the same. When we come to consider how and by what acts he may do this, the .courts may, upon grounds of public policy and in the absence of legislation, see fit to confine the father to the act of changing his own domicile; or, when they come to consider what acts shall be taken as evidence that the father has exercised his power of changing the child's domicile, they may decline to consider any other than that of a change of his own domicile as conclusive. We find, when the jurists consider the right of a surviving mother or guardian to change any child's or ward's domicile, they, where the right is conceded, qualify it by confining it to cases free from any fraudulent purpose, such as changing the order of succession for their own benefit. The change will not be permitted to do this, while it may be effectual for other purposes. I do not, with the limited means at my command, find any trace of this qualification having been applied to the right of a father to change his child's domicile; but again I see no reason why it should not be so applied, whether we regard him as changing it by changing his own or by other means. This would meet the objections urged against the principle in argument, but really it is a question not of international law, as applicable to independent countries, but rather of municipal regulations by the states, to be governed by considerations of the peculiar comity that comes of the anomalous relations they bear to each other under our system of government. Whether the principle I have indicated exists, so that it has received recognition in all countries, is a question I am unable to answer; but it certainly does, or did, obtain in France. Whether it is recognized by the common law of England, or is otherwise there established, seems doubtful; though the right of emancipation so as to change the child's domicile in the matter of parish settlements, and the existence of that effect in all matters of domicile through the operation of the marriage of the infant, seems established. It cannot, then, in any view, be unqualifiedly said, as was maintained in argument, that it is a rule, without an exception, that a father cannot change the domicile of his child without changing his own, or that a minor child cannot acquire any different domicile from that of its father. However these questions would have to be answered where there was an entire absence of legislation, or in international tribunals, there can be no doubt that our states, in their relation to each other, have control over the subject of emancipation of minors from parental control to the fullest extent, and that each may prescribe the rules to govern it and limit or extend its effects. Nothing was more common, some years ago, than special acts of the legislatures emancipating minors from the disabilities of infancy, entirely or partially; and some states have general statutes on the subject. I have no doubt that, under our adoption laws in Tennessee, if a citizen of Kentucky should adopt the minor child of a citizen of Tennessee, that ipso facto, and by necessary implication, the child would become a citizen of Kentucky by the consent of the state of Tennessee, and that Kentucky would recognize the changed status of the child. Const. Tenn. art. 2. § 6; T. & S. Code (Tenn.) 3643-3645. So, if, under our Code, which says "A father * * * may, by deed executed in his life-time, or by last will and testament in writing from time to time, and in such manner and form as he thinks fit, dispose of, the custody and tuition of any legitimate child under the age of 21 years and unmarried, * during the minority of said child, or for a less time." T. & S. Code, § 2492. -A deed or will should appoint a citizen of Kentucky such guardian, I have no doubt it would operate to make the child a citizen of Kentucky by necessary implication, whether it would or not for all purposes change the rule that the last domicile of the father constitutes the domicile of the child. And, perhaps, there would be the same result if the county court should bind an abandoned child to a citizen of another state. T. & S. Code, § 2549. Why cannot a person have two domiciles-one for political citizenship, and another for purposes of succession? And, as I understand the subject, there is respectable authority that he may. The supreme court has held that, ex necessitate rei, a wife may acquire a different domicile from that of the husband, and the same necessity may sometime exist, I should think, in the case of a child. Cheever v. Wilson, 9 Wall. 108. I am aware that our courts have decided that there is a distinction between residence, however long-continued, and citizenship, in the purview of our constitution and laws, and that they apply substantially the same tests applied to determine questions of domicile in determining questions of citizenship; but I know of no case that holds that the person must denude himself so entirely of his former domicile in one state that the laws of succession in the new state must attach to him in order to constitute a change of citizenship, and on the principles laid down by the authorities I have consulted on the subject of two domiciles, I do not know why this most rigid test of domicile should be insisted on. I should, of course, concede that the person can have only one domicile or residence as pertaining to his inter state right of suing or being sued in the federal courts; but it does not follow from this that when a conflict arises we must apply the test of the right of succession in determining the conflict, nor that the domicile of succession must be inevitably the one that settles this suable citizenship, if I may so call it. Simple residence is the usual test of the place to sue a man; and while I do not depart from the established doctrine that citizenship is something more than residence, I am not prepared to hold that it is nothing less than the domicile of succession. I do not overlook the fact urged in argument that the fourteenth amendment to the constitution has declared that "all persons born or naturalized in the United States and subject to the jurisdiction thereof are citizens of the United States wherein they reside." Const. art. 14. But I do not understand that this has enlarged the judicial power of the United States under article 3, § 2, so as to include controversies between persons who would be citizens of the same state, as theretofore understood, but who are now simply residents of different states, as contradistinguished from persons domiciled in different states. But we have the same tests of citizenship now as before the amendment. Robertson v. Cease, 97 U. S. 646, 649; Nat. Bank v. Teal, 5 FED. REP. 503, 505. I think these views will find support in the following authorities, and the cases cited by them: 2 Kent, (12th Ed.) 233, note c, 225, 226, note 1, (d,) 430, note 1, 431, 49, 71, 72; Schoul. Dom. Rel. part 3, passim, pp. 312, 412, 452, 442, 393, 394, 314, 367, 372, 591, 598; Story, Conf. L. (5th Ed.) passim, §§ 39, 49, § 46, and note 4, §§ 531, 543, § 480, et seq., 492 et seq.; Phil. Dom. passim, c. 3, c. 7; Westl. Priv. Int. L. §§ 35, 36, 37, 34, 316; Whart. Conf. L. (2d Ed.) passim, §§ 8, 10, 10a, c. 2, passim, §§ 24, 29, 41-43, 55-66, 67-77, 81, 82, 396, 704, 720; Bump, Fed. Proc. 130, 185, 217; Dill. Rem. (2d Ed.) 67, and notes; Somerville v. Somerville, 5 Ves. 750, (Perkin's Ed.) and notes; Allen v. Thomason, 11 Humph. 535; Cloud v. Hamilton, Id. 104; Ross v. Ross, 129 Mass. 243; Tirrell v. Bacon, 3 FED. REP. 62; Collinson v. Teal, 4 Sawy. 241; Holmes v. Railroad Co. 5 FED. REP. 523, 526. And see 11 Cent. L. J. 421; 12 Cent. L. J. 51. I do not treat this subject with a more exact and critical observation of the authorities, because, while I am inclined to think that an infant child may, at least to the extent of conferring the right to sue and be sued in the federal courts, with the consent of its father, acquire in the father's life-time such a domicile in another state than that of the father's domicile as will make it a citizen of that state, I do not think, on the facts of this case, this defendant has acquired. such a separate citizenship from her father. I find not the least trace of any principle upon which this result can be accomplished without the complete emancipation of the infant from the parental control of the father to that extent that there is conferred upon it the right to choose its own domicile, or upon some one else standing in loco parentis the right to choose one for it. The father can no more constitute a mere residence of his child a citizenship, than he can make his own mere residence a citizenship, under the rules of law regulating this federal jurisdiction over citizens of different states. The domicile of the child must be changed, whether so completely as to alter its status for all purposes or not, certainly so completely that it no longer depends upon the volition of the father to again change it. In Tamworth v. New Market, 3 N. H. 472, it was held that a child was not emancipated by a contract of the father that it should reside with a stranger till it was 21 years of age. He cannot by merely depositing his child in this or that state continue to change its domicile for any purpose without changing his own. He must relinguish and abandon his rights in that behalf to the child itself or another, or by operation of law the child's domicile will shift only with his own. The affidavit here shows only that he has placed his child to reside with friends in Kentucky-permanently, he thinks, judged by his own intention as it now exists, and that of the child and the friends with whom she resides, but non constat that he may not change that intention, resume his parental control of his own volition, or that these friends may not compel him to resume it by sending the child back to him. He shows that he has not released his parental authority, because he appeals to it to sustain his right to control this litigation, and has supplemented it by applying for a guardianship of her property. I have no doubt that after emancipation he might be guardian or next friend, as any other might, and natural father he must always be; but as long as he exercises his. legal control qua father, or has the right to do so, his child's domicile must remain his own. I have no doubt, therefore, that Maud B. McKenna is a citizen of Tennessee, and for that reason, as well as others, on the record as it now stands, this cause must be remanded. Remand the cause. BAILEY V. AMERICAN CENT. INS. Co. (Circuit Court, D. Iowa. 1881.) 1. JURISDICTION OF THE CIRCUIT COURT-REMOVAL OF CAUSES-ACT OF 1875. This court has jurisdiction, under the act of March 3, 1875, of a suit removed here from a state court on the petition of the defendant, where the suit was originally brought in the state court, appearance entered therein for the defendant at the first term, petition for removal presented, and the requisite bond tendered, without any other pleading being filed. 2. "CONTROVERSY "-PRESUMPTIONS. Where nothing appears to the contrary, it will be presumed, from the fact that a suit has been commenced, that there is a "controversy" between the parties. This is an action to recover damages upon a policy of insurance, and was originally instituted in the circuit court of Lee county, Iowa. The defendant, a non-resident corporation, appeared in the state court at the first term after the commencement of the suit, and, without filing any other pleading, presented its petition for a removal of the cause to this court. In the petition for removal the following statements appear: "Your petitioner, the defendant, would respectfully show the court that the matter and amount in dispute in the above-entitled cause exceeds, exclusive of costs, the sum of $500; that the controversy in said suit is between citizens of different states; and that the petitioner was, at the commencement of this suit, and still is, a citizen of the state of Missouri; and that the said Noah Bailey was then, and still is, a citizen of Iowa." Good and sufficient bond being tendered, the state court sustained the motion to remove the cause, and the record has accordingly been filed in this court. The plaintiff moves to remand, upon the ground that, at the time of the filing of the petition for the removal in the state court, there was no controversy between the parties. Hagerman, McCrary & Hagerman, for plaintiff. Fulton & Fulton, for defendant. MCCRARY, C. J. The act of congress of March 3, 1875, under which this case was removed, provides for the removal of causes "where the matter in dispute exceeds, exclusive of costs, the sum or value of $500, in which there shall be a controversy between citizens of different states." It is insisted by the counsel for plaintiff that inasmuch as no answer or demurrer was filed in the state court, and no issue joined, we are bound to presume that there was no controversy in the case. That there must be a controversy in order to authorize the removal, is, of course, clear; and if it appears affirmatively from the record that there was no controversy, then the |