval, but over the signature of the plaintiff's father, is the following indorsement: "I hereby accept this certificate and the conditions therein named." A contract is completed at the place where the minds of the parties meet and assent to the terms of the agreement. It is fairly to be implied from the contract of insurance that it was entered into at Roseburg, in Douglas County; but it is nowhere disclosed by the record that plaintiff's father, at the time the certificate was issued, was an inhabitant of that county. If this fact were manifest from an inspection of the record, it is possible that a continuation of his residence would be presumed until his death; but, in the absence of such showing, it does not affirmatively appear that the cause of action arose in Douglas County. The judgment will, therefore, be reversed, and the cause remanded, with instructions to quash the service of the summons, and for such further proceedings as may be necessary, not inconsistent with this opinion. LARCENY Argued 2 February, decided 27 March, 1905. STATE v. CLARK. 80 Pac. 101. INDICTMENT-CHARGING SEPARATE OFFENSES. REVERSED. 1. The stealing of articles belonging to several persons at one time and place constitutes only one offense, and may be charged by one indictment, but the allegation must be definite, no presumptions being indulged. INDICTMENT FOR LARCENY FROM DIFFERENT PERSONS. 2. An indictment alleging that defendants on a certain date "then and there being, and acting together, did then and there feloniously take, steal and carry away" several chattels belonging to two different persons, sufficiently alleges that the articles were taken at the same time and place. From Harney: MORTON D. CLIFFORD, Judge. R. E. Clark and John Lee Milam were convicted of horse stealing, and appeal. AFFIRMED. For appellants there was a brief over the names of Gammans & Malarkey and Biggs & Biggs, with an oral argument by Mr. Daniel J. Malarkey. For the State there was a brief and an oral argument by Mr. Andrew M. Crawford, Attorney General, and Mr. J. W. McCulloch, District Attorney. MR. JUSTICE BEAN delivered the opinion of the court. The defendants were convicted of the crime of larceny. They appeal, assigning as error the overruling of a demurrer to the indictment on the ground that more than one crime is charged therein. The charging part of the indictment is as follows: "That said R. E. Clark and John Lee Milam on the 14th day of June, A. D. 1903, in the County of Harney and State of Oregon, then and there being, and acting together, did then and there wrongfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, steal and ride away and drive away and lead away one mare and two geldings, said mare and one of said geldings being then and there the personal property of Frank Miller, and said mare being of the value of $150, and said gelding being of the value of $125, and the other said gelding then and there being the personal property of one Harrison Kelly, and of the value of $100, contrary to the statutes in such cases made and provided, and against the peace and dignity of the State of Oregon." It is argued that the indictment charged two distinct offenses one, the larceny of the property of Miller, and the other, the larceny of the property of Kelly-without alleging that they were committed at the same time and place. 1. It is elementary that an indictment must charge but one crime: B. & C. Comp. § 1308. But a person by a single act may accomplish two or more criminal results, or, perhaps more accurately speaking, one offense may be committed at one time and place to the injury of two or more persons: Woodford v. People, 62 N. Y. 117 (20 Am. Rep. 464); People v. Milne, 60 Cal. 71. It is therefore held by the weight of authority that the stealing of articles belonging to two or more persons at the same time and place constitutes but one offense, and may be so charged in an indictment: Rapalje, Larceny, § 117; State v. Magone, 33 Or. 570 (56 Pac. 648); Ben v. State, 22 Ala. 9 (58 Am. Dec. 234); People v. Johnson, 81 Mich. 573 (45 N. W. 1119); State v. Nelson, 29 Me. 329; Lorton v. State, 7 Mo. 55 (37 Am. Dec. 179); State v. Hennessey, 23 Ohio St. 339 (13 Am. Rep. 253); Fulmer v. Commonwealth, 97 Pa. 503; Hoiles v. United States, 3 McArthur, 370 (36 Am. Rep. 106). It must be alleged, however, that the larcenies were committed at the same time and place. There is no presumption that, because they are charged to have been committed on the same day and in the same county, they constitute a single crime: Joslyn v. State, 128 Ind. 160 (27 N. E. 492, 25 Am. St. Rep. 425); State v. Bliss, 27 Wash. 463 (68 Pac. 87). 2. The indictment in this case, we think, sufficiently complies with the rule, by alleging that the articles belonging to the persons named were, as a matter of fact, stolen at the same time and place, and by the same act. It is charged that the defendants on a certain day and in the County of Harney, etc., "then and there being, and acting together, did then and there wrongfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, steal," etc. The repetition of the words "then and there," in connection. with the words "wrongfully, unlawfully and feloniously," definitely fixes the time and manner of the taking, and shows that the larceny of the three horses was committed at one and the same time. This is equivalent to an allegation that the defendants did at the time and place specified, and as one transaction, commit the several acts charged. In State v. Bliss, 27 Wash. 463 (68 Pac. 87), relied upon` by the defendants, the indictment alleged that the defendant, in a certain county and on a certain day named, "then and there being, did steal," etc., and the court held that the words. "then and there," as used in the indictment, were nothing more than an allegation that, on the day and in the county named, the defendant committed the crime, and did not state that the property alleged to have been stolen might not have been in different parts of the county, and taken at different times on the same day. In short, the words "then and there being" had relation only to the day and county, and not to the time or manner of the taking. Here, however, the repetition of these words in the information shows that they were intended to relate to the time and manner of the taking, and to confine it to one and the same act. The judgment is affirmed. AFFIRMED. Argued 18 January, decided 13 February, 1905. 79 Pac. 497. EFFECT OF INDORSING NOTE FOR COLLECTION-REAL PARTY IN INTEREST.* 1. By indorsing a negotiable note "for collection," or the like, the indorser makes the indorsee his agent with power to proceed in his own name, reserving to himself the beneficial interest and the right to maintain in his own name appropriate proceedings for his own protection, if advisable. INDORSEE AS REAL PARTY IN INTEREST. 2. An indorsee of a negotiable note for collection is the real party in interest in the sense that he may maintain an action on the paper in his own name: B. & C. Comp, § 27. RIGHT OF RESTRICTIVE INDORSEE. 3. Under B. & C. Comp. § 4439, providing that a restrictive indorsement confers on the indorsee the right to receive payment and to bring any action thereon that the indorser could bring, an indorsee of a negotiable note "for collection and return" is entitled to sue thereon in his own name. DEFENSES TO ACTION BY RESTRICTIVE INDORSEE. 4. A restrictive indorsee of a negotiable note takes it subject to all equities that might have been asserted by the maker had it not been indorsed. PAROL EVIDENCE TO VARY INDORSEMENT. 5. In an action by an indorsee of a note for collection, parol evidence that plaintiff was the actual owner of two sevenths of the note was inadmissible as tending to contradict the indorsement, which must control. IDEM. 6. In an action in his own name by an indorsee of a note for collection, a payment to the indorser after the assignment of the note, is a good defense, even against a claim of partial beneficial ownership by the indorsee. PRESUMPTION OF HARMFULNESS OF FALSE ISSUE. 7. It cannot be presumed that an instruction was harmless where it submitted to the jury an issue not made by the pleadings or presented by competent evidence. From Multnomah: MELVIN C. GEORGE, Judge. Statement by MR. JUSTICE BEAN. This is an action by Milton W. Smith against J. C. Bayer and Peter Hobkirk on a promissory note for $290, executed and delivered by the defendants to the Concordia Loan & Trust *NOTE. In 64 L. R. A. 581-624 is a monographic note, Who is the Real Party in Interest Within the Meaning of Statutes Defining the Parties by Whom an Action Must be Brought. See also 66 L. R. A. 967. REPORTER. 46 143 46 408 Co. of Kansas City, Mo., on January 30, 1896, due on or before August 1 following. The complaint alleges the execution of the note, its indorsement to the plaintiff before maturity, the making of certain payments thereon by defendants, and prays judgment against them for the balance. The answer admits the genuineness of the note, denies that it was indorsed to the plaintiff before maturity or at all, and affirmatively alleges that it remained the property of the payee named therein until after maturity, when it was transferred to the Fidelity Trust Co., and that thereafter the defendants paid the note to the trust company and satisfied it in full. The reply denies the allegations of the answer, and affirmatively pleads that at all the times mentioned the plaintiff was and now is the owner in his own right of two sevenths of the note, and since the 21st day of July, 1896, has been and now is the owner of the remaining five sevenths for collection. Upon the trial plaintiff produced the note, with an indorsement thereon as follows: "Pay to the order of Milton W. Smith for collection and return to Concordia Loan & Trust Co. A. D. RIDER, Treasurer. He testified that he received the note in due course of mail from the loan and trust company, inclosed in a letter which the witness produced, and which stated in substance, that the note was remitted for collection; that he knew the signature to the letter, had seen the handwriting, and knew that it was the signature of the Concordia Loan & Trust Co., and the person signing it had authority to represent the company; that such person was and had been employed by the company for a good many years, doing business for it and exercising such authority; that witness knew that he had a right to make contracts in the name of and for the company; that he (witness) knew the indorsement on the note to be that of the payee; that Rider, who made it, was the treasurer of the company, and had done business for it as such for a good many years; that witness knew him personally, had seen him write, and knew that his signature to the indorsement was genuine; that |