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iliat the cause of action was barred by the statute of limitations. The demurrer Was that the defendant, on or about the 1st day
of January, 1889, received from the plainoverruled. The defendant answered, denying tiff moneys and notes in the sum of $3,042.80, all the material allegations of the complaint, which the defendant had agreed to lend and and pleading the statute of limitations and collect for the use and benefit of the plaincounterclaims-one on a note of $55, execut- tiff, and to pay the principal and interest to ed by plaintiff to the defendant, which, it her from time to time on her demand; that was alleged, remained unpaid, and upon in June, 1896, the defendant rendered plainwhich judgment was demanded for $81; one tiff a statement showing that the defendant on a note for $23.44, executed by plaintiff to held $3,202 belonging to the plaintiff; and the defendant, upon which judgment was that on or about June, 1897, the defendant demanded for $34.79; and one for $300 for paid to the plaintiff the sum of $100, interest services rendered and performed by the de- money, but since the date last aforesaid the fendant for the plaintiff as an attorney, and defendant had not paid anything to the plainfor costs paid out by him on her behalf. tiff, and had failed and refused to account to The plaintiff replied, denying the allegations her, although often requested so to do. As of the counterclaims. Upon these issues the conclusions of law the court found that the case was tried before Hon. Charles H. Hart, plaintiff was entitled to a judgment against judge of the First judicial district court in the defendant for the sum of $3,202, less and for the county of Box Elder, and after
the payment of $100, together with interest the taking of evidence on behalf of both
at 8 per cent. per annum from 1896. Judg. parties for four or five days the court, on the ment was entered accordingly, from which 20th day of November, 1903, made a find- the defendant has prosecuted this appeal. ing that a trust relation existed between the
We are asked to dismiss the appeal beplaintiff and the defendant, and that in ac
cause not taken in time. The findings were cordance therewith the defendant came into made and filed, and judgment was entered possession of certain funds of the plaintiff,
thereon, on the 29th day of December, 1904. with respect to which she was entitled to an On the 16th day of January, 1905, defendant accounting, and thereupon the court ordered
served and filed his motion for a new trial. that the defendant make an accounting of This motion was overruled on the 20th day the funds so received by him before the court of June, 1906. We have repeatedly held that on the 8th day of December, 1903. Upon that in this state an appeal lies only from objection made by the defendant to Judge
the judgment, and not from an order denyHart's further proceeding with the case, and ing or granting a new trial; that the judgupon defendant's request that the case be
ment is not final while a motion for a new concluded before another judge, Hon. John trial, made within the time allowed by law, E. Booth, judge of the Fourth judicial dis
is pending and undisposed of; and that an trict, was authorized to further try the case,
appeal may be taken within six months from commencing on the 29th day of December,
the overruling of the motion for a new trial. 1904. On that day the case was regularly If appellant has filed his motion for a new (alled before Judge Booth. The defendant
trial within the time allowed by law, his failed and refused to make an accounting, appeal is within time; otherwise, it is not. or otherwise to comply with the order of
The statute provides (section 3294, Rev. St. the court made on the 20th day of Novem- 1898) that a party intending to move for a ber, 1903, and objected to any further pro- new trial must, within five days after the ceedings being had in the case, claiming verdict of the jury, or after notice of the dethat the court had no authority to make the cision of the court or referee, if the action order, and that the court had lost jurisdic- were tried without a jury, serve and file a tion of the case. These objections were all notice of such intention. In this case the overruled. Plaintiff's counsel then demand- motion for the new trial was not served nor ed that judgment by default (because of the filed until 19 days after the findings were defendant's failure to comply with the order) filed and judgment was entered. The mabe entered against him for the sum of $3,202, terial question here is: When did the fivewhich sum, it was claimed, the defendant day period begin to run? The statute proadmitted to have been received by him, as vides that the party intending to move for evidenced by a statement furnished by him a new trial must within five days after noto the plaintiff, which statement was attach- tice of the decision of the court or referee, ed to the complaint and made a part there- if the action were tried without a jury, file of. The default was so entered. The de- and serve his notice of intention. Section fendant having declined and refused to 3330 of the statute provides that all notices make an accounting or to comply with the must be in writing. It is not made to aporder, Judge Booth thereupon made findings pear of record that any written notice was reciting the order theretofore made by Judge served upon the defendant of the decision Hart, the defendant's refusal to comply of the court. The contention made by the therewith, and the entering of the default, appellant is that the five days did not begin and without hearing further evidence found to run until such a notice was served upon him or his counsel, and, as no written notice not necessary to be done until after the nowas served of the decision, the motion for a
L'nder the authorities, we are connew trial was made within time. Ou the t'on- strained to hold that the motion for a new trary, it is urged by respondent that the irial was filed within time; and, as the apbill of exceptions prepared by the appellant peal was taken within six months from the shows that on the 29th day of December, time of the overruling of the motion, it folwhen the findings were presented to the lows that the appeal was taken within time. court, and before they were signed and filed, The motion to dismiss the appeal must therethe defendant was possessed of the proposed fore be denied, findings, and objected to the court's making The appellant urges that the court erred findings upon the ground that the court was (1) in overruling the demurrer; (2) in making without authority to do so; that Judge Ilart, the order requiring him to account; (3) that and not Judge Booth, heard the evidence, the court presided over by Judge Booth was and that the latter heard no evidence upon not authorized to make findings, because the which the alleged findings of fact could be evidence with respect thereto was not heard based; that the findings were not warranted by him, but was heard by Judge Hart; and nor supported by the pleadings; that the ap- (1) that the court failed to find upon the ispellant then and there made various other sules tendered by the counterclaims. We specific objections to each of the proposed think the demurrer was properly overruled. findings of fact, and likewise, for the same With respect to the second assignment the and additional reasons, the appellant object- appellant has not made to appear wherein ed to the court's signing the decree as pro- the court erred in ordering him to make an posed by respondent; that the court then
accounting. The evidence which the court, and there overruled all of appellant's ob- presided over by Judge Hart, received and jections, to each of which rulings the appel- heard on behalf of both parties, lasting some lant then and there excepted; that the court four or five days, is not before us. Whether then and there, and on the same day, signed the court was or was not justified in making and filed the findings and decree as proposed such an order must largely depend upon the by the respondent; and that because of such evidence. We can perceive of some phases proceedings, and of appellant's participation of the case where such an order might be therein, the respondent was not required to made with propriety. Nothing having been serve a written notice of the decision in or- made to appear to the contrary, we must preder to start the running of the five-day sume that the order was properly made. Beperiod. There is much force to the position cause the defendant failed to comply with taken by counsel for respondent, and, were the order, the court, however, was not justithe question an open one in this jurisdiction, tied in treating such failure and refusal as we would be inclined to hold with him. But a confession of the plaintiff's demand, and in the case of Burlock v. Shupe, 5 Utah, +29, entering a judgment against him for such an 17 l'ac. 19, followed and approved in Mer- amount, in the face of his general denial and cantile Co. v. Glen, 6 Utah, 139, 21 Pac. J00, of his counterclaims. 1 Cyc. 113; Lee v. and in the case of Biagi v. Howes, C6 Cal. Abrams, 12 Ill. 111; Bishop v. Baldwin, 14 469), 6 Pac. 100, a contrary doctrine seems to Vt. 17.). But the court did not enter the have been held. There, in effect, it was held judgment simply because the defendant failthat, under statutes identical with those here
ell and refused to comply with the order. in question, a party intending to move has The judgment of the court was also based a right to wait for a notice in writing of upon the findings of fact as found and filed the decision from the adverse party before ly the court, and as hereinbefore set forth. giving notice of intention to move for a new Had the court found upon all the material trial, and that he is entitled to such notice issues raisel by the pleadings, we would, on of the decision before he is called upon to this record, affirm this judgment. We think act, although he was present in court when that the court presided over by Judge Booth the decision was rendered, and waived find- Was autliorized to make findings upon the ings, and asked for a stay of proceedings whole case. But assignment No. 4 must be on the judgment, and applied to the court sustained. It was the duty of the court for an extension of time in which to give to find upon all the material issues, innotice of his intention to move for a new cluding those raised by the counterclaims, trial. It is there said that such a rule is regardless of the insufficiency of evidence to more certain and definite, prevents contro- support them, or even though no evidence versies which under any other construction in their support was introduced. If the eviwould be likely to a rise, and accords with dence was insufficient, or if there was no
evident intention expressed in the statute. evidence in their support, the findings of Undoubtedly the serving of the written no- fact with respect thereto should have been tice may be waived. But, als pointed out in against the defendant, for on him was the the case of Burlock v. Shupe, supra, to con- burden of proof on such issues. With restitute a waiver, "the party must do some spect to these issues the findings are silent, affirmative act pointed out in the statute as and until they are disposed of no judgment could be properly pronounced. Dillon Imp. This is an action for malicious prosecuCo. v. Clea veland (Utah) 88 Pac. 670. For tion. On March 27, 1906, defendant caused this reason the judgment must be vacated, plaintiff to be arrested at Canyon City, Grant and the cause remanded. We, however, are
County, on a warrant issued by a justice of not disposed to grant a new trial.
the peace, based on an information sworn to The case is remuned to the trial court, by defendant, charging plaintiff with having with directions to set aside the findings and obtained from defendant on March 9, 1900, judgment, to make new and complete find
the sum of $37.50, under false pretenses. ings upon all the issues presented by the
By reason thereof, plaintiff was confined in pleadings, and to enter judgment accordingly.
the county jail for 11 days. On May 21, This order is made pursuant to chapter 161,
1906, at the regular term of the circuit court p. 260, Sess. Laws 1907, passed since the
for that county, the prosecuting attorney decision of Dillon Imp. Co. 1. Cleaveland,
returned into court an information indorsed supra. Neither party to have costs.
“not a true bill,” and thereupon plaintife
was discharged. In addition to the foregoing MCCARTY, C. J., and FRICK, J., concur.
facts, plaintiff alleges that the prosecution was without probable cause and was actuated
by malice, concluding with proper and usual (50 (r. 210)
allegations of damages. By his immended anPITXAM v. STALKER.
swer, defendant, by general denial, travers(Supreme Court of Oregon. July 30, 1907.)
es the whole complaint, and, as a further de
fense, alleges the facts on which the charge 1. TRIAL-NONSUIT-DETERMINATION.
was basel; that, after making an investigalOn a motion for a nonsuit, every intenilment and fair and legitimate inference which tion of all the circumstances, he submitted (an arise from the evidence must be made in all the facts within his knowledge, through favor of plaintiff, and the court must assume those facts its true which the jury might prop
his attorney, to the deputy district attorney erly find under the evidence.
: for that county, who advised defendant that [Ed. Note.-For (ases in point, see Cent. Dig.
there was probable cause for prosecuting vol. 16, Trial, $ 5373.]
plaintiff, and requested defendant to make 2. MALICIOUS PROSECUTIOX-ACTIONS - PRE
and file the information on which the warSUMPTIONS AND BURDEN OF PROOF.
rant was issued; that acting in good faith, That plaintiff, in an action for malicious
and relying upon the advice of the deputy prosecution, was held by the magistrate on his preliminary examination, wherein witnesses
district attorney, he made the information; were examined, both on behalf of the state and that on April 25, 1906, a legal preliminary plaintiff, to answer at the next term of the çir- examination of the charge against plaintiff cuit court, affords a prima facie case of probable cause; such prima facie case being subject
was had before the magistrate, at which to overthrow by evidence that his binding over evidence was introduced and witnesses were was procured by fraud or other improper means.
sworn and examined, both on behalf of the [Ed. Note.-For cases in point, see Cent. Dig.
state; represented by the deputy district atvol. 33, Malicious Prosecution, $ 54.]
torney, and on behalf of defendant in said 3. SAME-EVIDENCE-SUFFICIENCY.
cause, who appeared in person and by his Evidence, in an action for malicious prosecution, examined, and held to establish that de- attorney, and, after a full and fair hearing fendant in making the charge complained of act- of the cause, plaintiff herein was held by the ed in good faith, relying on the advice of the
magistrate to await the action of the grand prosecuting attorney, who had previously been fully and fairly advised of all the facts within
jury at the next term of circuit court, and defendant's knowledge.
was admitted to bail in the sum of $250, , [Ed. Note.-For cases in point, see Cent. Dig. and, being unable to give the same, he was vol. 33, Malicious Prosecution, g 132.)
committed to the custody of the sheriff of 4. SAME-WANT OF PROBABLE CAUSE-ADVICE the county; that these acts of the defendant OF PROSECUTING OFFICER.
are the same acts stated in the complaint; Where one before the commencement of a criminal prosecution in good faith discloses to
and that the charges preferred were true. the prosecuting attorney all the facts within his By the reply there was a general denial of knowledge, or which he has reasonable ground the new matter of the answer. The cause to believe, relating to the offense, and is advised
was tried before a jury, and at the close to institute the prosecution, he is not liable as having acted without probable cause, though
of plaintiff's case defendant moved for a there were other exculpatory facts which he nonsuit, which was overruled by the court. might have ascertained by diligent inquiry.
He also requested of the court an instruc[Ed. Note.-For cases in point, see Cent. Dig. vol. 33, Malcious Prosecution, $$ 45, 46.]
tion for a verdict in his behalf, based upon
a claim that he had established by unconAppeal from Circuit Court, Grant County; troverted and competent evidence the deGeorge E. Davis, Judge.
fense that the prosecution was upon the adAction by H. X. Putnam against J. L. vice and direction of the prosecuting attorStalker. From a judgment for plaintiff, de- ney, which requested instruction was denied. fendant appeals. Reversed and remanded. The verdict was for plaintiff in the sum of $120, on which judgment was accordingly of the sheriff of the county. But it further entered, and from which defendant appeals. shows that on April 25, 1906, a preliminary Error is assigned upon the overruling of the hearing was had before the magistrate upon motion for nonsuit and the refusal of the the charge, and after an examination duly court to instruct the jury as requested by held according to law, at which the state the defendant, as well as upon admission of appeared by the deputy prosecuting attorney testimony objected to by defendant.
for that county, and the plaintiff appeared in
person and by his attorney, and after three Errett Flicks, for appellant. V. G. Cozad, witnesses has been examined on behalf of the for respondent.
state, and two on behalf of plaintiff, includ
ing himself, he was held to answer at the SLATER, C. (after stating the facts). By
next term of the circuit court for that counhis motion for nonsuit, defendant invoked
ty, and was admitted to bail in the sum of the ruling of the court on the legal effect of
$250. This evidence, instead of showing the the evidence of plaintiff to support his cause
want of probable cause, the burden of showof action. Upon such motion every intend
ing which was upon plaintiff, makes, it would ment and every fair and legitimate infer
seem, a prima facie case of probable cause. ence which can arise from the evidence must
"It is quite generally held," says Mr. Justice be made in favor of plaintiff, and the court
Wolverton, in Stamper v. Raymond, 38 Or.
16, 62 Pac. 20, "that, where proof was offered must assume those facts as true which the
upon the examination which is deemed suffijury can properly find under the evidence. Wallace v. Railway Co., 26 Or. 174, 37 Pac.
cient by the committing magistrate upon 477, 25 L. R. A. 603. And if the evidence
which to commit, his commitment accordingly tends to show facts which will sustain the
will afford prima facie evidence of probable action, though remote, the motion for non- cause." The effect of the commitment ag suit should not be sustained. Ilerbert v.
evidence of probable cause, however, may be Dufur, 23 Or. 461, 32 Pac. 302. But if the
overthrown by other evidence showing that testimony offered by plaintiff tends to show
it was obtained by false pretenses or other that the defendant bad good reason to be
improper means. Sharpe V. Johnston, 76 lieve that the law had been violated, and he
Mo. 600; Giusti v Del Papa, 19 R. I. 338, acted in good faith, it is the duty of the
33 Atl. 525; Womack v. Circle, 29 Grat. (Va.) court to declare the legal effect of the evi
192. But, unless it is overthrown by testidence by allowing the motion for nonsuit.
mony of that character, it becomes conclu“The welfare of society," says Mr. Justice
sive, and must prevent the plaintiff from Bean, in Hess v. Baking Co., 31 Or. 513, 49
prevailing. We are unable, however, to disPac. SO3, "imperatively demands that those
cover in the record any evidence on the part who violate the law shall be promptly and
of plaintiff tending to show, and in fact it speedily punished, and to accomplish that
does not seem to have been claimed by him, purpose the rule has been firmly established that there was any fraud or other improper
conduct on part of this defendant at the prethat any citizen who has good reason to believe that the law has been violated may
liminary examination which prevented the
plaintiff from obtaining a full and fair hearcause the arrest of the supposed offender,
ing, or that the conclusion announced by the and, if in doing so he acts in good faith, the
magistrate was the result of any improper law will protect him against an action for
conduct of defendant; nor are we able to damages, although the accusation may in
find any evidence on part of defendant in fact be unfounded. This rule is founded on
this case, after his motion for nonsuit was grounds of public policy to encourage the
overruled, by which the prima facie case of exposure of crime, and the punishment of
a probable cause, made out by the commitcriminals, and when, therefore, the act of a
ment, was overthrown. The court therefore citizen in thus enforcing the law is chal
erred in denying the motion. lenged, the court must determine the question
2. At the close of the testimony, defendant when the facts are admitted or established
by his counsel requested the court to instruct as to whether he had probable cause for so
the jury as follows: "The court instructs doing, and not leave it to the arbitrament
the jury that the fact is before you and is of a jury."
not disputed that, before the defendant beAt the outset of his case, plaintiff offered,
gan the criminal action described in the and there was received, the transcript of the
complaint in this case, he was advised by proceedings in the justice court, which con
J. E. Marks, deputy district attorney for tains the information sworn to by defendant
the Ninth judicial district of Oregon for before the magistrate on March 27, 1906, Grant county, to institute the said criminal and the warrant issued thereon, and upon action, and that before receiving such adwhich plaintiff was arrested on the 27th day vice there had been laid before the said of March, 1906, and on the next day was deputy district attorney all the facts and circommitted by the magistrate to the custody | cumstances in the knowledge of the defend.
ant relating to the charge against the plaintiff, and that the said deputy, district attorney also made an investigation of his own motion of the charge against the plaintiff, and that after making such investigation, and after receiving all such facts and circumstances, , advised the defendant to institute said criminal action, and that defendant acted on such advice in good faith; and I instruct you as a matter of law that such fact constitutes probable cause for said criminal action, and I instruct you to return a verdict for defendant." This requested instruction was denied by the court, and, an exception to the ruling having been taken by the defendant, error is assigned thereon. It appears from the testimony that defendant, soon after having given plaintiff the order for the books, and after having paid plaintiff the sum of money charged to have been obtained under false pretenses, became suspicious of plaintiff's good faith and his right to receive the money as an agent for the proprietors of the work, and on that account defendant consulted with his attorney, A. M. F. Kircheiner, in regard to the matter, giving him a full, fair, and correct statement of all that had transpired between the parties. It transpired that this attorney and R. R. McHaley, residents of that neighborhood, also had recently had transactions with plaintiff similar to those which had taken place between him and defendant, and on which the criminal information was based, and under the same circumstances. These three persons, after talking the whole matter over among themselves, becoming convinced that they had been swindled, and that they would never be supplied with the books, made an investigation to ascertain the correctness of the statements and representations made to each of them by plaintiff when taking their orders and receiving their mony. To that end communications were ad(lressed to the Bureau of National Literature and Art in Washington, D. C., plaintiff's reputed principal, and to Mr. C. T. Brown, general manager of the Washington Post at Kansas City, Mo., wbich was, since June, 1905. the successor in interest to all of the proprietary rights in the sale and distribution of the books in question, formerly possessed by said bureau. On March 19, 1906, the Bureau of National Literature and Art, through E. M. Hunt, its assistant treasurer, replied that Putnam had not been in its employ for a long time, and saying: "We have been endeavoring to ascertain his whereabouts. * * * If Mr. Putnam is still in your locality we would thank you to advise our Mr. C. T. Brown, C01 Century Building. Kansas City, Mo., at his expense by wire. Mr. Putnam's work has been very irregular, and we intend to put a stop to it. We should be pleased to receive this information if possible.” On March 21, 1906, Kircheiner received a tele*aphic message from Brown to have Putnam
arrested; but, fearing to act on such request without further information, Brown was advised by Kircheiner to forward a warrant. On March 25th following, the sheriff of the county received from Brown this telegram : “Arrest H. N. Putnam claiming to be representative of Bureau of National Literature and Art. Charge, collecting and retaining trust fund.” Plaintiff was arrested and taken into custody by the sheriff, acting upon this order but without warrant; but he immediately advised Brown that he would not hold plaintiff unless a proper warrant was forthwith furnished, and on March 27th he received from Brown this message: "A. M. Kircheiner of Prairie City, Or., will make charge against Putnam. If not, collect all supplies belonging to Bureau of National Literature and Art and let go." All of these matters were fully disclosed to the deputy district attorney by Kircheiner acting for himself and for the defendant, and by R. R. McHaley. The deputy district attorney had talked with both of these persons, and they testified that they had fully and fairly disclosed to him all of the facts within their knowledge regarding not only plaintiff's transactions with defendant, but also plaintiff's dealings with them concerning the sale of books, and the evidence shows that the defendant had previously disclosed to Kircheiner and McHaley all of the material facts within his knowledge upon which the criminal charged was afterwards based, and that Kircheiner was acting as defendant's attorney and was advising him as to what he should do in the matter. The deputy aistrict attorney also swears that he was made fuuv acquainted with all of the facts of the case by McHaley and Kircheiner, and that he had in fact been investigating appellant's conduct for a month or six weeks previously, and was well advised concerning his transactions, and based on such knowledge and information he advised Kircheiner to have his client, Stalker, the defendant, swear to the information, because he then believed there was sufficient evidence to hold plaintiff. He preferred that Stalker should make the information, instead of either Kircheiner or McHaley, because Putnam had admitted to McHaley that he had not forwarded Stalker's order, which fact made a stronger case against plaintiff, while they had no evidence as to whether plaintiff had forwarded McHaley's or Kircheiner's orders and money. This testimony is corroborated by both Kircheiner and Mellaley. The latter testifies that he expressed his willingness to make the information himself; but, the deputy district attorney advising that
advising that Stalker had the stronger case, the latter was the proper person to make the charge, and he was requested to swear to the information. Defendant swears that he was so advised and requested by his attorney, and that relying upon the