Gambar halaman
PDF
ePub

their debts; and therefore they ask for some it is only in cases of clear violation of the relief from the overwhelming ruin which constitution that the court can interpose to has been brought upon them, not by any annul a statute. misconduct or extravagance of their own, but by a calamity for which creditors and debtors are alike responsible. Of this class of debtors there are very few whose property will not exceed the amount exempted by the constitution; and there are few cases in which the property remaining will not afford a larger percentage on its debts than was obtained from the property of that class of debtors for whom the $500 exemption was provided. Then, if it was proper and constitutional to exempt five hundred dol275 lars out of the small property *that this last class of creditors possessed, how can it be said that the exemption provided for the present debtor class by the constitution is improper and unconstitu

tional.

But all this relates to the action of the court upon a statute which is the act of the legislature; a body acting under the powers vested in them by the people by the constitution, and acting under delegated powers, and which can only exercise the powers thus delegated to them. But in this case it is not a question whether the power has been delegated. The question is, whether the sovereign people of Virginia-I say, sovereign people of Virginia, because this court has said, in a late case, that we are a sovereign State-whether the sovereign people of Virginia, acting in their sovereign capacity, establishing their supreme law, by which their legislators and courts and officers are to govern themselves, have, on this solemn occasion, and in this solemn instrument, violated the constitution of the United States.

When the principle of exemption is once admitted to be proper and constitutional, the amount of the exemption is a question It has been said by one of the judges of of sound discretion, and that discretion is this court, in a late opinion, that the conto be exercised in view of the condition of stitution of the United States might be viothe country and the circumstances affecting latedy b the constitution of a State as well the subject. And that, I submit, is a ques-as by a statute. I would respectfully sugtion for the legislative department of the gest, that this is not a well considered government; and it is one upon which opinion. I can well believe, that the Sucourts cannot enter. This court has fre- preme court of the United States, with the quently and lately expressed itself on this contempt felt by that court, and by all subject. On the question whether the United States authorities, for States, and keepers of billiard saloons could be subjected the people of the States, may undertake to to a license tax, the court said: "The legis- pass upon the most solemn acts of these lature must, in the nature of things, have people. That court is a branch of another a large discretion in determining the ques- government, deriving its authority from tion as to what business can be reached by another constitution and from another the ad valorem system, within the meaning source, and holds itself up, and is set up by of the constitution. The subject is indefi- others, when it suits them, as the spenite in its nature, and although the in- cial guardian of the constitution of the stances enumerated in the constitution United States; and it may, therefore, afford material aid in ascertaining the *undertake to enquire whether the meaning of its framers in the use of the constitution of a State is or is not general words which follow the enumera- violative of that constitution. But the tions, still much room is necessarily left question here is, whether a State tribunal, for the exercise of legislative discretion in deriving its authority from the State conthe matter; and we certainly cannot say stitution, which sits here by authority of that such discretion has been so exercised that constitution, and can only take jurisin this case as to make the laws in question diction of the case by virtue of that auunconstitutional." Lewellen v. Lockharts, thority, can constitutionally undertake to 21 Gratt. 570. In this case there are no pass upon the solemn act of the sovereign instances given in the constitution by which people of Virginia. a court may be guided; but it is a simple question of legislative discretion, dependent upon circumstances of which the court can have no judicial knowledge. And I again refer to the act of Congress to show how large a discretion that body considered as vested in the legislatures of the States.

One other topic, and I will conclude. This court has often said, and said in the case to which I have referred, that "certainly it ought plainly to appear that a law 276 is *unconstitutional to warrant the

court in so declaring." And the constitution provides "that the assent of a majority of the judges elected to the court shall be required in order to declare any law null and void by reason of its repugnance to the Federal constitution or the constitution of this State;" showing that

277

The pretension is, that the people acting in their capacity of sovereign, establishing their organic law, by which the frame of their government is fixed, and the powers vested in each department is defined, have given to their creature acting as their agent, the power and authority to annul their act, and defeat their will. To my mind, if the pretension is just, popular sovereignty is a farce.

Wallace and Sener, for the appellees:

The provision in the State constitution of Virginia, under which we are now living, article XI, section 1, and the act passed June 27, 1870, are in direct conflict with article 8, section 10, United States constitution, in so far as the provisions of said constitution and law propose to exempt property to the extent of two thousand dol

lars from all liability to the payment of debts contracted prior to the adoption of said Virginia constitution, and so null and void.

And, first, The laws which exist at the time and place of the making of the contract enter into and form a part of it, and they embrace, we hold, alike those which effect its validity, construction, discharge, and enforcement.

(a) At the time of making this contract, the laws of Virginia then recognized, with slight exemptions, the liability of all present and after-acquired property, real and personal, of the debtor, for the payment of his debts; whereas this constitution and law proposes to exempt two thousand dollars' worth of property of every debtor, which *not only shifts and abridges the remedy of the creditor, but totally, pro tanto, denies all remedy, and all right of recovery.

278

(b) The decisions touching the right to deal with the remedy have never gone farther than to permit such a modification of the remedy as does not impair the obligation of the contract; i. e. you cannot so abuse the remedy as to make it work a denial of all rights. And the later decisions hold the broad ground that any interference with the remedy to that extent impairs the obligation of the contract. 4 Wall. U. S. R. 554; 8 Id. 575, and infra.

Rogers; 8 Id. 575, 583, 584, Butz v. City of Muscatine; 9 Id. 477, The City v. Lamson; 10 Id. 511, Railroad Co. v. McClure; 1 Id. 175, 206, Gelpecke v. City of Dubuque.

CHRISTIAN, J. These three cases were heard together at the late session of this court at Richmond. The arguments of counsel were submitted just before the adjournment of that session, which left us no time for their consideration. They involve the question [so full of interest and importance to the whole people of this Commonwealth,] as to the validity of that provision of the State constitution and the act of the General Assembly, passed in pursuance thereof, which exempts from execution, or other legal process, a homestead to each householder or head of a family to the value of two thousand dollars.

This court, deeply impressed with the magnitude of the subject, and the high responsibility imposed upon it in the final adjudication of the question, has had the subject, since its adjournment at Richmond, under careful and anxious consideration. It is much to be regretted that a subject of such general interest and importance should not, at an earlier day, have received the final adjudication of the supreme tribunal constituted by law, to pronounce the supreme law of the State, instead of being left to the decision of inferior courts, some of which have sustained the validity of the "homestead exemption," while others have pronounced against it, thus leaving the law unsettled, and the people, both debtor and creditor, in doubt as to their rights and liabilities.

Nor can it be argued that this homestead law is constitutional, because poor debtors' laws are recognized, for Chief Justice Taney limits such laws to necessary implements of agriculture, tools of mechanics, or articles of necessity in household and wearing apNot long after the constitution of parel. Bronson v. Kinzie, 1 How. U. S. R. 280 the present court, *the announcement

311.

Nor, secondly, can it be held that Congress, in readjusting the relations of the States to the Union, after the war, had any right to validate any special provision of a State constitution which was repugnant to the Federal constitution. White v. Texas, 7 Wall. U. S. R. 720:

A State can only pass such laws touching the remedy as do not clog with conditions, or so change the remedy as to make it not worth pursuing; a fortiori the remedy cannot be destroyed without the substitution of some other substantial remedy. And this provision, we hold, destroys all remedy, and it is well settled that all laws existing at the date of the contract for the enforcement, enter into and form a part of the obligation of the contract.

And for these propositions, we rely upon the following additional authorities:

[ocr errors]

was made from the bench, by the president, that the court would take up out of its turn for hearing any case involving this question. No such case, however, was ready to be heard [until near the close of the last session at Richmond,] and we now proceed, at the earliest moment consistent with a due consideration of the important questions involved, to pronounce our unanimous judgment upon the cases submitted to us.

No question of greater delicacy can ever be presented to a judicial tribunal, and especially to one of the last resort, and from which there is no appeal, than a question involving the validity of an act of the legislature, particularly where the act is in furtherance of a provision of the organic law of the State, incorporated in the solemn form of a constitution. Such a law, in pursuance of such a provision, organic in 8 Wheat. R. 1, Green v. Biddle; 12 Id. terms, and purporting to speak in solemn 213, Ogden v. Saunders; 1 How. U. S. R. form, the sovereign will of the people, must 311, Bronson v. Kinzie; 2 Id. 608, Mc-be always sustained and upheld, unless it Cracken v. Hayward; 6 Id. 301, 327, Planters is plain that it abrogates and annuls that Bank v. Sharp; 15 Id. 304, 319, Curran "supreme law of the land," the constitu279 v. Arkansas; *24 Id. 461, Howard v. tion of the United States. Bugbee; 2 Wall. U. S. R. 10, Hawthorne v. Calef; 18 Gratt. 244, Taylor v. Stearns, &c.; 4 Wall. U. S. R. 553, Von Hoffman v. City of Quincy; 5 Id. 705, City of Galena v. Amy; 7 Id. 181, Lee Co. v.

And while it is the duty of the judicial department generally to give effect to the acts of its co-equal and co-ordinate department, the legislative, and always in doubtful case to solve the doubt in favor of

a

the validity of the law; on the other hand, | the same thing. Dodge v. Woolsey, 18 it is one of its highest duties and most How. U. S. R. 334; White v. Hart et al., solemn prerogatives to declare what the law (not yet reported). December term, 1870. is. And where the legislative will, or the The validity of the law in question is popular will declared in the solemn form of attempted to be maintained upon three à constitution, is in contravention of the grounds: supreme law of the land, the judicial de- 1st. That when the constitution containpartment must uphold that law, and un-ing the homestead provision was adopted, flinchingly guard it as inviolable. This Virginia was not a State of the Union; principle and this duty grow out of no that she had sundered her connection as superiority, which the judicial department such, and was a conquered territory wholly of the government claims over the legisla- at the mercy of the conqueror; and that tive, but is inherent in the very nature and hence the inhibition of the States, by the form of our system of government. In ex- constitution of the United States, to pass ercising this high authority, the courts any law impairing the obligation of conclaim no supremacy over the legisla- tracts, had no application to Virginia; 281 ture. They are only the administra- that the constitution, having no validity tors of the paramount law expressing until approved by Congress, was the act of the public will. If an act of the legislature Congress, and not of the State; and though is held void, it is not because the courts a State cannot pass any law impairing the have any control over legislative power, but obligation of contracts, Congress may; and because the act is forbidden by the consti- that for this reason also the inhibition in tution, and because the will of the people the constitution of the United States has therein declared is paramount to that of no operation. their representatives expressed in any law. The power, however, is a delicate one, and is always exercised with reluctance and hesitation. But it is a duty which the courts in a proper case are not at liberty to decline, but must firmly and conscientiously perform.

The provisions of the constitution, and the act of the legislature made in pursuance thereof, and validity of which is called in question in the cases before us, is in these words:

2d. That the law in question affects only the remedy, and does not impair the obligation of contracts; that all exemption laws must be considered as affecting the remedy only, and that the legislature has the right to modify the remedy as it may deem proper. 3d. That the power of the legislature to exempt certain articles of necessity has never been questioned, and that the amount of exemption is a matter of discretion with the legislative department of the government, with which the judicial department cannot interfere.

Article XI, section 1. "Every householder or head of a family shall be entitled, in addition to the articles now exempt from levy or distress for rent, to hold exempt from levy, seizure, garnisheeing, or sale under any execution, order or other process issuing on any demand for any debt heretofore or hereafter contracted, his real or personal property, or either, including of the United States applies to States in money or debts due him, whether heretofore or hereafter acquired or contracted, to the value of not exceeding two thousand dollars, to be selected by him, " &c. The single question which we have to determine is whether this provision of the State constitution, and of the act of 1870, which is but a copy of this article, is in violation of the provision of the constitution of the United States, which declares that "no State shall pass any law impairing the obligation of a contract."

It is upon these three propositions that the argument in favor of the validity of the "homestead exemption" is based; and, if either one is sound, the law must be sustained as valid and constitutional. 283 *As to the first proposition, to wit, that the inhibition of the constitution

We may observe, before proceeding to discuss the main question, that this prohibition of the Federal constitution is upon the State, without regard to the form its laws may take, or the agencies which enact them. It is certain that the obligation of a contract can no more be impaired by the constitution of a State than by an act 282 *of its legislature. It has been well settled by the adjudications of the Supreme court of the United States, that a State can no more impair the obligation of a contract by adopting a constitution than by passing a law. In the eye of the constitutional inhibitions they are substantially

the Union, and that Virginia was not at the time of the adoption of her present constitution a State in the Union, it is sufficient to remark that very recently that question has been definitely adjusted by the Supreme court of the United States, and the status of the seceding States with reference to the Federal Union is no longer an open question.

The case of White v. Hart, decided at the last term of that court, was a writ of error to the Supreme court of the State of Georgia. The constitution of that State contained a provision that no court or officer shall have, nor shall the General Assembly give, jurisdiction, to try or give judgment on, or enforce any debt, the consideration of which was a slave, or the hire thereof;" and the question was, whether this provision of the constitution of Georgia was in conflict with that of the constitution of the United States, which declares that no State shall pass any law impairing the obligation of a contract. The Supreme court of Georgia decided in favor of the validity of the constitutional provision of that State. That judgment was reversed by the Supreme court of the

United States. It was sought to be main- | garded as a law of Congress. It is true tained mainly upon the ground that when the constitution of 1868 was adopted Georgia was not a State in the Union, and that the inhibition of the constitution of the United States had no application to her.

284

[ocr errors]

*

tablishment of the civil authority of the State. That having been accomplished, the power and authority of Congress (if it ever legitimately had any) is at an end.

that, under the act of March 1867, the approval of the constitution by Congress was required before the State should be entitled to representation. The effect of withholding its approval would have been to conThis question, which had been inciden- tinue the military government to which the tally discussed in other cases before that State was then subjected. But when the court, was thus directly brought up and constitution was approved, and senators pronounced upon by that tribunal. Mr. and representatives elected under it adJustice Swayne, delivering the opinion of mitted, it then became the organic law of the court, says: "At no time were the re- this State, binding upon all the citizens of bellious States out of the pale of the Union. the State and all departments of the State Their rights under the constitution were government organized under it, except so suspended, but not destroyed. Their con- far as any of its provisions may be in constitutional duties and obligations were un-flict with the constitution of the United affected and remain the same. * States. If it is to be considered a mere "Georgia, after her rebellion, and be- creature and law of Congress, then Confore her *representation was restored, gress may repeal it and declare it void. It had no more power to grant a title of can no more do this than it can declare the nobility, to pass a bill of attainder, an ex constitution of New York a nullity. It is post facto law, or law impairing the obliga- as much the constitution of Virginia, and tion of contracts, or to do anything else beyond the power or control of Congress, prohibited to her by the constitution of the as the constitution of any of the northern United States, than she had before her re- States of the Union. The approval of the bellion began, or after her restoration to constitution by Congress was a condition her normal position in the Union." precedent to the withdrawal of the military This decision upon a constitutional ques-authority of the United States, and re-estion, made by the highest tribunal in the land, specially constituted and clothed with the authority to adjudicate questions of this character, is binding upon this court; and while we do not adopt its language or its But suppose the constitution of Virginia reasoning in all respects, its conclusions could, in any view, be considered an act of must be adopted as settling the status of Congress, then I deny that Congress can the seceding States. But if the question violate the constitution of the United States was not res adjudicata-if it were still an any more than a State. That constitution open question whether the seceding States is the "supreme law of the land,' by the act of secession actually sundered mount in its obligation and binding force their connection with the Federal Union-upon all departments of government, State the result, in my view, would be precisely and Federal; upon the National legislature the same. If they are to be regarded as as well as the State legislatures; upon "out of the Union" from the date of the 286 the judicial and executive, *as well as adoption of their respective ordinances of upon the legislative departments of secession until their representation in both Federal and State governments; upon Congress was restored, yet the moment they the whole people, governing and restraining were readmitted and restored to their nor- their acts and conduct, whether exercised mal position in the Union, the constitution by their representatives in the National of the United States at once operated upon Congress or by their representatives in them as the "supreme law of the land, State conventions and State legislatures. and they became at once bound by the force It is to each and all the supreme law of the of its prohibitions, as well as entitled to land. the benefits of its protection. And if there was anything in their constitution and laws in conflict with the constitution of the United States, thenceforward the latter would prevail as controlling and supreme. But it is further insisted by the counsel for the appellants, that the present constitution of Virginia, having no validity under the reconstruction laws, until approved by Congress, must be regarded as a law of Congress; and that therefore the inhibition of the constitution of the United States which is upon the States, and not upon

Congress, has no application. 285 *In answer to this view (which I would not deem it necessary to notice, except out of respect to the counsel who so earnestly pressed it in argument), it is sufficient to remark, first, that in no sense can the constitution of this State be re

para

It would be a monstrous fallacy to hold, either that Congress can authorize a State to do that which the constitution of the United States prohibits a State from doing, or that Congress may itself supersede the National constitution.

The prohibition of the constitution upon the States was necessary because the States could do anything not prohibited by the constitution. The prohibition upon Congress was not necessary, because Congress could do nothing except under powers granted by the constitution. But I will not pursue the discussion further, because the point that Congress no more than a State can supersede the National constitution has been very recently expressly decided by the Supreme court of the United States. See White v. Hart, to be reported in 13 Wallace, decided at the last term.

interpretation and legal import of the constitutional provision referred to:

(1.) The obligation of a contract is the law which binds the parties to perform their agreement.

(2.) Nothing can be more material to the obligation than the means of its enforcement. The ideas of validity and remedy are inseparable, and both are parts of the obligation, which are guaranteed by the constitution against invasion.

I am therefore of the opinion that the validity of the "homestead exemption" cannot be maintained upon the first ground insisted upon by the appellant's counsel. I am now to consider the second proposition upon which it is sought to be maintained, to wit, that "the law in question affects the remedy only, and does not therefore impair the obligation of contracts," and consequently is not within the inhibition of the constitution of the United States. It here becomes necessary to ascertain with (3.) The laws which subsist at the time precision the meaning of the constitutional and place of making a contract, and where prohibition and the object of its insertion. it is to be performed, enter into and form Its object plainly was to secure against leg-a part of it, as if they were expressly reislative invasion the sanctity of contracts, and to preserve their uniform inviolability in all the States. Of such importance 287 is this *principle regarded, that the large majority of the States have incorporated it either in their bill of rights or constitution in the same language used in the constitution of the United States.

It was said by this court in Taylor v.

ferred to and incorporated into its terms.
(4.) It is competent for the States to
change the form of the remedy, or to mod-
ify it otherwise as they may see fit, provided
that no substantial right secured by the
But any
contract is thereby impaired.
law, which in its operation amounts to a
denial or obstruction of the rights accruing
by a contract, though professing to act
only on the remedy, is directly obnoxious
to the prohibition of the constitution.

Fletcher v. Peck, 6 Cranch R. 87; Green

Haywood, 2 How. U. S. R. 608; Sturges v.
Crowning shield, 4 Wheat. R. 122; Ogden
V. Saunders, 12 Wheat. R. 213; Von Hoffman
Hawthorne v. Calef, 2 Id. 10; White v.
v. City of Quincy, 4 Wall. U. S. R. 553;
Hart, to be reported in 13 Wallace.

These decisions have been uniformly followed by this court, and recently re-affirmed in the cases of Taylor v. Stearns, 18 Gratt. 244, and the Bank of the Old Dominion v. McVeigh, 20 Gratt. 457.

Stearns, 18 Gratt. 244, after an instructive review of the circumstances under which this restriction was adopted, "the contemporaneous history of the legislation out of Biddle, 8 Wheat. R. 1; McCracken v. which this restriction grew, and the declarations of the framers of the constitution, conclusively prove that this clause was designed to interdict to the States all legislative interference with contracts, such as had so disastrously relaxed the morals, interrupted the commerce, and disturbed the harmony of the States. For obvious reasons, no attempt was made to enumerate cases within this prohibition; but its terms were so comprehensive as clearly to embrace the antecedent mischiefs to which it was directed, as well as to provide against future evils of the same kind." The terms used in the constitution, "no State shall pass any law impairing the obligation of a contract," are terms, in the language of Chief Justice Marshall, for which "it would seem difficult to substitute words which are more intelligible or less liable to misconstruction." Sturges v. Crowningshield, 4 Wheat. R. 122.

But plain and comprehensive as are the terms used in the constitution, they have been the subject of settled judicial interpretation by the Supreme court of the United States, as well as the Supreme courts of many of the States of the Union, and we are not left to etymological discussion to arrive at their true meaning and legal import. These are indubitably and irreversibly fixed by a weight of authority which cannot now be shaken.

The decisions of the Supreme court of the United States in a long series of years, from Fletcher v. Peck, 6 Cranch, decided in 1810, down to White v. Hart, to be reported in 13 Wallace, decided in December 1871, *have given a uniform and unvarying construction to this clause of the Federal constitution. From these decisions may be extracted the following propositions as to the true

288

V R, 22 Gratt-8

be regarded as now well settled (notwithApplying these principles which must standing some contrary decisions of State courts, which I shall notice presently), let us enquire what were the mutual rights and obligations of debtor and creditor as to contracts made before the homestead law."

289

The obligation of the debtor was to pay his debt. The right of the creditor was to enforce its payment. Under the laws existing at the time, which entered into and were a part of the contract, the creditor had a right to subject, by execution or other legal process, the whole property of the debtor, (except certain articles of personal property already exempted by existing laws.) Nay more, the debtor was prohibited from withdrawing his property from that liability, and appropriating it, either openly or upon secret trust, to his own use, or the use of his family. Every attempt to do that was, by law, declared fraudulent and void. But this "homestead law," to the extent of two thousand dollars, takes away the right which the creditor had at the time that the contract was entered into to enforce the payment of his debt, and allows the debtor to make a conveyance of the property, to that extent, for the use ofhimself and family, which, before the law was passed, would have been pronounced by the courts fraudulent and void.

113

How

« SebelumnyaLanjutkan »