Affirmed. Mr. Justice PITNEY, with whom concurred Mr. Justice BRANDEIS and Mr. Justice CLARKE, dissenting. "If a transaction of this sort is to be deemed, The latter also completely defines what conusurious, the same principle must apply with stitutes the taking of usury by a national equal force to bank discounts, generally, for the bank, referring to the state law only to depractice is believed to be universal; and proba- termine the maximum permitted rate. bly few, if any, charters contain an express provision authorizing, in terms, the deduction of the interest in advance upon making loans or discounts. It has always been supposed that an authority to discount, or make discounts, did, from the very force of the terms, necessarily include an authority to take the interest in advance. And this is not only the settled opinion among professional and commercial men, but stands approved by the soundest principles of legal construction. Indeed, we do not know in what other sense the word 'discount' is to be interpreted. Even in England, where no statute authorizes bankers to make discounts, it has been solemnly adjudged, that the taking of interest in advance by bankers, upon loans, in the ordinary course of business, is not usuri 115 I agree that in this case but one federal question is properly presented for our consideration, and that is whether the National Bank of Savannah took usury, *in violation of sections 5197 and 5198, Rev. Stat. U. S. when, in discounting short-term notes in the ordinary course of business at its banking house in the state of Georgia, it knowingly reserved in advance a discount at the rate of 8 per centum per annum, computed upon the face of such notes, when by the laws of Georgia this was not allowed to be done by state banks of issue. I agree that this question is to be determined by the provisions of section 5197; but, local rate of interest, we must determine it so far as it depends upon ascertaining the according to the law of the state of Georgia, because the cited sections make that law the criterion. It is settled that although the consequences of acceptance of usurious interest by a national bank and the penalties to be "The taking of interest in advance, upon the discount of a note in the usual course of business by a banker, is not usury. This has long been settled, and is not now open for contro-enforced are to be determined by the proviversy." Tyler on Usury (1872) p. 155. 114 "That it is not usury to discount commercial paper in the ordinary course of business is absolutely settled. This rule of law arose out of custom and does not depend upon statute." Webb on Usury (1898) § 111. Associations organized under the National Bank Act are plainly empowered to discount promissory notes in the ordinary course of business. To discount, ex vi termini, implies reservation of interest in advance; and, under the ancient and commonly accepted doctrine, when dealing with short-time paper such a reservation at the highest interest rate allowed by law is not usurious. Recognizing prevailing practice in business and the above stated doctrine concerning usury, we think Congress intended to endow national banks with the power, which banks generally exercise, of discounting notes reserving charges at the highest rate permitted for interest. To carry out this purpose, the National Bank Act provides that associations organized under it may reserve on any discount interest at the rate allowed by the state, and only when there is reservation at a rate greater than the one specified does the transaction become usurious. The maximum interest rate allowed by the Georgia statute is 8 per centum. That marks the limit which a national bank there located may charge upon discounts; but its right to retain so much arises from federal law. sions of the National Banking Act, the ascertainment of the rate of interest allowable is to be according to the state law. Farmers', etc., National Bank v. Dearing, 91 U. S. 29, 32, 23 L. Ed. 196; Union National Bank v. Louisville, &c. Railway, 163 U. S. 325, 331. 16 Sup. Ct. 1039, 41 L. Ed. 177; Haseltine v. Central Bank of Springfield, 183 U. s. 132, 134, 22 Sup. Ct. 50, 46 L. Ed. 118. The language of section 5197 is explicit. It allows a national bank to"take, receive, reserve, and charge on any loaa or discount made, or upon any note, bill of exchange, or other evidences of debt, interest at the rate allowed by the laws of the state. * * where the bank is located, and no more, except that where by the laws of any state a different rate is limited for banks of issue organized under state laws, the rate so limited shall be allowed for associations organized or existing in is fixed by the laws of the state, any such state under this title. When no rate ** * the bank may take, receive, reserve, or charge a rate not exceeding seven per centum, and such interest may be taken in advance, reckoning the days for which the note, bill, or other evidence of debt has to run. 116 *I regard it as clear that by "the laws of the state" is meant not merely acts of legislation, much less a particular act or section, or a particular phrase in a single section. In order to determine the point in controversy we must take all applicable provisions of the statutes as interpreted and construed by the (40 Sup.Ct.) decisions of the court of last resort, and from their combined effect determine what is "interest at the rate allowed by the laws of the state." respect for the views of my Brethren, I am constrained to dissent from the opinion and judgment of the court because convinced that there is error in holding without qualification that since the decision of the Forrester Case 8 per cent. is the rate of interest allowed and limited for state banks of issue by the laws of the state of Georgia. It seems to me erroneous to regard that decision as merely defining usury and thus settling what lawfully may be done by state banks in respect of taking interest in advance, and to ignore its effect, in combination with the quoted sec The pertinent statute law of the state of Georgia is found in sections 3426, 3427, and 3436 of the Code. The first of these defines "what is lawful interest," and prescribes 7 per centum per annum as the legal rate where no rate is named in the contract, and permits a higher rate to be specified in writing, "but in no event to exceed 8 per cent. per annum." Section 3427 defines usury as: "Reserving and taking, or contracting to re-tions of the Code, as constituting the law of serve and take, either directly or by indirection, a greater sum for the use of money than the lawful interest." And section 3436 declares: the State which fixes the maximum rate of interest for such banks and therefore, under section 5197, Rev. Stat. U. S., establishes the limit for national banks located in that state. Plainly, I think, the purpose of Con 118 "It shall not be lawful for any person, company, or corporation to reserve, charge, or take for any loan or advance of money, or forbear-gress was *to place national banks upon a ance to enforce the collection of any sum of precise equality in this respect with banks of money, any rate of interest greater than eight issue organized under state laws, and that per centum per annum, either directly or in- where the local law places a higher or a directly by way of commission for advances, dis- lower limit upon such banks of issue than upcount, exchange, or by any contract or contri- on other lenders of money the same limit vance or device whatever." should be imposed upon the national banks. The section has regard to substance, not merely to form; and in determining what I agree that, under the decisions of this court and the general current of authority, the discounting of short-term notes with a reservation of interest in advance at the highest rate allowed by statute is permissible, in the absence of special restriction. Fleckner v. U. S. Bank, 8 Wheat. 338, 349, 354, 5 L. Ed. 631. And I understand it to have been permitted in Georgia prior to the recent decision by the Supreme Court of that state in Loganville 117 Banking Co. v. Forrester, 143 *Ga. 302, 84 S. E. 961, L. R. A. 1915D, 1195. See Mackenzie v. Flannery, 90 Ga. 590, 599, 16 S. E. 710; Union Savings Bank v. Dottenheim, 107 Ga. 606, 614, 34 S. E. 217; McCall v. Herring, 116 Ga. 235, 243, 42 S. E. 468. The Forrester Case was decided April 13, 1915. The claim involved in the present suit includes a series of transactions, the first of which was on November 2, 1914, the last on October 18, 1915. A majority of these were prior to the decision in the Forrester Case, and as to them I agree that there was no violation of the federal statute. is in substance the local rate of interest it is fallacious, I submit, to regard the multiplier only (say, 8 per cent.), and ignore the multiplicand, since both factors have equal influence in producing the result. As in other cases of testing state laws by a federal standard, the question is: What is the effect and operation of those laws, as construed and applied by the state court of last resort? The difference between the effect of computing discount taken in advance according to the custom of bankers, by applying the allowed percentage to the face of the note, termed "bank discount," and the effect of deducting an amount equivalent to exact interest on the sum actually loaned, termed "true discount," is very substantial, and is recognized in the standard interest and discount tables, which contain computations on both bases. To illustrate by a comparison: If interest at the rate of 8 per centum per annum be reserved in advance and computed upon the face of a three months note, it amounts to 2.0408 per cent. for the period, or With respect to the others, I have reached at the rate of 8.1632 per centum per annum a different conclusion. The case was decided upon the money loaned; upon a six months on a demurrer to plaintiff's petition, in which note it amounts to 4.1667 per cent. for the it was alleged that defendant (now respond-period, or at the rate of 8.3333 per centum ent) knowingly received and charged interest per annum; upon a nine months note, to in excess of the highest contractual rate 6.383 per cent. for the period, or at the rate allowed under the laws of the state, specifying the particular dates and amounts. This necessarily imports a knowledge at the time of each transaction as to what then constituted the law of the state, supposing such knowledge need be averred. of 8.511 per centum per annum; upon a one year note it amounts to 8.695 per cent. The legal problem is precisely analogous to that involved in comparing respective burdens of taxation imposed upon different prop 119 As to these later transactions, with great erties or classes of property; *concerning which this court has more than once held that, greater than was allowed by Rev. Stat. U. S. a law requiring that one class shall be taxed § 5197, and it was forfeited." at the "same rate of taxation" paid by another requires that not only the percentage of the rate but the basis of the valuation shall be the same. Cummings v. National Bank, 101 U. S. 153, 158, 162-163, 25 L. Ed. 903; Greene v. Louisville & Interurban R. R. Co., 244 U. S. 499, 515, 37 Sup. Ct. 673, 61 L. Ed. 1280, Ann. Cas. 1917E, 88. For these reasons I am convinced that the respondent national bank, in knowingly discounting notes and reserving interest at the rate of 8 per centum per annum upon the face of the notes, in violation of the limitation imposed by the quoted sections of the Georgia Code as construed by the Supreme Court of that state in the Forrester Case, charged more than "interest at the rate allowed by the laws of the state," and that therefore the judgment in its favor ought to be reversed. Mr. Justice BRANDEIS and Mr. Justice CLARKE concur in this dissent. The laws of Georgia do not prohibit the taking of interest in advance by a state bank; and they permit it to be charged according to the usual course of banking, with this qualification, that if reserved in advance at the highest percentage, or at any percentage that has the effect of yielding to the lender more than at the rate of 8 per centum per annum upon the amount actually loaned, it is usurious. This qualification, which since the decision of the Forrester Case must be deemed to be the law of Georgia, has precisely the same effect as if it had been inserted by way of an amending proviso to sec. 3426 of the (Argued Oct. 13, 1919. Decided Dec. 8, 1919.) Code. That it happens to arise from the construction and application of that section together with sections 3427 and 3436 by the 1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 281—HEARING ON state court of last resort can make no difference for present purposes. The case before us comes squarely within the principle of Citizens' National Bank v. Donnell, 195 U. S. 369, 373-374, 25 Sup. Ct. 49, 49 L. Ed. 238. There the question was whether a national bank in Missouri had taken usury, contrary to sections 5197 and 5198, Rev. Stat. U. S., in taking interest computed at a percentage less than the highest rate allowed by the state law, if agreed upon in writing, but at the same time violating a state prohibition against compounding interest oftener than once a year. This court held that the prohibition against frequent compounding affected the "rate of interest" within the meaning of those words in section 5198, and that this section was violated because the local prohibition was violated. I quote from the opinion (195 U. S. 374, 25 Sup. Ct. 50, 49 L. Ed. 238): *120 "The rate of interest which a man receives is greater when he is allowed to compound than when he is not, the other elements in the case being the same. Even if the compounded interest is less than might be charged directly without compounding, a statute may forbid enlarging the rate in that way, whatever may be the rules of the common law. The Supreme Court of Missouri holds that that is what the Missouri statute has done. On that point, and on the question whether what was done amounted to compounding within the meaning of the Missouri statute, we follow the state court. Union National Bank v. Louisville, New Albany & Chicago Ry., 163 U. S. 325, 331 [16 Sup. Ct. 1039, 41 L. Ed. 177]. Therefore, since the interest charged and received by the plaintiff was compounded more than once a year it was at a rate (251 U. S. 57) BRAGG v. WEAVER et al. No. 22. NECESSITY AND EXPEDIENCY OF CONDEMNA- 2. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 281-HEAKING ON It is essential to due process in the sense of the Fourteenth Amendment to the federal Constitution that the mode of determining the compensation for private property taken for public use be such as to afford the owner an opportunity to be heard, among several permissible modes being that of causing the amount to be assessed by viewers subject to appeal to a court carrying with it a right to have the matter determined on full trial; in such case due process not requiring that hearing be afforded before the viewers, but being satisfied by the hearing obtainable on appeal. TERMINING COMPENSATION FOR EARTH TAKEN By Code Va. 1904, § 944a, cls. 21, 22, the compensation to an owner of land adjoining a public road for earth taken for use in repairing the road is to be assessed primarily by viewers, whose award is to be examined by the supervisors of the county and approved or changed as to the latter may appear reasonable, while from the decision of the supervisors an appeal lies as of right to the circuit court, where the matter may be heard de novo. For other cases see same topic and KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests and Indexes 4. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (40 Sup. Ct.) 281-PROVISIONS | direction of public officers and is for a public AS TO TAKING OF EARTH FOR ROAD NOT A use; also that adequate provision is made DENIAL OF DUE PROCESS. In view of Code Va. 1904, § 838, regulating the time and mode of taking appeals from decisions of county supervisors, section 944a, cls. 5, 21, 22, providing the mode of compensation for earth taken from land for use in repairing an adjacent public road, held not violative of the due process clause of Const. U. S. Amend. 14, as making no provision for hearing of the owner on the compensation to be paid; the proceedings, even when initiated by road officers, not being terminable without any notice to the owner. for the payment of such compensation as may be awarded. Hence no discussion of these matters is required. The objection urged against the statute is that it makes no provision for affording the owner an opportunity to be heard respecting the necessity or expediency of the taking or the compensation to be paid. [1] Where the intended use is public, the necessity and expediency of the taking may be determined by such agency and in such mode as the state may designate. They are legislative questions, no matter who may be 5. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 280 EMINENT charged with their decision, and a hearing *59 thereon is not essential to due process in the sense of the Fourteenth Amendment. Boom Co. v. Patterson, 98 U'. S. 403, 406, 25 L. Ed. 206; *Backus v. Fort Street Union Depot Co., 169 U. S. 557, 568, 18 Sup. Ct. 445, 42 L. Ed. 853; Adirondack Ry. Co. v. New York, 176 U. S. 335, 349, 20 Sup. Ct. 460, 44 L. Ed. 492; Sears v. City of Akron, 246 U. S. 242, 251, 38 Sup. Ct. 245, 62 L. Ed. 688. [2] But it is essential to due process that the mode of determining the compensation be such as to afford the owner an opportunity to be heard. Among several admissible modes is that of causing the amount to be assessed by viewers, subject to an appeal to a court carrying with it a right to have the matter determined upon a full trial. United States v. Jones, 109 U. S. 513, 519, 3 Sup. Ct. 346, 27 L. Ed. 1015; Backus v. Fort Street Union Depot Co., supra, 169 U. S. p. 569, 18 Sup. Ct. 445, 42 L. Ed. 853. And where this mode is adopted due process does not require that a hearing before the viewers be afforded, but is satisfied by the full hearing that may be obtained by exercising the right to appeal. Lent v. Tillson, 140 U. S. 316, 326, *Mr. Justice VAN DEVANTER delivered et seq. 11 Sup. Ct. 825, 35 L. Ed. 419; Withe opinion of the Court. By this suit the owner of land adjoining a public road in Virginia seeks an injunction against the taking of earth from his land to be used in repairing the road. The taking is from the most convenient and nearest place, where it will be attended by the least expense, and has the express sanction of a statute of the state (Pollard's Code, 1904, § 944a, clauses 21 and 22.) Whether the statute denies to the owner the due process of law guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment is the federal question in the case. It was duly presented in the state court and, while no opinion was delivered, the record makes it plain that by the judgment rendered the court resolved the question in favor of the validity of the statute. It is conceded that the taking is under the 1 Other enactments of March 12, 1912, c. 151; March 21, 1914, c. 174, and March 17, 1916, c. 279, make the statute specially applicable here, but they require no particular attention. nona & St. Peter Land Co. v. Minnesota, 159 U. S. 526, 537, 16 Sup. Ct. 83, 40 L. Ed. 247; Wells Fargo & Co. v. Nevada, 248 U. S. 165, 168, 39 Sup. Ct. 62, 63 L. Ed. 190. And see Capital Traction Co. v. Hof, 174 U. S. 1, 1830, 45, 19 Sup. Ct. 580, 43 L. Ed. 873. [3, 4] With these principles in mind we turn to the statute in question. By clause 21 it authorizes certain officers engaged in repairing public roads to take earth for that purpose from adjacent lands, and by clause 22 it declares: "If the owner or tenant of any such land shall think himself injured thereby, and the superintendent of roads, or his deputy, can agree with such owner as to the amount of damage, they shall report the same to the board of supervisors, or, if they cannot agree, a justice, upon application to him, shall issue a warrant to three freeholders, requiring them to view the said land, and ascertain what is a just compensation to such owner or tenant for the damage to him by reason of anything done under the preceding section. The said free For other cases see same topic and KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests and Indexes 60 provisions of section three of this act,2 *shall accordingly ascertain such compensation and report the same to the board of supervisors. Said board may allow the full amount so agreed upon, or reported by said freeholders, or much thereof as upon investigation they may deem reasonable, subject to such owner or tenant's right of appeal to the circuit court as in other cases." SO holders, after being sworn according to the fout his having an opportunity to take an appeal. We think the contention is not tenable. It takes into account some of the statutory provisions and rejects others equally important. It is true there is no express provision for notice at the inception or during the early stages of the proceedings; and for present purposes it may be assumed that such a requirement is not even implied, although a different view might be admissible. See Paulsen v. Portland, 149 U. S. 30, 13 Sup. Ct. 750, 37 L. Ed. 637. But the provisions relating to the later stage-the decision by the supervisors-are not silent in respect of notice, but speak in terms easily understood. Clauses 5 and 22 taken together provide that the owner, if dissatisfied with the decision, shall have the right to appeal as in other This presupposes that he will have some knowledge of the decision, and yet neither clause states how the knowledge is to be obtained, or when or how the right of appeal is to be exercised. All this is explained, however, when section 838 is examined. It deals with these questions in a comprehensive way and evidently is intended to be of general application. Of course, newly created rights of appeal of the same class fall within its operation unless the Legislature provides otherwise. Here the Legislature has not provided otherwise, and so has indicated that it is content to have the general The same statute, in clause 5, deals with the compensation to be paid for lands taken for roadways, and in that connection provides that the proprietor or tenant, if dissatisfied with the amount allowed by the supervisors, "may of right appeal to the circuit court of said county, and the said court shall hear the matter de novo" and determine and certify the amount to be paid. And a general statute (section 838), which regulates the time and mode of taking appeals from decisions of the supervisors disallowing claims in whole or in part, provides that the claimant, if present when the decision is made, may appeal to the circuit court within thirty days thereafter, and, if not present, shall be notified in writing by the clerk and may appeal within thirty days after service of the notice. Apart from what is implied by the decision under review, no construction of these statutory provisions by the state court of last resort has been brought to our attention; so for the purposes of this case we must construe them. The task is not difficult. The words employed are direct and free from ambiguity, and the several provisions are in entire harmony. They show that, in the absence of an agreement, the compensation is to be assessed primarily by viewers, that their award is to be examined by the supervisors and approved or changed as to the latter may appear reasonable, and that from the decision of the supervisors an appeal lies as of right to the circuit court where the matter may be heard de novo. Thus, by exercising the right to appeal the owner may obtain a full hearing in a court of justiceone concededly possessing and exercising a general jurisdiction. An opportunity to have such a *hearing, before the compensation is finally determined, and when the right there to can be effectively asserted and protected, satisfies the demand of due process. 61 Under the statute the proceedings looking to an assessment may be initiated by the owner as well as by the road officers. Either may apply to a justice for the appointment of viewers. Thus the owner is free to act promptly and upon his own motion, if he chooses. But it is contended that where the road officers take the initiative as they do in many instances the proceedings may be carried from inception to conclusion without any notice to the owner, and therefore withThat they will faithfully and impar tially discharge their duty as viewers." cases. 62 statute applied. As before stated, that *statute provides that the claimant, if not present when the supervisors' decision is made, shall be notified thereof in writing and shall have thirty days after such notice within which to appeal. If he be present when the decision is made, he is regarded as receiving notice at that time, and the thirty days for taking an appeal begins to run at once. apparent therefore that special care is taken to afford him ample opportunity to appeal and thereby to obtain a full hearing in the circuit court. It is [5] The claim is made that this opportunity comes after the taking, and therefore is too late. But it is settled by the decisions of this court that where adequate provision is made for the certain payment of the compensation without unreasonable delay the taking does not contravene due process of law in the sense of the Fourteenth Amendment merely because it precedes the ascertainment of what compensation is just. Sweet v. Rechel, 159 U. S. 380, 402, 407, 16 Sup. Ct. 43, 40 L. Ed. 188; Backus v. Fort Street Union Depot Co., 169 U. S. 557, 568, 18 Sup. Ct. 445, 42 L. Ed. 853; Williams v. Parker, 188 U. S. 491, 23 Sup. Ct. 440, 47 L. Ed. 559; Crozier v. Krupp, 224 U. S. 290, 306, 32 Sup. Ct. 488, 56 L. Ed. 771. And see Branson v. Gee, 25 Or. 462, 36 Pac. 527, 24 L. R. A. 355. As before indicated, it is not questioned that such adequate provision for payment is made in this instance. |