This association was composed of a numerous and widely scattered class of colored people, the individuals were unacquainted with each other in the main, but had a common legal status relative to certain rights and claims of interest in the property of these Indian tribes. The association, so called, does not appear to have had any corporate, or other legal status. The twelve individuals who signed the contract, evidently entered into the same in their own interest and in the interest of those persons similarly situated. And when the contract was reduced to writing and executed by these individuals it seems entirely clear and free from doubt, considering only the language used, that they particularly intended to individually and personally guarantee the payment of the amount agreed upon to the attorneys employed. A careful study of the language used we think makes this conclusion manifest. It is carnestly urged, that it would be unreasonable to think that they intended to bind themselves to pay a sum equal to $1.00 per capita of the Freedmen enrolled. But this argument has no application, if they did by this writing bind themselves. But if it had application, we are not so sure that it would be either unreasonable or absurd to suppose they intended it. Nor would we be compelled to ascribe to them motives of pure benevolence or philanthropy. In assuming the relations they did, a rare field of speculation and possibility of exploitation was opened up to these leaders. In their guarantee of $1.00 per capita, they had excuse, and perhaps could justly have collected a much more substantial sum from the many interested but less active parties. (2) The point is urged that the court abused its discretion in refusing to permit an amendment near the close of the trial. The request and refusal appears in the record as follows: "At this stage of the prceedings, the counsel for the defendant moved the court to permit them to amend their pleadings so as to show proper and necessary allegations of fraud, of all of the defendants, which motion the court denies because of the status of the case at this particular time, as made by pleadings long pending in the court." This suit was filed in June, 1908. In August, 1908, the defendants filed verified answers, denying that they constitute an executive committee or that they made the contract, and that if heir names appeared on it they had been fraudulently placed thereon. Without withdrawing the averments of their former answer, in which it was denied that they constituted or acted as an executive committee, or that they made the contract, defendants on May 18, 1910, filed a second verified answer, in which it was specifically admitted that they did execute the contract in suit, but that they executed the same in their official capacity as members of the executive committee. This second answer was in direct contradiction of the first, both being verlfied. The request to amend does not indicate the matter which they wished to assert, except fraud generally stated, but in examining the testimony preceeding the offer, it appears the defendants wanted to prove that they did not understand what they were signing and that the terms of what they signed had been misrepresented to them. This would have been to again contradict their sworn answers, and would of course have necessitated a mistrial anr the continuance of the case. From a careful perusal of the record it is doubted if the offer was made upon any substantial basis, or that any proof would have been forthcoming in substantial support of the proposed amendment had it been allowed. It has been decided many times that the question of allowing amendments, is addressed to the sound judicial discretion of the court, and that the action of the court in allowing or refusing same, will not be disturbed except where this discretion has been abused. Euchler vs. Weaver, 23 Okla. 420; Swope vs. Burnham, 6 Okla. 736; Consolidated etc. Co. vs. Burnham, 8 Okla. 514; Tecumpsey etc. Bank vs. Maddox, 4 Okla. 583. While our statutes and policy favor very liberal rules relative to amendments of pleadings, in furtherance of justice, yet these rules were never intended to be extended so far as to work injustice to the other side of the case, or to make of court proceedings a farce. The court did not abuse its discretion. The other objections need not be considered. The instructions complained of were not objected to. Neither was objection taken to the refusal to give certain other instructions. The other points are not discussed in the briefs and are therefore treated as abandoned. The cause should be affirmed. J. H. DUPREE, Plaintiff in Error, V8. No. A-1680 STATE OF OKLAHOMA, Defendant in Error. (Rendered July 12, 1913.) Error from County Court of Oklahoma County. J. V. Hayson, trial Judge. Reversed 1. (a) When a statute is enacted making it a crime to do one thing or another, naming more than one thing disjunctively, all of which are made punishable alike, as a general rule, the whole may be charged conjunctively in a single count as constituting one single offense; but such offenses cannot be charged in the disjunctive. (b) When the proecuting attorney is in doubt as to which of two or more offenses, growing out of the same transaction, has been committed, he may charge two different offenses in separate counts, but cannot, as a general rule, charge two distinct offenses in one count. 2. In this State it is the duty of trial judges to see that trials of all criminal cases are conducted fairly and impartially, and according to law. The doctrine of harmless error, so frequently invoked by this court, was not established for the purpose of permitting or encouraging trial courts to depart from the established and well recognized principles governing the trial of criminal cases. It is only in cases wherein the record disclose the fact that the trial court has made an honest effort to follow the law and endeavord to give the accused a fair and impartial trial that this doctrine is invoked. It does then apply in the trial court, and is only to be applied by the appellate court. 3. The trial courts of this State cannot recklessly disregard the rules of law and permit prosecuting attorneys to wring verdicts of guilty from a jury by the introduction of improper evidence and unfair tactics, and then evade the responsibility for such action by permitting the case to be appealed to this court and here reversed. The responsibility is solely with the trial court and pros ecuting attorney, and such responsibility cannot be shirked or placed upon this court. (Syllabus by the Court.) Opinion of the Court by ARMSTRONG, P. J. MONTEL HAGER, Plaintiff in Error, V8. No. A-1767 STATE OF OKLAHOMA, Defendant in Error. (Rendered July 7, 1913.) Error from County Court of Pottawatomie County. 1. Police court methods in the examination of witnesses in courts of record in Oklahoma, will not be tolerated. 2. Great latitude should be allowed in the cross-examination of witnesses and they may be interrogated in a proper manner with reference to any matter which may tend to affect their credibility, but they should not be asked questions which are full of insulting insinuations and intimations that they are guilty of some other crime than that for which they are upon trial. 3. Where the record shows that counsel for the Sate in a prosecution of a person charged with crime has been guilty of conduct calculated to arouse prejudice or passion against the defendant and to prevent the accused from having a fair and impartial trial, a conviction had will be set aside and a new trial granted. (Syllabus by the Court.) R. C. BENSON, Plaintiff in Error, V8. No. A-1654 STATE OF OKLAHOMA, Defendant in Error. (Rendered July. 12, 1913.) Error from the County Court of Murry County. H. W. Fielding, trial Judge. Reversed |