shall show the name and address of the mover, the name of the person for whom the moving was done, the name of the person who was the owner or ostensible owner of the said household goods or personal property moved, the address from which in the said City of Chicago and to which in the City of Chicago, or outside of the City of Chicago, as the case may be, such moving was done and the name and address of the common carrier to whom such household or personal property was delivered, with the date of such removal, or delivery and the character of the articles moved."

Section 6 provided for a fine not exceeding Two Hundred ($200) Dollars for any violation of the ordinance.

The appellee proved that from 80 to 90 per cent of the moving is done within the City of Chicago, about 9 per cent from Chicago to places outside of the city, in the State of Illinois, and about 1 per cent to places outside the state.

It was contended by the appellee that the ordinance is not valid because the state legislature did not confer power upon the city to enact it, because it is unjust, unreasonable, and oppressive, and because it conflicts with the state and federal constitutions. The brief of the appellee does not point out any provisions of the state or federal constitution with which the ordinance conflicts, except that the provision which declares that Congress shall have power to regulate commerce among the several states.

The appellant contends that clauses 42 and 66 of section 1, of Article 5, of the Cities and Villages Act give the city authority to pass the ordinance. These clauses are as follows:

"Forty-second-To license, tax, and regulate hackmen, draymen, omnibus drivers, carters, cabmen, porters, expressmen, and all others pursuing like occupations and to prescribe their compensation."

"Sixty-sixth-To regulate the police of the city or village and pass and enforce all necessary police ordinance."

The Supreme Court held:

1. That this ordinance does not violate the commerce clause of the federal constitution, since an ordinance adopted in the exercise of the police power, for the protection of the community, may extend, incidentally, to a carrier and is not opposed to federal legislation. This is merely the application of settled principle.

2. That under clauses 42 and 66 of Section 1, of Article 5, of the Cities and Villages Act, supra, the city has a right to regulate persons, engaged in moving or hauling for hire. But the purpose of clause 42, supra, is to give the City Council power to fix the compensation and to regulate the business of moving so as to prevent extortion and wrong to persons compelled to employ carriers of the classes mentioned to move their property from one place in the city to another. But the information required by the ordinance would not help the city to accomplish this purpose, and therefore the ordinance requiring such information is unreasonable when tested by the power conferred by clause 42, supra. Neither is the ordinance valid under clause 66, supra, as an exercise of the police power for the suppression of crime, or the discovery of contagious diseases,

even if it may be incidentally of some value for such purposes; because the ordinance is not limited to these purposes, but compels the person whose property is to be moved to give information in regard to the nature of the property to the mover, and the mover to keep a record of the character of the goods, the places from which and to which the goods are moved, and the names of the parties, and provides that such information shall be filed with the city bureau of statistics, and shall be accessible upon the payment of a nominal fee to any person inquiring about a removal, without reference to the motive of the inquiry. This provision which authorizes the sale of the information, as aforesaid, has no reference to the suppression of crime or the discovery of contagious disease, but merely permits giving the information for any purpose, public or private, to any person willing to pay for it, without regard to motive. The ordinance, therefore, without reference to any constitutional question, is void because it is an unreasonable and inquisitorial interference with the liberty of individuals.

The conclusion of the court is unquestionably correct in principle, as the ordinance is undoubtedly an unreasonable interference with the liberty of persons to move from place to place, and to have their property moved. The doctrine of the case of Wagner v. City of St. Louis 224 S. W. 413, is not a reasonable exercise of the police power, and our Supreme Court very properly disagrees with it. This ordinance was not only unreasonable, but it was oppressive and inconsistent with public policy; it also contravened common right. C. M. ALSAGER.

PROPERTY-ESTATES-CONTINGENT

REMAINDER-DESTRUCTIBILITY BY MERGER-TRANSFERABILITY OF REVERSIONS.-The case of Fisher v. Eaton 299 Ill. 293, 132 N. E. 442, should be commended for the lucidity of its exposition of an interesting and by no means, simple problem in contingent remainders. The problem was X, testator, to A for life, remainder to the heirs of her body, if any, and in the event that A has no heirs of her body at the time of her death, to B. The following clause in the will was a residuary devise and bequest to A and B, who were the children of X. In that situation, A conveyed to Fisher, appellee in the case, and Fisher brought a bill for partition upon the theory that the deed to her, merged the life estate and one-half the ultimate reversion to the destruction of the intervening contingent remainder interests. In this position the court sustained Fisher.

The limitation to the heirs of the body of A, being that of an estate tail and A having at the time of the execution of the deed relied upon as a merger, had no children born to her, this remainder was contingent by operation of the statute (Lewin v. Bell 285 Ill. 229; ILLINOIS LAW REVIEW XVI 123, 124). That, of course, saves the need of going into any such question as whether "heirs of her body" was intended to be confined to those in being at the death of A. The limitation to heirs of body being contingent, the limitation upon that must, of necessity, be contingent whether or not the

term "heirs of body" would have been without the first limitation. (Golladay v. Knock 235 Ill. 412; Hill v. Hill 264 Ill. 220, 222, 223; ILLINOIS LAW REVIEW XV 580.)

The case is valuable, also upon the point apparently passed upon here for the first time in this state, that an ultimate reversion is transmissible by a residuary clause in the will by virtue of which the ultimate reversion arises. E. M. L.

PRACTICE ACT-WHEN A FREEHOLD IS INVOLVED.-Upon the question whether a freehold is involved, within the meaning of the Illinois Practice Act, in applying the rule that the effect of the decision must be to deprive one or other of the parties of a freehold, the cases seem to require that to be the effect in the strictest literal sense. Thus, if the deprivation of a freehold is incidental, merely, and can be avoided by some other act (Becker v. Fink 273 Ill. 563; ILLINOIS LAW REVIEW VIII 177 et seq.; XIV 223) a freehold is not involved. Again the cases indicate that the tribunal from whose action the review is sought, must have had jurisdiction to deprive one of a freehold not only in the broad sense of the court's jurisdiction as a court, but also in the narrower sense of the court's jurisdiction under the issues in the particular case: Corwine v. Wiggington 290 Ill. 321 (a forcible detainer action does not involve a freehold); Town of Pleasant Hill v. Stark 277 Ill. 304 (a proceeding merely to ascertain the damages to be paid owners in laying out a highway where there was as yet no final determination to lay it out); and see also ILLINOIS LAW REVIEW XIV 224. The recent case of Road District v. McKinney 299 Ill. 130, ... N. E. therefore, is but cumulative of the law as it already exists upon that question, for there no freehold was involved in a proceeding to recover a fine for obstructing a public highway, even though it was contended by defendant that the place was not a public highway. E. M. L.

PRACTICE-CHANGE OF VENUE.-The case of People v. Rosenbaum 299 Ill. 93, 132 N. E. 433, recalls the distinction in criminal cases where a change of venue is asked, between those cases where the change is asked on account of prejudice of inhabitants of the county, and those where the ground is prejudice of the court In the former situation the right to a change is discretionary with the court (People v. Donaldson 255 Ill. 22; People v. Pfanschmidt 262 Ill. 440; People v. Murphy 276 Ill 319), whereas in the latter, the right is absolute on compliance with the statute, just as it is in civil cases (Feigen v. Shaeffer 256 Ill. 494). E. M. L.

CONCILIATION TRIBUNALS.-In Klein v. Hutton N. W. —, the Supreme Court of North Dakota has recently held that the Conciliation Act (Laws 1921, c. 38) is constitutional. The decision. validates one of the most progressive measures of procedural reform enacted in this country.

BOOKS AND PERIODICALS

INTERNATIONAL LAW, CHIEFLY AS INTERPRETED AND APPLIED BY THE UNITED STATES. By Charles Cheney Hyde, Professor of Law in Northwestern University. Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1922. Two volumes. Pp. lix + 832; xxvii + 925.

lix+832;

American scholars have produced a number of meritorious works on international law, but the war has revealed the need for an authoritative exposition and revaluation of its underlying principles and variable practices in the light of present-day conditions. That need has now been supplied. In these two volumes Professor Hyde has proven himself to be a master craftsman, one truly "learned in the law." He has given us not only a most scholarly exposition of the generally accepted principles of his subject, but what is even more important, has also attempted a material reconstruction of some of its most controverted tenets. He has contributed in no small measure towards restoring to the jurists of the school their former pre-eminent position as expositors and makers of the law. It is safe to prophesy that this work will rank as the most important American contribution to the principles of international law since the days of Wheaton and will take its place among the small group of standard classics of all nations.

The first and most distinctive feature of this study is its national point of view. The title of the book is the key to its interpretation. The work, in the words of the author, is an attempt "primarily to portray what the United States, through the agencies of its executive, legislative, and judicial departments, has deemed to be the law of nations." In this respect these two volumes stand out in striking contrast to the recent scholarly work of Fauchille, in which the comparative method of approach has been most successfully employed. The author frankly admits that there can be, in legal contemplation, "no international law as distinct from that which necessarily prevails throughout the society of civilized states," but he is convinced that the views of the Department of State, the Congress and courts of the United States, not only "give expression to an authentic American understanding of what the principles of international law really are," but also constitute "the only scientific basis for the formulation of principles, in reliance upon which the United States, whether at the Hague or elsewhere, may participate intelligently and worthily in the common effort to render the law of nations closely responsive to the just and changing demands of civilization."

There are, undoubtedly, certain marked advantages in the national over the comparative method of treatment. This method at times may seem somewhat parochial, but it enables the author to deal with various topics with a care and thoroughness such as would not be possible in a work of broader international scope. An even greater advantage may be seen in the opportunity it affords of link

ing up the general substantive body of international law with the municipal laws and institutions of this country, by and through which the nation's international rights and obligations are recognized and fulfilled. There is the greater reason for emphasizing the administrative phase of the subject, since, in most of our texts it has been largely overlooked, if not neglected. In this case Professor Hyde has been most successful in supplying the omission.

The national character of the treatment is still further emphasized by the author's extensive use of the diplomatic correspondence, the opinons of the attorneys-general and the various publications of the war and navy departments. No other writer save Professor Moore has drawn to the same extent upon such strictly nonjudicial sources of information. Thanks to this extension of the field of investigation, we are afforded not only an exposition of the official American interpretation of the rules of international law, but are also favored with many valuable sidelights on various phases of our diplomatic history and public policy. So far has this tendency been carried that many sections of the book would seem to fall within the field of political science rather than that of international law.

That there is a close and intimate connection between the special interests or public policy of a state and its interpretation of the principles of international law will scarcely be denied by even the staunchest internationalist. There has grown up in course of time a distinct body of Anglo-American international principles which materially differ in some respects from the law of continental countries. The decisions of the British prize courts have always been. greatly influenced by the policy of the Admiralty and foreign offices and our own federal courts have not hesitated to deviate from English precedents when the national interests have seemed to demand it, as during the Civil War. To this extent at least it may truly be said that there is an American interpretation of international law. It may well be that the only hope for developing a systematic body of international law throughout the world is through a proper understanding of the peculiar national tenets and practices. of the several states.

Yet with all these admissions, the doubt still keeps cropping up as to whether this is the proper mode of approaching the study of international law. The author's method of treatment, it must be confessed, lends countenance to the oft-repeated witticism that international law is neither international nor law, but a strange compound of international morality and national self-interest masquerading in the guise of law. In emphasizing the strictly American aspects of his subject, Professor Hyde has unfittingly obscured at times not only the ideal universal character of international law, but also the fundamental distinction between politics and international law. The opinions of the attorneys-general and other administrative officials of this country are undoubtedly deserving of the high tribute which Professor Hyde has paid to them, but it can scarcely be expected that these will be regarded by foreign govern