three companies. Are not the interests of the public most deeply concerned in preventing that? Is it not obvious that the interests of the public must suffer if that state of things is allowed to arise? And yet what this company is doing may just as well be done by each of the other companies I have mentioned; and the result would be, in effect, not a monopoly of one company, but a monopoly of three or four, or five companies, and a monopoly most prejudicial." But the answers deny that either the Philadelphia & Reading Company or the Central Company own any coal lands, or produce or deal in coal. That is true, but at the same time it is admitted that the Philadelphia and Reading Company owns a majority of the capital stock of the Reading Coal & Iron Company, and that the Central Company owns the majority of the capital stock of the Lehigh & Wilkesbarre Coal Company, and that these two coal companies own or possess the coal land referred to as belonging to their owners. What is this but disguise and evasion? Whatever may be the nominal ownership or the legal title, for the substantial purposes of the injury apprehended and the attorney general's complaint, the railroad companies. stand as the owners of the coal lands in this court. That the fiction which excuses the denials of the answers is mere form is emphasized by the language of the president of the Philadelphia & Reading Company when, in one of his reports to its stockholders, he speaks of competitors, and adds: "Who, with yourselves, are engaged in producing a commodity far in excess of the demand of the markets; but the proportion of business alloted to this company in years past, when its financial straits and lack of facilities did not permit it to mine and distribute its proportion of the increased tonnage," etc., and when he refers to the Port Reading Railway as supplying the means of putting the product of "your mines" upon the market; and when he reports to the same stockholders in this language: "It will not do to expect immediate returns for your large holdings of unproductive coal lands.' These, in good time, will reach a value equal to the entire capital debt of your company. But what is needed now is the practical development of so much of these lands as are needed to supply the demand for anthracite coal." And also by the report of the president of the Central Railroad Company to its stockholders, to which I have already referred, in which he says: "It is fair to expect, as the further results of this alliance, with the co-operation of other large coal-producing companies, greater uniformity in the price of coal," etc. So, also, the testimony of the president of the Philadelphia & Reading Company abounds.

in admissions of railroad ownership of the coal lands. The answers are literally true, but their denials in this respect, without explanation, and in the face of the facts adverted to, savor of an evasion which disentitles them to that force which is usually accorded to the denials of responsive answers upon such a preliminary hearing as this.

Here, then, we have great coal dealers, complaining that they are not sufficiently paid for the produce of their mines, combining, so that already they control more than one-half of the coal fields upon which this state depends for fuel, and looking to the co-operation of the remaining anthracite coal producers to effect a change in the price of their output, so that they may have more satisfactory returns from their investment. To say that these conditions do not tend to a disastrous monopoly in coal would be an insult to intelligence. It is possible that such a monopoly may be used, as the defendants suggest, to introduce economies, and cheapen coal; but it does violence to our knowledge of human nature to expect such a result. Upon such a possibility I quote again the language of Vice Chancellor KINDERSLEY in the case of the Great Northern Railway Company. He says: "It is said: Well, but according to the statement of the bill and affidavits, so far from that being prejudicial to the public, it is most beneficial. For see what is the result; coal is made cheaper. Yes, coal is made cheaper temporarily; but are we to suppose that this company, or any company-for I confess I have no faith in the morality of any joint stock company-that this company or any other company-especially this company, which has contrived such a cunning device' to conceal its proceedings-will merely consider the interests of the public, and supply the public with cheap coal? What is the object of a joint stock company? To make as much money as possible to divide among shareholders. The result, if this proceeding goes on, with this company and other companies must be most grievously to the detriment of the public." Treating this same suggestion in State v. Standard Oil Co. (Ohio), 36 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas. 1, Judge MINSHALL says: "It may be true that it has improved the quality and cheapened the cost of petroleum and its products to the consumer. But such is not one of the usual or general results of a monopoly; and it is the policy of the law to regard not what may, but what usually happens. Experience shows that it is not wise to trust human cupidity where it has the opportunity to aggrandize itself at the expense of others. The claim of having cheapened the price to the consumer is the usual pretext on which monopolies of this kind are

defended, and is well answered in Richardson v. Buhl, 77 Mich. 632, 27 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas. 256. After commenting on the tendency of the combination known as the Diamond Match Company' to prevent fair competition and to control prices, CHAMPLIN, J., said: It is no answer to say that this monopoly has in fact reduced the price of friction matches. That policy may have been necessary to crush competition. The fact exists that it rests in the discretion of this company, at any time, to raise the price to an exorbitant degree.'" The commodity in which these companies deal is a necessary of life in this state. It is the principal fuel of its homes and factories. The slightest increase in its price is felt by a population of hundreds of thousands of persons, for their necessity compels them to pay that increase. If once a complete monopoly be established by the destruction of competition, whether that be through lease or by co-operation, the promoters of it and sharers in it may have whatever price their cupidity suggests. The disaster which will follow cannot be measured. It will permeate the entire community-furnaces, forges, factories, and homes, leaving in its trail murmurs of discontent with a government which will tolerate it, and all the other evil effects of oppression. Enough has been said to exhibit that the ultra vires act complained of portends the greatest danger to the public welfare, and that the case is clearly one in which the attorney general may and should. ask the assistance of this court.

My conclusions upon the points stated preclude the necessity of my passing upon many other matters that were discussed at the argument. Among them is the question whether the Central Company has power to lease its forty and more auxiliary roads, many of which it holds by lease or the ownership of the majority of stock; and also the very important question as to the power of the Central Company, under its charter and subsequent legislation, to invest its capital in coal lands, or in the stock of a coal company; also questions presented in a wider discussion of the subjects monopolies, competition, and restraint of trade than it has been necessary for me to venture upon. Perhaps the prayer of the information and the motion for injunction thereon would now justify an entrance upon the discussion of these latter topics; but as I conceive that the relief I have concluded to afford at this time is all that the public necessity. will demand until all the proofs may be regularly taken, and the case may be finally and more deliberately heard, I refrain from it.

of

It remains only to define the bounds of the injunction to

Terms of

which the attorney general is now entitled. This is a preliminary application, heard upon information, answers, and ex parte proofs. Its object is to do Injunction, no more than to prevent a threatened, irreparable injury until the cause can be finally heard, and it should go no further in disturbance of the existing situation than the effectual prevention of the injury apprehended will admit. But the danger is serious. I do not perceive how I can effectually prevent it in any other way than by forbidding all operations under the lease and tripartite agreement, and also the performance of the covenants that those instruments contain. To merely continue the stay that has been granted, and leave the Philadelphia & Reading Railroad Company in possession and operation of the property and franchises of the Central Company, would be to facilitate and invite infraction of the order already made. The devices for disguise which have appeared in this case as attributable to the defendants admonish me to sever, as far as possible, the connection between them until the final hearing. I will therefore continue the present injunction to final hearing, adding to it, however, the further direction that the defendants, and each of them, their officers and agents, do desist and refrain from further performing and carrying into effect the lease and tripartite agreement, and that the Port Reading Railroad Company and the Philadelphia & Reading Railroad Company do desist and refrain from continuing to control the road, property, and franchises of the Central Railroad Company of New Jersey, and from further in any wise intermedling therewith; and that the Central Railroad Company of New Jersey do desist and refrain from permitting the Port Reading Railroad Company or the Philadelphia & Reading Railroad Company to use, control, or operate its road, property, and franchises; and that the Central Railroad Company do again resume control of all its property and franchises, and performance of all its corporate duties.

Power of Railroad Company to Lease its Property and Franchises.-See note. 32 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 409; note, 16 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 512; Central Transportation Co. v. Pullman Palace Car Co. (U. S.) 45 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 607; Memphis & C. R. Co. v. Grayson (Ala.), 43 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 681, note 687.

Law of Monopolies-Combinations to Prevent Competition.-See Elkins v. Camden & A. R. Co. (N. J.), 9 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 590, note 595; State v. Standard Oil Co. (Ohio), 36 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas. 1, note 29.

Excess of Corporate Powers-Authority of Attorney General to Bring Suit. See State v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co. (Tex.) 50 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 683, note 699.

Sufficiency of Title of Legislative Acts Concerning Railroads.-It is a well settled principle of constitutional law that the common constitutional provision that the object and contents of a statute shall be expressed in the

title is not to be too literally construed. The meaning of this constitutional requirement is that the title and acts must correspond, not literally, but substantially; and this correspondence is to be determined in view of the subject matter to which the legislation relates. Macon & Birmingham R. Co. v. Stamps, 85 Ga. 1, 43 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 318. Thus, where the title of an act indicated that a railroad was to run into and through a named town, and the body of the act provided for running it into and through the corporate limits, or within one mile of the court house, on certain conditions, the title covers the matter of the enactment. Macon & Birmingham R. Co. v. Stamps, 85 Ga. 1, 43 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 318. And an act entitled "An act to authorize the incorporation of companies for the construction of union railway stations and depots with the necessary tracks and management of the same," is sufficient to warrant the conferring of the power of eminent domain upon such corporations. Fort Street Union Depot Co. v. Morton, 83 Mich. 265, 47 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 41. And the provision of the Mich. Union Depot Act, which authorizes companies organized thereunder to run local trains is warranted by the provision in the title of such act authorizing the construction of depots with the necessary tracks and the management of the same." Fort Street Union Depot Co. v. Morton, 83 Mich. 265, 47 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 41. An act making railroads liable for work performed and materials furnished in the construction or repair of the road was held not to be unconstitutional on the ground that the bill contained more than one subject not embraced in the title. Kansas City & O. R. Co. v. Frey, 30 Neb. 790. The Michigan Act of 1855, relating to "Train Railway Companies amended in 1861, 1867 and 1871, by acts authorizing and regulating the operation of such railroads for the carriage of passengers through the streets of cities under municipal regulation. The amendment of 1867 authorized the use of steam or any other power than animal power under the authority of the municipality. Held, that it cannot be said that the act is unconstitutional as embracing more than one subject which is not expressed in its title. Detroit City R. Co. v. Mills, 85 Mich. 634, 46 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 608.

was

The provision of the Virginia Act of March 21, 1877, entitled "An act to secure the payment of wages or salaries to certain employes of railway, steamboat and other corporations, and of the act of April 2, 1879, entitled "An act to amend and re-enact the first and second sections of an act approved March 21, 1877, entitled," etc., which declares that persons furnishing cars and engines to any railroad company shall have a prior lien on the franchise, etc., is unconstitutional and invalid under the constitutional provision which declares that "no law shall embrace more than one subject which shall be expressed in its title.” Fidelity Insurance, Trust & Safe Deposit Co. v. Shenandoah Valley R. Co., 86 Va. 1, 38 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 559. The Georgia Act of October 27, 1887, entitled "An act to amend section 2971 of the Code of 1882 (being a codification of acts of 1850 and 1855) as amended by the act approved December 16, 1878," which extends in certain contingencies, to parents and husbands the right of action for homicide conferred by the original act upon widows and children, and defines the term full value of the life of the deceased, is not unconstitutional as containing more than one subject matter which is not expressed in its title. Clay v. Central R. & B. Co., 84 Ga. 345, 42 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 76. A provision authorizing consolidated railroad companies to issue bonds and to secure the same by mortgage, and a proviso declaring that no consolidated company shall have power to create any mortgage or other lien which shall be valid against judgments for timber furnished, work or labor done, or for damages to person and property, are germane to the subject of an act entitled “An act to amend the law in relation to the