scruples shall not be compelled to bear arms; and to this exemption it adds a qualification. What is that? That they shall be compelled to pay an equivalent for personal service. How far then does the amendment of the gentleman from Chester differ from the clause? His amendment provides that they shall not be compelled to bear arms, and so far they agree. Then it provides that, at all times of war and public exigency, they shall pay an equivalent for personal service. Mark, Mr. Chairman, how small a difference there is between the amendment and the original clause. There is scarcely a hair's breadth of difference between them. The exemption shall exist only when there is no war and no exigency. What is the meaning of the word "war?" It means that space of time when hostilities are in progress-that is plain; but to define the meaning of the term “ 'exigency," will be more difficult. But this very difficulty itself serves to narrow down the privilege to a small compass, and it is left to the Legislature to say what shall constitute the exigency. In case of the occurrence of circumstances which justified an apprehension of war, even at a distant time, would it not be competent for the Legislature to say that the "exigency" contemplated by the Constitution has occurred? Certainly it would be. The limit of the exemption would, after all, be left to the Legislature to prescribe. The question. then simply comes down to this, whether it is necessary to provide, at this period of time, when there is no strong occasion for it, that there shall be no exemption, and that the same duty shall be required from every citizen as in time of actual war, or of the exigencies arising from an apprehension of war.

Let us, said Mr. S., look at the question in another point of view. Suppose the Legislature should lay a tax of two hundred thousand dollars for the provision of munitions of war. There was nothing in this amendment that would exempt any one from paying his portion of the tax. Adopt this amendment, and there is nothing in it to prevent the Legislature from taxing citizens, including the Quakers, to the whole extent of their private fortune, for the purchase of arms and munitions of war. The extent of the provisions of the amendment has been misunderstood, and he put that case to illustrate it, and also for the purpose of deducing from it this position, that by this amendment we exempt the Friends and others who entertain scruples, from nothing but personal service. There was no tax nor contrivance, for the purpose of military preparation, from which any one could by this provision be exempted, and its single and sole aim and effort was to relieve them from personal service, and they were exempted before by the existing Constitution.

I do not, continued Mr. S., regard this as an exemption from a tax. I do not regard this duty of taking up arms as a tax. I recognize in it a privilege, of which no citizen is to be deprived-the high privilege of a freeman-the privilege to bear arms. This we are not to regard as a tax or a burden. It is a duty to the public and a right appertaining to the character of a freeman; and in the old Constitution, which was framed at a time when men scrupulously criticised every word they used in such an instrument, the word "equivalent" is employed, from a knowledge that the term "tax" would be inadequate for the idea intended to be conveyed. By the word "tax," we invariably understand a pecuniary

and holders of property for the general good. That is the well known meaning and character of the word "tax ;" and, in the Constitution of the United States, there is a provision to secure uniformity of taxation. The Constitution uses the word "equivalent" for the reason that it does not mean a "tax," from which no one, as its framers knew, could be exonerated. It only said that these persons should not be compelled to perform this specific duty.

As an

The argument of conscience, Mr. S. said, had been so ably and eloquently presented to the committee, that it would be unjust for him to go into it. He would pass it over, therefore, with a single remark. argument, it had been pressed with a very important qualification; that all scruples should yield, at all times. to public necessity. Now, when this was admitted, when it was conceded that the persons asking exemption shall submit to the paramount claim of public necessity, all that is required is given up. It is put into the power of the Legislature at all times to determine when this public necessity exists. Certainly, gentle. men can find nothing alarming in the doctrine of conscientious scruples, with such qualification as this. But who, it is asked, holds these conscientious scruples? How shall it be ascertained who entertains these scruples? Will it be competent for me to say to the tax-gentlemen, I have a scruple, you can collect nothing from me? That, too, will require legislation. It must not be left in the power of every man to start up and say, I have a conscientious scruple, and am exempt. It is competent for the Legislature to direct the mode in which the existence of a conscientious scruple shall be ascertained. It would not be permitted, for instance, that a young man who has broken through the discipline of the Quakers society and borne arms, should, when he chose, afterwards again avail himself of his original scruple to evade the duty. It would be found necessary to make some general provisions with a view to determine what are conscientious scruples, and how they shall be ascertained.— That would be an important check upon any abuse of the exemption, and would fully meet the objection that the provision will put it in the power of any one, by mere word of mouth, to evade the performance of military duty. But who believes that any person would make such a claim for the sake of getting rid of this duty in time of peace? Without treading further upon this ground, he would now beg leave to introduce another topic-one, however, which had already been forcibly argued by his colleague on his left, (Mr. Chandler.)

In all ages and nations, the people have deemed it consistent with their obligations to themselves, to acknowledge, by suitable remunerations, the services of great benefactors; individuals, families and provinces, had been distinguished by the high rewards bestowed on them by a grateful people, in remuneration and memorial of their great services. This has been the practice in monarchical governments, and there is no reason why a free people should deprive themselves of the power of fixing the stamp of their approbation on individuals and bodies of men who have rendered signal services to the public. He would not set up for the Friends any overweening and exclusive pretension to exalted merit.But he could not forbear to see in that society the founders of the Commonwealth. They laid the basis of our prosperity. They did establish

the influence of which will be felt to the latest posterity. He could point to the tenets of Pennsylvania on the subject of slavery; to the establishment of the first penitentiary system; and to the amelioration of the criminal code. He could, he said, enumerate other great principles which had been infused in the legislation of Pennsylvania and which derived their origin from the society which laid the basis of this Commonwealth. He had forgotten one thing which he had intended to name, as distinguishing the policy of this Commonwealth from that of any other of the colonies here founded-he meant the terms of intercourse between the original settlers and the aborigines. How proud would be the situation of a Pennsylvanian, when, in the national councils, any question should arise in relation to the amelioration of the criminal code, or to the abolition of slavery, or to our intercourse with the aborigines-our whole policy in relation to which had been marked out by the society of Friends. It was not a boon that was proposed to be given to this society, but the distinction was asked as resting on their old privileges and laws, which had not yet been wholly wrested from them. This noble and venerable mansion was once theirs, all its rooms and furniture were theirs. They had a right to prescribe the terms on which all who sought admission within its walls, should be permitted to enter. One small apartment was all that was now left to them. The new comers had crowded them out of every other. One solitary chamber and place of rest was left to them, and they only asked the privilege to remain there. You have the hall, the chambers, the stairways-leave us, they ask, our private room, to which we may retire in safety. The privileges which they claimed by charter they had a right to perpetuate. He apprehended that these were the feelings and principles which induced our forefathers, when they adopted the present Constitution, to insert an exemption for them from the duty of bearing arms. From respect to the original owners of the splendid edifice which we inhabit, he was willing to place his vote in favor of such an amendment as will save their feelings, while, at the same time, it will not hazard the public interests.

The question being on the amendment of the gentleman from Chester, as modified,

The yeas and nays were required by Mr. M'CAHEN and nineteen others, and were as follows:

YEAS-Messrs. Agnew, Ayres, Baldwin, Barnitz, Bell, Biddle, Brown, of Lancaster, Carey, Chambers, Candler, of Chester, Chandler, of Philadelphia, Chauncey, Coates, Cochran, Cope, Craig, Cunningham, Dar'ington, Denny, Dickey, Dunlop, Farrelly, Forward, Hopkinson, Jenks, Maclay, Martin, M'Dowell M'Sherry, Meredith, Merrill, Pennypacker, Porter, of Lancaster, Porter, of Northampton, Purviance, Royer, Russell, Scott, Serrill, Snively, Stevens, Thomas, Young, Sergeant, President-44.

NAYS-Messrs. Banks, Barclay, Barndollar, Bedford, Bigelow, Bonham, Brown, of Northampton, Brown, of Philadelphia, Butler, Clapp, Clarke, of Beaver, Clarke. of Indiana, Cleavinger, Cline, Crain, Crawford, Crum, Curll, Darrah, Dickerson, Dillinger, Donagan, Donnell, Foulkrod, Fry, Fuller, Gamble, Gearhart, Gilmore, Grenell, Harris, Hastings, Hayhurst, Hays, Helffenstein, Henderson, of Allegheny, Henderson, of Dauphin, Hiester, High, Houpt, Hyde, Ingersoll, Keim, Kennedy, Kerr, Krebs, Lyons, Magee, Mann, M'Cahen, M'Call, Merkel, Montgomery, Myers, Nevin. Overfield, Pollock, Read, Rogers, Saeger, Scheetz, Sellers, Seltzer, Shellito, Sill, Smith, Smyth, Sterigere, Stickel, Sturdevant, Taggart, Todd, Weaver, Weidman, White, Woodward

76.

A motion was made by Mr. DUNLOP and Mr. Darlington,

That the committee of the whole reconsider the vote of the 21st inst., on the amendment of the report of the committee to whom was referred the sixth article of the Constitution, to strike from the fourteenth section of said report all after the word " law," in the line, as follows, viz: "Those who conscientiously scruple to bear arms shall not be compelled to do so, but shall pay an equivalent for personal service."

Mr. INGERSOLL said, he should vote against the motion to reconsider; but if it prevailed and if the state of things which he had supposed to be settled, and which he believed to be the best settlement of it, was overthrown, he should then offer a substitute for the clause, providing that the freemen of the Commonwealth should be armed, trained and prepared; with the exception of those who shall obtain the certificate of the court of the county where he resides, that it is contrary to his religious sentiments to bear arms. This provision would guard the rights of conscience both in war and in peace; and he knew of no reason why they should be less respected in time of war than in peace. He thought the matter had better be left where it was, but if it was the pleasure of the committee to reconsider the vote, he should offer this amendment.

He

Mr. BROWN, of Philadelphia, said the object of the gentleman was already understood; but as the motion was seconded by the gentleman from Chester, (Mr. Darlington) who was a member of the society of Friends, he should not oppose it. If the Friends declared that clause to be obnoxious to them, he certainly would agree to striking it out. (Mr. B.) supposed that it was in accordance with the wishes of the society that the clause was stricken out, and it was at the request of some members of the society that the motion was made, and not from any disposition unfriendly to the militia system. It took away a distinction which was made at the time of the formation of the Constitution for the avowed purpose of relieving the Friends from burdens of conscience, but the measure had in practice proved to be odious and oppressive. It was, therefore, declared by some of the Friends, and, in fact, it was their general wish, as he had always understood, that, if this was the only means of relief which we could offer them, they would prefer to have no distinction whatever, made between them and other citizens. If such a clause as they require cannot be made a part of the Constitution, they prefer to be left to take their chance with others. But, when one of the members of the society, who is presumed to know their views and feelings on the subject, moves a reconsideration, he must suppose the clause was acceptable to these, and that they proposed to let it remain where it He was, therefore, willing that the motion to reconsider should

was.

prevail.

Mr. DARLINGTON said, the opportunity thus offered him to explain his object in seconding this motion was not unacceptable to him. He voted for the motion to strike out the clause, distinctly understanding, and hoping to get in the place of it, something more favourable to the wishes of the society of Friends. He wished to strike out the clause, because it imposed on the Friends an obligation to "pay an equivalent" for the service from which it exempted them. Against that obligation the society had complained, and in the hope of being relieved from it and

But, finding, as he now did, that what the Friends wished could not be obtained, he was in favor of restoring the clause to what it was before. If he could get nothing better for the society, he certainly did not wish to render their situation any worse.

Mr. SERGEANT, (President) rose merely to suggest, he said, whether the member from the county of Philadelphia, had not a sort of right to offer his amendment. He had actually presented it, and it was entitled to consideration, but it was withdrawn to allow a direct vote on the amendment offered by the gentleman from Chester.

Mr. DUNLOP would, he said, withdraw his motion if necessary, but he did not understand it to be so. He asked what the amendment referred to was.

Mr. MARTIN, in reply, said, it provided that no man should be constrained to bear arms or pay an equivalent therefor, except in times of

war.

'The committee then rose, reported progress and obtained leave to sit again; and,

The Convention adjourned.

THURSDAY AFTERNOON, OCTOBER 26, 1838.

SIXTH ARTICLE.

The Convention again resolved itself into a committee of the whole, Mr. CHAMBERS in the chair, on the report of the committee to whom was referred the 6th article of the Constitution.

The question being on the motion of Mr. DUNLOP to reconsider the vote of the 21st, by which the amendment of Mr. BROWN, of the county of Philadelphia, was agreed to, Mr. DUNLOP withdrew the same.

Mr. MARTIN, of Philadelphia county, moved to amend the section, by inserting after the word "law," in the third line, the words, "no freeman shall be compelled to bear arms, nor pay an equivalent therefor, except in times of exigency or war."

Mr. MARTIN said, it would not be necessary to occupy the attention of the committee more than a very few minutes, as he thought the amendment must be fully understood. The question was now stripped of all those vexed matters which had occupied so much time. This consumption of time, however, was not to be regretted. The question was now reduced to this single point-if the freemen of this State shall be compelled at all times, to bear arms, and to be mustered into service whether they are wanted or not. It was a question, therefore, easily under