ate suspicion that he was the person who fired the pistol; but still, the circumstances failed to be conclusive of fastening it precisely on the individual, which was the great object of all this investigation. The surgeon stated, in his examination, in the presence of the Judge, that the pistol must have been very near the body. On being asked why, he replied, "Because the body was blackened, and the wad was found in it." Said the Judge, "Did you keep that wad?" "I did," was the response; and the Judge requested him to examine it. It was found that the wad was made from a part of a song; and the other part was found in the defendant's pocket. The two parts corresponded. I only put these as cases showing what are, and what are not, circumstances from which conclusions may be drawn as satisfactorily as from positive testimony. But these are from physical causes. There is another class of circumstances, which are to be considered as moral, arising out of the conduct of men in certain situations; because, from long experience, it is known that men act from motives; and that men, in certain circumstances, are likely to act in a particular way. Indeed, this is the only mode in which a great variety of crimes can be proved, because there are many crimes which can be proved only from the intent. Now, the intent is a secret of the heart, which can be known only from his declarations: and those he may express to none, so that they remain known only to Him who is the reader of all hearts, except by external acts. But it is reasoned from the fact that a man, doing a certain thing, acts in a particular way; and, as I have already stated, in another part of the case, a man is always presumed to intend the natural and usual consequences of his own acts. The natural conduct of men is such, that fair inferences can be drawn from it. It is necessary, to the proper administration of justice, that such evidence shall be admitted, because it is, in its nature, satisfactory; and, if proved, it is equally conclusive. There are various other views taken: where, for instance, probable proof is brought of a state of facts, the absence of evidence tending to a contrary conclusion is then to be weighed, to be considered; and I shall have occasion to consider that, by and by, in another part of the present case. So, if a party who is called upon to meet a charge, and against whom stringent proof is produced, can offer satisfactory evidence to account for the circumstances in which he is placed, in another way, and does not do it, the presumption is, that the proof, instead of rebutting the charge, would have the contrary effect; and, therefore, he suppresses the evidence. There is another consideration, and that is this: that inferences coming from independent sources, different from each other, and tending to the same conclusion, not only support each other, but support each other with an increased weight of evidence. To illustrate. Suppose, for instance, in the case just mentioned, that the paper containing the song was produced. It is barely possible that he might have picked up the piece. It is not conclusive that he wadded the gun himself, from the fact of the piece of paper being found in his possession. But suppose, from another, and an entirely independent witness, it was proved that that individual purchased that paper, that particular song, at a shop, the day before; then we have concurrent circumstances, coming from different sources, independent of each other, which bear upon the same conclusion, and therefore have a very strong tendency to establish the result. Under this head-that is, under the head that a party who can produce proof, and does not do it, thereby, to some extent, corroborates the evidence produced against him-may be referred various other considerations, where it is shown that the party has attempted to suppress proof, has endeavored to prevent things from being known which might make against him; such efforts, when proved, exert an influence against him. It sometimes happens that a man may be placed in such a situation that he attempts to resort to deception, for the purpose of concealing proofs, when he is an innocent man, instead of having the fact produced. That was the point in the case produced yesterday, of a man who was convicted of the murder of his niece, because she suddenly disappeared under circumstances that gave rise to the suspicion that she was dead; then he attempted to impose on the Court by presenting another person as his niece. The deception was discovered, and operated against him. In that light, in connection with these various considerations, certain rules can be applied to circumstantial evidence. The first is, that the circumstance on which the conclusion depends must be fully established by proof. They are facts. They are not less to be proved by competent evidence than if they were the direct proof. Under this rule, great care is to be taken, by guarding against pretended circumstances, which might seem to raise suspicion against the party. There are found, detected; and in general it may be considered as one of the wisest provisions of Providence, that where certain things have happened in reality, there they must, of necessity, correspond; because what has happened once may happen again; and therefore, if the facts and circumstances all correspond, there is then a strong belief in their truth. But, if there be one circumstance repugnant, not consistent with them, then they can not agree; because two things impossible cannot agree. The familiar illustration is: where persons have been slain, and placed in certain positions to make it appear that they had committed suicide. In one case of this kind, there was the print of a bloody hand, a bloody left hand, on her own left hand. It was therefore impossible that the theory of suicide I could be maintained. So in another case, where a man was found dead, shot by a pistol ball, with the pistol in his hand. Of course, this indicated suicide. But, upon an examination of the bullet, it was found to be too large for the pistol; and hence you will see at once that suicide was impossible. The rule, therefore, is, that the circumstance upon which the conclusion depends must be proved. I have already attempted to distinguish that upon which the conclusion de pends, and that which is not essential to the conclusion, but only corroboratory of it. If they are not of that character upon which the conclusion depends, then the failure of any one does not make the case fail, but only fails in the corroboration. The next rule to which I ask your attention is, that all the facts must be consistent. What has happened may happen again. What is impossible could not have happened. And, therefore, the facts must be consistent with each other. Considering them to be the facts upon which the conclusion depends, if any one fact is wholly inconsistent with the hypothesis of guilt, it, of course, breaks that chain of circumstantial evidence, and puts an end to the case. Of this character, gentlemen, is an alibi. And what is an alibi? A man is charged with crime. He says, I was elsewhere-alibi, the Latin word for elsewhere. Well, if that is true, that cannot be consistent with the fact of his being there at that time. At precisely 8 o'clock, on a given evening, he is proved to be in one place, therefore, he cannot be in another place at precisely the same hour. That has been the source of a vast deal of contrariety, because an alibi is easily suggested. With a little contrivance, and a little arrangement of proof, a person may seem to have been in one place when he was in another. If the alibi is proved, then it is a certain conclusion, because a person cannot be in two places at the same time. Therefore, showing him to be in one, shows him not to be in the other. But, whereever such proof is attempted, there must be the most rigid and strict inquiry whether the fact is proved to the satisfaction of the jury; and false testimony, in the attempting to prove that a man was in another place from his real one, is open to all the various suggestions of contrivance, such as the appearance of sudden riding from one place to the other, and various other modes of that description. Another fact, which appears in one of these cases. A man was accused of stealing timber. The evidence was gone through with, and seemed to make a very strong case against him. But, on the whole, it was proved, that, if he did it, he did it alone. Then a witness came forward and stated that one man could not lift the timber; it would take five. That was sufficient to close the case. But where the circumstances are proved, where they lead to a certain result, it may not be the same species of evidence; but it is legal evidence, competent evidence, and evidence which is necessary, in many cases, in order that the guilty may not escape. But they must be of a conclusive tendency. Yet, how is that conclusive tendency to be shown? Whether the party had, or had not, the motive to do the act, may be shown; that there was an advantage to be gained by it; plunder to be obtained. The circumstances which the party fails to prove, when he might prove them; the attempt to create and impose false evidence; the attempt to withdraw attention from himself to a third person; to suppress actual facts, and various other modes of this description, these all tend to show, that circumstances which might have affected that party, as well as any other party, were such as to implicate him, because of something wrong. Having a motive, and nobody else having such a motive, nor there being any other cause of homicide shown-such as making threats, manifesting a disposition to do the act, and various other things- come under the head of what I have stated to be moral coincidences, and facts which coexist with each other. The facts should be, to a moral certainty, exclusive of any other reasonable hypothesis, besides the one proposed to be proved. This is merely an expansion of the last suggestion which I made. They must be such not only as are consistent with the guilt of the party, but must exclude and overthrow every other reasonable hypothesis. They must have a tendency to show that no other individual could, under any reasonable presumption, have done the act which is alleged to be done by the party. They must prove the corpus delicti, or the offense committed-the fact that the crime has been committed. The evidence must prove, not only, in a case of homicide or death by violence, the hypothesis presented, but, to a reasonable extent, it must exclude a reasonable hypo |