courts of law, in the cases which have arisen on that statute, apply equally to leases made in pursuance of powers. 9. Lands which have been demised three times Vaugh. 33. are considered as lands usually let. So lands which have been demised twice: but lands which have been only once let, do not fall within the description of lands usually let; for, usus fit ex iteratis actibus. 10. Lands not demised for the space of 21 years previous to the making of a lease under a power, are not considered as lands usually let. 11. A person was tenant for life, with power to Tristram v. Baltinglass, make leases of all or any of the lands in an indenture Vaugh. 31. of settlement particularly mentioned, which at any time theretofore had been usually letten or demised, for and during the term of 21 years; reserving the rents then usually paid, or more. The tenant for life made a lease of part of the premises contained in the settlement, which had been once let for 100l. a year for 21 years, but the term of 21 years had been long expired, and the premises had not been letten after. The question was, whether these lands came within the description of lands at any time theretofore usually demised. Lord Ch. Just. Vaughan said, the words usually demised, might be taken in two senses; the one for the often farming, or repeated acts of leasing lands, to which sense this case did reasonably extend; the other for the common continuance of lands in lease, for that was actually demised, and so lands leased for 500 years long since were lands usually demised, that was, in lease, though they had not been more than once demised; and the former construction agreed both with the words and intention of the settlement. But what was not farmed at the time of this proviso's being made, Right v. 3 Burr. 1441. A Qualification de structive of a Power, dis pensed with. Carth. 429. Cumberford's Case, 2 Roll Ab. 262. nor for 20 years before, could not be said to be at 12. A covenant to stand seised is considered as evidence of the usual manner of demising; and the objection, that the covenant to stand seised in question was by way of provision for a younger child, was deemed to be of no weight; for that was every day's practice. 13. Where there appears an intention that the tenant for life shall have a power to lease all the lands, and a proviso is inserted that the ancient rents shall be reserved; this shall not confine the power to those lands which have been usually let, but it will be construed to extend to all the lands; and the restriction only applied to those lands which have been usually let. And Lord Holt has said, that where a qualification is annexed to a power of leasing, which, if observed, goes in destruction of the power, the law will dispense with it. 14. A conveyance was made of divers manors, rents, and services, to the use of A. B. for life, with power to make leases of the same, or of any part or parcel thereof, so that such rent or inore was reserved on every lease, as was reserved and paid for the same within two years then next before. Some part of the premises consisted in woods, that had not been before leased at any rent, within the two preceding years. It was determined that the tenant for life might make leases of that part, reserving such rent as he pleased; because it appeared from the generality of the words, that it was intended he should have power to lease all the lands; and the restrictive clause was meant to apply only to such lands as had been demised for two years before. 15. An estate which consisted of lands and a Walker v. Wakeman, rectory, was conveyed to the use of a person for life, 1 Vent. 294. with power to let the premises, or any part of them, 2 Lev. 150. so as a rent of five shillings was reserved for every acre of land. The tenant for life demised the rectory, which consisted of tithes only, reserving a rent; and the question was, whether the power warranted such a lease. It was argued that it did not, for a construction was to be made upon the whole clause, and the latter words, that required a reservation of rent, should explain the former, and restrain the general word premises to land only, or things out of which a rent might issue, which it could not out of tithes. But it was resolved by the Court, on the authority of Cumberford's case, that the lease of the rectory was good for the power was general, and enabling; and the last clause being affirmative, though restrictive, would not restrain the generality of the former ones: therefore the power must be construed to be, to demise the premises that consisted of acres at 5s. an acre; but of what were not acres, no rent need be : reserved and it was said by Lord Hale, that if the 3 Keb. 597. power had been to let the manor and rectory, ex pressly reserving 5s. per acre, the lease had been good of the rectory, without any rent. Winter v. 1 Ld. Raym, Goodtitle v. 16. A manor and other hereditaments were settled; with a power to the tenant for life to make leases, excepting the ancient demesne lands, and so as the ancient rent was reserved. It was determined that this power did not enable the tenant for life to demise the copyhold lands held of the manor; because they were part of the demesnes: but that the rents and services of the manor might be demised; notwithstanding that one qualification annexed to the exercise of the power was, that the ancient rent should be reserved; and no rent could be reserved on a lease of rents and services: for it appeared that part of the manor was intended to be comprised within the power, but as the demesne lands were not comprised, the rents and services must; for the whole manor consisted of demesnes, rents, and services : and if a man had a power reserved to him of making leases of two things, and a qualification was annexed to the power which could not extend to one of these things, he might make a lease of that thing, without any regard to the qualification. 17. A tenant for life, with power to demise all the Doug. 565. manors &c. and hereditaments, or any part thereof, reserving so much or as great yearly rents, or more, as was then paid; made a lease of a manor and fishery, which had never been let, together with other premises, reserving a greater rent than had formerly been reserved. It was contended that the manor and fishery were not demisable under the power, as no rent was then paid for them: to which it was answered, that the qualification in the power, with regard to the reservation of rent then paid, could only apply to such parts of the subject of the power as were then let; but the power itself expressly extended to the manors and fishery; and it must have been known at the time of the settlement, that neither the manors nor fishery were then let; for where a general authority is given by a power to let manors, lands, &c., and afterwards there is a qualification that the usual rent shall be reserved, such affirmative qualification shall not restrain the generality of the power, but shall only apply to the part which was formerly demised. It was also objected, that as the rent was entire, and could not be apportioned, it was not clear that the ancient rent was reserved for that part of the premises which had formerly been let: in answer to which it was said to be sufficient that the advance on the whole was 307., and that the fishery was only worth 157. a year; and the manor was not of any pecuniary value. Lord Mansfield said, the power was express, to demise the manors and fisheries; they were particularly mentioned in the settlement, and the power went to the whole. They paid under this lease as great a yearly rent as at the time of the settlement, for they paid nothing then; the words therefore were complied with, and this objection could only stand upon intent ; but the Court thought no such intent appeared. The manors were nominal, of no value, no object of yearly income, the fishery worth only 15l. a year: they were convenient to the lessee living on the land, and of no use to the remainder-man : the right of fishing and shooting was reserved to him. For his part, he thought the intent was to give leave to demise all, reserving as much rent in the whole, as had been paid before; and in fact 30%. more had been reserved. The Court was of opinion that the lease was good. 18. A power may however be taken to be special, and not allowed to extend to all the property comprised in the deed wherein the power is given, if it |