they could not be gratified, and would not be gratified. The Jersey case was associated with a sort of feeling: I do not know how to describe it it is like the German Wanswerduleine, which I was reading something of in a periodical yesterday, a thing which nobody understands, and which you cannot deal with.

A few words as to the federal judiciary, and its influence. When that system was formed, the same spirit of federalism prevailed-a spirit of apprehension of the people, which appeared at the outset of our government-the spirit displayed in Montesquieu, and which regarded democracy as too dangerous a devil to let loose in society-the spirit which I attribute to Blackstone, and to those whom I harmlessly discriminated as his apprentices-this was the prevailing spirit of the time.

The distinction between the federal and the state Constitution, is very broad. The federal government emanated from the states, and not, as Mr. Webster and Judge Story supposed, from the people. The book of Judge Baldwin, to which I have before referred, shows that the federal government was created by the states. It is a state and not a popular emanation; and between the federal and the state judiciary there is all the difference in the world. The federal judiciary is something like that created in one of the European governments for trying pirates; it is for high federal purposes; for trying ambassadors; state controversies; and questions arising under the laws and treaties of the federal government. It is the tribunal in the last resort for trying constitutional questions-though this is a matter disputed and doubted by some. It was denied by Thomas Jefferson, and John C. Calhoun will probably deny it,—but Mr. Madi

son asserts it.

To whom are the federal judges responsible? Not to the people, but to the states to the senate, which represents the states. How can the Constitution, which establishes this court, be amended? Through the states. The judges are not responsible immediately to the people as they are. But, perhaps, they are still finally responsible immediately to the people. Suppose the house of representatives should refuse to put in the appropriation bills any provision for the payment of the salary of the judges. Who would compel them to do it? How could it be prevented? So, indirectly, they were as much in the control of the people, as it was proposed, by the amendment, to make them here.

But, in regard to the supreme court of the United States, I am compelled here to remark, that never did a system work worse than that. If, as it was supposed by Mr. Madison, in whom I have a deep rooted faith, the federal judiciary was organized for the purpose of settling state controversies, and adjusting great constitutional questions, it has been a signal failure. It is made plain by Judge Baldwin,-in the work to which I before alluded,-that, in the whole history of popular and executive changes, and in controversies of opinion, there is nothing like the confusion and contradiction in which the supreme court have involved themselves by their decisions. It is now impossible to say what is the law of the land on any one of the great subjects which have been referred to the decision of that tribunal. Judge Baldwin shows that, from their decision, it is extremely difficult to ascertain what is the law of the land in regard to mere matters of meum and tuum. Suffer me to say,

this supreme court of the United States has had to start afresh. Judge Baldwin mentions, as a proof of this, that last year he was in a majority of the court upon a question, as to which, a few years ago, he strove alone in the minority. They have now started afresh, and must begin by disentangling themselves from their former decisions. This furnished another evidence that the good sense of mankind is superior to that of individual wisdom, however well and elaborately instructed and cultivated.

Sir, our judiciary experiment has failed; and that is the postulate with which I set out. Now, granting even that all the apprehensions felt in regard to the proposed change, should be verified, what harm can be done by trying it. If it is found to be no remedy for existing faults in our system, why, then, all we shall have to do, will be, through the provision for future amendments, to go back again to the old system. Whatever may be said of my views in regard to the present judiciary system, either in the house or out of it, it does appear to me that the facts which I haɣe adduced, cannot be destroyed, and that my inferences cannot be impugned. We have seen what a vicious judiciary can do ;-I do not mean vicious personally, I mean vicious in system. Do you believe that in any party excitement, the people would conduct themselves as boldly as the judiciary have on some occasions? Do you believe that even in times of popular commotion, you would get the vote of a mob to commit a Quaker to prison for not taking off his hat; to strike half a dozen attornies from the roll, and deprive their families of the means of subsistence; to throw two respectable lawyers into prison, and keep them there a fortnight, for want of respect? We have heard of Baltimore mobs, of Lynch law, of flour rioters, and convent burners at the east; but these are spasmodic cases which will occur among the people, and cases to which the judiciary ought not to be subject. Do you believe that, if the judges were appointed, as the reputed father of the Convention was supposed, by the gentleman, to propose,-annually,and for which suggestion, he rebuked the gentleman from Beaver with so much asperity,-meaning, I suppose, that he was in favor of appointing the judges monthly, or every morning,-do you believe, I ask, that even in that case, the judges would do such things? One circumstance more, I can mention, as a fact, that a bishop of the church was committed to prison for some fault. Would you think such things possible even from a mob?

If the people are so much to be feared,-let us refer to Mr. Dallas' letter for greater power,-let us resolve ourselves into something stronger, -let us declare that the judges shall hold their offices for any term not exceeding a hundred years-or let us propose a dictation, if, as was for merly supposed by some politicians, the people are really incapable of self-government, and their own worst enemies. But these sentiments, in regard to the people, are now seldom heard. The mild workings of our system have dispelled these fears; and it is found that the farther it goes, the better it works.

As to the petition presented by the gentleman from Fayette, the other morning, it appeared to him to contain very judicious views, couched in temperate language. If the day has come when the right of petition

not meet and discuss their affairs, suggest remedies for the defects in their institutions, and ask a redress of grievances, without having their proceedings treated with contumely-I do not intend to say, that this was the intention of the remarks made on that paper, but it was their tendency-if, I say, the people are so much to be dreaded, let us muzzle them at once-let us submit to them some high-toned, some strong measures, and, if they see fit to adopt them, so be it.

One argument of the chairman of the judiciary committee struck me very forcibly, at the time it was advanced; and, upon farther reflection, seems entitled to some weight. The argument I refer to is, that the termination of so many offices at or near the same time, and so often, will greatly aggravate and magnify the patronage and influence of the executive, which it was the prevailing and anxious wish, both of the people and the Convention, to restrict and lessen. This objection made a deep impression on my mind at the time when it was urged, and it still remains there for consideration. I feel it to be a serious difficulty in the way, and it may regulate my vote on the question; but I should be very sorry if such a difficulty were to have the effect upon me and others to turn us aside from our object. I must, however, with deference, say that it has more weight in it than all the other arguments against the amendment which have been presented to us.

Mr. Chairman, no one who hears me, is as sensible as I am, of the important view which I have taken of this great subject. Precipitated into the debate, I have given my views crudely and imperfectly,-but they have, I assure you, the benefit of sincerity; and, in all sincerity, I wish to say one word as to the consequences of this vote. Who is in the majority and who in the minority, I cannot tell, and no one, perhaps, knows; for no one could have anticipated the result of the vote taken the other day on the proposition of the gentleman from Beaver. We talk of the uncertainty of law, and of the uncertainty of what God has pleased to make the most uncertain of all the other sciences,-government, but the vote the other day shows also, that legislation is equally uncertain. We do not know how the majority will go; but we know this that the majority on this question will take upon themselves a serious responsibility. This majority, however composed, will be responsible to the people, and responsible to posterity for the result of this proceeding. I don't know that I would not prefer a safe place in the minority to taking upon myself any share of that heavy responsiblity, which must fall upon the majority; and I am not sure that, after recording my sentiments, I may retire into the minority, and leave the responsibility in other hands. What I have said on the subject, has been said in sincerity. I know that, like other men, I am liable to the influence of prejudice, of passion, and of party, but I have endeavored to divest myself of it in considering this question. I shall continue to take an independent and sincere course in regard to it, not doubting that any amendments we may propose, will be less complained of by the people, than our present system.

With perfect respect, I beg leave again to admonish this Convention of the deep responsibility they are under to their constituents; and that, as they do well or ill here, so they will be regarded by the people, and

but I call on those of the minority, who are disposed to do right, to rally, and constitute themselves into a majority. I have no faith in tactics. They may serve to defeat or carry a measure; but depend upon it, that the stupid Germans, and the wild Irish, who, with an admixture of native Americans, form the population of Pennsylvania, have sense and shrewdness enough to see through the tactics of the greatest party manager in the world; and if this body be broken up and go home, without accomplishing the purposes for which they were assembled, they will go home despicable and despised. Let us give an honest and independent vote on the subjects before us, and leave the result to the people.

Before I sit down, I will submit the following amendment: to strike out all after the word "him," in the fourth line which will make the paragraph read as follows, viz:

The judges of the supreme court, of the several courts of common pleas, and of such other courts of record as are or shall be established by law, shall be nominated by the Governor, and by and with the consent of the senate, appointed and commissioned by him. They shall hold their offices during good behaviour, but the Governor may remove any judge, upon the address of the representatives of the people, by vote of the general assembly."

The CHAIR pronounced the motion to be out of order, at present.

Mr. CHAMBERS, of Franklin, rose and said: Without regard to the question immediately before the chair and the committee, I shall consider the great question of the judicial tenure as now presented to the committee for their consideration. That question arises on the report submitted by the standing committee on the fifth article, with the several amendments offered to it. As one of the committee to which was referred the fifth article of the Constitution, I have given the subject my best attention, and I united with the majority in favor of the report on the table. That report is in favor of retaining the present judiciary tenure; and I must say, that I have heard nothing, since it was agreed to, to induce me to change the opinions which it goes to sustain. I now ask, as one of the committee, and as one who has trespassed but little upon the time of this body,-to be permitted to offer a few remarks in explanation of the facts and principles which induced me to form and entertain those opinions.

I do not expect to be able to entertain or instruct this highly enlightened and respectable body; but I shall confine myself to a plain statement of my views. Let us see, in the first place, where we agree. It is conceded on both sides of the house, as an acknowledged and well established principle, that the powers of government, under the existing Constitution, are divided into three branches; the executive, the legislative, and the judicial. This division of power, is an improvement of modern times, in the science of government, not now to be contradicted or called in question: it is one that is deemed not only desirable for a free government, but so essential, that the gentleman from Philadelphia county, (Mr. Ingersoll) earnestly urged us to place the principle on the frontispiece of the Constitution, in order that it might be more deeply and permanently impressed upon the minds of every officer whose constitutional duty it is to make, or to execute the laws, or to

another principle:-that it is essential to the prosperity of a government that the judiciary shall be independent. We only differ, sir, as to the manner of making that department independent, consistently with a due and proper share of responsibility. I, and those who agree in sentiment with me, believe that the tenure of good behaviour is essential to the independence of the judiciary; but it is objected to this tenure, that while it gives independence to that department, it places it beyond the control of the people, or the representatives of the people, and makes it irresponsible. It is objected that, under the existing Constitution, our judiciary is independent of the people. This we deny. They are responsible to the representatives of the people; they are amenable to them, and we know of no other mode in which they can or ought to be held responsi ble. They should not be held responsible to any other power than the representatives of the people. You do not, in the proposed amendment, attempt to bring them down directly to the people. How are they now amenable? They were appointed during good behaviour; but they are liable to be arraigned, tried, condemned, dismissed, and rendered incapable of holding office ever after,-and the tribunal, to which they are thus amenable, is the legislature, the representatives of the people. Is not here then a direct and adequate responsibility? They are responsible directly to the representatives of the people, who are both their accusers and their judges.

Their responsibility does not end even here. They are liable to be removed for other causes, than crimes and misdemeanors, on the address of the two branches of the legislature. There may be deficiencies in a judge, which will, without affecting his judicial or moral character, render him incompetent and unfit for the discharge of his duties; and, in those cases, he may be removed on the address of the legislature.

Then we have, in this Constitution, judicial responsibility to a sufficient extent, if the representatives of the people are faithful to their trust, and faithfully discharge their duty. But we are told, that the remedy by impeachment has failed, that it is not an efficient remedy-that it is a mere mockery of responsibility. I am not willing to admit the fact. But if it is so, whose fault is it? It is the fault of the people's representatives, whoil in the execution of their duty. This is not an objection, then, to the Constitution, but to their representatives, and the people themselves. It is for the people to choose, for their representatives, those who are qualified by their integrity and ability to discharge the trust reposed in them: and, as we contend, they have been chosen in regard to such qualifications.

It is said that, under this provision, your judges have been complained of, and have not been removed. If, sir, there is any foundation for this charge-if the representatives of the people have failed to discharge their trust-this is not to be imputed as a reproach to your Constitution, and it cannot, on that account, be said that your judiciary system is a failure.

It is said that under this power your judges have been complained of and have not been removed. Why sir, if there be any thing in this charge, the representatives of the people have failed to perform their trust. Then he would say, that this would not only be charging the