Upon these authorities no remark is necessary. They go clearly to prove that the word "several" is not necessarily to be taken as a distributive term. We have one more authority which we consider perfectly conclusive, not only on account of the sense in which the word in question is used, but because it appears to have been the model upon which the restrictive rule was framed. It is found in the Constitution of the United States, ARTICLE V:—

"Congress, whenever two-thirds of both houses shall deem it neces. sary, shall propose amendments to this constitution; or, on the application of the legislatures of two-thirds of the several states, shall call a convention for proposing amendments, which, in either case, shall be valid to all intents and purposes as part of this constitution, when ratified by the legislatures of three-fourths of the several states, or by conventions in three-fourths thereof, as the one or the other mode of ratification may be proposed by the congress."

Here the phrase "the several states," is most evidently not to be taken distributively. And from the general conformity of the principles and language of the restrictive rule with this provision of the Constitution of the United States, it seems to us extremely probable that in drawing up the restrictive rule the article of the constitu. tion above quoted was the model upon which it was constructed. But be this as it may, the use made of the word several in this instrument is an instance directly at war with the position of the committee; for there is the same reason for concluding that the phrase "the seve ral states" must be understood "distributively," as there is that the phrase "the several annual conferences" must be so understood, if we confine ourselves to the meaning of the words employed, or their "true grammatical construction."

But the committee attempt to strengthen their position by changing the collocation of the words, and by putting in the place of the adjective several, the adverb severally, thus, "The propriety of this interpretation will be perfectly manifest if the passage read thus-provided, nevertheless, that upon the concurrent recommendation of threefourths of all the members of the annual conferences severally." But, by the by, it does not happen to "read thus." And in reply to the question "respectfully" proposed by the committee, whether the "meaning" is not "in both cases precisely and obviously the same," we "would respectfully," and yet most unequivocally answer, No. There is plainly a different shade of meaning. If not, what advantage would result from the change? The adjective is often used in the collective sense, but we are not aware that the adverb is. But we would here beg leave just to make one honest query, and that is, if the framers of the restrictive rule meant, as the committee suppose, "that there must be three-fourths of the members of every annual conference VOL. XI.-Oct., 1840.

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in favor of the contemplated measure, in order that it may be carried into effect," why did they not say so? Why did they not use the very identical language employed by the committee in their commentary? This would have been just as easy, far more natural, and entirely definite.

But there is still another difficulty found in the second part of the proviso, upon the hypothesis of the committee. This part reads as follows: "And also, when such alteration or alterations shall have been first recommended by two-thirds of the General Conference, so soon as three-fourths of the members of all the annual conferences shall have concurred as aforesaid, such alteration or alterations shall take effect." Now let the reader specially mark the little but very important word "all" here. Can any one tell, on the hypothesis of the committee, why the framers of this article did not say every annual conference, instead of "all the annual conferences?" I know the worthy chairman of the committee plead that the phrase "as aforesaid," limits the sense of this latter part of the article, and makes it conform to the former. But we are not aware that this phrase would any more necessarily make the latter part of the article conform to the former than it would make the former conform to the latter and if indeed, as we trust we have shown, the former part of the proviso is not necessarily to be taken in the distributive sense, then of course this phrase is nothing to the brother's purpose. But if the first part of the proviso was intended, as the committee supposes, to be taken "distributively," then the latter part is a most glaring grammatical solecism.

The committee next proceed to show the bad consequences which would grow out of the views we take of the restrictive rule, or, in other words, to show what the rule ought to be. Thus they proceed:

"Your committee are strengthened in the opinion just expressed, by reflecting upon the evils that might very possibly arise if the proviso were differently interpreted. For example: there are twenty-eight annual conferences, and it might happen that sixteen (say) out of these twenty-eight would contain more than three-fourths of all the members of all the conferences taken collectively; and consequently, according to the construction objected to by your committee, these sixteen conferences would be able to effect a change in the fundamental principles of our church, though it might be contrary to the unanimous will of the other twelve conferences. And what is more (on that view) these twelve conferences would be bound to acquiesce in, and act upon the change, however repugnant it might be to their peculiar local circum. stances, or the honest convictions of their own minds. And who that is conversant with human nature does not know that a severance of our ecclesiastical union would be the inevitable consequence of such a state of things? Your committee cannot believe that it was the intention of the wise framers of the constitution of our church to open a door by which it might be possible to make essential changes in the great cardinal principles of the connection, and to thrust those changes

upon numerous annual conferences in defiance even of their unanimous wishes to the contrary."

We understand the Methodist Episcopal Church to be a unit, and the annual conferences to be integrant parts of the complete whole, and holding a rank in proportion to numbers, so that the case stated by the committee cannot be effected at all by the number of conferences supposed to be in the negative of the question. Two annual conferences of fifty each can have no more importance, other things being equal, than one conference of one hundred members: and hence it is that the annual conferences are represented in the General Conference according to their numbers. In the case supposed by the committee there would be in favor of the change a majority of threefourths of the whole number of members, though by conferences they would stand sixteen against twelve. Now in such a case the question would be simply whether the one-fourth or the three-fourths of the whole body should rule. Whether, indeed, in this case, the minority ought to submit to the majority, or separate, we need not determine; but that they should not govern the majority is, to us, obvious enough.

We will now turn the tables, and see what would be the practical operation of the committee's views of the restrictive rule. Suppose it should be deemed desirable and necessary still farther to lessen the ratio of delegation, and all the annual conferences should recommend it by a unanimous vote, except one small conference composed of seventeen members, and all of them, excepting six, should concur: now though we should have the vote of every member of all the annual conferences excepting six individuals, the alteration could not be made, for it would not have the sanction of "three-fourths of all the attending and voting members of every annual conference." And can the committee "believe that it was the intention of the wise framers of the constitution of our church" to give to so small a number of individuals the power to control and oppress the whole mass? Vastly more credulity than we have is necessary to believe this.

Finally, the committee attempt to sustain their positions by presuming upon the intention of the framers of the rule under consideration. They proceed:

"Your committee are perfectly satisfied that the great object of these venerable men was to preserve and perpetuate the unity and integrity of the church in the bond of peace and amity. And assuming as correct the interpretation now offered by the committee, this object would be most happily and permanently secured. For if any fundamental change were concurred in by three-fourths of all the members of every annual conference, there is no earthly probability that the enforcement of such change would ever be productive of any schism in the body."

It is a correct mode of procedure, when an instrument is ambigu. ous, to go into its history, and endeavor to find out the design of the

framer and if the committee had spent a small share of the time and pains they occupied in their fruitless philological speculations in investigating the history of the rule in question, they would have arrived at a very different result, and we, of course, should have been spared the necessity (real or supposed) of these animadversions. Let us now briefly refer to the facts.

Previous to the General Conference of 1832, the second restriction upon that body required that they should not allow of more than one representative for every five members of the annual conference, nor less than one for every seven; and the proviso for altering any of the restrictions was in the following language, viz., "Provided, nevertheless, that upon the joint recommendation of all the annual conferences, then a majority of two-thirds of the General Conference succeeding shall suffice to alter any of the above restrictions." Between the General Conference of 1824 and 1828 a resolution originated in the Mississippi conference recommending the ensuing General Conference so to change the restriction as to admit of a smaller representation. This resolution passed all the annual conferences excepting the Philadelphia conference. This conference, wishing to procure some farther mitigation of the restrictive rules, refused to pass the Mississippi reso lution, and sent out one of their own for the adoption of the conferences. The General Conference of 1828, finding that the recommendation had failed to obtain the concurrence of one conference, and consequently could not be acted upon, and the body having become exceedingly unwieldy, seemed to think no remedy left but so to modify the proviso as to make a change in the restrictions upon the General Conference more feasible; and it was with this view that the present proviso was substituted for the former. It was to take the power from any one conference to negative changes in the restrictive rules which might be judged necessary by all the remaining conferences. Formerly a simple majority of each annual conference sufficed to enable the General Conference, by a majority of two-thirds, to make any alterations in the restrictive rules. But even then it was found impracticable to effect a necessary change. Now who would suppose this body would set themselves at work in order to make such a change practicable, and throw still greater difficulties in the way by requiring a majority of three-fourths of each annual conference, instead of a simple majority? This could never have been; more, it was not the fact.

The whole process is now distinctly in our recollection. The lamented Dr. Fisk, as chairman of a committee appointed for that purpose, reported the rule as it now stands, with the exception, we believe, of one amendment, and several leading members took a decided part in the discussion of its merits. The same objection urged by the committee in 1840, viz., that it would open a door for fundamental

changes, was urged in 1828, and was met by the distinguished member from Mississippi, in both instances, in nearly the same language. His position was, as nearly as we can now state it, that when a ma. jority of three-fourths of the members of the several annual conferences, and of two-thirds of the General Conference should concur in any change, the minority ought either to submit or retire.

Before we proceed any farther we beg leave to say, explicitly, that though we have felt constrained to oppose some of the views of the committee of the late General Conference on temperance, we hope nothing we have said will be construed into the least disrespect for the worthy brethren who composed that committee. With several of them we have had a long and an agreeable acquaintance, and in their general integrity and regard for the best interests of the church we have the fullest confidence: and there is a redeeming quality in the report itself which we must not pass. Though the committee objected to the restoration of Mr. Wesley's original rule, it was not from opposition to the principles of the rule, but from what they conceived legitimate constitutional difficulties in the way. They concede the whole ground of the immorality of the traffic in alcoholic drinks; and propose to purge it from the church in another way, as will be seen in the following, which is the conclusion of their report:

"But it has occurred to your committee, that there is a method, unencumbered by any constitutional impediment, by which this may just as effectually subserve the great interests of temperance as it would do by the restoration of Mr. Wesley's rule. The method referred to is comprehended in the following resolution, with which your committee beg leave to conclude this report :—

"Resolved, That section 8, chapter 2, on page 90 of our Discipline be stricken out, and that the following be inserted as a substitute:

SECTION VIII.

Of the Manufacture and Sale of Spirituous Liquors.

"Quest. What directions shall be given concerning the manufacture and sale of spirituous liquors?

"Answer. It is our judgment that the manufacture or sale of spirit. uous liquors, except for mechanical, chimical, medical, or sacramental purposes, is doing harm, in the sense of our general rules,' being highly injurious to the health, morals, and happiness of society, and inconsistent with Christian obligation; and that if any members of our church offending herein, will not desist therefrom, after being affectionately admonished to do so by those who watch over their souls, the preacher having the oversight of the circuit or station shall proceed against them as in case of other immoralities, and the persons accused shall be cleared, censured, or excluded, according to their conduct, as on other charges of immorality.

Respectfully submitted,

J. S. TOMLINSON, Chairman.

Baltimore, May 22, 1840."