serves the appellation of a "matchless instrument." It may be considered as the work of delegates from every state in the Union, for the people of that state have been gathered from every portion of the country, and unite the joint experience of all our systems of polity. If there be, in forming a Constitution, any advantage in numerous examples, any thing in varied knowledge and experience, any thing in freedom from the violence of party, and any thing in the absence of all disturbing and exciting motives, the people of Michigan possessed it in settling theirs.

Considering the time and circumstances of its adoption, the lights shed by surrounding examples, and the principles embodied in it, that Constitution comes to us as high authority, and it contains no such solecism as life offices. The judges of the supreme court are appointed for seven years-judges of county courts, associates of circuit courts-judges of probate, and justices of the peace, are elected by the people for four years. I cannot help thinking, sir, that this last experiment at a free Constitution ought to outweigh, in this argument, all the abstractions, which great names, ancient and modern, have sanctioned, and which the gentleman has pressed into his service. If I am mistaken in this, let me ask if the examples of all the States to which I have referred, are to go for nothing in this argument. They modify the judicial tenure variously, but none of them extend the good behaviour principle to every branch of their judiciary in the same unqualified manner we do. Is this no evidence that the American sentiment is against this tenure? Is it not at least evidence that communities of freemen may live in the enjoyment of all the rights of freemen, without so permanent and irresponsible a judiciary as ours? Whatever else is denied to me, I feel entitled to this conclusion. It will be remembered that between other States and ours there is a strict analogy, so that you may reason from them, to this, with propriety and force; but that, between the English or federal judiciaries and ours, there is no such analogy, and there can be no such argument.

Mr. Chairman these are some of the views and reasons which have induced me to move this amendment. I submit, sir, if there be not in the character and wishes of our people, in the genius and spirit of our institutions, and in the evils and disadvantages of the good behaviour principle, reason for abandoning it; and if there be not, in our own and the experience of other States, and in the principles of the limited tenure,. abundant encouragement for adopting this. If I believed it would sacrifice the independence of the judiciary, I would not ask you to abandon that principle and adopt this one, but I do not believe it. I do not believe it is necessary an officer should feel himself a tenant for life, in order to be independent and upright. If he be an honest man, he will be independent of all improper influences; if he be not an honest man, no parchment limitations can make him independent, and it is worse than mockery, to instal him in office during good behaviour. In what does the independence of a judge consist? It consists in rendering judgment according to law, without any hope of gain or fear of loss. How is a Pennsylvania judge to gain or lose by his judgment? We have no crown influence to propitiate, no disappointed political power to dread.

The people will not sacrifice an independent and upright judge, for it will not be to their interest to do so; and the judge will be independent

their interest to retain him. But, we are told, occasions of high party excitement, sometimes occur, and that a case may come into the courts for decision, which divides and excites the whole community, and the gentleman from the city has illustrated the danger of such an occurrence by a recent example in New Jersey. What was that case? We understand from the gentleman, that a controversy had arisen between two sects of Quakers, and that a suit was pending before Chief Justice Ewing and Judge Drake, which involved the title to a large amount of property claimed by both sects-that judgment was rendered in favour of the orthodox Quakers who were the weakest party, and that the Hicksites threw their influence into the political scale, which next year returned a majority of members to the Legislature, who were adverse to renewing the commissions of Judges Ewing and Drake, which were about expiring -that Judge Drake was turned out, and that Chief Justice Ewing would have been, but for a merciful Providence who removed him by death, before his commission expired. I am not about to deny, Mr. Chairman, that this is a very affecting story. It addresses itself very strongly to our feelings, but what does it amount to as an appeal to our judgments. To this simply, that Judge Drake was not re-appointed to an office which he had held many years, the majority of the people preferring another. And what is this but the operation of the republican principle of govern ing by majority.They turned out one man and put in another, and had they not a right to do so? Judge Drake had no claim on the office; it was not made for him, it was not his, it was the people's office, and if a majority of them thought it could be better administered by another incumbent, who in this country, where every thing goes by majorities, can question their right? It was, I repeat, the operation of a republican principle. I do not mean to say that the exercise of this principle, in this particular case, was wise or just-I think it probable, it was harshly applied, and it may have been attended with distressing circumstances, which are to be regretted; but, when you divest it of all its attending circumstances, and look at the transaction as the operation of a political principle, you can see nothing in the principle to condemn, unless you condemn the principle on which all our political institutions rest. I understand the public interests did not suffer by the change, for that Judge Ryerson, the successor of Judge Drake, is one of the ablest lawyers and purest men to be found in the State of New Jersey.

But, sir, I thank the gentleman from the city for bringing this New Jersey case to the notice of the committee. It proves two things very germain to my argument: First, that you can obtain learned, able and upright lawyers to go on the bench under the limited tenure. The gentleman paid a high eulogy to both Judge Ewing and Judge Drake, and I have no doubt they deserved it; yet you find them leaving their professions, to go on the bench, under a tenure which they knew would expire of its own limitation in seven years. Connect this fact with the experience we have had in our district courts, and can any body doubt that the elite of the profession will accept judicial appointments for a limited time, if the salaries be adequate? But I thank the gentleman for this case, for another reason. It proves in the second place, that a prospect of losing office is not always destructive of judicial independence. These judges undoubtedly knew that their decision would array against their re-appoint

right or wrong, they certainly did not bend to this influence; so that we have in this case a consoling example of independent and upright judges, deciding conscientiously, and not caring for consequences. Moreover, it is to be considered, that this was a peculiar case of popular excitement, of rare occurrence, which could only have operated so effectually in a small community, and would have been unsufficient to agitate parties in a great State like ours. Altogether, I do not think the New Jersey case is calcu lated to aid the gentleman's argument sensibly. And still less to the purpose were his instances taken from Cromwell's time, and the French revolution. Why sir, what would any tenure of a judge have availed him in those times? Would Cromwell, do you suppose, who cut off the head of his king, have been restrained, in his purpose, by a judge, with the good behaviour tenure, pleading the habeas corpus act? He would have taught him that the only good behaviour he was bound to, was obedience to the protector! And do gentlemen fancy that the good behaviour tenure would have mitigated the horrors of the French revolution, or saved a single victim from the guillotine? Impossible. These were times when arbitrary power was the only law, and they can furnish no argument for a constitutional question. For what purpose are such strained analogies introduced here? We have a written Constitution, which prescribes the orbit of each department of the government; we have no arbitrary power, no lawless licentious faction to fear; but a sober, staid and honest people who want the justice of the State administered by men in whom they can confide, according to law, and without sale, denial or delay. They know what a judge should be, and after all, the people are the best judges of the judges. Give them, for their judges, men who are sound lawyers, who are conscientious, who are gentlemen and republicans, and there will be no fear of popular reproach or persecution, and no danger of justice being warped, and the land marks removed by seductions of judicial independence and virtue. Make it the interest, sir, of the judges to serve such a people well, and you will promote their independence and all the judicial virtues. The love of popular applause is one of the strongest and noblest instincts of our nature, and if judicial independence can have a stay more firm and sure than all others, it is this. My amendment lays hold of this feeling of the human heart, and makes it stand surety for the good behaviour of the judge. For when his commission expires, and its renewal depends on the public voice, he will feel its value, and learn, by an independent, faithful and upright performance of his duties, to merit its approba

tion.

Mr. Chairman, there are many gentlemen here who believe the people of Pennsylvania desire the proposed change. I believe a large proportion of our fellow citizens expect and desire it. They regard these life offices as the plague-spot in the Constitution, and we shall sadly disappoint their hopes, if we do nothing to eradicate it. Other gentlemen doubt that a majority of the people wish for the change, and they believe firmly that many of them prefer the good behaviour tenure to any other. Now in this state of uncertainty and conflicting opinion, what can be more proper than to submit the question to the people. Every thing we do here is to be reviewed by them, and it is to that final arbiter, public opinion, that I wish to bring this issue. Let the principle

tenure, and all minor questions, and then gentlemen may enlighten public opinion before the election, and persuade the people to reject the amendment at the ballot boxes, if they can. If the people sustain the amendment, and declare for the limited tenure, it ought to become, as it will, a part of our Constitution.

Mr. Chairman, justice to myself requires me to say, in conclusion, that I have been influenced in my support of this measure solely by a conviction that it is right, and that the public interests demand it. I have no prejudice or pique, against judges to gratify-no wrongs to redress -no secret griefs to assuage. I have in that department many friendsI do not know that I have a single enemy.

I thank the committee for the patience and attention with which they have listened to me, and cheerfully commit the question to their judgment and candor.

The committee rose, reported progress, and obtained leave to sit again; and,

Then the Convention adjourned.

TUESDAY MORNING, OCTOBER 31, 1837.

Mr. FORWARD, of Allegheny, submitted the following resolutions, which were ordered to be laid on the table and printed:

Resolved, That it is expedient to amend the fifth article of the Constitution, so as to incorporate therein the following principles:

First. That the judges of the supreme and inferior courts may be removed by a vote of two-thirds of both branches of the Legislature.

Secondly. That no person who is or shall be a judge of the supreme or any inferior court, shall be eligible to any other office in this Commonwealth; that this ineligibility shall continue until the expiration of two years from and after he shall have ceased to hold his office; and that if any person, holding the office of a judge of the supreme or any inferior court of this Commonwealth, shall be a candidate for any legislative, executive, or judicial office in the govornment of the United States, his office shall be thereby vacated.

Thirdly. The Legislature shall provide by law for the appointment of commissioners to take the depositions of witnesses in cases of complaints made against any of the judges of the supreme or inferior courts, and that the depositions of witnesses thus taken may be read on the trial of the party accused, unless he shall specially demand their personal attendance.

Mr. STURDEVANT, of Luzerne, submitted the following resolution :

shall adjourn to meet again at nine o'clock in the morning, to continue in session until two o'clock in the afternoon, and that the afternoon sessions will be dispensed with.

The question being taken on the second reading of the resolution, it was decided in the negative-ayes 28.

Mr. PORTER, of Northampton, submitted the following resolution: Resolved, That the use of this Hall be granted to the Rev. Walker Booth, to-morrow evening, for the purpose of delivering a lecture explanatory of the views and prospects of the colonization society.

The resolution was read a second time and adopted.

FIFTH ARTICLE.

The Convention again resolved itself into a committee of the whole, Mr. M'SHERRY in the Chair, on the report of the committee to whom was referred the fifth article of the Constitution.

The question being on the motion of Mr. WooDWARD to amend the report by striking out all after the words "section 2," and inserting in lieu thereof the report of the minority;

Mr. WOODWARD having concluded his remarks,

Mr. PORTER, of Northampton, said it was conceded on all sides that justice should be in intelligent and independent hands. There could be no greater curse inflicted on a country than a weak and unlearned judiciary. I, (said Mr. P.) am not singular in this opinion. Our fathers thought it sufficient ground of complaint against the British government, that the King had made the judges dependent on the crown. So also thought the Convention of 1788, which formed the Constitution of the United States. And so thought the Convention of 1790, which formed the Constitution of Pennsylvania. The former provided that the judges should hold their offices during good behaviour, and should receive a compensation which could not be diminished while they remained in office. The Constitution of 1790, was similar in its import, although it varied in its phraseology, introducing the word "adequate," before "compensation," so as to make the section read thus:

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"Section 2. The judges of the supreme court and of the several courts "of common pleas, shall hold their offices during good behaviour: but "for any reasonable cause which shall not be sufficient ground of impeachment, the Governor may remove any of them, on the address of "two-thirds of each branch of the Legislature. The judges of the supreme court, and the presidents of the several courts of common pleas, "shall, at stated times, receive for their services, an adequate compensa"tion, to be fixed by law, which shall not be diminished, during their "continuance in office: but they shall receive no fees or perquisite of "office, nor hold any other office of profit under this Commonwealth."

On examination of the book of Constitutions furnished us, I find that, out of the twenty-six States, the Constitutions of eighteen provide that the judges shall hold their offices during good behaviour. These eighteen states are Maine, New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Connecticut, New York, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Kentucky, Tennessee, Mississippi, Alabama, Louisiana, Illi