1 of Dale, and in truth he hath nothing in that manor, and after he purchases the manor, yet he shall hold it discharged," and this applied equally to a release. And as the conveyances in use at the present day-which take effect by virtue of the statute of Uses, and which as distinguished from feoffments, fines, and common recoveries were called "innocent conveyances," viz., deeds of bargain and sale, lease and release, etc.-pass no more than the actual estate of the party, they have of course no greater effect by way of estoppel than the common law grant or release. $ 245. Where, however, it has distinctly appeared in such conveyance, either by a recital, an admission, a covenant, or otherwise, that the parties actually intended to convey and receive, reciprocally, a certain estate, they have obviously been held to be personally estopped from denying the operation of the deed according to this intent. § 246. There was then an ordinary and an extraordinary effect attached to an estoppel. The one was personal in its character, like the rebutter in a warranty, and estopped the grantor and his heirs from doing or alleging anything contrary to the tenor and effect of his sealed instrument. This effect, however, was purely personal as against him or them; the remedy being sometimes enforced in a court of law and for the avoiding of circuity of action by reason of breach of covenant, and more frequently in equity, by further assuring to the grantee the estate which had thus been intended to be conveyed. But it never operated to pass an estate by direct operation of law. The other-the extraordinary-effect possessed the high function of actually transferring every estate, present or future, vested or contingent, to the feoffee, conusee, or lessee, according as the mode of assurance employed was a feoffment, a recovery, a fine, or a lease, and this effect was peculiar to them alone, there being no authority in any of the English books to show that it was produced by any other species of convey ance. 1 Perkins, tit. Grant, § 65. 247. This sketch of some of the principal features of the doctrine of estoppel by deed has thus been made as introductory to an important class of cases which, on this side of the Atlantic, has given to some of the modern covenants for title, and especially to the covenant of warranty, the function just referred to, which is properly attributable only to the effect of an estoppel in its highest sense. The history of the law on this side of the Atlantic is this. It was decided in two early cases in New York that where one by deed of bargain and sale, or lease and release, conveyed land to which he had no title, he was estopped by his deed from claiming any after-acquired estate in it.1 It does not appear in the report of the cases whether the deeds did or did not contain covenants for title; but the decisions were rested on the authority of familiar cases decided upon fines and leases. But this doctrine, which was unsupported by early authority, was soon after abandoned, and it was held by the same court, reversing the cases referred to, that where one conveyed land to which he had no title, by deed of bargain and sale containing no covenants for title, nor intention on the face of the deed that the grantee expected to become invested with a certain estate, a subsequently acquired title would not inure to the benefit of the grantee, even as against the grantor and his heirs. This decision has been almost consistently followed, and a large class of cases both in New York and throughout the United States has established the conclusion that as a general rule, and apart from the doctrine of estoppel caused by recital, in order that an after-acquired estate should pass by estoppel, it is necessary that the deed should contain covenants of some sort or kind. And while it is true that an intention-shown by recital, averment, or otherwise, that a certain definite estate was intended to be conveyed-will generally be allowed the same effect as though it were a covenant, yet it is considered that the presence of a covenant is perhaps the strongest evidence that 'Jackson v. Bull, 1 Johns. Cas. 81; Jackson v. Murray, 12 Johns. 201. such was the intention and the contract of the parties. But a mere release, or a deed of quit-claim, will not have the effect of estoppel. § 248. Where, however, the deed does contain such recital or averment, and more especially where it contains certain of the covenants for title, it has been held by large class of cases that as a general rule any after-acquired estate will inure, by virtue of the covenants, to the party claiming under the conveyance and his heirs and assigns by direct operation of law, with the same effect to all intents and purposes as if such estate had originally passed by the deed. And in many States, the doctrine has been made the subject of statutory enactment, and the legislation is to a great extent both recent and on the increase. D. REGISTRATION. WILLIAMS, REAL PROP., 242. In order to make a complete and unavoidable conveyance of lands situate in Middlesex or Yorkshire (including the town and county of Kingston-upon-Hull), a memorial of the deed of conveyance must be duly registered in the county register. The registration of deeds affecting lands in these counties was rendered necessary by statutes of the reigns of Anne and George II. These acts provided that all deeds should be adjudged fraudulent and void against any subsequent purchaser or mortgagee for valuable consideration, unless a memorial of such deeds were duly registered before the registering of the memorial of the deed under which such subsequent purchaser or mortgagee should claim. The Courts of Equity, however, held that a purchaser or mortgagee of land in a register county, who had had clear previous notice of a prior unregistered assurance affecting the same land, and yet registered his own deed before the other, should not be permitted to gain any priority over the persons claiming under the previous assurance with regard to the equitable estate in the land; but should hold the legal estate which he acquired by priority of registration, as a trustee for such other persons. And this doctrine of equity still prevails with respect to land in Middlesex. N. Y. 2 R. S., 756, § 1. Every conveyance of real estate, within this State, hereafter made, shall be recorded in the office of the clerk of the county where such real estate shall be situated; and every such conveyance not so recorded shall be void as against any subsequent purchaser, in good faith and for a valuable consideration, of the same real estate, or any portion thereof, whose conveyance shall be first duly recorded. MASS. PUB. STAT., c. 120, sec. 4. A conveyance of an estate, in fee simple, fee tail, or for life, or a lease for more than seven years from the making thereof, shall not be valid as against any person other than the grantor or lessor and his heirs and devisees and persons having actual notice of it, unless it is recorded in the registry of deeds for the county or district in which the real estate to which it relates is situated. 103 MASS. REP., 492. The formalities which shall be deemed indispensable to the valid conveyance of land are prescribed and regulated by statute. A deed duly signed, sealed and delivered is sufficient, as between the original parties to it, to transfer the whole title of the grantor to the grantee, though the instrument of conveyance may not have been acknowledged or recorded. The title passes by the deed, and not by the registration. No seisin remains in the grantor, and he has literally nothing in the premises which he can claim for himself, transmit to his heir at law, or convey to another person. But when the effect of the deed upon the rights of third persons, such as creditors or bona fide purchasers, is to be considered, the law requires something more, namely, either actual notice, or the further formality of registration, which is constructive notice. It may not be very logical to say that, after a man has literally parted with all his right and estate in a lot of land, there still remains in his hands an attachable and transferable interest in it, of exactly the same extent and value as if he had made no conveyance whatever. But, for the protection of bona fide creditors and purchasers, the rule has been established that although an unrecorded deed is binding upon the grantor, his heirs and devisees, and also upon all persons having actual notice of it, it is not valid and effectual as |