erty is situated.15 Attachment proceeding is the course generally employed by creditors of an assignor to subject property assigned by him, which is situated in another State, to the payments of their debts against him notwithstanding the assignment, and in the discussion of the questions arising under such proceedings with reference to the residence of the attaching creditors, the creditors have been divided into three classes: First, creditors residing in the State of the assignor in which he makes the assignment; second, creditors residing in another State but in the State in which the property sought to be taken under attachment is situated; third, creditors residing in any other State. With reference to creditors of the first class, it has been "held generally that the assignment will defeat their subsequent attachments of personal property in another State."'16 But concerning the creditors of the second class the decisions are not harmonious, but the tendency of the later decisions in most of the States, is to the effect that the voluntary assignment, if sufficiently formal and legal under the laws of the State where made, will be enforced over a subsequent attachment by such creditors in his own State ;17 but other States hold that such an assignment will not be enforced over a subsequent attachment to the prejudice of its citizens or where it is contrary to the policy of its local laws. 18 And as to the third class of creditors some States make no distinction between them and its own citizens,19 while other States maintain

15 Cragin v. Lankin, 7 Allen (Mass.), 395; Hunt v. Lathrop, 7 R. I. 58; Schroder v. Tompkins, 58 Fed. Rep. 672; Whitewright v. Leavitt, 4 La. Ann. 351; Law v. Mills, 18 Pa. 185; Barnett v. Kinney, 147 U. S. 476; Ockerman v. Cross, 54 N. Y. 29; Reynolds v. Adden, 136 U. S. 349.

16 See note to Long v. Forrest, 23 L. R. A. 38, and cases cited; Woodward v. Brooks, 3 L. R. A. 702; Bacon v. Horne, 123 Pa. 452, 2 L. R. A. 355; Mowry v. Crocker, 6 Wis. 326; Train v. Kendall, 137 Mass. 366; Halstead v. Strauss, 32 Fed. Rep. 380; Egbert v. Baker, 58 Conn. 319; Moore v. Bonnell, 31 N. J. L. 90.

17 Woodward v. Brooks, 3 L. R. A. 702; Whipple v. Thayer, 16 Pick. (Mass.) 25, 26 Am. Dec. 626; Bacon Horne, 123 Pa. 452, 2 L. R. A. 355.

18 Woodward v. Brooks (Ill.), 3 L. R. A. 702; Kelly v. Crapo, 45 N. Y. 86; May v. Wannemacher, 111 Mass. 202. See cases cited in note 7 supra.

19 Catlin v. Wilcox Silver Plate Co., 123 Ind. 477; Sheldon v. Blanvelt, 29 S. C. 453, 1 L. R. A. 685. See eases cited in note 8 supra; Mayberry v. Shisler, 1 Harr. (Del.) 349.

Supreme Court of Missouri, Division No. 1, Nov. 26, 1895.

1. A court of equity may interfere by injunction to prevent persons from attempting by intimidation, threats of personal violence, and other unlawful means, to force employees to quit work and join in a "strike."

.2. While equity will never interfere by injunction to prevent the commission of a crime, it may enjoin an act which threatens irreparable injury to the property of an individual, though such act may also be a violation of a criminal law.

PER CURIAM: This is an appeal from the final judgment of the Circuit Court of the City of St. Louis on a demurrer to the plaintiff's petition, which is as follows: "Plaintiff states that it is a corporation duly organized under the laws of the State of Missouri, and is engaged in the manufacture of shoes in the City of St. Louis, Missouri, at Twenty-first and Locust streets in said city, at which place its factory, for the purpose of its said manufacturing business, is located. And plaintiff says that it has in its employ in said manufacturing business, in its factory as aforesaid, between eight and nine hundred persons; that all of these persons are at work as operatives in some department or other of said factory; that of these employees as aforesaid a large number, to-wit: about two or three hundred, are women and girls, and a large number, to-wit: about two or three hundred, are young persons, many of them not being of age, and the balance of said operatives are adult men; that all of these persons are engaged in earning a livelihood at the business of this plaintiff aforesaid, and on the other hand this plaintiff requires the services of these persons to successfully carry on its business of manufacturing shoes as aforesaid. Plaintiff further states that all of these employees now in the employ of this plaintiff are desirous of continuing in the service of the plaintiff in its said business as aforesaid. Plaintiff further states that ten or fifteen days ago some of its employees, including all the defendants herein, except the defendants Thomas Beaty and P. J. McGarry, went out of the employ of this plaintiff on what is commonly called a strike,' claiming to have some grievance against this plaintiff, and which this plaintiff says was without any reasonable ground to rest upon, and thereupon attempted to inaugurate among

the employees of this plaintiff what is commonly called a 'strike;' that thereupon the said defend ants, lately employees of this plaintiff, together with the defendants Beaty and McGarry and divers other persons, unlawfully and wrongfully combined and confederated together to terrorize, and thereby, by intimidation and threats, to prevent the other employees of this plaintiff from peaceably or otherwise prosecuting their work in plaintiff's factory; that thereupon all of the defendants hereto, together with their associates and confederates, whose names are at this moment unknown to this plaintiff, began and have constantly pursued in a course of threats of personal violence and intimidation and persuasion, for the purpose, by means of such intimidation and threats and fear, to prevent the other employees of this plaintiff from peaceably or otherwise prosecuting their work in plaintiff's factory; that all of the said defendants hereto, together with divers and sundry other persons, who are their associates and confederates, have constantly hung about the plaintiff's said factory at the place aforesaid, and upon the streets in close proximity, for the purpose of picketing the premises of this plaintiff, and by putting the employees of this plaintiff in fear of bodily injury, to thereby keep them from continuing their employment with this plaintiff, and also for the purpose of preventing other persons from entering the employ of the plaintiff; and the said defendants and their associates and confederates, as a part of their policy of threats and intimidation, and for the purpose of carrying on their unlawful combination, have gone to the homes of divers of the employees of this plaintiff at nighttime, and then and there undertaken to induce, by persuasion and by intimidation and threats, the employees of this plaintiff from further prosecuting their work in plaintiff's said factory. And the plaintiff charges that the said defendants therein named, and their associates and confederates, for a number of days, by the use of threats and personal violence, intimidation and other unlawful means, have been, and are now, undertaking to prevent the employees of this plaintiff from prosecuting their ordinary work, and are endeavoring to induce them, by the unlawful means aforesaid, to quit the employment of this plaintiff. And plaintiff says that by reason of the fact that a great many of its employees are women and girls and young persons, that the defendants aforesaid and their associates and confederates have succeeded in exciting in the minds of the plaintiff's said employees, or many of them, fear for their bodily safety, to such an extent that they cannot happily, as they have a right to do, prosecute their ordinary work; and plaintiff says, by reason of the premises, it cannot peaceably and successfully prosecute its said business. And plaintiff says it is without remedy at law, and can only be fully protected and relieved in a court of equity. Plaintiff therefore prays that the defendants, their associates and confederates, be enjoined by a temporary order of injunction, to be made

final upon the hearing of this cause, issued out of this court, from in any manner interfering with the employees of this plaintiff now in the employ of the plaintiff, and from in any manner interfering with any person who may desire to enter the employ of this plaintiff, by the use of threats, personal violence, intimidation, or other means calculated to terrorize or alarm the plaintiff's employees, in any manner or form whatever, and that said defendants and their associates and confederates aforesaid be restrained by the order of this court from undertaking, by the use of the means aforesaid, to induce or to cause any of the employees of this plaintiff to quit the employment of this plaintiff, and that the defendants aforesaid and their associates and confederates be enjoined from congregating or loitering about the premises of this plaintiff at the place aforesaid, and that they be required by the injunction of this court to go about their ordinary business, and to abstain from in any way interfering with the business of this plaintiff, and for such other and further and general relief as may to the court appear proper in the premises."

The case was tried before the Hon. L. B. Valliant, one of the judges of that court, who, on overruling the demurrer, delivered the following opinion:

"The amended petition states in substance that the plaintiff conducts a large shoe manufactory in this city, and has in its employ some eight or nine hundred persons, all of whom are earning their living in plaintiff's employment, and are desirous of so continuing; that the defendants, except two of them, were lately in plaintiff's employ, but have gone out of the same on a strike, and are now, with the other two defendants, engaged in an attempt to force the other employees of plaintiff to quit their work and join in the strike, and that to accomplish this purpose they are intimidating them with threats of personal violence; that among the plaintiff's employees who are thus threatened are about three hundred women and girls and two or three hundred other young persons; that the effect of all this on the plaintiff's business, if the defendants are allowed to proceed, would be to inflict incalculable damage. Upon filing this amended petition, and the plaintiff's giving bond as required by law, a temporary injunction issued, restraining the defendants from attempting to force the plaintiff's employees to leave their work by intimidation and threats of violence, or from assembling for that purpose in the vicinity of plaintiff's factory. The defendants have appeared by their counsel, and by their demurrer filed admit that all the statements of the amended petition are true; but they take the position that, even if they are doing the unlawful acts that they are charged with doing, still this court has no right to interfere with them, because they say that what they are doing is a crime, by the State law of this State, and that for the commission of a crime they can only be tried by a jury in a court having criminal

jurisdiction. It will be observed that the defendants do not claim to have the right to do what the injunction forbids them doing. Their learned counsel even quotes the statute to show that it is a crime to do so. But he contends that the constitution of the United States and the constitution of the State of Missouri guaranty them the right to commit crime, with only this limitation, towit: that they shall answer for the crime, when committed, in a criminal court, before a jury, and that to restrain them from committing crime is to rob them of their constitutional right of trial by jury. If that position be correct, then there can be no valid statute to prevent crime. But that position is contrary to all reason. The right of trial by jury does not arise until the party is accused of having already committed the crime. If you see a man advancing upon another with murderous demeanor and a deadly weapon, and you arrest him-disarm him-you have perhaps prevented an act which would have brought about a trial by jury, but can you be said to have deprived him of his constitutional right of trial by jury? The train of thought put in motion by the argument of the learned counsel for defendants on this point leads only to this end, to-wit: that the constitution guaranties to every man the right to commit crime, so that he may enjoy the inestimable right of trial by jury.

"Passing now to the question relating to the particular jurisdiction of a court of equity, we are brought to face the proposition that a court of equity has no criminal jurisdiction, and will not interfere by injunction to prevent the commission of a crime. These two propositions are firmly established; and as to the first, that a court of equity has no criminal jurisdiction, there is no exception. As to the second, that a court of equity will not interfere by injunction to prevent the commission of a crime, that, too, is perhaps without exception, when properly interpreted, but it is sometimes misinterpreted. When we say that a court of equity will never interfere by injunction to prevent the commission of a crime, we mean that it will not do so simply for the purpose of preventing a violation of a criminal law. But when the act complained of threatens an irreparable injury to the property of an individual a court of equity will interfere to prevent that injury, notwithstanding the act may also be a violation of a criminal law. In such case the court does not interfere to prevent the commission of a crime, although that may incidentally result, but it exerts its force to protect the individual's property from destruction, and ignores entirely the criminal portion of the act. There can be no doubt of the jurisdiction of a court of equity in such a case. On this question counsel have cited cases in which courts of equity have been denied jurisdiction to enjoin the publication of a libel, and in those opinions are to be found the general statement of the proposition above mentioned. But the law of libel is peculiar, and those cases turn upon that peculiarity. The freedom of the press has been

so jealously guarded both in England and in this country that our law of libel is like no other law on the books. Our constitution provides that a man may, say, write, and publish 'whatever he will,' being answerable only for the 'abuse of liberty.' Libel is the only act injurious to the rights of another which a man cannot, under proper conditions, be restrained from committing; and that is so because the constitution says he shall be allowed to do it, and answer for it afterwards. Equity will not interfere when there is an adequate remedy at law. But what remedy does the law afford that would be adequate to the plaintiff's injury? How would their damages be estimated? How compensated? The defendants' learned counsel cites us to the criminal statute, but how will that remedy the plaintiff's injury? A criminal prosecution does not propose to remedy a private wrong. And, even if there was a statute giving a legal remedy to plaintiff, it would not oust the equity jurisdiction. The legal remedy that closes the door of a court of equity is a common-law remedy. Where equity had jurisdiction because the common law affords no adequate remedy, that jurisdiction is not affected by a statute providing a legal remedy. What a humiliating thought it would be if these defendants were really attempting to do what the amended petition charges, and what their demurrer confesses-that is, to destroy the business of these plaintiffs, and to force the eight or nine hundred men, women, boys, and girls who are earning their livings in plaintiff's employ to quit their work against their will-and yet there is no law in the land to protect them. The injunction in this case does not hinder the defendants doing anything that they claim they have a right to do. They are free men, and have a right to quit the employ of plaintiffs whenever they see fit to do so, and no one can prevent them; and whether their act of quiting is wise or unwise, just or unjust, it is nobody's business but their own. And they have a right to use fair persuasion to induce others to join them in their quitting. But when fair persuasion is exhausted they have no right to resort to force or threats of violence. The law will protect their freedom and their rights, but it will not permit them to destroy its freedom and rights of others. The same law which guaranties the defendants in their right to quit the employment of the plaintiffs at their own will and pleasure also guaranties the other employees the right to remain at their will and pleasure. These defendants are their own masters, but they are not the masters of the other employees, and not only are they not the masters of the other employees, but they are not even their guardians. There is a maxim of our law to the effect that one may exercise his own right as he pleases, provided that he does not thereby prevent another exercising his right as he pleases. This maxim or rule of law comes nearer than any other rule in our law to the golden rule of Divine authority: "That which you would have another do unto you,

do you even so unto them.' Whilst the strict enforcement of the golden rule is beyond the mandate of human tribunal, yet courts of equity, by injunction, do restrain men who are so disposed from so exercising their own rights as to destroy the rights of others. The demurrer to the amended petition is overruled."

The law applicable to the case is so clearly stated in this opinion of the learned judge that to add anything to it would be a work of supererogation. We adopt it as the opinion of this court, and affirm the judgment. All concur.

NOTE.-Though the principles governing the application of the writ of injunction to cases of this character are very clearly stated by the court in the principal case, no cases are cited on the subject. Cases of this character are of modern instance and develop.ment. Within recent years they have become more frequent. The display of banners with devices as a mode of threats and intimidation to prevent persons from entering into or continuing in the employment of the person in front of whose premises the banners were displayed, has been enjoined by the Supreme Court of Massachusetts in a somewhat recent case as an unlawful act, injurious to business and property, and a nuisance against which a court of equity should grant relief. Sherry v. Perkins, 147 Mass. 212, 9 Amer. St. Rep. 689. So an injunction was allowed in Springfield Spinning Co. v. Riley, L. R. 6 Eq. 551, a case presenting facts similar to the case last cited. Injunction has been granted against a labor organization which had instituted a boycott against a newspaper, and which was attempting to drive away business from it by threatening its subscribers and advertisers with a boycott in case they continued their patronage. Casey v. Typographical Union, 45 Fed. Rep. 135. But in Rogers v. Evarts, 17 N. Y. Supp. 264, the Supreme Court of New York denied an injunction to restrain the publishers of a newspaper from advising and encouraging persons in the employ of others to violate their contracts of employment. It was held, also, that an injunction would not issue to restrain workmen from combining and persuading peaceably and without intimidation fellow-workmen to leave their employers for the purpose of compelling a raise of wages. Members of a union have been enjoined from intimidating workmen and thereby preventing them from continuing in the employ of the applicant for the injunction. Cœur d'Alene Consolidated Min. Co. v. Miners' Union, 51 Fed. Rep. 260. In Mogul Steamship Co. v. McGregor, 15 Q. B. Div. 476, it was sought to restrain certain persons from sending out circulars or documents to the effect that if the parties receiving them dealt with plaintiffs the defendants would cease to trade with them. An injunction was refused on the ground that the injury was not irreparable. In Johnston Harvester Co. v. Meinhardt, 9 Abb. N. Cas. (N. Y.) 393, it was held that an injunction should not be granted against a confederation of persons whose object was to entice away employees, where there was not sufficient evidence that violence, force or intimidation were intended against the employees. In New York, etc. R. Co. v. Wenger, 17 Weekly Law Bull. 306, an injunction was granted to restrain a trespass by discharged employees on strike. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania held that an injunction will lie to restrain persons from attempting by force, menaces or threats to prevent workmen from working on such terms as they may agree on with any employer. Murdock v. Walker, 25 Atl. Rep. 492.

Evidence that, by reason of the action of a combination of persons, the crew left complainants' ship as she was about to sail, and that another crew could not be procured for nine days, and then only with the assistance of the police authorities and the protection of a restraining order, while other vessels in the vicinity had no difficulty in getting crews, is sufficient to authorize the court to enjoin interference with the business of the complainants by such combination pendente lite. Hagan v. Blindell (U. S. C. C. of App.), 56 Fed. Rep. 696, 6 C. C. A. 86. A trade union against whose members plaintiff discriminates in employing labor, will not be enjoined from sending circulars to plaint iff's customers to induce them to withdraw their custom from plaintiff as long as such discrimination continues, where defendants are not guilty of any violence or injury to property or intimidation. Sinsheimer v. United Garment Workers of America, 26 N. Y. S. 152, 5 Misc. Rep. 448: reversed in 28 N. Y. S. 321, 77 Hun, 215. Because the proprietor of a daily newspaper used plate matter in making up its forms, contrary to a resolution of the local typographical union, of which the employees were members, some of the employees left his employment, withdrew the union's indorsement of the paper and reported the matter to the trades' council, in which several trades' unions affiliated, the whole comprising a body of operatives in the county of a purchasing capacity of $400,000 a week: Held, that the trades council would be restrained from issuing circulars calling on the members of the several unions and the public to cease buying and advertising in the paper. Barr v. Essex Trades Council (N. J. Ch.), 30 Atl. Rep. 881. An employer is not entitled to an injunction against striking employees for inducing others, by entreaty and persuasion, to leave his employment, where no intimida. tion is used. Reynolds v. Everett (N. Y. App.), 39 N. E. Rep. 72, 144 N. Y. 189. Another late case of interest on the general subject of the legal rights of capital and labor is Longshore Printing & Pub. Co. v. Howell, 38 Pac. Rep. 547, 40 Cent. L. J. 245. The points there decided, succinctly stated, are as follows: That a strike is not illegal per se; that where a trade's union seeks by fair means to compel an employer of its members to observe one of its lawful rules, it cannot be restrained therefrom upon the ground that its object in enforcing the rule is to create a monopoly of labor in that particular trade; that a statute which makes it a misdemeanor for one by force, threats or intimidation to prevent an employee from continuing or performing his work, does not make it unlawful for a trade's union, by resolution or order of its executive committee, to require its members, under pain of suspension or expulsion from the union, to quit a person's employ because of his violation of a lawful rule of the union; that a conspiracy to injure or destroy a person's business or property is wrongful per se, although not indictable under the statute; and that where persons conspire to injure or destroy another's business or property, and it clearly appears that the injury is threatened and imminent, and will be irreparable, injunction will lie to restrain the conspirators.

Within recent months judges of the federal courts have asserted the applicability of the writ of injunction to restrain railway employees from committing acts of violence or intimidation, and from enforcing rules and regulations of labor organizations which, if carried out, would result in irremediable injury to the railway corporations and to the public. Toledo, etc. R. Co. v. Penn. Co., 53 Amer. & Eng. R. Cas. 293, 24 Amer. & Eng. Encyclopedia of Law, 136, 54 Fed.

Rep. 780, 53 Amer. & Eng. R. Cas. 307; Arthur v. Oakes (C. C. A.), 63 Fed. Rep. 310. But such cases are grounded principally upon the injury to the public. A late opinion by Judge Holmes, of the Massachusetts Supreme Court (Walker v. Cronin, 107 Mass. 555), on the subject of the right of strikers to exercise "persuasion, advice and social pressure," has created considerable comment, the position being taken by that eminent judge that the general rule applicable to injunction against combinations of strikers applies only to interference for pure mischief or for harm's sake. Interference for a good purpose, such as to compel a man to accept the strikers' schedule of wages, would be justifiable, in his opinion, though he admits that the weight of judicial opinion is the other way. See editorial reviews of this decision in 40 Cent. L. J. 507, 41 Cent. L. J. 337.

CORRESPONDENCE.

LIEN OF JUDGMENT

APPEALED FROM AND DISMISSED.

To the Editor of the Central Law Journal:

In answer to O. M. B. in correspondence in Cent. L. J. of Vol. 41, p. 477, I will say that the cases of Robideau v. Ewing, et. al. 5 Blkf. 552, and State ex rel. Cory v. Brewer, et. al. 64 Ind. p. 132, the first of which is in point. J. W. T.

A QUESTION OF EVIDENCE. To the Editor of the Central Law Journal:

An Indiana court has just decided a question of evidence that may be of interest to the profession. In an action for personal injuries, the plaintiff, Mrs. A, testified that she, in walking along a certain street after dark, fell over an exposed and unguarded water pipe in the line of the sidewalk; that she was pregnant at the time and in consequence of her fall suffered a miscarriage. It was proved by her medical attendant that as a result of the accident, she sustained permanent injuries and that the operation of ovariotomy was necessary. The defendant, under the general denial which had been pleaded as an answer, introduced four witnesses who testified that, in different conversations, the plaintiff had stated to three of them, that some months after the accident and after she had her first miscarriage, that she had twice become pregnant and both times had produced an abor tion upon herself. The fourth witness testified that the plaintiff had stated that she had hurt herself by lifting a heavy flower pot. The plaintiff went on the stand and denied that she had ever had any of these conversations. Her counsel then offered to prove by her and by her physician who was in constant attendance upon her, that she never had but the one miscarriage. They also offered to prove by her physician that he examined the plaintiff once or oftener every week from the time of her accident, until the time of the trial; that he had full opportunity to know whether she could have had a second or third miscarriage, and that he was positive that she had not had any such subsequent miscarriages. The offer was also made to prove by the plaintiff that she never, at any time, lifted a flower pot. The court rejected all of this testimony, upon the ground that while the plaintiff had the right to deny the conversations, she did not have the right to prove either by her own or independent testimony that the facts sought to be es tablished by the admissions proved against her were

untrue. The plaintiff's position was, that she was not confined to a denial that she made the admission, but that since the admission was offered in order to prove that she herself had either caused or aggravated the in. juries for which she sought damages, she had the right to controvert the facts, for the proof of which, the admissions against her were offered in evidence. The plaintiff, under the ruling of the court, had four wit nesses against her to prove the fact that the admis sions were made, but it was within her power to prove with absolute certainty, the falsity of the facts implied in the admissions, had she been permitted to do so. I have been unable to find any other court that has ever held this to be the law. Can you cite me to any authority which will uphold this ruling? SUBSCRIBER.

EJECTMENT-DIVORCE-QUERY.

To the Editor of the Central Law Journal: A and B are husband and wife and live in property. purchased by A, the husband, after marriage. They separated A going to the State of Nebraska, leaving his wife in possession of the property. A got a divorce from B in the State of Nebraska, service being had by publication and of which proceedings B knew nothing although A knew where B resided. A, after get ting the divorce, came back to Missouri and institutes ejectment proceedings to eject B out of the property. A deserted B and she has maintained herself since the separation. Now has B any defense to the ejectment proceedings? Has she any rights or interest in the property in Missouri? J. C. H.

MORTGAGE-NOTICE.

To the Editor of the Central Law Journal:

A the owner of real estate in fee simple executes a mortgage on the same to B; the amount being for $1,500 which is duly recorded, etc. B pays A $1,000 of the amount. Then A executes a mortgage on same property to C for $500 which is duly recorded and the entire amount paid over by C to A. B some time after this who has actual as well as constructive notice of C's mortgage pays the balance of the $1,500 to "A." Has B a first lien for $1,500 or only for a $1,000?

JETSAM AND FLOTSAM.

DIVORCE IN SOUTH CAROLINA.

E. H. A.

South Carolina may be weak in the matter of just treatment of the blacks, and tender towards white rascals who carry elections by fraud, but it is firm as a rock in defense of the sanctity of the marriage relation. From the earliest times public sentiment in that State has looked upon the idea of divorce with abhorrence, and except for the brief period of reconstruction rule the courts have never enjoyed any power to dissolve a marriage. The convention now sitting at Columbia has decided to maintain the ancient rigor unimpaired, adopting a clause for the new constitution which expressly provides that "no divorce shall be granted in South Carolina for any cause whatsoever;" while the sentiment was clearly expressed that the State will not recognize divorces granted in other States, except in so far as she is compelled by the constitution of the United States. Tillman was ready to let down the bars so far as to permit the granting of divorces under certain circumstances, and he also offered an amendment providing for the recognition of divorces granted in other States,