immensely in the last generation ;"-and this without women's suffrage! There is not one legitimate right of woman sought to be secured or protected by her ballot, which cannot be more effectually secured by petition. Where then is the need of taking the law into her own hands and asserting her political independence?

"Limited municipal suffrage, he admits, "would be an experiment, and if this experiment should not work well, it could be discontinued." Such experiment, as all must see, is designed as an entering wedge to draw after it the whole reform and revolution. Suffrage once granted to any class would be diffi cult, if not impossible, to be withdrawn.

His supreme argument is the last. "The whisky rings and other corrupt classes fear nothing so much as municipal suffrage for women; and that points out the most effective weapon that can be used against them." They fear it because they look only at immediate possible results. But the true legislator is bound to look beyond these to the ultimate effect on society and the family, which have interests outweighing and outlasting even the cause of temperance legislation.

Two fundamental errors underlie this whole movement, the correction of which would forestall and answer all arguments for women's suffrage yet adduced. The first is an exaggerated idea of the power of the ballot and of legislation to remedy moral and social evils. These evils are deeper than the outward surface of life, which is all that the law can reach, and can be remedied only by moral and spiritual agencies. What the law cannot do both for individuals and for society, can be done and is done by Christianity with its slow working grace and truth. Moral sentiment is before legislation and must become a power in society before it can be embodied in law, or enforced by civil authority. And to form this sentiment, to exercise this moral and spiritual sway, is preeminently the work and privilege of woman. Here is her true sovereignty.

The second error is a false conception of the nature and sphere and true glory of woman, and of what are called her political rights. This is connected with the false doctrine of individualism already mentioned, or the denial of the divine. idea of the family and the State. The nature and constitution of

woman is before the modern doctrines respecting her, and will survive them and determine her place and duties in society, however for the time she may lose her true dignity and the respect which belongs to her by blindly striving against them. The family, too, is before civil government; and its constitutive idea, its organic unity, and its sacred interests, must not be sacrificed to it, or practically violated in blind obedience to a false theory of natural or individual rights.

ARTICLE IV.--TELEOLOGY, OLD AND NEW.

THE trend of our time is eminently materialistic. Its thought has been directed by those advances which are the glory of the age. Chemistry, electricity, and above all, biology, have revolutionized the older science. Such rapid progress could not fail to leave idealism and the purely mental sciences in the background. Philosophy, save that which is naturalistic, no longer achieves her former successes with the people. The cry is for museums and lecture courses. The great popular mind has become first attracted and then engrossed. More than to any other, this result is due to the investigation and writings of Charles Darwin.

Materialists there have been in every age, and in our own they have not failed to lay hold of the new science as a triumphant vindication of their philosophy. The boldness of the appropriation, the prestige of the claimants, the plausibility of their assertions carried the world by storm. Before the new truths were half realized, materialism cloaked the young science and henceforth seemed its natural robe. Commencing with the facts and inductions of science she passed, apparently without a break, to the inferences of philosophy, and landed the inquirer in the boggy syrtis of materialistic conclusions.

The chief claim of modern materialism is that recent science excludes from nature all possibility of the Christian's God. As part of this grand conclusion, teleology is swept from its ancient basis and the evidence by natural design to an intelligent, planning Creator is wholly wanting. That the friends of religion have regarded such claims as the teachings of science is much to be deplored. Science as well as religion needs. vindication, and of theologians and men of science not a few have protested against the union of materialism with evolution. The aim of this paper is not to prove teleology or to defend organic evolution, but to examine the argument of design in the light of Development and determine to what extent, if at all, it is modified thereby. First is presented a résumé of Design, second, of Development, thirdly, the discussion.

THE ARGUMENT OF DESIGN.

This is not, as usually stated, from design to a Designer. Let the evidence of design be established, and since design can exist only in intelligence, the conclusion to an intelligent Designer is immediate and irresistible. The work of the teleologist is to substantiate in nature the evidence of design. His is not the argument of the cosmologist to prove the existence of a First Cause from the universe as an effect. Nor is that part of teleology here discussed which reasons from the harmony and order of the universe as a whole, known as the argument from order. As here used, teleology refers to the skill and contrivance perceived in the adaptations of nature. Mr. Darwin speaks of "beautiful contrivances" and "marvelous adaptations." Dr. Romanes, an earnest advocate of the theory of development, says: "Innumerable cases of adaptation of organisms to their environment are the observed facts for which an explanation is required."

Design concerns not the origination of matter but its use, not the materials or parts, but their relations, which achieve an end that the parts without arrangement could not accomplish. Strictly, design is not in the arrangement or adaptation, but in the Intelligence back of them and of which they are the evidence. Design, then, consists in adaptations, which appear to be the result of foresight and intention. As design actually exists only in mind, which is not open to observation even in our fellow men, our only way to arrive at such a conclusion is through external phenomena, indicating purpose.

To account for adaptations, final as well as efficient causes are required. In adaptations there is no doubt of efficient cause, but there is more than this,-the idea beforehand of the end to be attained. This existed before material means were invoked to realize that idea. Every phenomenon has its material, efficient cause, its reason how, and in each combination and adaptation we seek these objective causes. But the mind is not satisfied in thus determining physical antecedents. In the human hand as an instrument, we are compelled to see more than physics and physiology. The reason how does not suffice to account for the eye. The larger factor remains unexplained

and leads us to inquire the reason why. We reply that the eye was made to see. This reason is needed to account for all phenomena that appear designed to accomplish definite results. The why, in distinction from the how, is named the mental, subjective, or final cause.

Some object to this reason, saying that for cause it puts effect. It is not the effect, however, but the idea of that effect, which constitutes the final cause. This idea precedes, but does not supplant, efficient agency. Efficient causes are the means which realize objectively what has first been ideally conceived, -just as man, before constructing a machine to accomplish a purpose, has that purpose in mind. This determination of the present to the future is the distinctive element of finality. To explain any adaptation, truth requires a spiritual as well as material factor. The two causes are complementary and har monious.

Design possesses the same basis of fact as the natural systems of organic science. Homology expresses the fact that in nature there are serial relations, correspondences in type of structure, an example of which is the unity of type exhibited in a fish's pectoral fin, a bird's wing, a dog's fore-leg, a man's arm. Because of his knowledge of ichthyic relations, Mr. Agassiz was enabled to delineate from a single part, correctly as it proved, the skeleton of the fish from which it was taken. The reconstruction from a single part shows mutual adaptations in every portion of the skeleton. Homology, or the study of relations, the basis of all comparative science, finds expression in natural classification, the statement of those relations. Though homologies are but relations they are facts as shown by the instance given. Although classification is but a statement of relations it is an accepted scientific principle, a practical rule, a truth. Yet it is based only on the perception of relations. If these systematic relations did not actually exist in nature, natural science would be impossible, since it is systematized knowledge. Now it is on these very same relations, or adaptations of part to part-witness the case cited,-fitted to accomplish an end, which constitutes the induction of design. Resting on the same basis of natural relations are teleology and scientific systems, alike only perceivable by intelligence and alike only