penalty of the bond and the sureties
were satisfactory, held, that the
comptroller had no right to exact
a bond, such as was required by
him, but was bound to accept and
approve of the bond presented;
and that the purchaser was entitled 1.
to a mandamus to compel such ac-
ceptance and approval. People ex
rel. v. Barnard.
548

8. Certain other conditions contained
in the bond presented were not ob-
jected to by the comptroller, and
were mainly for the performance
of such things as the law, with-
out any agreement, requires the
purchaser to perform. Held, that
such conditions were not illegal
or against public policy: and that it
could not be claimed, as an objec-
tion to the issuing of the writ, that
the bond would be void, as given
colore officii, because it was volun-
tarily tendered to obtain a fran-
chise, and certainly, after having
compelled the comptroller by man-
damus to accept and approve the
bond, it could not be maintained
by the obligors that it was illegally
exacted.

9. B., one of two co-administrators,
who had united in giving a bond
with sureties for the faithful exe-
cution of their duties, misappro-
priated a portion of the funds of
the estate. His letters of admin-
istration were thereupon revoked
upon petition of plaintiff, the other
administrator. Plaintiff then com-
menced proceedings against B.
for an accounting, which resulted
in a decree directing B. to pay the
sum so misappropriated. The de-
cree was duly docketed, execution
issued and returned unsatisfied.
Upon petition of plaintiff the sur-
rogate directed an assignment to
him of the bond and gave him
permission to bring suit thereon
in behalf of the estate. In an ac-
tion so brought, held, that the pro-
ceedings in Surrogate's Court
were regular and valid; and that,
assuming plaintiff, as one of the
principals in the bond, would in-
dividually be bound to indemnify
the sureties for any sum recovered,
still he was authorized in his rep-
resentative capacity to maintain
the action. (Code of Civil Pro-

2.

Upon the trial of an indictment
for bribery, it was alleged, on the
part of the prosecution, that de-
fendant, as a member of the board
of aldermen of the city of New
York, in combination with other
members of the board and for a
sum of money paid to them for their
votes, voted for a resolution grant-
ing to a street railroad corporation
the right to lay its tracks on Broad-
way in said city. The prosecution
was allowed to prove, under objec-
tion and exception, that another of
the aldermen, alleged to have been
engaged in the conspiracy, had
been indicted for bribery and had
not been brought to trial; also,
that four persons implicated in the
bribery were at the time of the
trial, and for some time previous
thereto, had been out of the juris-
diction and were residing in
Canada. This proof was offered
as corroborative of two of the
alleged conspirators who had been
called as witnesses for the prose-
cution and had testified to facts
showing the commission of the
crime charged. Held, that the evi-
dence was incompetent for this or
any other purpose. People v.
McQuade.

284

Defendant proved that one of the
conspirators so testifying for the
prosecution had been called as a
witness before a committee of the
state senate some two years after
the accomplishment of the alleged
conspiracy, and had then denied,
under oath, the existence of the
facts testified to by him on the trial.
The prosecution was permitted to
prove, under objection and excep-
tion, that just before his examina-
tion before said committee he had
a consultation with another of the
alleged conspirators and was
directed by the latter as to how he
should testify. Held, error. Id.

BRIDGES.

M. A. B. Church v. O. S. B. Church
(46 N. Y. 131; 73 id. 82), distin-
guished. Lynch v. Pfeiffer. 41

Streeter v. Shultz (45 Hun, 406), dis-
tinguished. Peck v. Peck. 74

Mandeville v. Solomon (39 Cal. 125),
distinguished. Peck v. Peck. 76
Booth v. C. R. M. Co. (74 N. Y. 15),
distinguished. Hornbostel v. Kin-
ney.
99
Wilson v. Doran (46 Hun, 88), re-
versed. Wilson v. Doran. 101
In re City of Rochester (46 Hun, 651),
reversed In re City of Rochester.
159
Tarbell v. R. E S. Co. (21 J. & S.
190), reversed. Tarbell v. R. E. S.
Co.
170

237

limited.

People v. Carpenter (102 N. Y. 238), dis-
tinguished. People v. McQuade. 302

In re Carpenter (45 Hun, 552), re-
versed in part. In re Cornell. 351
Milliken v. W. U. Tel. Co. (21 J. &
S. 111), reversed. Milliken v. W.
U. Tel. Co.
403
People v. Krank (46 Hun, 632), re-
versed. People v. Krank. 488

People ex rel. Breslin v. Lawrence
(107 N. Y. 607), distinguished. Peo-
511
ple ex rel. Burnham v. Jones.

People ex rel. W. S. St. R. Co. v.
Barnard (48 Hun, 57), reversed.
People ex rel. W. S. St. R. Co. v.
Barnard.
548

Snell v. Levitt (39 Hun, 227), reversed.
Snell v. Levitt
596

Nanz v. Oakley (37 Hun, 492), dis-
tinguished. Sperb v. McCoun. 610

Wadsworth v. Lyon (93 N. Y. 201),

distinguished. Cole v. Cole. 632

1. Where, upon charges preferred
against a member of the police
force of the city of New York, a
dereliction of duty on the part of
the accused is proved, such as,
under the rules governing that
force, authorizes a dismissal from
the service, and the evidence for
the accused simply establishes pal-
liating circumstances, the question
as to the sufficiency of the excuse
is addressed solely to the discre-
tion of the police commissioners;
it presents no question of law or
fact for the courts, and so a deci-
sion of the commissioners in such
case removing the accused is not
reviewable on certiorari. People
ex rel. v. French.

494

2. Such a case is not within the pro-
vision of the Code of Civil Pro-
cedure (2140), authorizing the
Supreme Court, upon certiorari,
brought to review the proceedings
of a body or officer, where there
was competent proof of all the
facts necessary to authorize the de-
cision sought to be reviewed, to
determine whether there was such
a preponderance of proof against
the existence of any of the facts,
"that the verdict of a jury, affirm-
ing the existence thereof,
would be set aside by the court as
against the weight of evidence."

*

*

CHALLENGE (OF JURORS).

*

Id.

1. Every statutory provision intended
for the benefit of the defendant in
a criminal action confers a substan-
tial right which may not be disre-
garded without his consent. People
v. McQuade.
284

2. The provision of the Code of Crim-
inal Procedure (§ 385), declaring

3. Where, therefore, upon a criminal
trial neither party exercised the
right of peremptory challenge until
after the box was full, when the
district attorney challenged per-
emptorily certain of the jurors, and
others having been selected to take
their places, he declared himself
content, and after the defendant had
exercised his right the prosecution,
against the objection and exception
of the defendant, was permitted to
challenge peremptorily other jur-
ors who were in the box when the
district attorney declared himself
content. Held, error; and that the
error was a substantial one requir-
ing a reversal.

Id.

4. It seems that under the provision
of said Code (§ 455), explicitly con-
fining exceptions which may be
taken by a defendant on the trial
of an indictment, in allowing or
disallowing a challenge to a juror
for actual bias, to exceptions made
to the decision of the court on
matter of law, the decision of the
trial court on the question of the
indifferency of a juror is not re-
viewable except in the absence of
any evidence to support it; and so,
where the challenge is overruled,
the decision may not be reviewed
unless the evidence discloses a con-
dition of mind on the part of the
juror which, as matter of law, ren-
ders him incompetent, for actnal
bias.
Id.

See JURY.

CHATTEL MORTGAGE.

1. One M. and defendant entered
into a contract by which it was
agreed that, in consideration of