ownership of property rights, powers and franchises may legally pass to another company while such contracts for payments exist. The section embraces obligations for payment of taxes voted, and also voluntary conveyances by one company to another, in which the delivery of stock to taxpayers shall be provided for. Therefore, held, that a transfer by the company in whose favor a tax was voted to another company does not forfeit the ax voted, stock in the new company of equal or greater value than that of the company to whom the tax was voted being offered to the taxpayer. Cantillion v. Dubuque & N. W. R. Co., 78-48; and see notes to § 2086.

REPORTS OF COST OF CONSTRUCTION.

1998. To general assembly.

1303.

When any railway has been completed and opened for use, the corporation constructing the same shall report to the next general assembly, under oath, the total cost thereof, specifying the amount expended for construction, engines, cars, depots. and other buildings, and the amount of all other expenses, together with the length of the railway, the number of planes, with their inclination to the mile, the greatest curvature, the average width of grade, and the number of ties per mile. [9 G. A., ch. 169, § 1.]

MAXIMUM RATES.

1999. Schedule posted. 1304. In the month of June in each year, every corporation operating a railway in this state shall fix its maximum rates of fare for passengers and freight, for transportation of timber, wood, and coal, per ton, cord, or thousand feet per mile; also its fare and freight per mile for transporting merchandise and articles of the first, second, third and fourth classes of freight; and, on the first day of July following, shall put up at all the stations and depots on its railway, a printed copy of such fare and freight, and cause a copy to remain posted during the year. For wilfully neglecting so to do, or for wilfully receiving higher rates of fare or freight than those posted, the company shall forfeit and pay to the State of Iowa, for the use of the school fund, not less than one hundred dollars nor more than two hundred dollars, to be recovered in any civil action in the name of the state; and it is hereby made the duty of the several district [county] attorneys within their respective districts [counties] to sue for and recover all sums forfeited as aforesaid; and such corporation shall also forfeit and pay to the person injured, double the amount of compensation or charge illegally taken, to be recovered by such person in a civil action [9 G. A., ch. 169, § 2; 13 G. A., ch. 139.]

A former statute, similar to this section, considered and held not to be in conflict with the U. S. Const., as being an attempt to regulate commerce between the states. Fuller v. Chicago & N. W. R. Co., 31-187.

Under such statute, held, also, that the receiving of higher rates than those posted subject the company to the penalties imposed by the statute without it being shown that such overcharge was wilful. Fuller v. Chicago & N. W. R. Co., 31-211.

2000. Maximum passenger fare. 1305. For the transportation of passengers, no railway company shall charge to exceed three and one-half cents per mile per passenger.

The application of this section is limited by the provisions of § 2022.

REGULATION OF RATES.

2001. Rights reserved. 1306. All contracts, stipulations, and conditions, regarding the right of controlling and regulating the charges for freight and passengers upon railways, heretofore made in granting land or other property or voting taxes to aid in the construction of, or franchises to, railway corporations, are expressly reserved, continued and perpetuated in full force and effect, to be exercised by the general assembly, whenever the public good or the public necessity requires such exercise thereof.

[In next to the last line, the word "and" is erroneously inserted in the printed Code in place of "or."]

NEGLIGENCE OR WRONGS OF EMPLOYES.

2002. Liability for; co-employes. 1307. Every corporation operating a railway shall be liable for all damages sustained by any person, including employees of such corporation, in consequence of the neglect of agents, or by any mismanagement of the engineers or other employees of the corporation, and in consequence of the willful wrongs, whether of commission or omission of such agents, engineers, or other employees, when such wrongs are in any manner connected with the use and operation of any railway, on or about which they shall be employed, and no contract which restricts such liability shall be legal or binding. [9 G. A., ch. 169, § 7; 13 G. A.. ch. 121; 14 G. A., ch. 65.]

In general. Without this statutory provision the company would not be liable to an employee for injuries resulting from negligence of a co-employee, and the intention of the statute is merely to give to the employee a right of action in such cases, and not to change the degree of care necessary, which is, as between master and servant, that of ordinary care and diligence only. Hunt v. Chicago & N. W. R. Co., 26-363.

The company is liable to an employee for damages resulting from the negligence of a co-employee whose duty it was to keep a bridge in order, in the performance of such duty. Locke v. Sioux City & P. R. Co,, 46–109.

Person or company operating railway. A receiver who is managing a railway under the direction of a court is within this section and may be charged, and a recovery obtained against him, as a person operating a railway. And though his liability could not be personal, a judgment against him might be satisfied out of the property in his hands if the court by whom he was appointed should so direct. Sloan v. Central Iowa R. Co., 62-728. The fact that a lessee may be held liable under this section does not prevent recovery against the owner of the road. The actions are cumulative. Bower v. Burlington & S. W. R. Co., 42-546.

The running of special trains over the railway by a construction company in constructing it is operating a railroad within the meaning of the statutory provision. McKnight v. Iowa & M. R. Constr. Co., 43-406.

Persons not employees. The language of the section is so broad that it includes any and all persons, employees and others, who may be injured by the negligence of the agents or servants of the railway company or persons operating the railway. Rose v. Des Moines Valley R. Co., 39–246.

If the act of the employees is within the scope of his authority the company is liable for injuries therefrom to a third person, even though the act is wilfully wrongful. Marion v. Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co., 64-568.

If the employes perform their duty in operating a train in a manner so unusual or reckless as to endanger lives of persons upon the train they are guilty of negligence, and if in direct consequence of such negligence a person is injured the company will be liable even though the person was on the train without right. This section renders the company liable for all damages sus

tained by any person in consequence of the neglect of agents. Way v. Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co., 73-463.

It is not material that plaintiff, claiming to recover by virtue of this section, was not employed in the operation of the road. It is sufficient if it ap pears that he was injured by the operation of the road and by negligence of the parties charged with responsibility with respect to the movement of trains. Pierce v. Central Iowa R. Co, 73-140.

Employees engaged in operating road. This section affords a remedy only to such employees as are employed, at the time of receiving the injury, in the business of operating a railroad. Malone v. Burlington, C. R. & N.

R. Co., 65-417.

So that to entitle an employe to recover against the company for injuries which he has sustained, he must show, first, that he belonged to the class of employees to whom the statute affords a remedy, and, second, that the company which occasioned the injury was of a class of companies for which the remedy is given. Ibid.

Therefore, held, that an employe whose duty was to wipe off engines, open and close the doors of the engine house, and remove snow from the turntable and tracks and operate the turn-table, and who was injured by reason of the negligence of a co-employee causing the door of the engine house to fall upon him, was not engaged in the operation of the road in such a sense as to be within the statutory provisions. Ibid.

The change from the common law made by this section extends no further than to employees engaged in the business of operating a railway, and not to persons employed by the corporation without regard to the nature of their employment. Such corporation may be engaged in any other business, which may be within the scope of their organization, but not at all, or very remotely, connected with the use of the road, and in such cases employees by whom such affairs are conducted acquire no rights under the statutory provision, as their occupation does not expose them to the hazards incident to the use of railways, and the statute was not designed for their protection and benefit. Schroeder v. Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co., 41-344.

It is error for the court to instruct the jury that, as a matter of law, the nature of plaintiff's service and employment bring him within the terms of the statute. The character of his employment, whether in connection with the use of defendant's railroad, or whether thereby he is brought within the provisions of the statute, are questions of fact to be determined by the jury. Ibid.

The statutory provision applies no further than to employees engaged in the business of operating a railroad, and does not apply to employees in a machine-shop of the company. In such case the common-law rule exempting an employer from liability for injury to an employee resulting from the negligence of a co-employee is still in force. Potter v. Chicago, R. 1. & P. R. Čo.,

46-399.

The words "where such wrongs are in any manner connected with the operation or use of any railway" apply not only to wilful wrongs, but also to negligence of agents, etc., and in order to entitle an employee to recover for injuries received from a co-employee, it must appear that he was engaged in a service connected with the use and operation of the railroad. Foley v. Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co., 64-644.

Therefore, held, that an employe whose duty it was to repair cars while standing upon the track and side track of the company, while not in motion, and who was sometimes required to ride on the trains of the company from place to place for the purpose of making such repairs at different places, was not employed in the operation of the road in such sense as to bring him within the protection of the provision. Ibid.

Injuries to one employe by reason of negligence of another, both engaged in the work of repairing a track, such injury not resulting from the operation of the railroad, held not within the provisions of the statute. Matson v. Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co., 68-22.

Employees engaged in hoisting coal in a coal-house for the purpose of filling a car are not so engaged in the hazardous business of operating a railroad as

that one can recover for injuries caused by the negligence of the other. Luce v. Chicago, St. P., M. & O. R. Co., 67-75.

In order to render a company liable for injuries to an employee by reason of negligence of a co-employee, the negligence complained of must be that of an employee and a co-employee, who are in some manner performing work for the purpose of moving a train, as loading or unloading it, or superintending, directing or aiding its movement. The persons must be connected in some manner with the moving of trains. Work preparatory thereto, which may be done away from the train, is not connected with its movement. Stroble v. Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co., 70-555.

Therefore, held, that where employees were engaged about elevating coal to a platform to supply the engine, their duties were not so connected with the use and operation of the railroad as that one of them could recover for injuries received from negligence of the other. Ibid.

Where a section hand was injured by the negligence of a co-employee while engaged in loading a car, held, that it did not sufficiently appear that his employment was of such character as to entitle him to recover. Smith v. Burlington, C. R. & N. R. Co., 59-73.

Where an employee was injured by appliances connected with the roundhouse, held, that it was not error to instruct the jury that if they found it was a part of plaintiff's duty to keep such appliances in a safe condition, or that it was the duty of another employee of the same kind to do so, and they both, or either of them, neglect to do so, then the plaintiff could not recover, the employees not being engaged in the operation of the road. Manning v. Burlington, C. R. & N. R. Co., 64-240.

A person engaged in working on a bridge of the company and required, in the course of his employment, to ride on its trains, is within the statutory provision. Schroeder v. Chicago, R. 1. & P. R. Co., 47-375.

And so is a section hand. Frandsen v. Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co., 36–372. And so is a hand engaged in shoveling gravel from a gravel train. McKnight v. Iowa & M. R. Constr. Co, 43-406.

Or a hand engaged in connection with the operation of a dirt train. Deppe v. Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co., 36–52.

Where the plaintiff was employed on a train used for hauling sand, and was injured by the falling of a bank of sand where he had been shoveling, held, that the case was within the provisions of this section. Handelun v. Burlington, C. R. & N. R. Co., 72–709.

An employee required to go upon a train for the purpose of unloading cars is within the scope of this section and may recover for injuries received by reason of negligence of a co-employee. Raben v. Central Iowa R. Co, 73-579.

Where the employee was injured while engaged in operating a derrick situated on a flat car, the operation of which involved the movement of the car upon the track, held, that he was within the scope of this section. Nelson v. Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co., 73-576.

Where plaintiff's duties required him to ride on the train as snow-shoveler, and at the time of receiving an injury he was on the train in the discharge of the duties of his employment, riding from place to place where his services were required, held that the company was liable for such injury received from stepping on the train at an unsafe place, where such act was occasioned by the negligence of the employees in charge of the train. Smith v. Humeston & S. R. Co., 78-583.

A private detective injured while walking along the track, in accordance with directions of the company, to a certain place where he was to try to detect persons accustomed to place obstructions on the track, and who, while so walking to the place designated, was pr strated by sunstroke on the track and negligently run over and injured by defendant's engine, held to be so engaged as to subject him to the hazard peculiar to the business of operating a railway, and to be within the protection of the statutory provision. Pne v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co., 54–223.

A section hand, while riding on a hand car holding a shovel for the purpose of clearing snow from the rail, is engaged in the operation of the road within the provision of this section, so as to be entitled to recover for injuries

received by reason of negligence of the foreman in charge of the car. Chieago, M. & St. P. R. Co. v. Artery (U. S. S. C.), 11 S. C. Rep., 129.

Injury to foreman from negligence of subordinate. The fact that an employee of a railroad company is the foreman of a crew of workmen with power to direct the men under him in their work and to hire and discharge them at will does not prevent his being a co-employee with such workmen, within the meaning of this section, and he may recover for injuries received from the negligence of the men in his employ. Houser v. Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co., 60-230.

Contributory negligence. This statutory provision does not exonerate the injured party from the necessity of exercising reasonable care. Its purpose is to extend the liability of railroads to injuries to employees for which, at the common law, they were not liable. Murphy v. Chicago, R. I. &. P. R. Co., 45-661

In case of death. Where the injury results in death, the company is liable to the personal representatives of deceased. Philo v. Illinois Ĉent. R. Co., 33-47.

Constitutionality. This provision is not unconstitutional, as subjecting railroad corporations to penalties and liabilities other than those imposed on other business corporations engaged in a like business; being applicable to all persons or corporations engaged in a peculiar business it is not open to such objection. McAunich v. Mississippi & M. R. Co., 20-338; Deppe v. Chicago, R. 1. &. P. R. Co., 36-52; Bucklew v. Central Iowa R. Co., 64-603; Pierce v. Central Iowa R. Co., 73-140; Raben v. Central lowa R. Co., 73-579.

Liability of company for negligence of superior or inferior employee. If the employee of a railroad company is injured while riding on a hand-car, through the negligence of the boss in charge thereof, the company is liable. Hoben v. Burlington & M. R. R. Co., 20–562.

Instructions based upon the hypothesis that a person for whose death damages were sought to be recovered from the company for injuries received while acting in obediance to the directions of an employee having authority to control him, held applicable where deceased was a fireman accompanying the engineer and discharging his duty while upon the engine under the control of such engineer. Cooper v. Central R. of Iowa, 44-134.

Where an accident by which an employee is injured is caused by the act of an inferior employee acting under the direction of such superior, the latter cannot recover for an injury received. Dewey v. Chicago & N. W. R. Co.,

31-373.

Where the forman of a crew of men employed by the company in the repair of bridges brought action against the company for injury received from negligence of one of the men under his control, held, that the fact that he was in charge of the workman did not defeat his right to recover for such negligence under the statute (referred to below) giving a right of action for the negligence of a co-employee. Houser v. Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co., 60–230. It may be that a mere foreman, as the word is generally understood, that is, a laborer with power to superintend the labor of those working with him, is a co-employee so far as his own mere labor is concerned, but it is error to exclude from the jury the consideration of the question whether there is a negligence of such foreman, acting as a superior. Baldwin v. St. Louis, K. & N. R. Co., 68-37.

Release of Claim. A written release of all claim for damages resulting from an injury, executed for a consideration, will be binding on the person injured in the absence of fraud, even though it is not read over by him before signing it. Gulliher v. Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co., 59-416,

Contract. A written contract between a company and an employee by which he agrees to hold the company harmless for injuries received in doing certain acts which he is advised are dangerous is admissible for the purpose of showing the existence of the rule on the subject, and notice of it to the employee and also notice to the employee of such danger. Sedgwick v. Illinois Cent. R. Co., 73-158.