instruction to the jury declaring correctly the legal effect of the re-
cognizance, is proper.
Ib.
6. Same.-Harmless Error.--An instruction in such case, that after judg-
ment the body of the principal debtor might have been taken in ex-
ecution and committed to jail for a period of ten or fifteen days, though
erroneous (R. S. 1881, section 865), is harmless to the plaintiff. Ib.
See BILL OF EXCEPTIONS, 3, 4; CRIMINAL LAW, 4; EVIDENCE, 4; JUDG-
MENT, 2, 5; NEW TRIAL, 2; PLEADING, 19.
REDEMPTION.
Rents.-Statute Construed.-Under the statute of 1861, giving to the judg-
ment defendant, the right to occupy lands sold on execution, for the
period of a year from the sale, with a liability for rents if he do not
redeem, the rents during that period are his absolutely, in his own
right, and not as trustee for the purchaser, and if he be insolvent,
and assign the rents in payment of a just debt, the assignee is not lia-
ble therefor to the purchaser.
Ridgeway v. Nat'l Bank, etc., 119
REFEREE.
See INJUNCTION, 2.
RELEASE.
See RECOGNIZANCE, 3.
See LANDLORD AND TENANT; REDEMPTION; REPLEVIN, 12 to 15.
REPLEVIN.
See FIXTURES, 1 to 3.
1. Personal Property.-Conversion.-Right of Possession. In an action to
recover for the conversion of public property, the plaintiff must show
a right of possession in himself at the time he began his action.
Easter v. Fleming, 116
2. Same.-Action to Recover.-Title.-In actions for the recovery of per-
sonal property, the plaintiff must recover on the strength of his own
title, and not upon the weakness of his adversary's.
3. Same. Sheriff's Sale.—If a claimant of personal property has no title
thereto, he can not recover it from one in possession claiming title by
virtue of a sheriff's sale, although the sale was irregular.
Ib.
4. Pleading.-Complaint.—Verdict.- Defects Cured.—A complaint in re-
plevin, which alleges that the defendants unlawfully and wrongfully
took from the plaintiffs, and converted to their own use, the following
described personal property, etc., shows with sufficient certainty, at
least after verdict, that the property was taken without leave and had
not been returned.
Roberts v. Porter, 130
5. Same.-Competency of Witness.-Husband and Wife.-Practice.—In an
action of replevin, for the recovery of the husband's personal prop-
erty, his wife was not a competent witness as to matters for or against
him, under the provisions of section 2 of the act of March 11th, 1867,
defining who shall be competent witnesses.
6. Justice of the Peace.-Jurisdiction.-Statute Construed.-Cases Overruled.—
Under the provisions of section 9 of the act concerning justices of the
peace, 2 R. S. 1876, p. 605, an action of replevin before a justice must
be brought either in the township in which the property was taken,
or in which it is detained. Beddinger's Adm'r v. Jocelyn, 18 Ind. 325,
and Test v.. Small, 21 Ind. 127, overruled.
Copple v. Lee, 230
7. Pleading.-Complaint and Affidavit.-A complaint, which contains all
the statutory requisites of an affidavit to obtain an order for the de-
livery of personal property, and is verified by the oath of the plain-
tiff or of some one in his behalf, will be sufficient, both as an affidavit
and a complaint in replevin.
Cox v. Albert, 241
8. Same.-Evidence.-Demand.-Conversion.-In a suit for the recovery of
the possession of personal property, alleged to be unlawfully detained,
if a wrongful conversion of the property by the defendant is shown by
the evidence, a demand for the property, before suit brought, and
proof of such demand, are alike unnecessary.
Ib.
9. Same.-Pawn or Pledge.-Tender.-Where personal property is pawned
or pledged as a security for a debt or loan, and the pledgee, without
notice to the pledgor, wrongfully disposes of the property or converts
the same to his own use, the pledgor may sue at once for the recovery
of the property, or of its value, without any demand therefor, and
without having first paid or tendered the amount of such debt or
loan.
10. Same.-Affidavit.—County in which Property is Detained.-Verdict.—Evi-
dence. In an affidavit in replevin, the statute requires that the affiant
should state in what county he believes the property is detained; but
it is not necessary to the validity of the verdict, that this statement
should be sustained by any evidence.
11. Justice of the Peace.-Jurisdiction. In actions of replevin, justices of
the peace have jurisdiction where the property does not exceed in
value two hundred dollars.
Grubaugh v. Jones, 350
12. Landlord and Tenant.-Crops.-Sheriff's Sale.-One who purchases land
at sheriff's sale can not, after crops have been harvested by the tenant
in possession at the time of the sale, and suffered to remain in actual
possession, maintain replevin for the grain harvested by the tenant.
Bowen v. Roach, 361
13. Same.-Evidence.-Deed.-In such an action, a deed executed before
the decree is admissible in evidence to show that the tenant's posses-
sion was under color and claim of right.
Ib.
14. Same. Undivided Interest in Personalty.-The owner of an undivided
interest in personal property can not maintain replevin against a co-
15. Same.-Possession of Crops Planted.-A tenant of the execution debtor,
having been left in undisturbed possession of the premises sold, under
a claim of right, may rightfully retain possession of the crop planted,
cultivated and reaped by him, yielding to the holder of the sheriff's
deed the landlord's share.
Ib.
16. Evidence.-Possession.-To sustain replevin the evidence must show
that the defendant was in actual or constructive possession of the
property at the time of the commencement of the action.
Louthain v. Fitzer, 449
17. Same. Sheriff.-Execution.-Delivery Bond.-Demand.-Demurrer to Evi-
dence. In replevin against a sheriff evidence that the property be-
longed to the plaintiff, and was levied upon under an execution against
his father; that the sheriff then took from the plaintiff a delivery
bond and permitted the property to remain on the farm where he re-
sided; and that afterwards the plaintiff formally demanded and was
refused a return of the property to him, is sufficient on demurrer to
sustain the action.
Ib.
REPLEVIN BAIL.
See LIQUOR Law, 2.
RES ADJUDICATA.
See MASTER AND SERVANT, 2.
See REAL ESTATE, ACTION TO RECOVER, 3.
See MASTER AND SERVANT; MORTGAGE, 14; PROMISSORY NOTE, 6; VEN-
DOR AND PURCHASER, 1, 5.
RESIGNATION.
See CITY, 19.
REVIEW OF JUDGMENT.
See JUDGMENT.
See CONTRACT, 7; CRIMINAL LAW, 1; DEED, 6; DESCENT, 4; EJECTMENT,
1; JUDGMENT, 11, 12; PARTNERSHIP, 21; REAL ESTATE, ACTION TO
RECOVER; REDEMPTION; REPLEVIN, 3, 12; SHERIFF'S SALE; VOL-
UNTARY ASSIGNMENT.
See CITY, 19; Town, 2; TOWNSHIP TRUSTEE.
SCHOOL TRUSTEE.
See CITY, 19.
SET-OFF.
See DEED, 8.
SHERIFF.
See EXECUTION; REPLEVIN, 17.
SHERIFF'S DEED.
See DEED, 6; REAL ESTATE, ACTION TO RECOVER; REPLEVIN, 13 to 15;
VENDOR AND PURCHASER, 7.
Date.-Delivery. The date of a sheriff's deed is prima facie evidence of the
time of its delivery.
Turner v. Nat'l Bank, etc., 19
SHERIFF'S RETURN.
See EXECUTION.
SHERIFF'S SALE.
See DEED, 6; EJECTMENT, 1; JUDGMENT, 11, 12; PARTNERSHIP, 21; REAL
ESTATE, ACTION TO RECOVER; REDEMPTION; REPLEVIN, 3, 12.
1. Execution.-Levy.-Judgment.-Lien.-Deed.-Notice.-A joint judgment
was rendered against H. and others, upon which an execution was
issued and levied upon lands of one of the other defendants, which
was subject to the prior lien of an older judgment, but of value much
exceeding both judgments. This land was sold to satisfy the senior
judgment, and the sheriff having returned that fact upon the execu-
tion on the junior judgment, and an alias issuing, he levied it upon
the lands of H., which he sold upon it to the plaintiff, who, in due
time, obtained a sheriff's deed.
Held, that the levy of the first execution was, until legally disposed of, a
satisfaction of the judgment.
Held, also, that the mere sale to satisfy the older lien did not, in view of
the right to redeem therefrom, given by statute, divest the junior lien,
and was not such a disposition of the property as warranted the levy
on the lands of H.
Held, also, that the purchaser, being the plaintiff, was charged with notice
of the irregularity, and took nothing by his purchase and deed.
Neff v. Hagaman, 57
2. Deed.-Possession.-A sheriff's sale without a deed confers no title, nor
does it entitle the purchaser to possession. Goss v. Meadors, 528
See BILL OF EXCEPTIONS, 3; CRIMINAL LAW, 9; PROMISSORY NOTE, 17.
SLANDER.
Actionable Words.-Pleading.-In an action of slander by D. against E., it
was averred that A. died testate, bequeathing to B. and C., daughters
of D., $500 each, leaving E., his son, surviving him, and that E. spoke
of and concerning D., and of and concerning his father's death, the
following false and scandalous words: "Old lady, you gave my father
four double doses of morphine on the day he made his will; you said,
old man, you had better be fixing up your business; if it had'nt been
for you giving morphine, your daughters would not have gotten what
they did."
Held, that the words, with the proper innuendoes, are not actionable per se.
Held, also, that the extrinsic circumstances averred in the complaint do
not render the words actionable.
McFadin v. David, 445
SOLDIER'S BOUNTY.
See CONTRACT, 4.
SPECIAL BAIL.
See RECOGNIZANCE.
SPECIAL FINDING.
See MORTGAGE, 7.
1. General Verdict.-Practice.-It is only in cases where the special find-
ings are irreconcilable with the general verdict that they control it.
Chambers v. Chambers, 400
2. Same.-Account.-On trial of an action on an account current, an an-
swer of the jury to the question, "What amount, if any, have you al-
lowed the defendant on the account in his favor in your general ver-
dict?" is not repugnant to the general verdict for the plaintiff for
the excess due him.
See CITY, 3, 7, 8, 9, 17; Costs; CRIMINAL LAW, 1, 5, 6, 15, 18; DESCENT,
1; HIGHWAY, 6, 7; JUDGMENT, 16; LANDLORD AND TENANT, 3;
LIQUOR LAW, 5; MORTGAGE, 11; REDEMPTION; REPLEVIN, 5, 6;
VOLUNTARY ASSIGNMENT.
See JUDGMENT, 5; PARTITION; Pleading, 15.
Current.-Answer.--Reply.-Pleading.-A reply to an answer plead-
ing the statute of limitations, which states that the account sued on
was a mutual running account, and that every item of the bill of par-
ticulars is one item thereof, and shows the last item to be within six
years, is sufficient.
Chambers v. Chambers, 400
See CORPORATIONS; PARTNERSHIP, 12.
See CITY, 1 to 6, 9, 10, 13 to 18.
STREET RAILWAY.
See CITY, 13 to 18.
SUBMISSION.
See PRACTICE, 1; SUPREME COURT, 8.
Service.-Witness.-Continuance.-No person other than the sheriff or his
deputy is authorized to serve a subpoena, and a party who has not
thus subpoenaed his witness, but has served the subpoena himself, is
not entitled to a continuance on account of the absence of such wit-
Leary v. Meier, 393
SUBROGATION.
See CONTRACT, 6; LIQUOR LAW, 2.
See JUSTICE OF THE PEACE, 2.
See CRIMINAL LAW, 16; TELEGRAPH COMPANY.
See BILL OF EXCEPTIONS, 4; CRIMINAL LAW, 11; EVIDENCE, 3; INJUNC-
TION, 4; INSTRUCTION, 6, 9; JUDGMENT, 2, 4; NEW TRIAL, 1, 2.
1. Evidence.-Verdict.--When there is evidence, which, if credited, justi-
fies the verdict, though this evidence is contradicted, the Supreme
Court will not weigh the evidence, nor disturb the verdict.
Becker v. Denmure, 147
2. Practice.-New Trial.-Weight of Evidence.--The Supreme Court will not
reverse a judgment upon the evidence, if it fairly tends to sustain the
verdict or finding on every material point. Adams v. Stringer, 175
3. Practice.-Admission of Evidence.-Grounds of Objection.-Where, on the
trial of a cause, a party objects to a question put to a witness, the
record must show that the party stated to the court the grounds of
his objection, or the action of the court thereon will not be considered
by the Supreme Court. In such a case, the party can not state one
ground of objection to the trial court, and insist upon other and dif-
ferent grounds in the Supreme Court. Pennsylvania Co. v. Hoagland, 203
4. Practice. Instructions.-Harmless Error.-Instructions to the jury which
assume the truth of facts necessary to make out the case, when there
is really no dispute about such facts, and no conflict in the evidence
concerning them, is a harmless error, and not available in the Su-
preme Court.
Jones v. State, ex rel., 217
5. Presumption.-Trial Court.-Evidence.-Practice.In the Supreme Court,
all the presumptions go in favor of the proceedings below, and a judg-
ment will not be reversed for the exclusion of evidence, unless it be
shown that the evidence excluded had some relation to the real and
particular question involved at the trial. Parker v. The State, 259
6. Practice.-Appeal.—Dismissal.-Lapse of time for the taking of an ap-
peal to the Supreme Court may be pleaded in bar of the appeal; or
the question may be raised on motion. Day v. City of Huntington, 280
7. Same.—Disability of Appellant.-A motion to dismiss an appeal, not
taken in time, will be sustained, unless the appellant shows that he
was under disability.
Ib.
8. Same.-Agreement for Submission.-An agreement by the appellee for
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