bid in by the State, and on March 22, 1897, purchased by, and deeded to, defendant Moore by the auditor general. It was found by the court below that the petitioners here, who are the owners of the land in controversy, had no knowledge of the sale of the lands in the proceedings by the auditor general, or that defendant Moore claimed any title to them, until May 17, 1897, when an agent of petitioners accidentally noticed the publication of an order on a bill filed by defendant Moore to quiet title. On ascertaining this, the petitioners presented a certified copy of the decree of the circuit court of August 16, 1894, to the auditor general, who on July 20, 1897, issued a certificate of error canceling the tax deed to the lands held by defendant Moore. Petitioners then filed this petition. Defendant Moore appeared, proofs were taken, and the court below made a decree setting aside the tax deed, and vacating the decree entered on the auditor general's petition. Defendant Moore appeals.

While many questions are raised and discussed by the defendant, but two or three need be noticed. The petitioners had prosecuted their bill to have these taxes declared void to a decree in the circuit court in chancery in Gogebic county. The defendant township appeared in that case, and no appeal was taken. The petitioners rested upon their supposed rights under that decree. The defendant contends that the proceedings under that decree and the decree itself are void on their face. The proceedings were had before a court of competent jurisdiction, and that court, by its decree, held that the taxes were void. The owners of the land rested upon that. No actual notice was given to them of the filing of the auditor general's petition, or of any of the proceedings taken thereunder. It is true that the usual notice was published upon the filing of the auditor general's petition, but the owners of the land, having taken the proceedings to set the taxes aside, had no reason to anticipate that any such proceedings would be taken, as the decree was not appealed from. They had paid all the taxes they considered valid, and had a right to suppose

that the whole controversy in reference to the taxes was ended. The case falls in principle within the cases of Hand v. Auditor General, 112 Mich. 597; Hough v. Auditor General, 116 Mich. 663; Carpenter v. Jones, 117 Mich. 91; Kneeland v. Wood, Id. 174. In those cases it appeared that the parties had made every proper effort to pay the taxes assessed, and were misled by the officers having the matter in charge. In the present case, the parties had taken the steps which the law points out to rid themselves of an invalid tax, and free the land from the incumbrance thereof. They rested upon what they thought to be a valid and proper decree. The township had notice of this proceeding, and appeared therein. These were township taxes solely, and no other governmental subdivision had any interest in them. The state and county taxes had been paid for that year. We shall, however, refer briefly to the contentions of defendant.

It is claimed that, in the bill against the township, there was a misjoinder of complainants. The complainants had each paid all taxes on their lands except one-half of the highway tax and the old highway tax. They each had the same interest in the proceedings. They were each similarly affected by what they claimed to be the illegal tax. The tax was assessed at the same time on each parcel, and under the same statute, by the same assessing officer. It is settled in this State, under such circumstances, that the parties may join as complainants in a bill to set aside illegal taxes. Scofield v. City of Lansing, 17 Mich. 437; Zabel v. Harshman, 68 Mich. 270; Turner v. Hart, 71 Mich. 139.

It is also contended that the auditor general was a necessary party to the proceedings against the township to set aside these taxes. This contention cannot be sustained. The township taxes, as soon as assessed, became a debt due to the township, and the county treasurer, in making the sale, bid in the lands "in the name of the State, for the State, county, and township, in proportion to the taxes, interest, and charges due each."

These last propositions, however, have no significance in the present case. We are satisfied to rest our ruling in affirming the decree below upon the proposition that the petitioners had the right, under the circumstances, to rely upon the decree setting aside the taxes.

The decree of the court below must be affirmed, with costs to the complainants.

The other Justices concurred.

CHITTENDEN v. CITY OF LANSING.

MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS-CONTRACTS-AUTHORITY OF BOARD OF
PUBLIC WORKS-ALTERATIONS.

Under the charter of the city of Lansing, the common council
determines when a public building shall be erected. The
board of public works then prepares plans and specifications,
and submits them, with an estimate of the cost, to the coun-
cil. Bids are advertised for, and are reported by the board,
with recommendations, to the council, which alone may
authorize the execution of a contract. Held, that a provision
in such a contract that, in case of alterations, a fair valuation
of the work added or omitted should be made by the board of
public works, and the sum agreed to be paid for the work,
according to the original specifications, increased or dimin
ished in accordance therewith, gave the board no authority
to bind the city for alterations in an amount in excess of the
contract price.

Error to Ingham; Person, J. Submitted May 4, 1899. Decided July 5, 1899.

Assumpsit by Charles M. Chittenden against the city of Lansing for extra material furnished under a building contract. From a judgment for defendant, plaintiff brings error. Affirmed.

Kilbourne & Harris, for appellant.

Charles B. Collingwood, City Attorney, for appellee.

HOOKER, J. The plaintiff was the successful bidder for the contract for the erection of the city hall at Lansing. According to the specifications, the bidders named the stone from which they respectively proposed to build the face of the walls, and the plaintiff named "Blue Amherst." His bid also contained a tender of "Blue Amherst Select" at an increased cost of $2,160. After his bid was accepted, the board of public works directed him to substitute Blue Amherst Select for Blue Amherst stone, and he at once changed his order in compliance therewith. The council repudiated this action without delay. The building was completed and accepted, and the contract price of $108,000 was paid to the plaintiff,, but the council refused to pay the sum of $2,160 for the substitution of Blue Amherst Select stone, denying the authority of the board of public works to make the change and bind the city therefor, and claiming that the council did not consent thereto. The brief of counsel for the plaintiff states that the committee of the board of public works recommended the acceptance of the bid of the plaintiff on March 25, 1895, and that the report was adopted by the board, and its action was ratified and confirmed by the council, on the same day. Counsel say that the specifications required alternative bids on stone, and that the contract executed by the board of public works on behalf of the city contained paragraph 3 of the specifications, reading as follows, viz. :

"(3) Should any alterations be required in the work shown or described by the drawings or specifications, a fair and reasonable valuation of the work added or omitted shall be made by the board of public works, and the sum herein agreed to be paid for the work, according to the original specifications, shall be increased or diminished, as the case may be. In case such valuation is not agreed to, the contractor shall proceed with the alteration, upon the written order of the said board, and the valuation of the work added or omitted shall be referred to three (3)

arbitrators (no one of whom shall have been personally connected with the work to which these presents refer), to be appointed as follows."

Their contention appears to be that this paragraph authorized the board of public works to increase the expenditure by changes in the specifications. But we agree with the learned circuit judge that this cannot be true. Under the charter the city council determines whether it will build a public building. The board then procures plans and specifications, and reports them, with an estimate of cost, to the council. Bids are advertised for, but before a contract can be made it must be authorized by the council. In this case the council authorized a contract to be made binding it to pay $108,000 for the construction of a building according to certain plans and specifications. The board of public works cannot bind the city by an agreement to increase the contract price. We are not cited to any case upholding such power. If this arrangement binds the city, then there is no limit to the power of the board to make changes in material and construction at the public expense. We feel that this is a hard case, and that there is a moral obligation on the part of the council to pay for this extra which the public would be slow to forgive a private person for disregarding; but we have not the power to give relief.

The judgment is affirmed.

The other Justices concurred.