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Att. Gen. v.
Day,

1 Ves. 218.

What is a sufficient Signing.

Wheeler v.

reference to the conditions of sale, to entitle us to look at them for the terms."

10. A bidding for an estate before a Master in Chancery, amounts to an agreement within the statute. Upon the same principle it is held, that the Court of Chancery will carry into execution, against the representatives, a purchase by a bidder before the Master, without the bidder's subscribing, after confirmation of the Master's report that he was the best bidder; the judgement of the Court taking it out of the statute. So if the authority of an agent, who subscribed for a bidder before the Master, cannot be proved, yet if the Master's report can be confirmed, the Court will carry it into execution; unless there be some fraud.

11. It was formerly held, that an agreement must have been sealed as well as signed; otherwise it could only be considered as a párol agreement, and that Newton, Prec. in Cha. the writing was only evidence of it. But this was altered; and signing being the only thing required by the words of the statute, was deemed sufficient.

16.

1 Cha. Ca. 164. 2 Bro. R. 564.

7 Ves. 275.

9- 351. Bawdes v. Amhurst,

402.

12. In the case of Horton v. Gray, 36 Cha. II.; and also in the case of Coleman v. Upcot, which will be stated hereafter; it was held that an agreement, signed by the party to be charged with the same, was sufficient; and that it was not necessary for an agreement to be signed by both parties. This doctrine has been assented to in modern cases.

13. It is said by Lord Cowper, that he knew of no Prec. in Cha. case where an agreement, though all written with the party's own hand, had been held sufficient, unless it had been likewise signed by him; that the party's not signing it was evidence that he did not think it complete; that he had left it to an after consideration, and might make alterations or additions in it: there.

fore, unless it was signed by him, or something equivalent done, to show that he looked upon it as completed, he thought such writing by the party himself was not sufficient to bind him within the statute.

14. Although a purchaser makes alterations in the Hawkins v. Holmes, draft of an intended conveyance, and returns it to 1 P. Wns. the attorney of the vendor; yet this is not a sufficient 770. signing within the statute.

3 Atk. 503.

1 Wils. 118.

15. It was resolved by Lord Hardwicke, that where Welford v. a person subscribed a deed, as a witness, to which Beazeley, she was not a party, but knew the contents of it, which constituted a complete agreement, such signing was sufficient. For the meaning of the statute was to reduce contracts to a certainty, in order to avoid perjury on the one hand, and fraud on the other. Therefore, both in the Court of Chancery, and in the Courts of Common Law, where an agreement has been reduced to such a certainty, and the substance of the statute has been complied with in the material part, the terms have never been insisted on.

16. In a modern case it was held by Lord Eldon, that Coles v. Trecothick, à vendor of an estate was bound by the ssignature of 9 Ves. 234. the agent's clerk, thus, "Witness E. S. for Mr. Smith, agent for the seller," upon evidence of assent. He expressed his approbation of the doctrine laid down by

Lord Hardwicke in Welford v. Beazeley, that where ante, § 15. either the party himself, or a person duly authorized by him, ascertains the agreement, by a signature in the form of addition, that signature of that instrument ascertains the agreement sufficiently within the statute; though not a signing as an agreement, yet sufficient to identify the agreement: the instrument itself containing the terms; and therefore sufficient within the statute. But he expressed a doubt whe- Stokes v. ther the insertion of the name in the body of the

Moore,
1 Cox R. 219.

An Agent may be authorized to

agreement, was a sufficient signature within the

statute.

17. It is observable, that in the 4th section of the statute, it is not required, as in the first section, that sign by Parol. the agent should be authorized by writing. In the

5 Vin. Ab. 524. pl. 45.

9 Ves. 250. 10-311.

A Letter is an
Agreement.
Coleman v.
Upcot,

5 Vin. Ab.
527.

Seagood v.
Meale, Prec.

in Cha. 560.

case of Waller v. Hendon, before Lord Macclesfield, it was held, that an authority to treat or buy, may be good without writing, though by the statute the contract itself' must be in writing. And in a modern case Lord Eldon said" It is clearly settled now, that an agent need not be authorized in writing."

18. It has been held, that a letter will amount to a sufficient agreement within the statute, where it is signed by the party to be charged with the same. But the letter must sufficiently specify all the terms upon which the agreement is made; or refer to some written agreement, in which all the circumstances are specified; and not require any external evidence to explain it for otherwise that which the statute was made to prevent, namely, fraud and perjury, would be let in. It must likewise appear that the other party accepted the terms, and acted in contemplation of them.

19. A bill was brought for a specific execution of an agreement, for the purchase of nine houses. The owner had agreed to sell them to the plaintiff for a certain sum: the plaintiff paid a guinea in part; and sent a note to his solicitor to this effect:-" Mr. L. pray deliver my writings to the bearer; I having agreed to dispose of them." The defendant insisted on the statute of frauds; and the question was, whether this note would take it out of the statute. It was decreed that it would not; for it ought to be such an agreement as specified the terms thereof, which this did not, though signed by the party; for it did

not mention the sum that was paid, nor the number of houses to be disposed of, whether all or some, or how many, nor to whom they were to be sold: neither did the letter mention whether they were to be disposed of by way of sale or by assignment of lease. So all the danger of perjury, which the statute was to provide against, would be let in to ascertain the agreement.

20. The plaintiff had agreed for the purchase of an estate from the defendant, but the agreement was not reduced into writing. However, in confidence, plaintiff had given orders for conveyances to be drawn and engrossed, and went several times to view the estate. Sometime after, the defendant sent a letter to the plaintiff, to inform him, that at the time he contracted for the sale of the estate, the value of the timber was not known to him; and that the plaintiff should not have the estate, unless he would give him a larger price. A bill was brought to carry this agreement into execution; to which the statute of frauds was pleaded.

Lord Hardwicke allowed the plea, and said, that the letter could not be sufficient evidence of the agreement, the terms of it not being therein mentioned.

Clerk v.
1 Atk. 12.
Wright,

21. In a modern case, where the defendant ac- Tawney v. Crowther, knowledged by letter an agreement for the sale of 3 Bro. R. an estate, which had been reduced into writing, 161.318. but not signed; it was held to be a sufficient agreement within the statute of frauds. And Lord Thurlow said-" If the letter contains the terms of the agreement, or if it refers to another letter, which contains the terms, that is sufficient. For I am of opinion, that if a letter refers so clearly to an agreement, as to show what was meant by the parties, where the existence of the paper is

Ford v Compton, 2 Bro. R. 32. 309.

Letters previous to Marriage.

Bird v.
Blosse,
2 Vent. 361.

Skin. 142.

Moorv. Hart, 1 Vern. 110.

Wankford v.

Fotherly,

proved by parol, that will take the case out of the statute."

22. A letter of this kind must have the proper stamps put on it, in order to make it evidence.

23. There have been several cases in which a father or near relation promises by letter to give a portion to his daughter or cousin in marriage; which has been held to amount to a contract within the statute.

24. A. wrote a letter, signifying his assent to the marriage of his daughter with J. S., and that he would give her £1,500. Afterwards, by another letter, upon a farther treaty, he went back from the proposals in his former letter; but some time after, he declared he would agree to what was proposed in his first. letter. This was held a sufficient promise in writing within the statute; the last declaration having set the terms in the first letter up again.

25. On a treaty of marriage, the father of the lady agreed, by letter to a third person, to give a certain portion to his daughter; this was held to be binding, and out of the statute.

26. A., in a letter written by his direction, promised 2 Vern. 322. to give £1,500 portion with his daughter. A. was 2 Freem. 201. afterwards privy to the marriage, and seemed to approve of it. Decreed, that A. should £1,500 as pay his daughter's portion. The decree was affirmed in the House of Lords.

Cookes v.
Mascall,

2 Vern. 200.

Prec. in Cha. 561.

27. The principle of these cases is, that a man who marries a lady upon the encouragement of a letter, shall recover what is promised in such letter; because the agreement is executed on his part, as far as it can be, and can never be undone after. But where a man marries without any knowledge of such a letter, a court of equity will not decree the performance of any promise contained in it.

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