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SPECIAL MESSAGE.

MARCH 20, 1844.

To the House of Representatives of the United States:

I TRANSMIT, herewith, to the house of representatives, a copy of the convention concluded on the 17th day of March, 1841, between the United States and the republic of Peru, which has been duly ratified, and of which the ratifications have been exchanged.

The communication of this treaty is now made, to the end that suitable measures may be adopted to give effect to the first article thereof, which provides for the distribution among the claimants of the sum of three hundred thousand dollars, thereby stipulated to be paid.

SPECIAL MESSAGE.

MARCH 26, 1844.

To the House of Representatives of the United States :—

I submit, for the consideration of Congress, the accompanying communication from A. Pageot, minister plenipotentiary, ad interim, of the king of the French, upon the subject of tonnage-duties levied on French vessels coming into ports of the United States, from the islands of St. Pierre and Miquelon, and proposing to place our commercial intercourse with those islands upon the same footing as now exists with the islands of Martinique and Gaudaloupe, as regulated by the acts of the 9th of May, 1828, and of the 13th of July, 1832. No reason is perceived for the discrimi nation recognised by the existing law, and none why the provisions of the acts of Congress referred to should not be extended to the commerce of the islands in question.

SPECIAL MESSAGE.

APRIL 9, 1844.

To the House of Representatives of the United States :

IN compliance with a resolution of the house of representatives of the 23d of March last, requesting the president to lay before the house “the authority and the true copies of all requests and applications upon which he deemed it his duty to interfere with the naval and military forces of the United States, on the occasion of the recent attempt of the people of Rhode Island to establish a free constitution in the place of the old charter government of that state; also, copies of the instructions to, and statements of, the charter commissioners sent to him by the then existing authorities of the state of Rhode Island; also, copies of the correspondence between the executive of the United States and the charter government of the state of Rhode Island, and all the papers and documents connected with the same; also, copies of the correspondence (if any)

between the heads of departments and said charter government, or any person or persons connected with the said government, and of any accompanying papers and documents; also, copies of all orders issued by the executive of the United States, or any of the departments, to military officers, for the movement or employment of troops to or in Rhode Island; also, copies of all orders to naval officers to prepare steam or other vessels of the United States for service in the waters of Rhode Island; also, copies of all orders to the officers of the revenue-cutters for the said service; also, copies of any instructions borne by the secretary of war to Rhode Island, on his visit, in 1842, to review the troops of the charter government; also, copies of any order or orders to any officer or officers of the army or navy to report themselves to the charter government; and that he be requested to lay before this house copies of any other papers or documents in the possession of the executive, connected with this subject, not above specifically enumerated," I have to inform the house that the executive did not deem it his "duty to interfere with the naval and military forces of the United States," in the late disturbances in Rhode Island; that no orders were issued by the executive, or any of the departments, to military officers, for the movement or employment of troops to or in Rhode Island, other than those which accompany this message, and which contemplated the strengthening of the garrison at Fort Adams, which, considering the extent of the agitation in Rhode Island, was esteemed necessary and judicious; that no orders were issued to naval officers to prepare steam or other vessels of the United States for service in the waters of Rhode Island; that no orders were issued "to the officers of the revenue-cutters for said service;" that no instructions were borne by the secretary of war to Rhode Island, on his visit, in 1842, to review the troops of the charter government; and that no orders were given to any officer or officers of the army or navy to report themselves to the charter government. "Requests and applications" were made to the executive to fulfil the guarantees of the constitution, which impose on the federal government the obligation to protect and defend each state of the Union against "domestic violence and foreign invasion;" but the executive was at no time convinced that the casus fœderis had arisen which required the interposition of the military or naval power in the controversy which unhappily existed between the people of Rhode Island. I was in no manner prevented from so interfering by the inquiry whether Rhode Island existed as an independent state of the Union under a charter granted at an early period by the crown of Great Britain, or not. It was enough for the executive to know that she was recognised as a sovereign state by Great Britain, by the treaty of 1783; that, at a later day, she had, in common with her sister states, poured out her blood, and freely expended her treasure, in the war of the revolution; that she was a party to the articles of confederation; that at an after period she adopted the constitution of the United States as a free, independent, and republican state; and that in that character she has always possessed her full quota of representation in the senate and house of representatives; and that, up to a recent day, she has conducted all her domestic affairs, and fulfilled all her obligations as a member of the Union, in peace and war, under her charter government, as it is denominated by the resolution of the house of the 23d of March.

I must be permitted to disclaim entirely and unqualifiedly, the right on the part of the executive to make any real or supposed defects existing in any state constitution or form of government, the pretext for a failure to

enforce the laws or the guarantees of the constitution of the United States in reference to any such state. I utterly repudiate the idea, in terms as emphatic as I can employ, that those laws are not to be enforced, or those guarantees complied with, because the president may believe that the right of suffrage, or any other great popular right, is either too restricted or too broadly enlarged. I also with equal strength, resist the idea that it falls within the executive competency to decide in controversies of the nature of that which existed in Rhode Island, on which side is the majority of the people, or as to the extent of the rights of a mere numerical majority. For the executive to assume such a power, would be to assume a power of the most dangerous character. Under such assumptions, the states of this Union would have no security for peace or tranquillity, but might be converted into the mere instruments of executive will. Actuated by selfish purposes, he might become the great agitator, fomenting assaults upon the state constitutions, and declaring the majority of to-day to be the minority of to-morrow; and the minority, in its turn, the majority, before whose decrees the established order of things in the state should be subverted. Revolution, civil commotion, and bloodshed, would be inevit able consequences. The provision in the constitution intended for the security of the states, would thus be turned into the instrument of their destruction. The president would become, in fact, the great constitutionmaker for the states, and all power would be vested in his hands.

When, therefore, the governor of Rhode Island, by his letter of the 4th of April, 1842, made a requisition upon the executive for aid to put down the late disturbances, I had no hesitation in recognising the obligations of the executive to furnish such aid, upon the occurrence of the contingency provided for by the constitution and laws. My letter of the 11th of April, in reply to the governor's letter of the 4th, is herewith communicated; together with all correspondence which passed at a subsequent day, and the letters and documents mentioned in the schedule hereunto annexed. From the correspondence between the executive of the United States and that of Rhode Island, it will not escape observation, that, while I regarded it as my duty to announce the principles by which I should govern myself, in the contingency of an armed interposition on the part of this government being necessary to uphold the rights of the state of Rhode Island, and to preserve its domestic peace; yet, that the strong hope was indulged, and expressed, that all the difficulties would disappear before an enlightened policy of conciliation and compromise. In that spirit I addressed to Governor King the letter of the 7th of May, 1842, marked "private and confidential," and received his reply of the 12th of May, of the same year. The desire of the executive was, from the beginning, to bring the dispute to a termination without the interposition of the military power of the United States; and it will continue to be a subject of self-congratulation that this leading object of policy was finally accomplished. The executive resisted all entreaties, however urgent, to depart from this line of conduct. Information from private sources had led the executive to conclude that little else was designed by Mr. Dorr and his adherents than mere menace, with a view to intimidation. Nor was this opinion in any degree shaken until the 22d of June, 1842, when it was strongly represented, from reliable sources, as will be seen by reference to the documents herewith communicated, that preparations were making by Mr. Dorr, with a large force in arms, to invade the state; which force had been recruited in the neighboring states, and had been preceded by

the collection of military stores, in considerable quantities, at one or two points. This was a state of things to which the executive could not be indifferent. Mr. Dorr speedily afterward took up his headquarters at Chepachet, and assumed the command of what was reported to be a large force, drawn chiefly from voluntary enlistments made in the neighboring states. The executive could with difficulty bring himself to realize the fact that citizens of other states should have forgotten their duty to themselves and the constitution of the United States, and have entered into the highly reprehensible and indefensible course of interfering so far in the concerns of a sister state, as to have entered into plans of invasion, conquest, and revolution; but the executive felt it to be his duty to look minutely into the matter; and, therefore, the secretary of war was despatched to Rhode Island, with instructions (a copy of which is herewith transmitted), and was authorized, should a requisition be made upon the executive by the government of Rhode Island, in pursuance of law, and the invaders should not abandon their purpose, to call upon the governors of Massachusetts and Connecticut for a sufficient number of militia at once to arrest the invasion, and to interpose such regular troops as could be spared from Fort Adams, for the defence of the city of Providence, in the event of its being attacked, as was strongly represented to be in contemplation. Happily, there was no necessity for either issuing the proclamation or the requisition, or for removing the troops from Fort Adams, where they had been properly stationed. Chepachet was evacuated, and Mr. Dorr's troops dispersed, without the necessity of the interposition of any military force by this government; thus confirming me in my early impressions, that nothing more had been designed, from the first, by those associated with Mr. Dorr, than to excite fear and apprehension, and thereby to obtain concessions from the constituted authorities, which might be claimed as a triumph over the existing government.

With the dispersion of Mr. Dorr's troops ended all the difficulties. A convention was shortly afterward called, by due course of law, to amend the fundamental law; and a new constitution, based on more liberal principles than that abrogated, was proposed and adopted by the people.

Thus the great American experiment of a change in government, under the influence of opinion, and not of force, has been again crowned with success; and the state and people of Rhode Island repose in safety under institutions of their own adoption, unterrified by any future prospect of necessary change, and secure against domestic violence or invasion from abroad. I congratulate the country upon so happy a termination of a condition of things which seemed, at one time, seriously to threaten the pub-. lic peace. It may justly be regarded as worthy of the age and of the country in which we live.

VOL. II.-40

TEXAS TREATY MESSAGE.

APRIL 22, 1844.

To the Senate of the United States:

I TRANSMIT, herewith, for your approval and ratification, a treaty, which I have caused to be negotiated between the United States and Texas, whereby the latter, on the conditions therein set forth, has conveyed all its right of separate and independent sovereignty and jurisdiction to the United States. In taking so important a step, I have been influenced by what appeared to me to be the most controlling considerations of public policy and the general good; and in having accomplished it, should it meet your approval, the government will have succeeded in reclaiming the territory which formerly constituted a portion, as it is confidently believed, of its domain, under the treaty of cession of 1803, by France to the United States.

The country thus proposed to be annexed, has been settled principally by persons from the United States, who emigrated on the invitation of both Spain and Mexico, and who carried with them, into the wilderness which they have partially reclaimed, the laws, customs, and political institutions of their native land. They are deeply indoctrinated in all the principles of civil liberty, and will bring along with them, in the act of reassociation, devotion to our Union, and a firm and inflexible resolution to assist in maintaining the public liberty unimpaired-a consideration which, as it appears to me, is to be regarded as one of no small moment. The country itself, thus obtained, is of an incalculable value in an agricultural and commercial point of view.

To a soil of inexhaustible fertility, it unites a genial and healthy climate, and is destined, at a day not distant, to make large contributions to the commerce of the world. Its territory is separated from the United States, in part, by an imaginary line, and by the river Sabine, for a distance of 310 miles; and its productions are the same with those of many of the contiguous states of the Union. Such is the country, such are its inhabitants, and such its capacities to add to the general wealth of the Union. As to the latter, it may be safely asserted, that in the magnitude of its productions, it will equal, in a short time, under the protecting care of this government, if it does not surpass, the combined productions of many states of the confederacy.

A new and powerful impulse will thus be given to the navigating interest of the country, which will be chiefly engrossed by our fellow-citizens of the eastern and middle states, who have already attained a remarkable degree of prosperity by the partial monopoly they have enjoyed of the carrying trade of the Union, particularly the coastwise trade, which this new acquisition is destined in time, and that not distant, to swell to a magnitude which can not easily be computed; while the addition made to the boundaries of the home-market, thus secured to their mining, manufacturing, and mechanical skill and industry, will be of a character the most commanding and important.

Such are some of the many advantages which will accrue to the eastern and middle states by the ratification of the treaty-advantages, the extent of which it is impossible to estimate with accuracy, or properly appreciate. Texas, being adapted to the culture of cotton, sugar, and rice,

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