LIBRARY

CONSTITUTION.

Art. I, § 2. Trial by jury.

In divorce action.-At the time of the adoption of the Constitution of 1846 the only mode of trial sanctioned by law for the determination of the issue raised by a denial of the charge of adultery in a divorce suit was a trial by jury; and the right of the parties to such an action to have such issue tried by a jury has been preserved by the Constitution, under any and all circumstances except such as amount to a waiver prescribed by law. Moot v. Moot (1915), 214 N. Y. 204, Affd. 164 App. Div. 525, 149 N. Y. Supp. 901.

Section 95 of the Inferior Criminal Courts Act (Laws of 1910, chap. 659) in so far as it attempts to confer jurisdiction upon city magistrates to summarily try and convict in cases of misdemeanor violates the constitutional provision that the right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate. People v. Pray (1914), 87 Misc. 464, 150 N. Y. Supp. 1061.

Art. I, § 6. Bill of rights.

Privilege of witness; admission; rights in new proceeding.-Admission made by a person who gives testimony in court of a transaction without asserting his constitutional privilege cannot be recalled, but a person who is entitled to the benefit of constitutional provisions is entitled to that privilege in each new and independent proceeding, and if compelled to testify in another proceeding, the statute (Penal Law, § 770) expressly provides for immunity. People v. Cassidy (1915), 213 N. Y. 388.

Waiver of immunity.—Where a witness voluntarily appeared before a committing magistrate, requested that his testimony be taken, insisted upon testifying after he had been advised of his rights and warned that his testimony might be used against him, and expressly waived his immunity, the immunity is gone forever, and there is no bar to a subsequent criminal prosecution brought against him, founded upon the matters as to which he had testified. People v. Walter (1914), 164 App. Div. 25, 149 N. Y. Supp. 365.

Privilege personal; refusal of officers and agents of corporation to testify.-The right of a person to refuse to incriminate himself is purely personal. Hence, none of the officers or agents of a defendant corporation can refuse to testify because their evidence might tend to convict it, nor can the defendant raise such objection in its own behalf. People v. Hudson Valley Construction Co. (1915), 165 App. Div. 626, 151 N. Y. Supp. 314.

Employment of citizens only on public works. The provision of section 14 of the Labor Law that only citizens shall be employed upon public works does not violate any constitutional right of aliens. People v. Crane (1915), 214 N. Y. 154. Constitutional provisions relating to two-fold jeopardy construed.-People ex rel. Bullock v. Hayes (1915), 166 App. Div. 507, 151 N. Y. Supp. 1075.

Reservation of rent or service.-The use of lands for twenty-five years as a consideration alone for the support and maintenance of the owner is neither a reservation of rent nor of service within the meaning of the constitutional provision. A reservation of rent to come within said constitutional provision means a reservation of something arising out of the land itself in annual payment for its use,

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CONSTITUTION.

Private and local bills.

Art. III, §§ 16, 18.

and the service. referred to in said provision is what was known as rent service at common law, An agreement in the form of a lease that plaintiffs should care for, support and maintain the lessor during his lifetime upon the leased premises, a smalk.farm, and as a consideration therefor should have the use of the place for a term of twenty-five years, is not void. Parmely v. Showdy (1914), 86 Misc. 634, 148.N. Y. Supp. 1086.

Art. I, § 17. Charters granted prior to 1775.

Not a restraint upon legislative power. This section is not a restraint upon legislative power but simply a declaration that the Constitution itself shall not annul such charters. People ex rel. Deitz v. Hogan (1914), 165 App. Div. 298, 151 N. Y. Supp. 261.

Art. II, § 4. Registration and election laws to be passed.

Submission of question as to whether or not there should be a constitutional convention not an "election."-The submission of the question to the people, pursuant to chapter 819 of the Laws of 1913, as to whether or not there should be a constitutional convention, did not constitute an "election" within the meaning of article 2 of the State Constitution, requiring registration of voters before an election. Hence, said statute authorizing the submission of the question as to whether or not there should be a constitutional convention, and providing that the officers take the registry list of voters for the general election of 1913 and revise the same, is constitutional, and a vote taken in accordance with its provisions is valid. Schieffelin v. Komfort (1914), 163 App. Div. 741, 149 N. Y. Supp. 65, aff'd. 212 N. Y. 520; S. C. 86 Misc. 678, 149 N. Y. Supp. 254.

Election Law, § 159, as amended by L. 1913, ch. 820, violates this section. Matter of Rupert v. Rees (1914), 212 N. Y. 514.

Application. Chapter 234 of the Laws of 1898, entitled “An act to incorporate the Electric Water Power Company of Oneonta, Otsego County," and providing therein that "Such corporation may acquire lands by condemnation in the manner provided by the Condemnation Law of the State for any of the purposes herein specified," does not violate this section. Oneonta Light & Power Co. v. Schwarzenbach (1914), 164 App. Div. 548, 150 N. Y. Supp. 76.

Art. III, § 18. Private and local bills; when not to be passed.

Application.-L. 1898, ch. 234, entitled “An act to incorporate the Electric Water Power Company of Oneonta, Otsego County," is not in violation of this section which provides no private or local bill shall be passed in any of the cases enumerated. Oneonta Light & Power Co. v. Schwarzenbach (1914), 164 App. Div. 548, 150 N. Y. Supp. 76.

Exclusive privilege, immunity or franchise.-Public Health Law (§§ 194, 196, 198) providing for licensing dentists and regulating the practice of dentistry does not grant an exclusive privilege, immunity or franchise in violation of this section. People v. Griswold (1914), 213 N. Y. 92.

Local bill relative to selection of jurors.—Chapter 564 of the Laws of 1902, entitled "An act in relation to jurors, and to the appointment and duties of a commissioner of jurors in the county of Kings," is a local act providing for selecting and drawing petit jurors and so within the constitutional prohibition against the passage of local bills relative to the selection of jurors. People v. Damson (1914), 212 N. Y. 256.

Pardons; civil service.

Art. IV, § 5; Art. V, § 9.

Art. III, § 22. Appropriation bills.

Purposes for which appropriated.-Money appropriated by the Legislature for "books, binding and supplies for Supreme Court law libraries" can not be used for insurance upon such libraries. Rept. of Atty. Genl. (1915), p. 134.

Art. III, § 29. Prison labor; contract system abolished.

A contract to furnish electricity produced and generated by convict labor at Clinton prison, to the residents of the village of Dannemora for residential and individual purposes would be illegal and unconstitutional, but electricity so produced can be furnished for public purposes to the village of Dannemora, that being a political division of the State. Rept. of Atty. Genl. (1915), p. 177.

Art. IV, § 5. Reprieves, commutations and pardons.

Governor under impeachment cannot grant pardon.-As the Constitution of this State in substance provides that upon the impeachment of the Governor his powers and duties shall devolve upon the Lieutenant-Governor for the residue of the term or until the disability of the Governor shall cease, a Governor while under impeachment and during the hearing of the charges against him has no power to pardon one who has been convicted of crime. While an impeachment per se does not deprive the Governor of his office, his powers and duties devolve, nevertheless, upon the Lieutenant-Governor pending the trial of the charges. People ex rel. Robin v. Hayes (1914), 163 App. Div. 725, 149 N. Y. Supp. 250.

Art. V, § 9. Civil service appointments and promotions.

Promotion. After relator had served the required time in the volunteer fire department in the city of Lockport he was, after competitive examination, appointed by the city water board as an assistant electrical engineer. It was held, that his appointment to the position of chief electrical engineer was not a "promotion" within the meaning of the constitutional provision that all promotions in the civil service shall be made according to merit and fitness to be ascertained so far as practicable by examinations, it appearing that both positions were classified in the same group and grade and the difference in salary was less than one hundred dollars a year. Matter of Murray (1915), 88 Misc. 625, 151 N. Y. Supp. 419.

Art. VI, § 3. Judge or justice not to sit in review.

Right of litigant to have case determined by judge who heard the testimony.Smith v. State (1915), 214 N. Y. 140.

Art. VI, § 14. County courts.

See generally, Kortwillyeszsy v. Manhattan Cooperage Co. (1914), 162 App. Div. 285, 287, 147 N. Y. Supp. 586.

Art. VI, § 15 Vacancies in office of county judge.

Effect of amendment of 1913; county judges in Kings County; appointment to fill vacancies. A constitutional amendment, adopted in November, 1913, to take effect January 1. 1914, increased the number of county judges in Kings county from two to four and provided that the additional judges should be chosen at the general election held in the first odd-numbered year after the adoption of the amendment. It was held, that vacancies existed in such newly-created constitutional offices from the time the amendment took effect; that the governor was authorized to fill such vacancies by appointment in the same manner as like vacancies occurring in the Supreme Court (Const. art. 6, § 15); that the appointment of two judges to fill such vacancies on March 27, 1914, was valid, and that the judges so appointed are

Inferior local courts; forest preserve.

Art. VI, § 18; Art. VII, § 7.

de jure county judges of Kings county. People ex rel. Snyder v. Hylan (1914), 212 N. Y. 236, revg. 163 App. Div. 219, 148 N. Y. Supp. 287.

Art. VI, § 18. Inferior local courts.

Construction with section 3, Art. XII.-The words "except as herein otherwise provided" must be construed "except as otherwise provided in this constitution" rather than "except as otherwise provided in this article." As thus construed the section must be read in connection with section 3 of article 12 of the Constitution, providing that "All elections of city officers, including . . . judicial officers of inferior local courts. . . except to fill vacancies, shall be held . . . in an oddnumbered year, and the term of every such officer shall expire at the end of an odd-numbered year. . . ." The two sections when read together authorize the legislature to establish inferior local courts, to provide for the number of justices thereof and the method of their selection. Matter of Trounstine v. Britt (1914), 212 N. Y. 421.

The City Court of the city of New York is not a constitutional court but an inferior court of limited jurisdiction created by the legislature which has power, under the Constitution, to provide for its organization and the election of the justices thereof. Matter of Trounstine v. Britt (1914), 212 N. Y. 421.

Art. VII, § 2. State debts, power to contract.

Power to borrow money.-The provisions of section 14 of the State Finance Law, authorizing the Comptroller to borrow money for the current expenses of temporary loans, in anticipation of, and payable out of fixed revenues to be collected, are not violative of sections 2 and 4 of Article VII of the Constitution. Rept. of Atty. Genl. (1915), p. 161.

Art. VII, § 7. Forest preserve.

Illegal compromise of an action involving title of state to forest lands; estoppel not invoked by reason of unauthorized acts of state officers.-The Constitution of the state (Art. 7, § 7) effective January 1, 1895, reserves to the People the title to the lands and timber then or subsequently owned by them within the forest preserve, and forbids the legislature and each officer and department to dispose or in any manner deprive them of it. Hence, the forest, fish and game commissioner had no right under the provisions of section 20 of chapter 220 of the Laws of 1897, as amended by chapter 135 of the Laws of 1898, to stipulate in compromise of an action involving title to lands that upon conveyance to the state of such title and of title to other lands owned by them the claimants could dispose of and remove timber from the lands so conveyed. Such statute did not authorize the commissioner or the state to settle and compromise the action and adjust the claims therein in contravention of the constitutional provision, and the doctrine of estoppel cannot be invoked against the state in support of the unauthorized acts of its officers and agents. People v. Santa Clara Lumber Co. (1914), 213 N. Y. 61. Damages to state lands within forest preserve from fire thereon; measure of damages. The measure of damages to lands, resulting from fire thereon, is the difference between the market value of the land of which the timber was a part immediately before, and its market value immediately after the burning. Section 7 of article 7 of the State Constitution, which prohibits the selling, removing or destroying of timber on the lands constituting the forest preserve, has not prescribed any other rule as to such lands. People v. New York Central and H. R. R. R. Co. (1914), 213 N. Y. 136.

Highways in forest preserve.-The State Highway Department cannot under the limitations contained in article VII, section 7, of the Constitution, deviate or