ments with the same degree of respect as in this country. Moreover, the very fact that these papers and opinions are often placed in the same category with judicial decisions as authoritative sources of international law can scarcely fail to give rise to serious misconceptions on the part of the public as to the true nature of that body of law. In short, if international law is ever to assume its place as a true branch of law, it can only be brought about by divorcing it from public policy and by putting it upon a strictly juristic basis. The second outstanding characteristic of Professor Hyde's work is his successful application of the rule of reason to state papers and judicial decisions. Seldom has the analytical method of investigation been employed to better advantage. In undertaking this analysis, the author has not been actuated by any a priori conceptions of eighteenth century naturalistic philosophy. He has realized that the future development of international law must be based upon a clear recognition of the more or less conflicting economic and political interests of the several states in war as in peace. In short, he has been a realist, always striving to keep his principles in close relation to the practical needs of international intercourse, justice and morality. It has been "his constant endeavor to emphasize the unreasonableness of any rule, which, however widely accepted, and although acquiesced in by American statesmen, has appeared through its operation to violate the requirements of international justice." Nor has he hesitated "to suggest the nature of the modifications which those requirements seemed to demand." Throughout these discussions he has not been content with mere obiter dicta or vague generalizations as to the commonly accepted. rule of law, but has sought to get at the true rationale of the views of the government and the decisions of the courts. He handles his subject with the sureness and certainty of one having authority and not as a mere text-book scribe or an official apologist for governmental action.

In dealing with the various controversies arising out of the war, particularly during the neutrality of the United States, Professor Hyde has attempted to strike a just balance between the rights of the belligerent and neutral nations, though in some cases his conclusions seem to be unduly favorable to the belligerent pretensions of the Allies, particularly on such matters as reprisals and the requisition of ships and foodstuffs. Fortunately, he has not been a narrowminded stickler for ancient precedents. He has observed the war as a whole, not as a neutral only; and in view of the supreme interest of the world at large in the triumph of the Allied cause, he has not seen fit to insist upon a technical observance of all former usages and practices of maritime war, provided that no substantial injury was inflicted upon neutral shipping and trade. He has realized, moreover, that the war was as much an economic as a naval and military struggle, and that, as a consequence, the validity of the acts of the allied nations could not be determined by legal precedents only, but must also be regarded in the light of existing economic facts and the adoption of commercial methods of warfare.

Of particular value in this connection is the author's discussion of the legal status of armed and unarmed merchantmen, in which he severely criticizes the uncertain policy of our State Department. There can be no national or practical distinction, he contends, between the offensive and defensive arming of merchantmen. An armed vessel is a potential warship and, by reason of its arming, should forfeit its immunity from attack at sight. It is rather unlikely, however, that belligerent nations will forego the right of arming private ships, in view of the growing tendency to extend the scope of warlike operations to vessels of all kinds.

Among other notable contributions which Professor Hyde has made to a revision of the law and practice of nations are his proposals in respect to visit and search and as to the legal liability of neutral governments for the unneutral acts of their citizens. In the author's judgment, the old method of visit and search at sea is no longer applicable to modern conditions of trade and warfare, while the more recent practice of bringing neutral vessels into belligerent ports for purposes of examination has inflicted an unjust burden upon neutral commerce. In place thereof, he would set up a system of neutral certificates as to the innocent character of ships and cargoes. The suggestion has much to commend it, but if we may judge from past experience, there is little reason to believe that the British navy will consent to forego one of its most important belligerent rights, or that neutral governments will voluntarily agree to assume the responsibility of passing upon the character of all shipments made from their shores, particularly in the case of goods from neighboring neutral and belligerent states. Under the suggested rule, a neutral nation would be called upon to supervise not only its own trade, but the commerce of all other nations which might pass through its ports. It is doubtful indeed if the relief which would be vouchsafed to neutral ships and cargoes at sea would be commensurate with the additional burden which would be imposed upon neutral governments and trade at home. The same difficulty would be experienced in carrying out the further suggestion for neutrality certificates as to the innocent character of passengers on board neutral vessels. It is safe to predict that if an international convention for the regulation of neutral commerce be adopted, it will be on the basis of the establishment of an international commission somewhat similar in character and operation to the allied maritime transport council during the war. A similar criticism may be directed against the author's proposed extension of the doctrine of neutrality to cover the action of private individuals. According to this proposal, a neutral government would be under the obligation of preventing its citizens from rendering any form of military or financial assistance to belligerent nations on penalty of a violation of its neutrality. In his anxiety to safeguard neutrals against the abuse of belligerent rights, Mr. Hyde has been tempted at times to extend the constitutional powers of the government at the expense of the individual freedom of its citizens.

In view of the existing uncertainty of some of the rules of international law, it would be surprising indeed if the author's views should find acceptance on all matters in controversy. On several minor questions of law the reviewer finds himself unconvinced by the author's reasoning. It is very difficult, for example, to follow the argument against the legality of title by conquest in case of the succession of states (Section 106 pp. 175-177). The distinction between conquest and subjugation is by no means clear. In any case the introduction of the idea of temporary occupation into the argument serves only to confuse the question at issue. The proposition laid down in Section 112 p. 186, in respect to the joint protection of territory pending session, seems likewise open to question. The theory that a contingent grantee is entitled to interfere with the right of the grantor and innocent outside parties to make other disposition of the property or territory in question is, it is submitted, unsound both in principle and law, howsoever much it may be operative in fact in the relation of stronger to weaker states. It is likewise difficult in principle to lay down a different rule of law for the diversion of waters on navigable and non-navigable rivers in view of the growing need on the part of lower riparian states for common access to international waterways for power and irrigation purposes as well as navigation. The author is undoubtedly justified in his criticism of the present confused state of the law on the question of the immunity of public ships, but it is doubtful whether the test of immunity which he suggests, namely, "the dedication of the vessel to the public service," would prove much more effective in operation than the older rule of ownership or exclusive possession. In actual practice it will probably be found that the courts will continue to look to the ship's flag and the official commission of its officers as the simplest and most conclusive evidence of its public character, whether engaged in commerce or otherwise. But the question, as the author points out (Sections 256-57 pp. 444-445), is obviously one "demanding general international agreement to establish a reasonable substitute for the broad yielding of jurisdiction by the territorial sovereign."

The position of the author on the question of dual allegiance seems likewise open to criticism (Sections 373-75 pp. 654-58). It will be readily conceded that our government cannot legally make a distinction between the status of native-born and naturalized citizens either at home or abroad, but it does not follow that our naturalization laws can be given an international effect in the country of origin or can be transformed into a general rule of international law in the face of the conflicting principles of English and Continental law. That such is the case was frankly admitted by President McKinley in his message to Congress of 1899. To support his contention, Mr. Hyde has appealed to "an analogous principle" in the field of Conflict of Laws, whereby "the civil status or artificial condition attached to a man may be dissolved by a state other than that which conferred or imposed it," as in the case of the emancipation of a slave who has established a new domicile in a free state. "The

reasonableness of this assertion of sovereign power, moreover, is recognized when the individual resumes his home in the state ta which he formerly belonged. His former status is deemed to have been destroyed, and the imposition or conferring of a new and similar one is believed to require affirmative action." But the illustration, unfortunately, serves to weaken rather than to strengthen the author's argument. In the case of the slave Grace (Broom "Constitutional Law" p. 101), Lord Stowell distinctly laid down that the status of a slave would still attach to an emancipated slave who voluntarily returned from England to one of the West India Islands where slavery was legal; in other words, the slave did not become wholly free by residence in England. Our Supreme Court likewise held on several occasions that the slave-holding state could alone decide on the status of slaves whether bond or free upon their return from a free state to the state of their original domicile. The same principle, it is submitted, is equally applicable to the case of so-called dual allegiance. The naturalization of an alien does not work a complete emancipation or change of allegiance in international law. The question of nationality, as the author points out, is essentially one of municipal law; and the naturalization acts of the United States can no more supersede the laws of allegiance of foreign states within their territory than their laws of nationality can override our municipal law within this jurisdiction.

In his discussion of the capture of enemy prizes, the author adopts the ancient view that, as between the belligerents, capture is essentially confiscatory and suffices "to transfer title." This view is undoubtedly upheld in the majority of decisions, but to the reviewer, the newer and competing theory that capture confers a possessory right only and that adjudication is necessary to transfer title seems sounder in principle and better adapted to the complexities of modern business organization in which neutral and belligerent interests are closely intermingled. A slight objection may also be raised to the generality of the language in respect to the effect of the ownership of land upon enemy character. The produce of the enemy's soil, the author declares (Section 791 p. 562), is liable to condemnation, irrespective of the domicile or of the guilt or innocence of the owner. But in the case of Benzon v. Boyle (9 Cranch 191) Chief Justice Marshall limited the application of this rule by inserting the clause "when the owner remains unchanged." Thanks to this restriction, it is still possible for a neutral to purchase supplies from a belligerent without exposing his goods to ruthless condemnation merely because they originate in a belligerent country.

In his excellent analysis of the Civil War cases, the author sometimes seems much less concerned about their peculiar legal significance at the time than as to their historical significance in the light of the recent World War. He would fain reduce some of these decisions to comparatively innocuousness, or at least destroy their value as precedents for many of the arbitrary acts of the Allies during the war. Mr. Hyde is doubtless right in holding that

"these decisions involve a question with respect to contraband or to enemy ownership or to unneutral service rather than an application of the doctrine of continuous voyage to a simple breach of blockade." But unfortunately our courts did not always succeed in keeping the legal principles applicable to contraband and blockade clear and distinct from one another, with the result that it is often difficult to determine what was the true basis of their decisions. In a few cases, it must be admitted, they did mistakenly apply the doctrine of continuous voyage to blockade. To that extent, at least, the Allies were justified in appealing to these decisions, howsoever confused and mistaken, as furnishing an admirable defense for their further extension of belligerent rights at the expense of neutral

commerce.

Another striking characteristic of this work is the attention Mr. Hyde devotes to the intimate interrelation of constitutional and international law. He conceives of international law as dealing not only with the mutual relations of states, but as concerned with the constitutional organization of states for the conduct of foreign affairs and also with private rights, so far as these relate to, or are affected by, treaty or international principles. But in setting forth the close constitutional relation of international and municipal law in our federal system, particularly in respect to the effect of the treaty-making power upon the powers of Congress and the state legislatures, the author has been careful to distinguish between the different obligations of the two bodies of law. He has not fallen into the mistake (so much in evidence during the recent Senate debates on the covenant of the League) of confusing "constitutional requirements as to the mode of performance with constitutional limitations as to power of contract" (Section 503, pp. 23-24).

The political sections of this book will perhaps prove most interesting to the general reader. The author has many keen observations to make on such questions as the Monroe Doctrine, the changing policy of this country in respect to the recognition of new governments, the recent developments of open diplomacy, through non-governmental channels, as revealed in the Fiume incident and Lord Gray's communications to the London Times and the attitude of the United States toward the League of Nations. We can refer to one or two topics only.

In his attitude toward the League Mr. Hyde is critical, but essentially fair-minded. It is not difficult to read between the lines, however, that he is somewhat suspicious of the organization and workings of the League as too distinctly political in character and would have preferred the establishment of an international association of a more strictly judicial nature. Naturally, he is greatly interested in the recent creation of a permanent court of international justice, but is dissatisfied with its present limited membership and restricted jurisdiction, and would gladly transform it into a true world tribunal "representative of all civilization" and endowed with obligatory jurisdiction in specifically enumerated cases.