Neutrality divided into general and particular.

rent powers.(24) It is, therefore true, that the definition by which neutrality is explained to be nothing more than the continuance of a state of exact and perfect impartiality, is not susceptible of any interpretation which can alter the essence of that position.

12. Some doubts may, perhaps, arise in the application of my definition to the different systems followed by nations in the practice of neutrality; though this may create a diversity of cases, we may always adapt to them the maxim drawn from the spirit of the definition, which is an exact and impartial continuation of that state in which a nation happens to be, antecedent to the war.

ARTICLE IV.

Of the different kinds of Neutrality.

§ 1. SOME publicists have divided neutrality into general and particular. They denominate general neutrality, the state of a nation which, not being in alliance with either of the belligerent powers, discharges towards all of them, the duties which are mutual and common to all. By particular neutrality is meant the state of a nation which, by vir

(24) See Ranucci, the illustrious professor of public law in the University of Pisa, in his learned Eulogy on Lampredi.

Particular neutrality subdivided into full and limited.

tue of some treaty, is under an express obligation to remain neutral in the war carried on.

2. Others have divided particular neutrality into a full and entire neutrality, and a limited neutrality. The first takes place when it is agreed to conduct towards one of the belligerents, in all respects, in the same manner as towards the other. The second, is the case of a neutral nation, that is bound to favour one of the two parties more than the other, in relation to certain things, or to certain actions. But this subdivision is founded on usage, rather than on universal law.

3. By reflecting on the nature of neutrality, and on the spirit of the definition which I have given, it will be seen how opposed these divisions and subdivisions are to the law of nations. Every one knows that a nation at war, however powerful it may be, has no lawful right to compel another nation, equally free and independent, to stipulate to observe a particular neutrality, nor to declare, much less to restrain it to, a limited neutrality. Such conventions would be treaties of alliance and subsidy, not treaties of neutrality. It is true, that they are not without example; but they serve only to prove, that nations, as well as individuals, do not always follow the dictates of equity, and that just moderation which ought to characterise civilised societies; since, by the aid of armies, they too often trample under foot the rights

A further division of neutrality by Galliani.

of their fellow men, regardless of the claims of justice and humanity.

Galliani having observed that nations at one time refuse every thing, and at another concede every thing, to the belligerent powers, imagined a new division of neutrality, into that of an impartial refusal, and an impartial concession.

5. In adopting this distinction, he did not consider, that it became a nullity, in regard to those powers who at the commencement of a war, are in a state of total and absolute indifference, that is, without any commercial relations with either of the belligerents. But, at the present day, no nation is to be found in this situation, unless, for example, we take Persia and China, in regard to Sardinia. It is evident that, without any reciprocal relations or wants, these states would remain absolutely indifferent towards each other. Let a war break out between the two first, the third might declare itself neutral, in the sense of the above distinction, and impartially refuse every thing both to China and Persia, because, they never had any connexion with Sardinia. But suppose a war between France and England, Holland and Spain, Naples and Genoa, how could Tuscany adopt a neutrality in the sense of the distinction made by Galliani? These nations, as well as the rest of Europe, keep up a correspondence with each other, and are connected by commerce, either active

Objections to the distinction of Galliani.

or passive. At the commencement of a war between two or more of these powers, how could Tuscany immediately break off all correspondence with them, by adopting a neutrality of impartial refusal, without ruining her own commerce, since. in that case she would have none remaining. Yet certainly, in no other way, could she support that. kind of neutrality. The merchants who should be provided with goods which they were accustomed annually to sell to those nations, would be reduced, at the commencement of a war, to the hard necessity of remaining idle, and embarrassed with their property, until peace was re-established.

6. Galliani saw very well, that there might be nations to whom his distinction would not apply. Accordingly, in the third chapter of his work, in discussing the question, whether a prince be allowed. to remain neutral, page 26, he gives the following solution: "It never entered into the mind of any man of good sense to inquire, whether, in case of a war between very distant princes, a sovereign, who has no connexion, or commercial relation whatever, with either, was bound to enter into the war; (to de-, clare himself neutral would have been a better expression.) For where is the man of common understanding, who, supposing a war between China and Japan, would amuse himself with considering, whether the duties of justice required the king of Morocco to take part in the war? It is the same,

The new division of neutrality by Galliani, is not correct.

thing with a small nation towards two formidable powers, such as France and the house of Austria."

7. After what has been said, it is easy to see that this division of neutrality is not correct, even in the sense of the author; since the first kind, denominated impartial refusal, cannot be admitted, in any case, and is, in fact, a nullity, nor is it generical, or applicable to all nations; and the second species is, at bottom, the same kind of neutrality as the first. This is sufficient to evince its inaccuracy, since it does not embrace the diversity of ideas applicable to the division of a generical term, an essential feature in every good division.

8. Having laid down his distinction, Galliani would wish further, that this neutrality of impartial concession should be adopted in all wars. The reason he gives for it, is, that if all nations refused to the belligerents the means of continuing the war, or that war must cease when they found the ports of neutrals shut, the neutrality of impartial refusal would, in the end, be generally preferred. But I answer, if this refusal serves only to injure the commerce of neutrals, without arresting the scourge of war, why should they deprive themselves of an advantage which others turn to their own profit? Our author has acknowledged, that a negative neutrality, even though it should be practicable at the present day, would be contrary to the interest of a state, as I have already shewn. It may be further