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The inferior court, therefore, erred in rejecting the testimony offered by the plaintiff.

Therefore it is considered by the court that the judgment aforesaid be reversed, annulled, and set aside; that the cause be remanded to the Jefferson circuit court, with directions to admit the said testimony, the weight of which to be left with the jury, and that the plaintiff recover of the defendant his costs in this behalf expended, which is ordered to be certified to the said court

INDEX.

ABANDONMENT.

Sen INSURANCE, 11, 12, 35, 36, 37.

ACCOUNT.

ACCOUNT, DEFENSE AGAINST.-If a party has acknowledged the correct-
ness of an account presented against him by another, he is not, how-
ever, estopped, showing that the acknowledgment was founded on
mistake, and that the account is not correct. Dickerson v. Nabb, 725.
See EQUITY, 4.

ACKNOWLEDGMENT.

1. DEFECTIVE ACKNOWLEDGMENT BY FEme Covert.-Where a statute
required that the wife should be examined separate and apart from her
husband, and that the full contents of a deed or conveyance shall be
read or otherwise made known to the wife, and the certificate of ac-
knowledgment by the judge of the common pleas indorsed on a deed
of the wife's land by husband and wife, stated that they "personally
appeared before him, and acknowledged the indenture to be their act
and deed, and desired the same to be recorded, she being of full age,
and by him examined apart," it was held that this was not sufficient
to pass the wife's estate. Watson v. Bailey, 462.

& DEFECTIVE ACKNOWLEDGMENT.-A conveyance of land acknowledged
by the grantor and his wife, before two justices of the peace, in a
county in which they did not reside, and in which the land was not
situated, is not admissible in evidence; but parol evidence may be re-
ceived to prove that a grantor, although stated in the deed to reside in
a particular county, was a resident of the county in which the deed
was acknowledged. Gittings v. Hall, 502.

See DEEDS, 2; EVIDENCE, 11.

ACTION.

ACTION FOR MONEY PAID ON AN AWARD.-Money voluntarily paid in
compliance with an award of arbitrators, cannot be recovered back in
an action of indebitatus assumpsit. Bulkley v. Stewart, 57.

See CONTRACTs, 6; Covenants, 1, 4; Deceit, 1.

ADMIRALTY.

ADMIRALTY JURISDICTION.-The question of prize or no prize is exclu-
sive of admiralty jurisdiction, even though the vessel captured wu
not carried into a port for condemnation. Simpson v. Nadeau, 634.
See EVIDENCE, 6; JUDGMENTS, 3, 6.

AGENCY.

See PRINCIPAL, AND AGENT.

ANIMALS, FERÆ NATURÆ,

See PERSONAL PROPERTY, 1, 2

APPEAL.

RELIEF IN APPELLATE COURT.-If a cause come before the court on an
appeal from an interlocutory order, and the whole merits of the case
appear, the court will make a final decree, and decide upon the whole
merits of the case. Bush v. Livingston, 316.

ARBITRATION AND AWARD.

1. CONCLUSIVENESS OF AN AWARD.-An award performed will be a suffi-
cient bar to an action for the matters submitted and passed upon until
it is regularly set aside, and in a collateral action its validity cannot
be attacked, by alleging fraud in the party obtaining it. Bulkley v.
Stewart, 57.

2 AWARD SETTING ASIDE.-The court will not interfere to set aside an
award, on the ground of the arbitrators having mistaken the law in a
doubtful case. Ross v. Overton, 552.

& EXCEPTIONS TO AN AWARD.-There are two modes of taking an ex-
ception to an award; one, by what appears on the face of the award
itself, as that it does not comply with the requisites of law for consti-
tuting a good award; the second may be for matters extraneous to the
award, as for misbehavior of the arbitrators. Blackledge v. Simpson,
614.

▲ DUTY OF ARBITRATORS.—Arbitrators must pass on all that was particu-
larly referred to them, but their award need not specify each particular;
it is sufficient if the general result show that every matter referred
must have been considered and decided. Id.

IN WHAT Sense an Award IS MUTUAL.—An award must be mutual;
the meaning of which is, that the award must not leave him, who is to
pay, liable to be sued for the same cause for which he is awarded to
pay. Id.

IMPEACHMENT OF AWARD.-The court will not set aside an award ex-
cept for misbehavior of the arbitrators, such as gross partiality, collu-
sion or fraud, or for a mistake by which the award is made to operate
in a way they did not intend; or for some mistake apparent on the face
of the award. Evidence will not be admitted to show that the arbitas-
tors have erred in judgment, either as to law or fact, where such judg-
ment is free from the imputation of fraud or partiality. Alken v.
Bolan, 660.

See ACTION, 1.

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ARSON.

See CRIMINAL LAW, &

ASSAULT.

See CRIMINAL LAW, 15; DAMAGES, 6.

ATTORNEYS.

SECRETS, COUNSEL BOUND TO KEEP-A client's secrets which a counsel
is bound to keep are the communications and instructions of the client
relative to the management or defense of his cause.
ton, 145.

See CONTRACTS, 5; LIBEL, 1.

BANKRUPTCY.

Riggs v. Dennis

1. DISCHARGE OF BANKRUPT—AGAINST WHAT DEMAND NO BAR-If a house had been leased for a year before an act of bankruptcy, and the bankrupt continue in possession thereof afterward, his certificate of discharge will be no bar to an action for the subsequent rent. Hendricks v. Judah, 213.

2 DISCHARGE UNDER INSOLVENT LAW of another STATE.-The discharge under the insolvent law of one state is no bar to a suit in another by a citizen of the latter for a debt contracted within it, and who has not in any degree come in under the proceedings of the insolvent law of the former state. Van Raugh v. Van Arsdaln, 259.

& INSOLVENT DEBTOR-WHEN CAN MAINTAIN ACTION.- An action may be maintained in the name of an insolvent debtor, unless a trustee has been appointed who has accepted the trust, and to whom a conveyance has been executed. Kirwan v. Latour, 519.

BARRATRY.

See INSURANCE, 26.

BONDS.

LIABILITY OF Assignor of BOND.-The assignee of a bond cannot sus tain an action against the assignor on the failure of the obligor to pay by virtue of the assignment only. Garretsie v. Van Ness, 323.

See DAMAGES, 1, 3.

BY-BIDDING.

See FRAUD, 6.

CONSIDERATION.

See CONTRACTS, 5; DEEDS, 3, 6, 7, 8; EQUITY, &

CONSPIRACY.

See EVIDENCE, 1; FRAUD, 1.

CONTEMPT.

CONTEMPT-PUBLICATION CONCERNING A CAUSE.-The publication of a paper calculated to prejudice the public mind in a cause depending

in court is a contempt, if it manifestly refers to the cause, though the
reference may not expressly appear on the face of the writing. Respub
lica v. Passmore, 388.

CONTRACTS.

1. CONTRACT TO CONVEY LAND WITH WARRANTY. — A contract by
three to convey land with warranty is not complied with by a convey.
ance with warranty by one of the three warrantors, and a release or
quitclaim deed from the other two. Lawrence v. Parker, 10.

2. JOINT AND SEVERAL OBLIGATION.-The obligatory part of a bond was
in these words: "We are holden and bound unto M. C. in the sum of
five hundred dollars, for the payment of which we bind ourselves and
each of us." This was held a joint and several bond, on which an
action could be brought against one of the obligors separately. Carter
v. Carter, 113.

8. CONTRACT VOID AS AGAINST PUBLIC POLICY.-The land of A. was
advertised for sale, on an execution in favor of B. & C., who had pur.
chased the land subsequent to the judgment, without knowledge of
such judgment, agreed with B. at the sale that if he would not bid
against him, he would pay him the amount of his execution, and give
him his note for the further sum of one hundred and fifty dollars, and
B. agreed to these terms, and did not bid at the sale. In an action on
the note against C. by the second indorsee, to whom it was transferred
after maturity, aud with a knowledge of the circumstances under which
it was given, it was held that the consideration of the note might be
inquired into, and the consideration being in this case unconscien-
tious, and against public policy, the note was void. Jones v. Caswell,
134.

4. CONTRACT VOID AS AGAINST PUBLIC POLICY.-A penalty inflicted
by statute upon the commission of an act, implies a prohibition of it as
an offense, so as to make a contract based on such act void; therefore
under an act affixing a penalty for acquiring titles to lands in Pennsyi-
vania, except in the mode specified, a contract for the purchase and
sale of lands in Pennsylvania, under a Connecticut title, such being
excluded by the act, is unlawful and void, and no action can be main-
tained on such contract. Mitchell v. Smith, 417.

& CONTRACT VOID FOR WANT OF CONSIDERATION. — If an attorney
promise his client, while the action is pending, to indemnify him
against the consequences of it, the promise is without consideration,
and an action cannot be maintained thereon. Mitchell v. Bell, 627.

See DEMAND, 1.

COSTS.

See DAMAGES, 5.

COVENANTS.

1. WHEN ACTION ARISES ON COVENANT OF WARRANTY.—An action en
the covenant of warranty in a deed cannot be maintained without
showing an eviction by an elder and better title. Emerson v. Pro-
prietors, 34.

2 COVENANT OF TITLE IN CONVEYANCE.-The words "grant, bargain,

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