Idem. time of the lease made; because the deed-poll is only the deed of the lessor; whereas the indenture is the deed of both. 57. When an interest actually passes by a lease, there is no estoppel; though the interest purported to be granted be really greater than the lessor, at that time, had power to grant. As if A., lessee for the life of B., makes a lease for years by indenture, and afterwards purchases the reversion in fee, and then Cro. Car. 109. B. dies; A. shall avoid his own lease, though the years expressed in the lease be not expired. Iseham v. 'Morrice, 1 Inst. 45 a. 1 Inst. 352 a. Skipwith v. Green, 1 Stra. 610. Fairtitle v. Gilbert, 2 Term R. 169. Construction 58. If A. seised of 10 acres, and B. of other 10 acres, join in a lease for years, by indenture, these are several leases, according to their several estates, and no estoppel is wrought by the indenture to either party; because each has an estate whereout such lease for years may be derived. For the reason why estoppels were at any time allowed was, because otherwise, when the party had nothing in the lands, the deed must be absolutely void. 59. Every estoppel ought to be reciprocal; that is, to bind both parties. This is the reason that regularly a stranger shall neither take advantage, nor be bound by an estoppel. Privies in blood, as the heir; privies in estate, as the feoffee, lessee, &c.; privies in law, as lord by escheat, tenant by the curtesy, tenants in dower, and others that come in by act of law, or in the post; shall be bound, and take advantage of estoppels. 60. A lessee is not estopped by the description of the lands contained in his lease, for this is not the essence of the deed: he may therefore show that what is there called meadow, has been sometimes ploughed. 61. It was formerly held, that conveyances to uses ances to Uses. should be construed like wills; that is, according to of Convey Cro. Eliz. Brace, Carth. 343. 3 Atk. 734. the intention of the parties, though not expressed in Carter v. the proper, legal, and technical words, required in Ringstead, conveyances deriving their effect from the common 208. law. This doctrine is partly denied by Lord Hard- Leigh v. wicke, who, in a case where the question was, whether, in a covenant to stand seised, the words were to be construed strictly, said-" It is objected that there is no warrant to construe a deed to uses, as to the limitations and words of it, in a greater latitude than a conveyance at common law; and if construed in a different manner, would cause great confusion; which I hold to be true in general. For, the statute joining the estate and the use together, it becomes one entire conveyance, by force of the statute; and the words are to be construed the same way: but this is to be taken with some restriction. As to the words of limitation in a deed, they are, to be sure, to be construed in that manner, viz. in the same sense: but where they are words of regulation or modification of the estate, and not words of limitation, I think there is no harm in giving them greater latitude in deeds on the statute of uses, which are trusts at common law; than in feoffiments, which are strict conveyances at common law." 62. If it should be established that conveyances to uses, which are now become the common assur-ances of the realm, were to be construed in the same manner as wills, even with respect only to the words of regulation, or modification of the estate; such a doctrine would, in some degree, tend to introduce all that latitude and uncertainty which now prevails in the construction of testamentary dispositions. Of this opinion was the late Mr. Booth, the most able conveyancer of the last century; who says, in one of his opinions, "If deeds of uses must be governed by Cases and Opinions, v. 2. 279. Willes Rep. 180. 2 Bro. R. 233. 3 Term R. 765. 8 Term. R. 519. Of Declarations of Trust. the same rules as prevail with respect to wills, then a limitation to a man's male descendants, or male children, may create an estate in tail; and an abso lute inheritance may pass by a limitation to the use of the grantee for ever; which will produce infinite confusion." 63. Mr. Booth's opinion is confirmed by Lord C. J. Willes and his brethren, in the case of Tapner v. Marlott; where he says-" As to what was insisted upon, that a conveyance to uses is to be construed as a will, and in a different manner from other conveyances, we are all clearly of a contrary opinion. For since the statute of uses, an use is turned into a legal estate, to all intents and purposes; it must be conveyed exactly in the same manner, and by the same words and if it were otherwise, as most conveyances are now made by way of use, endless confusion would ensue. 64. Lord Thurlow and assented to this doctrine. laid down as settled, that be construed in the same manner as deeds deriving their effect from common law. Lord Kenyon have fully Therefore it may now be conveyances to uses are to 65. Declarations of trust are construed in the same manner as common law conveyances, where an estate Fearne Cont. is finally limited by a deed, without any kind of re Rem. 218. 4th ed. ference to a further execution of the trust, by a conveyance directed to be made. For in such cases any occasional conveyance that may at any time be required of the legal estate from the trustees, may well be deemed a matter of form only; and not otherwise requisite than for the mere purpose of investing the subsisting trusts, whatever they may be, with their commensurate legal estates. 1 Ves. 103. 66. But a declaration of trust, whose effect is re- Idein. ferred to another conveyance, directed to be made 1 Atk. 608. for its establishment, which was formerly called an executory trust, may reasonably be considered as left to some degree of modification, by that supplemental part of the deed, viz. the conveyance to which the completion of the trusts is referred. And such conveyance may be directed to be made, so as to effectuate the intention of the person creating the trust, with less regard to the strict rules of construction, than in a case of a trust executed. ment. Collect. Jur. vol. 2. 374. 67. Articles of agreement being only considered Of Articles of Agreeas preparatory to something which is to be completed afterwards, the construction of them is different from that of regular conveyances: it being a rule 2 Atk. 545. to look on them merely as the heads of what has been agreed upon between the parties, and only as minutes drawn up by them, to lay before counsel, in order to direct and guide them to carry the intent and scheme of the parties into execution. Therefore the Court of Chancery will mould them in such a manner, as to comprehend what appears to be the manifest intent and design of the parties, without paying a nice attention to the legal sense or operation of the words which may be made use of in framing the articles. 68. This doctrine is particularly applicable to infra, 22. articles of agreement made previous to marriage. Newcastle, And where a covenant to convey property at a Lincoln v. future time is inserted in a marriage settlement, it infra, c. 23. will be construed in the same manner as an article of agreement. ante, c. 2. $63. Date. SECTION 1. AVING stated the general rules and principles established for the construction of deeds, I shall proceed to the exposition of the formal parts of a deed; in the order in which they have been mentioned. 2. With respect to the date of a deed, which is the description of the time when it was made, by inserting the day of the month, the year of the King, and the year of our Lord; it may be placed either at the beginning or the end. In deeds indented, it is now usually placed at the beginning; and in deeds poll, at the end. 1 Inst. 6 a. 3. In former times deeds were not dated, because the limitation of prescription, or time of memory, |