against purchasers for a valuable consideration, without notice of the prior conveyance. Vide Buckle v. Mitchell, 18 Ves. 100. And Convey ances with 31. By the fifth section of the stat. 27 Eliz. it is enacted, that if any person shall make any conveyance Power of Reof any lands, with a clause of revocation, at his will vocation. and pleasure, of such conveyance, and after such conveyance, shall bargain, sell, demise, grant, convey, or charge the same lands to any person or persons for money, or other good consideration, the said first conveyance not being revoked, that the said former conveyance, as against such bargainees, vendees, lessees, their heirs, successors, executors, administrators, and assigns, shall be void and of none effect. 32. It was resolved in Twine's case, that if a man 3 Rep. 83 a. has a power of revocation, and afterwards, to the intent to defraud a purchaser, levies a fine, or makes a feoffment, by which he extinguishes his power, and then bargains and sells the land for a valuable consideration, the bargainee shall enjoy it; for as to him, the fine or feoffment by which the condition was extinct, was void by the said act; and so the first clause, by which all fraudulent and covinous conveyances are made void, as to purchasers, extends to the last clause of the act, namely, when he who makes the bargain and sale had power of revocation. And it was said that the stat. 27 Eliz. has made voluntary estates, with power of revocation, as to purchasers, in equal degree with conveyances made by fraud and covin, to Cross v. defraud purchasers. Faustenditch, 33. A man conveyed lands to the use of himself Standen v. for life, remainder to several persons of his blood, with Bullock, 3 Rep. 83 b. a future power of revocation; and before the power began, he, for a valuable consideration, bargained and sold the land to another and his heirs. It was adjudged that this bargain and sale was within the Tarback v. 2 Vern. 511. Jenkins v. Lavender v. Buller v. Waterhouse, 2 Show. 46. remedy of the statute; of which the intent was, that all voluntary conveyances, which were originally subject to a power of revocation, whether present or future, should not stand against a purchaser for a valuable consideration. 34. A power to mortgage an estate to any extent is in effect a power of revocation, and will therefore render a deed void, as to a subsequent purchaser. But if no fraud be found, a proviso to charge with a particular sum is not within the statute. for 35. A power to lease all or any part of the lands, any number of years, with or without any rent, being in effect a power of defeating the whole settlement, has been considered as a power of revocation. 36. Where the power of revocation can only be exercised with the consent of persons who are not under the control of the settlor, the conveyance will not be considered as within the statute. 37. Sir John and Lady Maynard, in consideration of the marriage of their son, and of 5,000l. portion 2 Jones, 94. paid with his wife, covenanted to levy a fine of lands, which were the estate of Lady Maynard, to the use of Sir John for life, remainder to Lady M. for life, remainder to the son and his heirs; with a proviso, that it should be lawful for Sir John and Lady M., with the consent of four persons, to revoke the uses. After the death of Sir J., Lady M. entered and sold some of the lands, without the consent of the trustees. It was resolved that the settlement was not fraudulent, within the stat. 27 Eliz., as it could not be made to deceive a purchaser. The power of revocation not being exercisable at the will and pleasure, such are the words of the act, of the settlor; but was restrained by the necessity of obtaining the consent of four persons, intrusted for the son's wife. Whereas in the case mentioned in 3 Rep. 83 b. the consent seemed to be given by a person at the devotion of the settlor, and appointed by him. vol. 1. 426. 38. Where a deed contains a power of revocation, at the will and pleasure of the settlor, it is immaterial whether the consideration be a valuable, or only a good one; for it is equally void as to a subsequent purchaser. And in an opinion of Mr. Booth's it is said, "The reserving of powers of revocation to the Collect. Jur. grantors or original owners of the land, though checked by requiring the consent of the trustees, hath of late been disused in settlements; because doubts have arisen whether such settlements are not fraudulent within the statute of 27 Eliz." And now powers of revocation, sale, and exchange, are always reserved to the trustees. deemed Pur 39. With respect to the persons who are deemed Who are subsequent purchasers within the stat. 27 Eliz., it was chasers. resolved in Twine's case, that no purchaser should 3 Rep. 83 a. avoid a precedent conveyance, made by fraud and covin, but he who was a purchaser for money, or other valuable consideration. For although in the preamble it is said, for money or other good consideration, and likewise in the body of the act, yet these words are to be intended only of valuable consideration. And this appeared by the clause respecting powers of revocation; for there it is said, for money or other good consideration, paid or given; where the word paid is referred to money, and given to good consideration; which excludes all considerations of nature, or blood, or the like, and were to be intended only of valuable considerations, which might be given. 40. A mortgagee is a purchaser within the stat. 27 Eliz., and may therefore avoid a prior fraudulent conveyance. Chapman ante, $ 27. Cro. Eliz. 41. R. Emery conveyed the premises in question, without any consideration, to the use of himself for life, remainder to his wife for life, remainder to their issue in tail. Three years after, Emery mortgaged the premises for 700l. to a person who had notice of the settlement. In an ejectment, the question was, whether the mortgagee should avoid the settlement as fraudulent, under the stat. 27 Eliz. It was contended, 1o. That the statute only related to purchasers, and that a mortgagee was not a purchaser. 2°. That the mortgagee had notice; and no pretence or circumstance of fraud appeared. The settlement was three years prior to the mortgage, therefore could not have been made with a view to defeat it. Lord Mansfield said, there was no doubt but that a mortgagee was a purchaser. And as to the point of notice, that made no difference; because it was of a conveyance made void by the statute. 42. A lessee at a rack rent is a purchaser within the stat. 27 Eliz.; and in the case of Goodright v. Moses this point was admitted. But in the case of Upton v. Bassett it was held, that where a person made a lease without receiving any fine, or reserving any rent, the lessee was not a purchaser within the stat. 27 Eliz. and therefore could not avoid a preceding voluntary conveyance. 43. Where the price is inadequate in a considerable degree, or where an apparent inadequacy of price is coupled with other circumstances, indicating a fraudulent collusion between the purchaser and the 3 Rep. 83 b. vendor, to avoid a preceding conveyance; a purchaser under such circumstances will not be entitled Cowp. 705. to the protection of the statute. Twine's Case, Doe v. Routledge, Douglas v. Waad, 1 Cha. Ca. 99. 44. The consideration of marriage is sufficient to establish a subsequent conveyance, and to render a previous one fraudulent and void, as against such Seamore. second conveyance. But a settlement upon a wife Martin v. after marriage, or upon children, will not avoid a 1Cha.Ca.170. preceding conveyance, unless it is made in pursuance 1Ab. Eq. 353. of articles entered into before marriage. Cro. Eliz. 445. 45. The statutes 13 & 27 Eliz. only avoid volun- Voluntary tary conveyances, as against creditors and subsequent binding on Conveyance purchasers; and therefore the persons making volun- the Parties. tary or fraudulent and covinous conveyances, and all those claiming under them, are as much bound by such conveyances, as if these statutes had not been made. Nels. 101. 46. A. made a voluntary conveyance to B., and Rand v. afterwards a mortgage of the same lands; the first Cartwright, deed, on a trial at law, was found fraudulent; B. exhibited his bill to redeem the mortgage. It was decreed, that though the deed to B. was fraudulent, quoad the mortgage, yet it was good as to the equity of redemption, and would pass it; for a voluntary deed is good against the party that makes it, and his heirs. 47. In the case of Leach v. Dean the Court de- ante, § 24. clared, that as to the voluntary conveyance, the same was not thereby impeached, as between the father and son, for any advancement, or any other thing thereby settled on the said son; other than making the said articles. 48. A voluntary deed cannot be defeated by a subsequent voluntary deed. And it has been stated, that where there are two voluntary conveyances of the same land, the first will prevail. And good as to subsequent voluntary Deeds. ante, c 2. $49. Clavering, 50. A. made a voluntary settlement of lands in Clavering v. trust for his grandson and his heirs; some years 2 Vern. 473.. after, he made another voluntary settlement of the 1 Ab. Eq 24. same estate, to the use of his eldest son for life, remainder to his first and other sons in tail; and by |