LANDLORD AND TENANT.

to carry on any offensive trade or bu siness on premises demised, much will depend on the situation of the premises; and in construing such a covenant, it is particularly worthy of consideration whether such trade as that complained of was carried on there at the time of the demise; and, semble, that a trade carried on there at the time of the demise would not be within the covenant. Ibid.

8. In an ejectment by a landlord against his tenant the landlord relied on a disclaimer. It was proved that the tenant disclaimed in March, 1833; in November, 1833, the landlord put in a distress for rent :-Held, a waiver of the disclaimer. Doe d. David v. Williams, 322

9. Held, also, that the stat. 8 Anne, c. 14, s. 6, which enables a landlord to distrain after the determination of a tenancy, does not apply to cases where the tenancy is put an end to by the tenant's wrongful disclaimer.

Ibid.

10. A tenant from year to year is not bound to do substantial repairs : he is only bound to keep the premises wind and water tight. Leach v. Thomas,

327

11. An outgoing tenant may remove an ornamental chimney-piece, put up by himself during his tenancy, but not a chimney-piece which is not ornamental. Ibid.

12. An outgoing tenant has no right to remove pillars of brick and mortar built on a dairy floor to hold pans, although such pillars are not let into the ground. Ibid.

13. In an action by a landlord, who is a tenant for life, against a tenant from year to year, for waste, the remainder-man in tail is a competent witness for the plaintiff. Ibid.

14. Primâ facie, the lord of the manor is entitled to all waste lands within the manor; and it is not essential that the lord should shew acts of ownership of such lands; and evi

dence that the public have been used to throw rubbish on waste land is rather evidence that it belongs to the lord than to any private individual. Doe d. Dunraven v. Williams, 332

15. If a person within twenty years inclose a portion of the lord's waste by the licence of the lord, such person cannot be turned out of the possession of it by the lord without some act being done, from which a legal revocation of the licence can be inferred. Ibid.

16. Primâ facie, every inclosure made by a tenant adjoining the demised premises is presumed to be made by him for the benefit of the landlord; but this presumption may be rebutted by evidence. If a lessee inclose land which is near the demised premises, as being part of the premises comprised in his lease, this is not an adverse possession against his landlord; and a twenty years' possession by him will not enable him to retain possession of the inclosed land against his landlord. Ibid.

17. If a down be let by an instrument not under seal for the purpose of digging copper ore, an action for use and occupation may be maintained if the defendant has ever taken possession; and if he has once taken possession he is liable to all subsequent rent until the determination of the tenancy, whether he has continued to work the minerals or not; but if the defendant merely caused holes to be dug on the down, and had them filled up immediately, with a view merely to ascertain what sort of bargain he was about to make or had made, that would not be a taking of possession. Jones v. Reynolds, 335

18. In an action for use and occupation, a judgment in a former action. for use and occupation between the same parties, given in favour of the plaintiff, is evidence of the defendant's having occupied, but is not conclusive; and the jury ought to take into their

consideration all the circumstances under which that judgment was obtained. Ibid.

19. A. demised a colliery to B., and B. covenanted to pay as rent "one third part of the money that should arise, be made, received, or produced from the sale of the coals;" and covenanted to keep "true accounts of all coal daily raised, and to make and deliver true copies thereof to A.:"-Held, that, taking the two covenants together, the rent was to be calculated on the amount of coals sold, and not on the amount of money actually received. Edwards v. Rees,

24. The answer of W. and H. to a bill in equity, filed by a third person, stating that W. has conveyed a reversion to H., is evidence against H. that he has done so, and if the answer refers to a deed, that makes no difference, and notice to produce the deed is not necessary. Ibid.

25. On the trial of an ejectment in 1835, between landlord and tenant, a verdict was taken by consent for the plaintiff, it being then agreed that the defendant is not to be called upon for any rent now due." The defendant had, with another person, given a promissory note to his landlord, to secure the payment of half a year's rent due at Lady-day, 1834-Held, that this agreement extinguished the landlord's claim on the note. Howell v. Lewis,

566

30. A tenant being in arrear for rent of a cottage, his landlord distrained the goods there, and locked up the cottage; and, after selling the goods, kept possession, the tenant saying he would "have done with it :"-Held, in an action by the tenant for an expulsion, that the landlord was justified in impounding the distress on the premises, and in locking up the cottage to secure the distress, but that he could not avail himself of the tenant's license to take possession, unless he specially pleaded it.-Cox v. Painter,

767

1. In an indictment for stealing property which had belonged to a deceased person, who appointed executors who would not prove the will, it was held that the property must be laid in the ordinary, and not in a person who, after the commission of the offence, but before the indictment, had taken out letters of administration with the will annexed; because, the rights of an administrator only commence from the date of the letters as distinguished from those of an executor, which commence, not from the granting of the probate, but from the death of the testator. Rex v. Smith and Smith, 147

2. If A. ask B., who is not his servant, to put a letter in the post, telling him that it contains money, and B. break the seal and abstract the money before he puts the letter in the post, he is guilty of larceny. Rex v. Jones,

151

3. A., the owner of a boat, was employed by B., the captain of a ship, to carry a number of wooden staves ashore in his boat. B.'s men were put into the boat, but were under the control of A., who did not deliver all the staves, but took one of them away to the house of his mother: Held, that this was a bailment of the staves to A., and not a charge only; and that a mere non-delivery of the staves would not have been a larceny in A.; but that if A. separated one of the staves from the rest, and carried it to a place different from that of its destination, with intent to appropriate it to his own use, that was equivalent to a breaking of bulk, and therefore would be sufficient to constitute a larceny. Rex v. Howell,

325

4. The question of what is or is not a recent possession of stolen property is to be considered with reference to the nature of the article stolen. Therefore, where two ends of woollen cloth in an unfinished state, consist

ing of about twenty yards each, are lost, and were in the possession of the prisoner two months after they were stolen, and still in the same state, it was held, that this was a possession sufficiently recent to call on the prisoner to shew how he came by the property. Rex v. Partridge,

551

5. A. was indicted at common law for simple larceny, in stealing in Middlesex a quantity of lead. It appeared that the lead was stolen from the roof of the church of Iver, in Buckinghamshire. The prisoner was indicted at the Central Criminal Court, which has jurisdiction in Middlesex, but not in Buckinghamshire:-Held, that he could not be convicted there, on the ground that the original taking not being a larceny, but created by statute a felony, the subsequent possession could not be considered a larceny. Rex v. Millar,

665

An unfinished building intended as a cart-shed, which is boarded up on all its sides, and has a door with a lock to it, and the frame of a roof, with loose gorse thrown upon it because it is not yet thatched, is a building within 7 & 8 Geo. 4, c. 29, s. 44. Rex v. Worrall, 516

LARCENY-FIXTURES. See LARCENY, 5.

LARCENY BY SERVANTS.

The driver of a glass coach hired for the day is not the servant of the party hiring it, so as to bring him within the statute 7 & 8 Geo. 4, c. 29, s. 46, relating to larceny by servants. Rex v. Haydon, 4.15

LARCENY IN SHIPS. The luggage of a passenger going

See ASSAULT, 1, 2.-EVIDENCE, 10, 11. SLANDER, 1, 2.

1. If, in a case of libel, the defendant in his plea state certain specific facts on which he justifies the publication, a letter written by the plaintiff, which does not go to prove any of the specific facts alleged in the plea, is not admissible in evidence for the defendant. Moscati v. Lawson, 32

2. In an action for a libel against the printer of a newspaper, one of the proprietors of a newspaper is a competent witness for the defendant, as he is not liable for contribution.

Ibid.

3. In an action for a libel published in a newspaper, the defendant cannot go into evidence in mitigation of damages, to shew that the same libel had appeared in another newspaper, from which the plaintiff had

already recovered damages, but the defendant may shew that he copied the libel from another newspaper, and omitted several passages contained in that newspaper, which reflected on the character of the plaintiff. Creevy v. Carr, 64

4. If in an action for libel the defendant by his pleading admits the publication, the plaintiff is still at liberty to shew the manner of the publication, with a view to the amount of damages. Vines v. Serrell, 163

5. If the printer and the editor of a magazine be sued for a libellous article contained in it, they are both liable for a libellous lithographic print which is contained in the work, though it was not printed by the printer, provided that the print is referred to in the letter-press part of the libellous article. Watts v. Fraser and Moyes, 369

6. In an action for a libel the defendant may in mitigation of damages give in evidence other libels published recently before by the plaintiff of the defendant, with a view of shewing a provocation by the plaintiff; and a witness may be also asked, whether the plaintiff has not previously published attacks on the defendant, but the Judge will caution the jury not to consider one libel as at all like a set-off against the other. Ibid.

7. In an action for libel the defendant may give evidence of provocation in mitigation of damages, and may for that purpose shew that the plaintiff had used expressions calculated to provoke him, both in writing and verbally. Tarpley v. Blaby, 395 8. If a wife be living apart from her husband as a servant in the family of A., and so maintaining herself, and she is dismissed from the service by A. in consequence of a letter written by B., reflecting on her character, her husband may maintain an action for special damage. Coward v. Wellington, 531

VOL. VII.

9. But if A. dismissed her colourably, intending to take her back again, the action will not lie. Ibid.

10. If B., a tradesman, be dismissed from serving A., one of his customers, A. stating as the reason of it that B. charged for goods never delivered, and B. after this write a letter to A., vindicating himself, and imputing the dishonesty to a servant of A., this is a privileged communication, if it be bonâ fide, and without malice. Ibid.

11. If a critic in criticizing a work goes out of his way to attack the private character of the author, this is a libel. Fraser v. Berkeley, 621

12. In an action for a libel, contained in an article against churchrates, written by the defendant, and published in the True Sun newspaper, the MS., in the handwriting of the defendant, addressed "To the Editor of the T. S." and sent to the T. S. office, is evidence to shew that the defendant intended the article to be published in that newspaper. The plaintiff may also, for the same purpose, give in evidence handbills on the same subject, published by the defendant about the same time; and to shew that the libel was published with an intent to injure the plaintiff, evidence may be given that one of the handbills was carried backwards and forwards before his door. Bond v. Douglas, 626

13. Any attempt to excite resistance to the payment of church-rates, or to render odious those who collect them, is illegal. Ibid.

14. A man has a right to communicate to any other any information he is possessed of in a matter in which they have a mutual interest; and it is a perfectly legal and justifiable object for one to induce another to become a party to a suit as to a subject matter on which both have an interest; and it is not because strong or angry language is used in such a