time, any more or greater estate or estates than for 21 years, or for three lives, or for any number of years determinable upon three lives; made severat leases for 99 years, to commence from the death of a remaining life in a former lease. And upon an issue directed out of Chancery to try the validity of these leases, the Court of King's Bench was of opinion, that they were good under the power. 29. But where, in a settlement of an estate in reversion, a power is expressly given to make leases in possession; a lease in reversion will not be supported. Thomasins, 30. A father and son made a lease for 99 years, if Opey v. three persons or any of them should so long live. T. Raym. Afterwards they settled the reversion to the use of the 132. father for life, with a power to make leases for 99 years, or three lives in possession, or for two lives in possession and one in reversion, or for one life in possession and two in reversion. The father, during the continuance of the first lease, made a lease for life; and the question was, whether the latter lease, being made while the lives in the former lease were in being, was authorized by the power. Justice Keeling inclined, that the lease was within the power; for the settlement being only of the reversion, a present lease of the reversion was within it. Windham and Twisden held, that the settlement being of a reversion, if the words of the power had been general, to make leases, a lease in reversion had been within it; but the power being expressly to make leases in possession, this lease in reversion was not within it. Does not Lease to 31. A power to make leases generally, does not authorize a authorize the donee to make a lease to commence after the determination of a lease in being. For it commence after a subsisting Lease. Shecomb v. Bucks v. Doe v. Cavan, 5 Term R. 567. has been observed, that such a lease is reversionary in the strictest sense. 32. A woman, tenant in fee simple, levied a fine to the use of herself for life, remainder to her eldest son in tail; reserving to herself a power to make leases at any time for 21 years or three lives. She afterwards leased a part of the premises to A. for 21 years, and before that lease expired, made another to A. for 21 years, to begin after the determination of the former lease, and died. The first lease expired, and then a question arose, whether the latter lease was good under the power. It was adjudged, that it was not, for upon such power she could not make a lease to commence at a day to come, but was confined to a lease in possession, and could not convey an interest to commence in futuro in reversion, after another estate expired; but the law would adjudge upon a general power to make leases, without saying more, that they ought to be leases in possession; for if upon such power a lease might be made upon a lease, the donee might, by making infinite leases, detain those in remainder out of posssesion for ever, which would be contrary to the intent of the parties, and against reason. 33. It is immaterial whether a lease made to commence upon the determination of a lease in being, be made to the person who holds under the former lease, or to a stranger; it is equally reversionary. 34. Lord Bath being tenant for life, with power to grant leases for any number of years, not exceeding 40 years, in possession and not in reversion, demised the premises in question to B. Timbrell for 60 years, which term became afterwards vested in Colonel Lambert. On the 30th of April, General Pulteney, who was then seised of the premises for life under the same settle ment, made a lease to Colonel Lambert for 34 years, 2 East, 376. 35. George Allan being tenant for life, with a Doe v. Calvert, power to make leases in possession, and not in remainder or reversion or expectancy; by indenture of lease, bearing date and executed the 29th March 1798, demised the lands in question to Calvert, to hold the same in manner following, viz. the tillage ground from the 13th February then last past, the pasture ground from the 5th April then next, and the residue from the 12th of May also then next, for the term of 12 years, from the said respective days. The periods mentioned in the habendum of the lease were the usual periods of entry by tenants on arable, pasture, and meadow ground, in the country where the lands lay. Calvert, the lessee, on the day of the date of the lease, held the premises as tenant from year to year, and which tenancy, according to the custom of the country, would determine on the 13th February, the 5th of April, and 12th of May in the year 1798.-It was contended, that this was a lease in reversion, and not in possession, except as to the tillage ground; and the lease being entire, if void for part, must be void for the whole. The Court was of But concurrent Leases are good. Berry v. Read v. Nash, this opinion, and observed, that the cases cited where leases had been holden void for excess only, did not apply, for this was no question of excess: in those cases, by retrenching the excess, a lease might be brought within the terms of the power; but no limitation of the term would make a lease in reversion, a lease in possession. 36. Where a person has a general power to make leases, he may make a concurrent lease, to commence immediately; although the lands are then held under an existing lease, made either by a former proprietor, or by the person making such lease. 37. It was adjudged by the Court of Common Pleas, about 17 Cha. II., that if a man had a power to make a lease for years, where there was another lease in being, there, if he made a lease to commence in præsenti, the power was well executed; and the second lease should continue as long as it might, taking effect in possession after the determination of the first lease. 38. A person devised lands to his son for life, with 1 Leon. 147. a proviso, that if he made any alienation, &c. otherwise than a lease for 21 years, he should forfeit his estate. The son made a lease for 21 years, and a year before the expiration of that lease, he made another lease for 21 years, to begin immediately. The question was, whether the last lease was authorized by the power. It was said, that although the tenant for life could not, under the power, make leases in reversion, for then he might charge the inheritance in infinitum, yet such a lease as this was good, for it was to begin presently, so that the inheritance could not be charged in the whole for more than 21 years. And the Court seems to have been of that opinion; but no judgement appears to have been given. ΙΟ Funucan, 39. A person was tenant for life, with power to Goodtitle v. demise the lands to any person or persons in posses- Doug. 565. sion, but not by way of reversion, or future interest, for the term of 21 years absolute, or any lesser absolute term, or for any term or number of years determinable upon one, two, or three lives. The lands were let for a year, and then the tenant for life, by indenture, reciting his power, demised them for 99 years if the lessee should so long live; and directions were given to the tenant for a year to pay his rent to the lessee, which he accordingly did. It was contended, that this was a lease in reversion, and therefore void under the power. But Lord Mansfield said, it was good as a concurrent lease, upon the authority of the case of Read v. Nash. lease in Re 40. With respect to leases in reversion, it has been Of Powers to already stated, that a power to make leases in rever- version. sion, when applied to chattel interests, only extends to leases to commence from the determination of leases in being and does not enable the donee of such a power to make leases to commence generally 39. at any future period. And Lord Holt says, the ex- 1 Com. Rep. pression to lease in reversion has a different signification, in the same conveyance, when applied to leases for lives in reversion, from that which it bears when applied to leases for years. For as a lease for lives cannot, strictly speaking, be made to commence in futuro, it will in that case be intended of a con- ante, c. 4. current lease, or a lease of the reversion; that is, of $21. the land which is then in lease, to commence in possession after the determination of the then existing lease; though it commences in interest presently, and is concurrent with the existing lease. And that if a power enabled any one to make leases in reversion, as well as in possession, he could not make a |