tion been, how far an existing establishment should be continued, the argument would have been different. But the question now is, as to the propriety of reviving a dormant and extinguished claim. To replace men in authority of which they have once been deprived, is always dangerous. The return of office is accompanied with feelings of resentment. The blood-thirsty man is he who returns from banishment to power, said the Roman proverb. The justice of this remark is too fully illustrated by late events in the revolutions in France, and in other parts of Europe. And the human feelings are every where the same.

It is dangerous to transplant a leading principle of one system of government into another differently constituted, because the principle, in the system to which it originally belonged, may have been counterbalanced by various checks, which are not to be found in the other. A Potail might have no motive of disaffection toward a Hindoo government. He was bound towards it by a variety of ties; by the influence of religion and caste, by habit, and by many affinities. But all these principles of action are not only wanting in regard to an European government, but they are even counteracted by various opposing sentiments. We are foreigners, heretics, aliens in point of language, habits, and customs.

Under the country governments, the duties of the police were confined to a very few objects, such as watching the baggage of a traveller at night, going in search of stolen goods, or in the pursuit of thieves. But with us they are employed in a variety of departments; they have the charge of the jails, and the custody of all prisoners; they are the common organ of all verbal orders from the magistrates; they protect the persons and courts of the judges, and they are in fact the civil guards of the state. Their number, power, and influence, are therefore very extensive, and pervade all the judicial and revenue establishments. A corps of this sort, in the occasional absence of the military, may command or dispose of the inhabitants and revenues of a whole province.

The danger to an arbitrary government, (and such, to a certain degree, every Asiatic and foreign government must be) is not always from the hostile sentiments of its principal subjects, or noblesse; but from the great body of the people, the yeomanry, and cultivators, feeling their strength, being sensible of their rights, and possessing the means of union and combination. The French Government stood secure amidst the cabals of a race of princes, and the factions of a thousand families of noblesse, whilst surrounded by a drooping servile peasantry. But the moment that the condition of the mass of the people

was improved, and they had become sensible of their rights, and were possessed of the means of union and combination, the monarchy fell before the natural strength of numbers. In India, we have triumphed over all the princes of the country. Our future contests, therefore, (if such we are destined to have) must be not with the few, but with the many. The equity of our laws has a natural tendency to introduce an equality of rights amongst the people. It is hardly possible to prevent the operation of this principle to a certain degree.

The right that we have given to the natives in the soil, and the right of purchasing and transferring property in land, are calculated to produce a spirit of independence. It is an unquestionable truth, that empire follows the balance of property; and, wherever this balance is in favour of the people, it will be accompanied with all the natural influence of wealth. If the general property of a whole province is in the hands of a numerous class of men, (whether you call these Zemindars, or by whatever other name,) they will also possess a proportioned degree of influence and command over the attachments and services of the inhabitants.

If a spirit of liberty is to distinguish (and may it long continue to do so) our government in India, its tendency ought at least to be counteracted by the natural balances and checks. It is

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in vain to suppose that we can confer on the natives the liberty of Europeans, and yet command their obedience, through the feeble institutions of their Hindoo princes, institutions only known to us by the ruin which they have brought upon all the states which have employed them. The government should be regarded as the fountain of honour, and as the source and spring from whence the right to office is derived. The number of places, which any prince has to bestow, has always been found to constitute one of the first springs of his government, and to be, in fact, the best safeguard of his throne. In the old French Government, during the reign of Louis the Sixteenth, a variety of offices depending on the crown, were cancelled and done away with as forming a useless establishment. Their use was not perhaps very great. But this abolition was, in fact, (as it was afterwards discovered,) destroying the very props and pillars of the throne. The office of Potail is said to carry a degree of influence superior to what was possessed by many of the native princes. The Potails are therefore a sort of tribune, on whose influence over the people, under particular circumstances, it may be difficult to calculate.

It was once a favourite opinion, that nothing was to be apprehended from the combination of the natives. Nothing is certainly to be apprehended under a regular system of policy, and in

the common occurrences of life. But how was it during the period of the disturbance at Vellore? Every inhabitant, every man at the plough, was affected with the same sentiments as the Sepoys. The impression was general. Will it be said, that, under similar circumstances, a native police and municipal officers, possessing the influence ascribed to Potails, and being uninterested in the existence of government, are not dangerous instruments in the hands of the disaffected!

It is not meant to insinuate that the recurrence of such an insurrection is a very probable event. It has however recurred, and to a very considerable degree, and within the short period of seven years, in a similar disturbance at Travancore. Independent of human design, or particular intrigues, disaffection and tumults arise occasionally in every state.

It is the nature of all influence to extend its limits. The influence of Potails may be insignificant at the first creation of their authority, but, the habits of command will imperceptibly give it strength. At present it is little," but nothing "should be regarded as unimportant which "touches the springs of government."

END OF THE SECOND PART.