SIMILARITY OF TransportatioN CONDITIONS: Transportation conditions affecting movement of intrastate shipments of coal to East St. Louis-Wood River-Alton, Ill., district and interstate shipments to St. Louis, including unusually expensive destination switching service, were the same except for additional handling required to move shipments across the river to St. Louis, which must be reflected in higher rates to that point. Coal from Illinois to Alton and East St. Louis, 637 (655).

INVESTIGATIONS. See EXPRESS RATES.

ISSUE. See COMPLAINTS; LIMITATION OF Actions.

JOINT RATES AND FARES. See also LIVESTOCK (Rates and Charges); RATE COMPARISONS; THROUGH ROUTES; TRANSIT.

PRESCRIPTION: Limitations of sec. 15 (4) on Commission's power to prescribe through routes which short-haul a carrier have no effect when issue is not establishment of a new through route, but determination of reasonable rate over route used. That route having been in effect when the traffic moved, shipper's right to a reasonable rate thereover may not be denied. Standard Cap & Seal Corp. v. Delaware, L. & W. R. Co., 357 (361). LACHES.

Although informal complaints had been held in abeyance pending final determination of related formal proceeding brought by same parties, complainants were not reasonably diligent in prosecuting claims covered by those informal complaints when about 12 years elapsed between decision in that formal proceeding and filing of their second formal complaints. Midland Flour Milling Co. v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co., 281 (302).

LEASE. Though conditions imposed in 71 I. C. C. 631 on sublease to Chicago River & I. R., a subsidiary of New York Central R., of line leased by Chicago Junction Ry. from Union Stock Yards were particularly intended to ensure that Junction and Chicago River would be operated as neutral terminal carriers without specially favoring Central, they were broad enough to inhibit operation of Junction to special advantage of the stockyard, notwithstanding covenants of the leases that the line would be operated in a manner tending to benefit the stockyard's business. Effect of the leases was to divest the stockyard of operation and control of the terminal railroad. Swift & Co. v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co., 557 (575). LESS THAN CARLOAD. See CARLOAD RATES; CARloads. LIABILITY OF CARRIERS. See also BILLS OF LADING; DAMAGES (Insolvent Carriers); LIMITATION OF ACTIONS; QUOTATION OF RATES. Establishment of "carriers' protective service" against cold in the East would not impose any new and unusual liability on carriers. That under it they in effect concede that, when a shipper has absolved himself from negligence by ordering and paying for such service, damage by cold is as much within scope of their legal liability as any other loss does not make them "insurers," as liability for loss from cold is no greater than liability attaching to common carriage in general. Such incidental restoration of normal common-carrier liability could not deprive Commission of jurisdiction to require establishment of the service. Charges for Protective Service to Perishable Freight, 751 (761).

LIABILITY OF SHIPPERS. See DEMURRAGE (Causes Relieving From Charges); VESSELS.

LIMITATION OF ACTIONS. See also COMPLAINTS; PARTIES (Defendants). Claim for reparation because of sec. 4 violation could not be considered when informal complaint did not allege such violation and formal complaint, while possibly broad enough to include that issue, was filed after the limitation period had expired. Central Cooperative, Wholesale, v. Northern Pac. Ry. Co., 144 (145).

Formal complaint was seasonably filed as to shipments delivered more than 2 years earlier but embraced by informal complaint filed by a practitioner, when presumption of his authority to act for complainant was not rebutted. While formal complaint was filed more than 6 months after Commission notified the practitioner that its file would be closed on the informal complaint because shipments were included in rule 5 statements submitted in another docket, the informal complaint was reactivated after carriers declined to dispose of the matter on that docket, and informal file had not been closed when formal complaint was received. Standard Cap & Seal Corp. v. Delaware, L. & W. R. Co., 357.

Complaint not filed within 2 years after delivery of shipments or within 6 months after carriers' disallowance of overcharge claim was barred by sec. 16 (3). The statutory period having expired, neither carriers' subsequent discussion of merits of claim, nor letter of intermediate carrier's claim agent advising complainant that claim had no merit and was barred by the statute, could revive a dead matter. Plastic & Die Cast Products Corp. v. Pacific Elec. Ry. Co., 500.

Expiration of the statutory period for filing claims or complaints not only bars the remedy but destroys the liability. Id. (502).

LINE-HAUL RATES. See DELIVERY; LIVESTOCK; SPOTTING.

LIVESTOCK. See also EVIDENCE (Relevance); MARKETS; SIMILAR CIRCUMSTANCES AND CONDITIONS (Discrimination or Prejudice).

IN GENERAL: Although, under long-standing terminal practice in stockyards area served by Chicago Junction Ry., Junction did not handle ordinary livestock, that traffic being handled entirely by line-haul carriers, it published switching charges on "all carload freight," which, without qualification, included livestock. There was therefore a holding out to switch livestock to and from industries, sidings, team tracks, and districts listed in its tariff. Swift & Co. v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co., 557 (559, 576);

-And while its service, tracks, and yards were not adapted for direct delivery of any substantial volume of livestock to packing plants, its proposal to except livestock from traffic it would transport, and to cancel application of its switching charges thereon, except to and from Union Stock Yards, was not justified. Maintenance of a switching charge on livestock would not adversely affect terminal operations. Id. (569, 573, 576).

DELIVERY: Commission may disapprove inauguration of a continuing practice of delivering livestock directly to packers under line-haul rates where such practice would seriously interfere with, delay, and disrupt terminal operations and the movement of livestock generally. Swift & Co. v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co., 557 (573);

-Therefore, requirement of free delivery of direct livestock shipments on siding of complainant's proposed new packing plant served only by Chicago Junction Ry. was not warranted when Junction's terminal services had been developed for handling of dead freight only. in conjunction with centralized delivery of livestock to Union Stock Yards by line-haul carriers, and its customary operating methods were not adapted to livestock traffic. Id. (568, 573);

-And while livestock consigned to complainant could be handled in consolidated trains by grouping cars at head of train with cars of dead freight intended for set-out in Junction's receiving yard, nevertheless, because of difficulties peculiar to livestock traffic, such handling would adversely affect line-haul carriers' operations in carrying traffic to Union Stock Yards, as all such traffic must move over Junction's in-bound track and any delay in unloading stock would tend to delay and pile up other trains seeking ingress to the stockyards. Id. (569);

-Moreover, if one of Junction's classification tracks was used for complainant's livestock shipments, cars would often be blocked between cars of dead freight and would have to be dug out for a special run to complainant's plant. In some instances, Junction might have to make a special run immediately on arrival of a consolidated train, since in practically all instances livestock arriving at Chicago has only a limited time left before it must be unloaded to comply with the 28-hour law, and Junction had no facilities for feeding and watering, while such facilities of line-haul carriers were very limited. Id. (570);

-Even if the time factor created by the 28-hour law were eliminated or minimized, livestock cars for complainant's plant, if handled in regular course, would have to be classified, etc., together with cars of dead freight; and because livestock cars and dead-freight cars handled with them could not be switched in usual expeditious manner but must be carefully placed to avoid injuring animals, interferences and delays in Junction's yards and to livestock trains headed for the stockyards would result. Considering the congested condition of Junction's yards and tracks, handling of even 18 cars daily (complainant's current average), would considerably delay and burden its operations, and record showed that proportion of complainant's direct shipments to those bought at stockyards was increasing. Id. (571);

—Moreover, probability of similar demands by other packers if complainant's demand for private track deliveries at line-haul rates were fully granted, and the required avoidance of undue prejudice, must be considered. Other packers would be under strong competitive compulsion to construct the requisite tracks and unloading facilities to support such demands, and complainant conceded that if they did so they would be entitled to like delivery service at like rates. Such service, together with service rendered complainant, would seriously interfere with, delay, and disrupt carriers' terminal operations in delivering livestock to the stockyards and other freight to industries on Junction's line. Id. (568, 572). RATES AND CHARGES: Rates on horses on prescribed basis 115 percent of cattle rates were not unreasonable merely because the horses were intended for slaughter or because assailed rates were subsequently reduced to cattle basis, since apart from differences in value there are no distinguishing transportation characteristics that justify lower rates on horses for slaughter than on work horses. Jordan Bros. Co. v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co., 510.

Requirement that Chicago Junction Ry. join in joint rates on direct shipments of livestock to complainant's proposed plant served only by it was not necessary or desirable when it would lead to demands for similar free private-track deliveries by other packers, which would overtax Junction's facilities and disrupt established terminal practices in the stockyard area. Line-haul rates on livestock to Chicago applied only to deliveries served by line-haul carriers, and Junction was not shown to participate in any from southwestern or w. t. 1. territory. Swift & Co. v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co., 557 (573, 574);

-And while, in prescribing the line-haul rates, Commission included an amount considered sufficient to cover terminal services under normal operation, as well as unloading and loading at public stockyards, it did not consider what services would be required for deliveries by Junction on private industrial tracks, as that carrier did not perform such services. Id. (574);

-Junction's published switching charge, which had been found reasonable for similar private track deliveries of livestock sought by another plant served only by it, was appropriate for any switching of livestock cars to complainant's proposed plant, and its addition to line-haul rates would not be unreasonable, considering services and modifications of service required for the desired deliveries, and effect thereof on terminal operations generally. Id. (573, 575).

LOADING. See also CAR SERVICE; FOLLOW-LOT SHIPMENTS.

IN GENERAL: Practice in New York port area of loading shipments of imported whisky and alcohol in second-hand barrels in single tiers to avoid springing of barrel staves and loss through leakage did not justify carrier in loading complainant's shipments to less than minimum weight when no instance of damage to double-tiered shipments, adequately braced, was shown, and it was the practice of carriers generally, including defendant, to double-tier domestic shipments. Hiram Walker & Sons, Inc., v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 211 (215).

CARRIER'S RESPONSIBILITY: When complainant's experience showed that double-tier loading of imported whisky and alcohol, in barrels, was practicable and carrier failed to show that proper loading in double tiers would have been less safe than in single tiers; and when considered shipments of alcohol could have been loaded in one car and lead cars of whisky consignment could have been loaded to minimum weight if double-tiered, it was carrier's duty to do so. Walker & Sons, Inc., v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 211 (213, 215, 216). LONG AND SHORT HAUL. See also COMPETITION.

Hiram

APPLICATION OF RATES: Principle that a tariff may not be construed as requiring a carrier to move traffic over the longer of two routes between same points at a through rate where such construction would result in a fourth-section violation over the longer and not over the shorter route, applies only where the tariff is ambiguous or susceptible of two interpretations. Hubbard Milling Co. v. Chicago G. W. Ry. Co., 173 (177).

INTERMEDIATE POINTS: Principle that, where delivery points are in same switching district, provision of sec. 4 that the shorter must be included within the longer distance must be strictly construed, and that the point to which the higher charge applies must actually be intermediate over route of movement to that to which the lower charge applies, was controlling where movement was in reverse direction and origin of shipment was not intermediate on route used to point from which lower switching rate was named. Central Cooperative, Wholesale, v. Northern Pac. Ry. Co., 144 (147).

INTERMEDIATE RULE: Commodity rate named on soda products from Baton Rouge, La., to St. Louis over route via Gulf, M. & O. R. "and connections" applied under intermediate rule to Nashville and Chattanooga, Tenn., and certain other intermediate points, notwithstanding circuity, when tariff authorized routing via lines of all participating carriers unless otherwise specifically provided, and that route was not specific because it was incompletely described. Solvay Sales Corp. v. Illinois Central R. Co., 19.

Application of intermediate rule at Nashville over routes from Louisiana to St. Louis embracing Tennessee Central Ry. was not barred by outstanding general relief limited to intermediate destinations on or via that line under provision of item 195 of tariff naming the rule, that rates published therein under such relief would not be subject to the rule, since Nashville on or via Tennessee Central was not an intermediate destination for considered traffic. Id. (26);

-Moreover, item naming rate claimed did not refer to item 195 although throughout tariff a cross reference was provided wherever rates were made subject to that item. Any different construction would make rates for which no specific routes were shown subject to item 195 and not to the rule, notwithstanding specific cross reference to the rule, merely by constructing a through route via the Tennessee Central. Such a strained construction may not be sanctioned. Id. (27). RELIEF, GENERALLY: Mere statement of need for competitive rates on acids and chemicals from certain southwestern points to Memphis, coupled with general representations that similar adjustments were unnecessary and would be detrimental to carriers' interests at intermediate points, did not justify greater relief, on basis of market competition, than was accorded on like traffic from same

and other southwestern producing points to numerous destinations east of Mississippi River. Relief granted to maintain rates on southern instead of southwestern basis to Memphis, on condition that rates on the southern basis would be established or applied at intermediate points for actual movements. Acids and Chemicals from Southwest to Memphis, Tenn., 533 (534, 536).

In the following cases, relief was granted: Caustic Potash from Corpus Christi to St. Louis, 153 (154); Export Iron and Steel Articles, North Atlantic Ports, 157; Fares, Louisville and East St. Louis and St. Louis, 486; Fresh Meats and Packing House Products, Pine Bluffs, Ark., 134; Fruits and Vegetables From Pacific Coast, 421; Lumber from Mississippi River Crossings to Texas, 603 (606); Muriatic Acid from Weeks, La., to Illinois, 589 (593, 596); Pulpboard from Florida to Atlanta and Army Depot, Ga., 335 (338); Pulpboard from Southern Ports to Eastern Ports, 97 (101); 786 (788).

In the following case, relief was denied: Class Rates to Illinois, 680.

LOSS AND DAMAGE. See LIABILITY OF CARRIERS; PROTECTIVE SERVICES (Charges).

MAILS. See EXPRESS COMPANIES; EXPRESS RATES.

MAINTENANCE. Since standards of normal maintenance in the private tankcar industry vary from company to company depending on such factors as financial ability, traffic volume, and operating policy, existence of deferred maintenance on privately owned tank cars as a whole would not necessarily indicate its presence on complainant's cars. Keith Ry. Equipment Co. v. Assn. of American Railroads, 469 (478, 479).

Allocation of all equipment repairs on a use basis is contrary to long-standing practice based on experience. A substantial portion of such maintenance should be allocated on a time basis reflecting the effect of weather and other factors unrelated to use. Id. (479).

If

Deferred maintenance should be omitted from computation of tank-car company's operating expenses in testing reasonableness of past mileage rate. there was any substantial deferred maintenance during period that rate was in effect, it should be susceptible to specific proof, but no such proof was offered. Even if there was any deferred maintenance in subsequent year which could be measured accurately, its existence was no proof that deferred maintenance existed in any prior year. Id. (479).

MANUFACTURE. See COMMODITIES; TRANSIT (Fabrication). MARITIME COMMISSION. Though Maritime Commission was an instrumentality of the Government, Commission had jurisdiction to adjudicate complaint against it when at time shipments moved it conducted intercoastal watercarrier operations under temporary authority from Commission. Commerce and Industry Assn. of N. Y., Inc., v. American Hawaiian S. S. Co., 181 (183). MARKETS. See also INCREASED RATES; RESTRICTED RATES OR ROUTES; THROUGH ROUTES (Short-Hauling).

LIVESTOCK: Delivery of livestock on private industrial tracks should not be condemned merely because of contention of livestock marketing agencies, interested in adequate functioning of the public market, that it was against public interest. Commission is not authorized to prescribe manner in which livestock shall be marketed in the public interest. Swift & Co. v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co., 557 (573).

RESTRICTION: As in normal peacetimes consumption of coal in Southwest is almost entirely superseded by that of oil and gas, mines in Henryetta district and at Judy, Okla., must have reasonable opportunity to market their coal in w. t. 1. territory. Existing group adjustment was unreasonable when it did not afford that opportunity. Midwest Coal Traffic Bureau v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co., 33 (38).