In consequence of the second vote in favor of a tariff, the three first paragrapha of the report were recommitted, together with the letter from the superintendent of finance.

On the fourth paragraph, on motion of Mr. Dyer, after the word "war," in the fifth line, was inserted "agreeably to the resolution of the 16th of December last." A motion was made by Mr. HAMILTON and Mr. WILSON to strike out the limitation of twenty-five years, and to make the revenue coëxistent with the debts. This question was lost, the states being- New Hampshire, no; Massachusetts, no; Connecticut, divided; New York, ay; New Jersey, ay; Pennsylvania, ay; Delaware, ay; Maryland, ay; Virginia, no; North Carolina, ay; South Carolina, no.

A motion was made by Mr. HAMILTON and Mr. WILSON to strike out the clauses relative to the appointment of collectors, and to provide that the collectors should be inhabitants of the states within which they should collect; should be nominated by Congress, and appointed by the states; and in case such nomination should not be accepted or rejected within days, it should stand good. On this question there were five ayes and six noes.

WEDNESDAY, 12th, THURSDAY, 13th, FRIDAY, 14th, and SATURDAY, 15th, of March.

These days were employed in reading the despatches brought on Wednesday morning by Captain Barney, commanding the Washington packet. They were dated from December the 4th to the 24th, from the ministers plenipotentiary for peace, with journals of preceding transactions; and were accompanied by the preliminary articles signed on the 30th of November, between the said ministers and Mr. Oswald, the British minister.

The terms granted to America appeared to Congress, on the whole, extremely liberal. It was observed by several, however, that the stipulation obliging Congress to recommend to the states a restitution of confiscated property, although it could scarcely be understood that the states would comply, had the appearance of sacrificing the dignity of Congress to the pride of the British king.

The separate and secret manner in which our ministers had proceeded with respect to France, and the confidential manner with respect to the British ministers, affected different members of Congress differently. Many of the most judicious members thought they had all been, in some measure, ensnared by the dexterity of the British minister; and particularly disapproved of the conduct of Mr. Jay, in submitting to the enemy his jealousy of the French, without even the knowledge of Dr. Franklin, and of the unguarded manner in which he, Mr. Adams, and Dr. Franklin, had given, in writing, sentiments unfriendly to our ally, and serving as weapons for the insidious policy of the enemy. The separate article was most offensive, being considered as obtained by Great Britain, not for the sake of the territory ceded to her, but as a means of disuniting the United States and France, as inconsistent with the spirit of the alliance, and a dishonorable departure from the candor, rectitude, and plain dealing professed by Congress. The dilemma in which Congress were placed was sorely felt. If they should communicate to the French minister every thing, they exposed their own ministers, destroyed all confidence in them on the part of France, and might engage them in dangerous factions against Congress, which was the more to be apprehended, as the terms obtained by their management were popular in their nature. If Congress should conceal every thing, and the French court should, either from the enemy or otherwise, come to the knowledge of it, all confidence would be at an end between the allies; the enemy might be encouraged by it to make fresh experiments, and the public safety as well as the national honor be endangered. Upon the whole, it was thought and observed by many that our ministers, particularly Mr. Jay, instead of making allowances for, and affording facilities to France, in her delicate situation between Spain and the United States, had joined with the enemy in taking advantage of it to increase her perplexity; and that they had made the safety of their country depend on the sincerity of Lord Shelburne, which was suspected by all the world besides, and even by most of themselves. Se Mr. Laurens's letter, December the 24th.

The displeasure of the French court at the neglect of our ministers to maintain a confidential intercourse, and particularly to communicate the preliminary articles before they were signed, was not only signified to the secretary of foreign affairs, but to sundry members, by the Chevalier de la Luzerne. To the former he showed

a letter from Count de Vergennes, directing him to remonstrate to Congress against the conduct of the American ministers, which a subsequent letter countermanded, alleging that Dr. Franklin had given some explanations that had been admitted; and told Mr. Livingston that the American ministers had deceived him (De Vergennes) by telling him, a few days before the preliminary articles were signed. that the agreement on them was at a distance; that when he carried the articles signed into council, the king expressed great indignation, and asked, if the Americans served him thus before peace was made, and whilst they were begging for aids, what was to be expected after peace, &c. To several members he mentioned that the king had been surprised and displeased, and that he said he did not think he had such allies to deal with. To one of them, who asked whether the court of France meant to complain of them to Congress, M. Marbois answered that great powers never complained, but that they felt and remembered. It did not appear, from any circumstances, that the separate article was known to the court of France, or to the Chevalier de la Luzerne.

The publication of the preliminary articles, excepting the separate article in the newspaper, was not a deliberate act of Congress. A hasty question for enjoining secrecy on certain parts of the despatches, which included those articles, was lost; and copies having been taken by members, and some of them handed to the delegates of Pennsylvania, one of them reached the printer. When the publication appeared, Congress in general regretted it, not only as tending too much to lull the states, but as leading France into suspicions that Congress favored the premature signature of the articles, and were, at least, willing to remove, in the minds of the people, the blame of delaying peace from Great Britain to France.15

MONDAY, March 17.

A letter was received from General Washington, enclosing two anonymous and inflammatory exhortations to the army to assemble, for the purpose of seeking, by other means, that justice which their country showed no disposition to afford them. The steps taken by the general to avert the gathering storm, and his professions of inflexible adherence to his duty to Congress and to his country, excited the most affectionate sentiments towards him. By private letters from the army, and other circumstances, there appeared good ground for suspecting that the civil creditors were intriguing, in order to inflame the army into such desperation as would produce a general provision for the public debts. These papers were committed to Mr. Gilman, Mr. Dyer, Mr. Clark, Mr. Rutledge, and Mr. Mercer. The appointment of these gentlemen was brought about by a few members, who wished to saddle with this embarrassment the men who had opposed the measures necessary for satisfying the army, viz., the half-pay and permanent funds; against one or other of which the. individuals in question had voted.

This alarming intelligence from the army, added to the critical situation to which our affairs in Europe were reduced by the variance of our ministers with our ally, and to the difficulty of establishing the means of fulfilling the engagements and securing the harmony of the United States, and to the confusions apprehended from the approaching resignation of the superintendent of finance, gave peculiar awe and solemnity to the present moment, and oppressed the minds of Congress with an anxiety and distress which had been scarcely felt in any period of the revolution.

TUESDAY, March 18.

On the report of the committee to whom the three paragraphs of the report on revenues (see March the 6th and 7th) had been recommitted, the said paragraphs were expunged, so as to admit the following amendments, which took place without opposition, viz.:

"Resolved, That it be recommended to the several states, as indispensably necessary to the restoration of public credit, and the punctual and honorable discharge of the public debts, to vest in the United States in Congress assembled a power to levy, for the use of the United States, a duty,

Upon Madeira wine,.

.

Upon the wines of Lisbon, Oporto, those called Sherry, and upon all French wines.

Upon the wines called Malaga or Teneriffe,

Upon salt, after the war, per bushel,

1 eighth

do.

And upon all goods, except arms, ammunition, and clothing, or other articles* imported for the use of the United States, a duty of five per cent., ad valorem:

Provided, that there be allowed a bounty of one eighth of a dollar for every quintal of dried fish exported from the United States, and a like sum for every barrel of pickled fish, beef, or pork, to be paid or allowed to the exporter thereof, at the port from which they shall be so exported."

The arguments urged by Mr. WILSON in behalf of his motion for adding “also a tax of one quarter of a dollar per hundred acres on all located and surveyed lands within each of the states," other than those heretofore generally urged, were, that it was more moderate than had been paid before the revolution, and it could not be supposed the people would grudge to pay, as the price of their liberty, what they formerly paid to their oppressors; that if it was unequal, this inequality would be corrected by the states in other taxes; that, as the tax on trade would fall chiefly on the inhabitants of the lower country, who consumed the imports, the tax on land would affect those who were remote from the sea, and consumed little.

On the opposite side, it was alleged that such a tax was repugnant to the popular ideas of equality, and particularly, would never be acceded to by the Southern States, at least unless they were to be respectively credited for the amount; and, if such credit were to be given, it would be best to let the states choose such taxes as would best suit them.

A letter came in, and was read, from the secretary of foreign affairs, stating the perplexing alternative to which Congress were reduced, by the secret article relating to West Florida, either of dishonoring themselves by becoming a party to the concealment, or of wounding the feelings and destroying the influence of our ministers by disclosing the article to the French court; and proposing, as advisable, on the whole,

1. That he be authorized to communicate the article in question to the French minister, in such manner as would best tend to remove the unfavorable impressions which might be made on the court of France as to the sincerity of Congress or their ministers.

2. That the said ministers be informed of this communication, and instructed to agree that the limit for West Florida, proposed in the separate article, be allowed to whatever power the said colony may be confirmed by a treaty of peace.

3. That it be declared to be the sense of Congress, that the preliminary articles between the United States and Great Britain are not to take effect until peace shall be actually signed between the kings of France and Great Britain.†

Ordered that to-morrow be assigned for the consideration of the said letter.

WEDNESDAY, March 19.

A letter was read from the superintendent of finance, enclosing letters from Dr. Franklin, accompanied with extracts from the Count de Vergennes relative to money affairs, the superintendent thereupon declaring roundly that our credit was at an end, and that no further pecuniary aids were to be expected from Europe. Mr. RUTLEDGE denied these assertions, and expressed some indignation at them. Mr. BLAND said, that as the superintendent was of this opinion, it would be absurd for him to be minister of finance, and moved that the committee on his motion for arranging the department might be instructed to report without loss of time. This notion was negatived as censuring the committee; but it was understood to be the sense of Congress that they should report.16

The other exception, as to the cards, and the wire for making them, &c., was struck out animously, on the motion of Mr. Clark; being considered as no longer necessary, and contrary to the general policy of encouraging necessary manufactures among ourselves.

This was meant to guard against a construction that they were to take effect when peace should be agreed on by those powers, and the latter be ready to sign, although the former should be restrained antil the other parties should be ready for signing.

The order of the day, viz., the letter from the secretary of foreign affairs, was taken up.

Mr. WOLCOTT conceived it unnecessary to waste time on the subject, as he presumed Congress would never so far censure the ministers who had obtained such terms for this country as to disavow their conduct.

Mr. CLARK was decided against communicating the separate article, which would be sacrificing meritorious ministers, and would rather injure than relieve our national honor. He admitted that the separate article put an advantage into the hands of the enemy, but did not, on the whole, deem it of any great consequence. He thought Congress ought to go no further than to inform the ministers that they were sorry for the necessity which had led them into the part they had taken, and to leave them to get rid of the embarrassment as to the separate article, in such way as they should judge best. This expedient would save Congress, and spare our ministers, who might have been governed by reasons not known to Congress.

Mr. MERCER said, that, not meaning to give offence any where, he should speak his sentiments freely. He gave it as his clear and decided opinion, that the ministers had insulted Congress by sending them assertions, without proof, as reasons for violating their instructions, and throwing themselves into the confidence of Great Britain. He observed, that France, in order to make herself equal to the enemy, had been obliged to call for aid, and had drawn Spain, against her interest, into the war; that it was probable that she had entered into some specific engagements for that purpose; that hence might be deduced the perplexity of her situation, of which advantage had been taken by Great Britain - an advantage in which our ministers had concurred for sowing jealousies between France and the United States, and of which further advantage would be taken to alienate the minds of the people of this country from their ally, by presenting him as the obstacle to peace. The British court, he said, having gained this point, may easily frustrate the negotiation, and renew the war against divided enemies. He approved of the conduct of the Count de Vergennes in promoting a treaty, under the first commission to Oswald, as preferring the substance to the shadow, and proceeding from a desire of peace. The conduct of our ministers throughout, particularly in giving in writing every thing called for by the British minister expressive of distrust of France, was a mixture of follies which had no example, was a tragedy to America, and a comedy to all the world beside. He felt inexpressible indignation at their meanly stooping, as it were, to lick the dust from the feet of a nation whose hands were still dyed with the blood of their fellowcitizens. He reprobated the chicane and low cunning which marked the journals transmitted to Congress, and contrasted them with the honesty and good faith which became all nations, and particularly an infant. republic. They proved that America had at once all the follies of youth and all the vices of old age; thinks it would be necessary to recall our ministers; fears that France may be already acquainted with all the transactions of our ministers, even with the separate article, and may be only waiting the reception given to it by Congress, to see how far the hopes of cutting off the right arm of Great Britain, by supporting our revolution, may have been well founded; and, in case of our basely disappointing her, may league with our enemy for our destruction, and for a division of the spoils. He was aware of the risks to which such a league would expose France of finally losing her share, but supposed that the British Islands might be made hostages for her security. He said America was too prone to depreciate political merit, and to suspect where there was no danger; that the honor of the king of France was dear to him; that he never would betray or injure us, unless he should be provoked, and justified by treachery on our part. For the present he acquiesced in the proposition of the secretary of foreign affairs; but, when the question should come to be put, he should be for a much more decisive resolution.

Mr. RUTLEDGE said, he hoped the character of our ministers would not be affected, much less their recall produced, by declamations against them; and that facts would be ascertained and stated, before any decision should be passed; that the Count de Vergennes had expressly declared to our ministers his desire that they might treat apart; alluded to, and animadverted upon, the instruction which submitted them to French councils; was of opinion that the separate article did not concern France, and therefore there was no necessity for communicating it to her; and that, as to Spain, she deserved nothing at our hands; she had treated us in a manner that forfeited all claim to our good offices or our confidence. She had not, as

had been supposed, entered into the present war as an ally to our ally, for our support; but, as she herself had declared, as a principal, and on her own account. He said, he was for adhering religiously to the spirit and letter of the treaty with France; that our ministers had done so, and, if recalled or censured for the part they had acted, he was sure no man of spirit wou'd take their place. He concluded with moving that the letter from the secretary of foreign affairs might be referred to a special committee, who might inquire into all the facts relative to the subject of Mr. HOLTEN seconded the motion.

it.

Mr. WILLIAMSON was opposed to harsh treatment of the ministers, who had shown great ability. He said, they had not infringed the treaty, and, as they had received the concurrence of the Count de Vergennes for treating apart, they had not, in that respect, violated their instructions. He proposed that Congress should express to the ministers their concern at the separate article, and leave them to get over the embarrassinent as they should find best.

Mr. MERCER, in answer to Mr. RUTLEDGE, said, that his language with respect to the ministers was justified by their refusal to obey instructions; censured with great warmth the servile confidence of Mr. Jay, in particular, in the British ministers. He said, the separate article was a reproach to our character; and that, if Congress would not themselves disclose it, he would disclose it to his constituents, who would disdain to be united with those who patronize such dishonorable proceedings. He was called to order by the president, who said that the article in question was under an injunction of secrecy, and he could not permit the order of the House to be trampled upon.

Mr. LEE took notice that obligations in national affairs, as well as others, ought to be reciprocal, and he did not know that France had ever bound herself to like engagements, as to concert of negotiation, with those into which America had at different times been drawn. He thought it highly improper to censure ministers who had negotiated well; said that it was agreeable to practice, and necessary to the end proposed, for ministers, in particular emergencies, to swerve from strict instructions. France, he said, wanted to sacrifice our interests to her own, or those of Spain; that the. French answer to the British memorial contained a passage which deserved attention on this subject. She answered the reproaches of perfidy contained in that memorial by observing that, obligations being reciprocal, a breach on one side absolved the other. The Count de Vergennes, he was sure, was too much a master of negotiation not to approve the management of our ministers, instead of condemning it. No man lamented more than he did any diminution of the confidence between this country and France; but if the misfortune should ensue, it could not be denied that it had originated with France, who has endeavored to sacrifice our territorial rights- those very rights which by the treaty she had guarantied to us. He wished the preliminary articles had not been signed without the knowledge of France, but was persuaded that, in whatever light she might view it, she was too sensible of the necessity of our independence to her safety ever to abandon it. But let no censure fall on our ministers, who had, upon the whole, done what was best. He introduced the instruction of the fifteenth of June, 1781; proclaimed it to be the greatest opprobrium and stain to this country which it had ever exposed itself to; and that it was, in his judgment, the true cause of that distrust and coldness which prevailed between our ministers and the French court, inasmuch as it could not be viewed by the former without irritation and disgust. He was not surprised that those who considered France as the patron, rather than the ally, of this country, should be disposed to be obsequious to her; but he was not of that number.

Mr. HAMILTON urged the propriety of proceeding with coolness and circumspection. He thought it proper, in order to form a right judgment of the conduct of our ministers, that the views of the French and British courts should be examined. He admitted it as not improbable, that it had been the policy of France to procrastinate the definite acknowledgment of our independence on the part of Great Britain, in order to keep us more knit to herself, and until her own interests could be negotiated. The arguments, however, urged by our ministers on this subject, although strong, were not conclusive; as it was not certain that this policy, and not a desire of excluding obstacles to peace, had produced the opposition of the French court to our demands. Caution and vigilance, he thought, were justified by the apsearance, and that alone. But compare this policy with that of Great Britain; sur