science had began to irradiate the world, when a system more conformable to the dictates of reason might be expected. It can hardly be doubted, that, if the systems of deeds and wills had sprung up together, but that the same words would have had the same effect in a deed as in a will. Surely it is as important in the former, as in the latter, that the intention should be complied with; and there can be no danger of admitting this idea. The words in a will to convey a fee-simple, must be clear, such as are indicative of that intention beyond a doubt. The indulgence shown to wills, admits of no conjecture; for the rule is, that the words used, must clearly demonstrate what kind of estate was intended to be given. Will not the same words in a deed, convey the same ideas with equal clearness? Does not common sense revolt at the idea that courts, whose peculiar province it is to administer justice, should give a construction to such words, when found in a deed, as is diametrically opposed to the intention of the parties, and the clear, unequivocal meaning of the words themselves? Will the investigating mind rest satisfied with the reasons given, that in wills, the intention is to be regarded, when clearly expressed, although not disfig- 492 ured by a certain set of technical expressions? that a testator is often inops consillii? His wishes are, therefore, to be complied with, and no criminalty imputed to him for not expressing himself in the language of a lawyer. But as to the man who conveys by deed, he, probably, is in sound health. Let him express his intention with ever so much perspicuity, since he has an opportunity to procure a Confessor in Technics, if he will not, they will impose the penalty upon him of thwarting his intention, and adjudge that he meant that, which they know he never intended. The warmest advocate for the galling fetters of systems and precedents, will find it difficult to convince the mind, not illuminated by legal maxims, of the propriety of giving different constructions to the same words in different instruments; when it is beyond a doubt, that the persons using them, affixed the same ideas to the words in one instrument, as they did in the other. IV. Of the Operation of the Term HEIRS, in a Bond. 493 By the English law, the personal estate is the only fund for the payment of debts of deceased persons, unless the heir is bound by the deed of his ancestor; and in such case, the specialty creditors may resort to the heir; or rather, to the real estate of the ancestor, descended to the heir. To the payment of such debts, the heir is bound to the extent of the real estate descended from the ancestor, but is not bound to pay his simple contract debts. These are to be sought for no where but from the executor; who has nothing to do with the real estate, nor any control over it. However great the real estate may be, which has descended to the heir, if there is a deficiency of personal assets, such creditors must lose their debts. Our law, founded upon more equitable principles, subjects the real estate, upon the deficiency of personal estate, to the payment of all the debts of deceased persons, without any distinction betwixt specialty credi tors and others. The whole estate, both real and personal, is, by our law, in the hands of the executor, and subject to the payment of all debts. No additional security is therefore gained to the creditor, by binding the heir in a bond. The law has already secured to him his right of recovering his debts against the executor, to the extent of the whole estate of the deceased. He has not any occasion to resort to the heir; for before the heir can have any part of the real estate, the executor carves out to himself, as much of it as is necessary to pay the debts. It is therefore very problematical, whether, in this State, any action can be sustained against the heir, for the debt of the ancestor. But 494 admitting that it can, in some exempt || instances; it is not because the ancestor bound the heir; but his liability, if any, arises from the equitable consideration, that he has received estate from the ancestor, and that the intervention of some cause has prevented a recovery from the executor, without any negli gence in the creditor. The term heir, therefore, although a word of the utmost importance and signification in an English bond, is an idle and insignificant expression with us. Would it not be best to omit it in such instruments, where it can serve no other purpose than to introduce a confusion of ideas? This, I apprehend, is commonly the case, when, through imitation, we retain a word that conveys important ideas to an English lawyer, and with us has no operation. THE END, Page power to devise personal property. Of their being bound, after they CHAP. III-Of adults being bound by their Contracts with infants. Of CHAP. V. Of the liability of infants for crimes, and civiliter for torts. CHAP. VII. Of suing by guardian, and when by prochein ami. Of the liability of guardian and prochein ami for costs. Of infant defendant's appearance by guardian. CHAP. VIII. Of children, as legitimate and illegitimate. Of the modern rule of determining who were legitimate, and who not. Of the effect of an intermarriage of a father of a child, and the mother of the same child, which child was illegitimate. Of the disabilities under which an illegitimate person labors. Of the place of settlement of an illegitimate child. Of the liability of the putative father to assist in supporting an illegitimate child, and of the proceedings to compel a performance of this duty. Of the liability of the putative father to save the town or parish from being liable to support such child, if it should ever become a pauper. Of the proceedings at law to attain this object. CHAP. IX. Of the liability of parents to support their children, after they are of full age, in the event of their becoming paupers. Of the liability of children, after they are of full age, to support their parents, in the event of their becoming paupers. Of the non-liability of the husband of a daughter, although the daughter would be liable if she was unmarried. Of the parent's right to govern, and being liable to the child in an action for immoderate correction, and what correction ought to be considered immoderate. 235 243 250 257 261 264 270 283 Page CHAP. X. Of the parent's consent to the marriage of an infant child. Of the father's control over the estate of his child. Of the father's right to the services of the child, until the child is twenty-one years old. Of the father's right of action, when his infant child is beaten. Of the infant's right of action in that case. Of the parent's right of action, when a daughter has been debauched. Of the father's right of action, when an infant child is taken away by force. CHAP. XI. Of the authority of a mother over children. Of infants in 295 GUARDIAN AND WARD. CHAP. II. Of the kinds of guardians in Connecticut. Of the power of a court of chancery, and of surrogates of probate courts, to appoint and remove guardians. Of the right of election of a guardian by the ward. Of the guardian's giving bond for the faithful discharge of his trust; and his liability to account for the infant's estate. CHAP. III. Of the particular duty of a father, when guardian; and of the mother, when guardian. Of the manner in which the guardian must manage the estate of the ward. CHAP. IV. Of the power of the courts of chancery, respecting the mar- riage of their wards. Of the effect which the marriage of a female ward has on her guardian's power over her person and estate, both when the husband is an adult, and when he is a minor. Of the effect which the marriage of a male infant has upon the guardian's CHAP. V. Of that power which chancery exercises over the gifts and contracts of wards, made with their guardians, soon after they come of age. Of the guardian's power, under any circumstances, to invest the personal property of the ward in lands, or to turn the real prop- erty into personal. Whether the law on that subject is applicable to our country. Some observations on the power of the guardian in Page power to devise personal property. Of their being bound, after they come of age, by ratifying those contracts, which were made during CHAP. III-Of adults being bound by their Contracts with infants. Of the effect of an infant's availing himself of his privilege, after having received of the adult the consideration for which the infant entered into the contract, Whether, during infancy, he can render valid his contract, so that he cannot, afterwards, avoid it. CHAP. IV. What contracts, when executed by infants, are void, and what are voidable. What instruments executed by them, are void, and what are voidable. Of executed contracts to them being voida- ble only. Whether a penal bond, executed by an infant, is void or voidable only. Of the executory contract of an infant, is it void, or voidable? Of the privilege of the infant to treat his executory con- tract as void. When may he do thus? Of a judicial conveyance by him, by fine or recovery. Of the privilege of an infant defendant, against whom a decree is passed in chancery. CHAP. V. Of the liability of infants for crimes, and civiliter for torts. CHAP. VI. Of infants being bound by conditions annexed to a grant of an office expressly. Whether liable to any annexed penalty for non- fulfilment. Of their being bound by implied conditions. Of the law respecting the prejudices they may receive from laches. Of their ability to hold offices, whether judicial or ministerial. Of their abil- ity to execute a power over real estate. CHAP. VII.—Of suing by guardian, and when by prochein ami. Of the liability of guardian and prochein ami for costs. Of infant defend- CHAP. VIII. Of children, as legitimate and illegitimate. Of the modern rule of determining who were legitimate, and who not. Of the ef- CHAP. IX. Of the liability of parents to support their children, after they are of full age, in the event of their becoming paupers. Of the lia- bility of children, after they are of full age, to support their parents, in the event of their becoming paupers. Of the non-liability of the husband of a daughter, although the daughter would be liable if she was unmarried. Of the parent's right to govern, and being liable to the child in an action for immoderate correction, and what correc- 257 270 |