Galliani led into error by his love of controversy.

possessed in time of peace, for what reason, I ask M. Galliani, ought it to abstain from continuing its commerce? Why should it be obliged to change its state, when, according to his own principles, it ought to experience no alteration in consequence of neutrality? Why, in short, may it not offer for sale, in one of its ports, a vessel fit for navigation, and armed for war?-In his work, I discover no cause for all this contradiction, except the confusion which prevails in it, and the error into which he has been led, by the spirit of party, and a desire to refute Lam+ predi, who maintains a contrary opinion. This is the cause why he has obscured the truth by so many artful sophisms and ingenious paralogisms. It is, there fore, necessary to repeat, in this place, the incontro+ vertible principle by which neutrals, in virtue of the conventional law of Europe, are forbidden to carry to belligerents, things adapted for warlike purposes, and by which they are allowed, according to the universal law of nations, to sell them as merchandise; within their own territory, to any person who offers to purchase them; provided this be done with im partiality, and without favouring one belligerent party more than another. So true, in this respect, is this doctrine, that Galliani himself, could not help laying down, afterwards, page 312, the very contrary to what he had already said before. "But if the phy"sical state of the climate, the productions, or ma"nufactures of a nation, be such, that it draws its "wealth principally from the commerce carried on "in peace, and war, (if, for example, it has many

Doctrine of Galliani refuted by Lampredi.

"mines of iron and sulphur, if its soil abounds with "nitre, or is covered with vast forests of resinous

trees, suitable for naval purposes, if hemp be one "of the chief branches of its agriculture, if it has "numerous founderies for arms) it will not, assuredly, be obliged to acquiesce in such a demand of one of the belligerents, who ought to be satisfied "with the impartiality of the vendors."

7. Let us follow these two celebrated publicists, in their dispute. Lampredi,(59) willing to revenge himself on Galliani, reproaches him for having inculcated a false doctrine,(60) in saying, that a neutral prince might, without violating the laws of neutrality, allow the belligerents to raise recruits and enlist men in his own territories, to fill up and reinforce their respective armies, and for attempting to justify this maxim by the reason, that the laws of neutrality are not violated, when there is no particular treaty; or when the prince does no more than recognise and guarantee the conditions of a treaty already concluded, without making levies himself, without regulating the contracts, and without exposing, by any act, his sovereign power.

8. Lampredi attempts to refute this doctrine of his adversary in the following manner: "If a neu

Inconsistency of Galliani and Lampredi.

"tral nation may permit, without partiality, the belligerent parties to make levies of men in his territories, for the use of their armies, why may he not "also allow them to supply themselves with arms, "and other military stores? Will it be said, that "powder is an instrument more proper and more directly suited for the purposes of war, than the "soldier who makes use of it to kill his enemies? "That a cannon or a musket, instruments absolutely passive, are more destructive than the man who uses them to destroy cities and their inhabitants?"

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9. To what degree will not the spirit of revenge and of party obscure the reason of the most enlightened men? Galliani, for the sake of combating the doctrine of Lampredi, goes so far as to contradict himself; the latter, in revenge for this, detaches a a single passage of Galliani from the chapter that follows, where in a more ample exposition of his subject, he returns to just principles, and leaves no doubt of his opinion, while the passage, thus cited, at first view, and without further examination, appears adverse to his own theory. But the principle opposed by Lampredi to the doctrine which he falsely attributes to Galliani, is not the less true, while the explanation given by the latter, a little further on, is a consequence of the opinion of them both. In page 329, Galliani thus expresses himself: "This is the true "point of view in which such treaties ought to be "considered. We shall, then, be persuaded that "enlistments are always contraband of war, though

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Doctrine of Galliani.-Verbal disputes.

"the sovereign who leaves his subjects at liberty to "enlist, does not violate his neutrality, if it be the "settled usage of the nation, existing in time of peace as well as in time of war; if its physical and political constitution be such; if, in short, he ob"serve, in this respect, a fair impartiality, by not refusing to one what he grants to the other. If, on "the contrary, the sovereign had never given his subjects permission to enlist in the service of foreign powers, by land or sea, I should be very much "at a loss to determine,* whether he might begin "the practice while two nations, his friends, are at "war. In vain might it be said, that he offered the "same advantage and the same indulgence to both; "the wants of the two nations might be so unequal, "that while one, on account of the scarcity of men " in the place, would derive an important and pow"erful aid from this permission, it would be super"fluous, and of no use to the other. For this rea"son, it appears to be much better to apply the

general theory of the essential duties of neutrality "to this case; which is, that we ought to continue "in the same state and the same practices that "existed before the war, without allowing any inno"vation whatever,"

10. I pass over in silence other disputes of these two writers, about the words to furnish, to transport, and to sell, which I consider as mere grammatical inquiries.

* For myself, I should have no doubt on the subject.-(Azunį,.)

Neutrals may sell to belligerents any goods in the way of commerce.

I shall content myself with observing, that, according to the principles above established, and agreeably to the theory of Lampredi, the restriction of the commerce in goods called contraband of war, cannot be derived from the universal law of nations, but only from the conventional law of Europe, as has been clearly laid down by Bynkershoek.(61) Though it be true, that a nation would be wanting in that impartiality which constitutes the essential feature of neutrality and the sole duty of neutrals, by furnishing to one of the belligerent powers, under the name of aids and succours, not only goods contraband of war, but any articles whatever useful and serviceable in war, it would be otherwise when these things were furnished merely in the way of commerce, especially, when it is considered, that contraband articles expose neutrals to seizure and confiscation by virtue of the various stipulations contained in treaties.

11. It is, then, clearly proved, that impartiality of commerce is the sole duty of neutrals towards belligerents, that is to say, they may continue their

(61) Jus gentium commune in hanc rem non aliuude licet discere quam ex ratione et usu. Ratio jubet, ut duobus invicem hostibus, sed mihi amicis, aque amicus sim; usus intelligitur, ex perpetua quodammodo paciscendi ædicendique consuetudine; pactis enim principes sæpe id egerunt în casum belli, sæpe etiam edictis contra quoscunque, flagrante bello. Dixi ex quodammodo consuetudine; quia unum forte alterumque pactum quod a consuetudine recedit, jus gentium non mutat. Questiones Juris Publici, lib. 1, cap. 10,