They seven years with impunity, and not be impeachable?—and, at the end of his term stand acquitted with honor before his country? Now, sir, that is not the sort of redress which honest men have a right to claim; nor is it the redress which the majority here are bound to accord. have a right to give the most ample redress, and that immediately. If a judge has done wrong, he must be disgraced. And, sir, I trust that the amendment I have proposed, will go to secure this right to every freeman of the state. Sir, the gentleman from Luzerne, (Mr. Woodward) has argued that there is no danger of an abuse of power. Then why not grant redress immediately? Why postpone it for seven years, and keep me all that time smarting under the evil? If you give the governor the power to appoint to office, why not remove? Can any one answer? Because those who propose this reform, have no confidence in it. They know that the governor is not to be relied on. They know, too, that the judiciary would be at the feet of the executive. It is said that no injustice will be done to the judges; that a man of talents and virtue will prevail over a man, not possessing these qualifications, but whose politics are more congenial to the ruling party. Now, I put it to gentlemen to say why I should be compelled to endure a wrong for seven years, if the executive be competent to decide. I do not see that any satisfactory answer can be given to this question. I contend, that if the governor is competent to appoint, he is equally competent to remove. The legislature can hear the complaint-bring the judge before them-try him, and eject him from office, if guilty of the charge or charges preferred against him. There is redress. Why is it not sought after? Why is it decried in this body by those very men who tell us of their confidence in the people, and of their desire to relieve them from oppression? All the evils that were ever let out of Pandoras box, have been charged to the judiciary. Does any man expect? did any man ever foretell, that an independent judiciary would be necessarily infallible?-that no man was to appear on the bench, but what was as wise as Soloman? That none but those who were as juridical as any in the country, would find their way to the judgment seat? No man expected it; I certainly did not. I concur with gentlemen, that there may be some good men expelled from the bench. Thomas Cooper, (whose name was brought into the debate, I know not for what purpose,) was sitting in judgment on a boy for horse stealing; and for which offence he might have been sentenced to be imprisoned for ten years, and in consideration of his youth, he reduced the punishment to one year's imprisonment. The associate judges, however, ascertained by the following morning, that he was an old offender, and that the lenity of the court was misplaced. They thought to have him brought up again, and they passed a heavier sentence on him. This, they had a right to do, for they had power over the record as long as the court remained in session. There was no injustice in doing as they did. This was done, let it be remembered, at the instance of the associate judges, and not of the president. He merely exercised his power. The boy was accordingly sentenced to three years imprisonment, for nothing but the trifling little offence of stealing a horse. I see nothing to implicate the conduct of Judge Cooper. And, if any complaint was made against him out of the legislature, his concsience acquitted him. If any blame rested anywhere, refusing to pull off his hat in court. Suppose he did. Well, he is brought before the legislature, tried, found guilty, and expelled from office. Now, sir, does this not shew that the legislature will act impartially? Does it not shew also that the injured party does not apply for redress and justice in vain? Does not the example of Thomas Cooper prove that redress may be had for the wrongs practised by an unjust judge? There was another case-that of a judge becoming a drunkard. It was said, that if the official tenure was limited, a judge would not drink to excess; but that, when the tenure is good behaviour, the judges have been often intoxicated with the flowing bowl. Men, it was said, might fall into this habit of intemperance, and become unfit for the discharge of their duties. When judges were brought before the legislature for vice, immorality, gaming, they shrunk from an investigation, and were, if guilty, very glad to compromise, by resigning their offices. The legislature was empowered to remove the judges in this case. Why should we step in, and say to them, you did not carry your power far enough in the punishment of these judges? Why should we arraign the judges because the legislature had not been sufficiently strict with them? There was no provision in the Constitution of the United States to retain idle or drunken judges, and the hostility to the system, deduced from that argument, was without any foundation. Another cause assigned for shortening the term, was error of judgment to which all judges are liable. But was it ever expected that a man must be infallible, because he is a judge? Was it ever supposed that our judiciary was to be invested with that infallibility of wisdom which is the exclusive attribute of the Deity? Do we expect that they will never be betrayed into error, in the dark, perplexed, and arduous course which they pursue? Would any tenure render the nature of man more akin to that of the Deity? Could we obtain more learning, more wisdom, more experience, or more infallibility of judgment, by bringing in new men, and working frequent changes? No. This system of changing would serve no purpose but to bring into office, for a short time, some hungry and needy expectants. The judges are among the learned and honorable in the land. Slander may assail them, but still they are among the best and wisest in the country. The judiciary of Pennsylvania, he admitted, had sometimes been unpopular. But the reason of its unpopularity was, that it stood in the way of the dominant party in the Commonwealth. The party could not, when they would, break it down, and appropriate its influence and emoluments to themselves. Judges were always unpopular with parties; for, if the politics of the judges are looked at, they must find an enemy in every individual of different political sentiments with themselves. Judges, whose political opinions do not accord with those of dominant parties, are maligned out of doors, in the hearing of the public; they are assailed by the party newspapers, and every effort is made to render them odious to the people. Must the judges yield to this clamor, and shape their doctrines and deeds accordingly, or be hurled, by popular will, from their offices, making room for mere party favorites ?-for mere demagogues, perhaps, who were the means of raising an excitement against them, and expelling them from office. No judge could adminis seven years with impunity, and not be impeachable ?—and, at the end of his term stand acquitted with honor before his country? Now, sir, that is not the sort of redress which honest men have a right to claim; nor is it the redress which the majority here are bound to accord. They have a right to give the most ample redress, and that immediately. If a judge has done wrong, he must be disgraced. And, sir, I trust that the amendment I have proposed, will go to secure this right to every freeman of the state. Sir, the gentleman from Luzerne, (Mr. Woodward) has argued that there is no danger of an abuse of power. Then why not grant redress immediately? Why postpone it for seven years, and keep me all that time smarting under the evil? If you give the governor the power to Because appoint to office, why not remove? Can any one answer? those who propose this reform, have no confidence in it. They know that the governor is not to be relied on. They know, too, that the judiciary would be at the feet of the executive. It is said that no injustice will be done to the judges; that a man of talents and virtue will prevail over a man, not possessing these qualifications, but whose politics are more congenial to the ruling party. Now, I put it to gentlemen to say why I should be compelled to endure a wrong for seven years, if the executive be competent to decide. I do not see that any satisfactory answer can be given to this question. I contend, that if the governor is comThe legislature petent to appoint, he is equally competent to remove. can hear the complaint-bring the judge before them-try him, and eject him from office, if guilty of the charge or charges preferred against him. There is redress. Why is it not sought after? Why is it decried in this body by those very men who tell us of their confidence in the people, All the evils that and of their desire to relieve them from oppression? were ever let out of Pandoras box, have been charged to the judiciary. Does any man expect? did any man ever foretell, that an independent judiciary would be necessarily infallible?—that no man was to appear on That none but those who the bench, but what was as wise as Soloman? were as juridical as any in the country, would find their way to the judgI concur with ment seat? No man expected it; I certainly did not. gentlemen, that there may be some good men expelled from the bench. Thomas Cooper, (whose name was brought into the debate, I know not for what purpose,) was sitting in judgment on a boy for horse stealing; and for which offence he might have been sentenced to be imprisoned for ten years, and in consideration of his youth, he reduced the punishment to one year's imprisonment. The associate judges, however, ascertained by the following morning, that he was an old offender, and that the lenity of the court was misplaced. They thought to have him brought up again, and they passed a heavier sentence on him. This, they had a right to do, for they had power over the record as long as the court remained in session. There was no injustice in doing as they did. This was done, let it be remembered, at the instance of the associate judges, and not of the president. He merely exercised his power. The boy was accordingly sentenced to three years imprisonment, for nothing but the trifling little offence of stealing a horse. I see nothing to implicate the conduct of Judge Cooper. And, if any complaint was made against him out of the legislature, his concsience acquitted him. If any blame rested anywhere, refusing to pull off his hat in court. Suppose he did. Well, he is brought before the legislature, tried, found guilty, and expelled from office. Now, sir, does this not shew that the legislature will act impartially? Does it not shew also that the injured party does not apply for redress and justice in vain ? Does not the example of Thomas Cooper prove that redress may be had for the wrongs practised by an unjust judge? There was another case-that of a judge becoming a drunkard. It was said, that if the official tenure was limited, a judge would not drink to excess; but that, when the tenure is good behaviour, the judges have been often intoxicated with the flowing bowl. Men, it was said, might fall into this habit of intemperance, and become unfit for the discharge of their duties. When judges were brought before the legislature for vice, immorality, gaming, they shrunk from an investigation, and were, if guilty, very glad to compromise, by resigning their offices. The legislature was empowered to remove the judges in this case. Why should we step in, and say to them, you did not carry your power far enough in the punishment of these judges? Why should we arraign the judges because the legislature had not been sufficiently strict with them? There was no provision in the Constitution of the United States to retain idle or drunken judges, and the hostility to the system, deduced from that argument, was without any foundation. Another cause assigned for shortening the term, was error of judgment to which all judges are liable. But was it ever expected that a man must be infallible, because he is a judge? Was it ever supposed that our judiciary was to be invested with that infallibility of wisdom which is the exclusive attribute of the Deity? Do we expect that they will never be betrayed into error, in the dark, perplexed, and arduous course which they pursue? Would any tenure render the nature of man more akin to that of the Deity? Could we obtain more learning, more wisdom, more experience, or more infallibility of judgment, by bringing in new men, and working frequent changes? No. This system of changing would serve no purpose but to bring into office, for a short time, some hungry and needy expectants. The judges are among the learned and honorable in the land. Slander may assail them, but still they are among the best and wisest in the country. The judiciary of Pennsylvania, he admitted, had sometimes been unpopular. But the reason of its unpopularity was, that it stood in the way of the dominant party in the Commonwealth. The party could not, when they would, break it down, and appropriate its influence and emoluments to themselves. Judges were always unpopular with parties; for, if the politics of the judges are looked at, they must find an enemy in every individual of different political sentiments with themselves. Judges, whose political opinions do not accord with those of dominant parties, are maligned out of doors, in the hearing of the public; they are assailed by the party newspapers, and every effort is made to render them odious to the people. Must the judges yield to this clamor, and shape their doctrines and deeds accordingly, or be hurled, by popular will, from their offices, making room for mere party favorites ?-for mere demagogues, perhaps, who were the means of raising an excitement against them, and expelling them from office. No judge could adminis munities. They may, in some cases, presume even to offend the legislature, the power which holds even the rod of expulsion and disgrace. But for whom do they make these sacrifices? For themselves?— for their own advantage? No. They thus brave the storm of popular and official excitement, for your sake, and that of your children. They do it for all those who are oppressed, and who come to them for justice against their powerful and popular oppressors. To act thus independently is the glory of the judge, so long as he can be protected in the discharge of his duty; but, unless he be guarded by this tenure, he must go out of office, for the exercise of his judgment against the will of majorities. If the judges be deprived of their independence, then you and I cease to be safe. It is for the weak and helpless that this tenure is provided. It is not the judge who is himself the object of the tenure, but it is the person who comes to the judge for justice. It is to assure all suiters that the judge will dare to do his duty. It is not for the judges that this tenure is secure, but for the suiter. It is a pledge to all, who ask for justice, that their rights shall be held inviolable. A war is waged against judges, because they hold commissions. He confessed that he was grieved and astonished at the arguments and views which had been adduced here on this subject. He wondered that gentleman who declaimed against the judges, did not look beyond the commission and its tenure, to the helpless men, to the widows and the orphans-to the oppressed and the weak, who come as suiters for justice; and there is the reason that security is given to the judge against the attacks of party clamor, and popular caprice. It had been admitted here, in a word, by one gentleman, (Mr. Woodward) and the gentleman from Philadelphia, (Mr. Ingersoll) that the tendency and objects of their propositions, was to render the judges responsible to the people. This was a strange doctrine, for it took from the judiciary the whole of its peculiar character. What would be the result of putting the judges on a tenure of popularity? Would the legislature, or the Governor, remove popular judges by address? No. Within the circle of their popularity, they may play the tyrant as much as they please, acting according to their own arbitrary discretion;-not administering the law, and expounding the statutes, but taking our money and courting popularity. But, in fact, all that we want a judge to do, is prescribed within written laws; and we do not wish him to turn to his right hand, or to his left, to please the power from which he derives his official existence. He is entrusted with no discretion. He has no power to do harm; but it is his only office to do good. He could do nothing, but administer the justice of the country according to law. For what purpose was he placed in the judgment seat? To protect the helpless individual. Because the legislative and executive officers were responsible to the people, it was no reason that the judicial officers should be. There was no analogy between the two cases. Their duties, and the purposes of their creation, were wholly different. What object would there be, in arraigning a judge before the people? For what purpose should he be brought to this accountability? What has he done? He has administered the law, and his decision has been appealed from to the people. The case is discussed before the people, and, according to their |