Court upon it, if gentlemen of great character really state it as a fair ground of objection. The objection arises from the mode in which the estate substituted was conveyed to the plaintiff, which was to the use of such person or persons, and for such estate or estates, interest or interests, and with, under, and subject to such powers, provisoes, and agreements, as he should, by deed or writing under his hand and seal, limit, declare, or appoint; and in default thereof, to the use of him, his heirs and assigns. This therefore was vested in him at the time of the substitution and the mode which he takes for that purpose is, not by expressly declaring that in pursuance of the power he appoints, but by this conveyance of lease and release; in which he uses words that cannot at all apply to the power; and as he had both a power and an interest, it is now said, to invalidate the deed, the Court must say he did this in execution of his power only, and not to convey his interest; that it must be referred only to the power, though the trustees are in possession by virtue of the lease, which was perfectly nugatory if he meant only to execute his power. That is going out of the way, to raise objections which the Court is in the habit of very much discouraging. I will not determine whether it would not have been a fatal objection, if it had been an execution of the power, vesting a trust estate, instead of the legal estate under the settlement; unquestionably it would be so at law. I am clearly of opinion, upon every principle upon which the Court acts with regard to the construction of conveyances, that it would be monstrous in this case to hold that where there is a power, and an interest, and the act being equivocal, it is doubtful whether he acted under the one or the other, the Vide 7 Ves. 582. 10 Ves. 257. Court should adopt that which would defeat the instrument. But this case goes farther, for the act is not equivocal; the party has made use of words that have no reference to the execution of a power. I am of 6 East, 289. opinion therefore that this is an exceedingly good title. Roach v. Wadham, Effects of the Execution of a Power. Tit. 11. c. 4. § 7. 73. It is now the usual practice, where a person has a power and an interest, for him to make an appointment in pursuance of his power, and in the same deed, by a new witnessing part, to convey the lands by lease and release.. 74. With respect to the effects attending the execution of a power, it has been stated, that where a power is executed, the former uses and estates cease, 10 Ves. 255. and a new use springs up to the appointee, which is derived from the seisin of the releasees or trustees, to which the statute immediately transfers the possession, and by that means the appointee acquires the legal estate, without entry or claim. 1 Inst. 379. b. n. 1. ap 75. Although estates arising from the execution of 2 Atk. 565. powers owe their commencement to the deed of pointment; yet the appointee under the power does not derive his title from the appointor, or out of the estate whereof the appointor is seised, but comes in directly under the conveyance by which the power was created; and the uses created by the appointment being, in order, prior to the uses limited by the original conveyance, which only take place in the meantime, and until the appointment is made, such new uses precede them ; and the appointment operates by relation from the time when the original conveyance was executed, just as if the estate created by the appointment had been actually limited in such infra, c. 22. original conveyance. 2 Ves. 78. Venables v. 76. An appointment in pursuance of a power operates under the statute of uses, not as a convey ance of the land, but as a substitution of a new use, in the place of a former one: from which it follows, that if an appointment be made under a power to A. and his heirs, to the use of B. and his heirs; it is a limitation of a use upon a use; consequently B. only takes a trust estate. It is therefore now the practice, where an appointment is made to particular uses, to appoint the lands, not to trustees, to the uses intended, as in the case of a release, but to the particular uses intended. 77. Where a person settles his estate to the use of himself for life, remainder over, reserving to himself a power of revocation, and executes his power, he becomes immediately seised of his former estate, without any entry or claim: because, as he is already in possession, he cannot enter on himself; and the revocation is stronger than any claim can be. Inst. 218 b. 1 Rep. 174 a. 78. It was resolved in Digges's case, that other uses Idem. might be limited or raised in the same conveyance by which the former uses were revoked; for inasmuch as the ancient uses cease, ipso facto, by the revocation, without claim or other act; the law will adjudge priority of operation of one and the same deed, although it be sealed and delivered at one and the same instant: therefore, in construction of law, it Fitzwilliam's Case, shall first be a revocation and cesser of the ancient 6 Rep. 33. uses; then a limitation and raising of the new ones: for the best construction of the statute of uses was, to make them subject to the rules of the common law : according to which, if two acts were done by one and the same means, and took place in one and the same instant, the law would so construe them, that that act should be taken to precede, which would give efficacy to the entire instrument. Will not de 79. The execution of a power will not however feat a prior defeat an estate, previously created by the Estate. Goodright v. executes it. person who 80. An estate was limited, in consideration of marriage, to A. for life, &c., and a power was given to A., with the consent of the trustees, to revoke all the uses. A. conveyed away his life estate, for securing an annuity, to a person for 99 years, if he should so long live; and afterwards, with the consent of the trustees, he revoked all the uses of the settlement. It was resolved that this revocation did not affect the estate granted, for securing the annuity. WE have seen that the courts of law construed Equity will defective powers strictly, and required that in the exe- support a cution of them every circumstance prescribed should Execution. be complied with; but the courts of equity have assumed a jurisdiction in matters of this kind, and have supplied a defective execution of a power in several cases. 1o. Where there has been a consideration; as for securing a jointure to a wife, or a sum of money to a husband; or making a provision for younger children, or for payment of debts; and no better on the other side. 2°. Where there is any fraud; or the party is guilty of any deceit or falsehood, by which the execution is prevented; for the person in remainder shall not take advantage of his own wrong. 3°. Where a complete execution is pre |