Massachusetts, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, ay, 7; Connecticut, Delaware, no, 2; Georgia, divided.

Adjourned.

[On the morning following, before the hour of the Convention, a number of the members from the larger states, by common agreement, met for the purpose of consulting on the proper steps to be taken in consequence of the vote in favor of an equal representation in the second branch, and the apparent inflexibility of the smaller states on that point. Several members from the latter states also attended. The time was wasted in vague conversation on the subject, without any specific proposition or agreement. It appeared, indeed, that the opinions of the members who disliked the equality of votes differed much as to the importance of that point, and as to the policy of risking a failure of any general act of the Convention by inflexibly opposing it. Several of them - supposing that no good government could or would be built on that foundation, and that, as a division of the Convention into two opinions was unavoidable, it would be better that the side comprising the principal states, and a majority of the people of America, should propose a scheme of government to the states, than that a scheme should be proposed on the other sidewould have concurred in a firm opposition to the smaller states, and in a separate recommendation, if eventually necessary. Others seemed inclined to yield to the smaller states, and to concur in such an act, however imperfect and exceptionable, as might be agreed on by the Convention as a body, though decided by a bare majority of states and by a minority of the people of the United States. It is probable that the result of this consultation satisfied the smaller states that they had nothing to apprehend from a union of the larger in any plan whatever against the equality of votes in the second branch.]

TUESDAY, July 17.

In Convention. Mr. GOUVERNEUR MORRIS moved to reconsider the whole resolution agreed to yesterday concerning the constitution of the two branches of the legislature. His object was to bring the House to a consideration, in the abstract, of the powers necessary to be vested in the general government. It had been said, Let us know how the government is to be modelled, and then we can determine what powers can be properly given to it. He thought the most eligible course was, first to determine on the necessary powers, and then so to modify the government, as that it might be justly and properly enabled to administer them. He feared, if we proceeded to a consideration of the powers, whilst the vote of yesterday, including an equality of the states in the second branch, remained in force, a reference to it, either mental or expressed, would mix itself with the merits of every question concerning the powers. This motion was not seconded. (It was probably approved by several members, who either despaired of success, or were apprehensive that the attempt would inflame the jealousies of the smaller states.)

The sixth resolution in the report of the committee of the whole, relating to the powers, which had been postponed in order to consider the seventh and eighth, relating to the constitution, of the national legislature, was now resumed.

Mr. SHERMAN observed, that it would be difficult to draw the line between the powers of the general legislature and those to be left with the states; that he did not like the definition contained in the resolution; and proposed, in its place, to the words "individual legislation," inclusive, to insert "to make laws binding on the people

of the United States in all cases which may concern the common inter sts of the Union; but not to interfere with the government of the individual states in any matters of internal police which respect the government of such states only, and wherein the general welfare of the United States is not concerned."

Mr. WILSON seconded the amendment, as better expressing the general principle.

Mr. GOUVERNEUR MORRIS opposed it. The internal police, as it would be called and understood by the states, ought to be infringed in many cases, as in the case of paper money, and other tricks by which citizens of other states may be affected.

Mr. SHERMAN, in explanation of his idea, read an enumeration of powers, including the power of levying taxes on trade, but not the power of direct taxation.

Mr. GOUVERNEUR MORRIS remarked the omission, and inferred, that, for the deficiencies of taxes on consumption, it must. have been the meaning of Mr. Sherman that the general government should recur to quotas and requisitions, which are subversive of the idea of government.

Mr. SHERMAN acknowledged that his enumeration did not include direct taxation. Some provision, he supposed, must be made for supplying the deficiency of other taxation, but he had not formed any.

On the question on Mr. Sherman's motion, it passed in the negative.

Connecticut, Maryland, ay, 2; Massachusetts, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, no, 8.

Mr. BEDFORD moved that the second member of the sixth resolution be so altered as to read, "and moreover to legislate in all cases for the general interests of the Union, and also in those to which the states are severally incompetent, or in which the harmony of the United States may be interrupted by the exercise of individual legislation."

Mr. GOUVERNEUR MORRIS seconds the motion.

Mr. RANDOLPH. This is a formidable idea, indeed. It involves the power of violating all the laws and constitutions of the states, and of intermeddling with their police. The last member of the sentence is also superfluous, being included in the first.

Mr. BEDFORD. It is not more extensive or formidable than the

clause as it stands - no state being separately competent to legislate for the general interests of the Union.

On the question for agreeing to Mr. Bedford's motion, it passed in the affirmative.

Massachusetts, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, North Carolina, ay, 6; Connecticut, Virginia, South Carolina, Georgia, no, 4.

On the sentence as amended, it passed in the affirmative.

Massachusetts, Connecticut, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, ay, 8; South Carolina, Georgia, no, 2.

The next clause, "to negative ali laws passed by the several states, contravening, in the opinion of the national legislature, the Articles of Union, or any treaties subsisting under the authority of the Union," was then taken up.

Mr. GOUVERNEUR MORRIS opposed this power as likely to be terrible to the states, and not necessary if sufficient legislative authority should be given to the general government.

Mr. SHERMAN thought it unnecessary, as the courts of the states would not consider as valid any law contravening the authority of the Union, and which the legislature would wish to be negatived. Mr. L. MARTIN considered the power as improper and inadmissible. Shall all the laws of the states be sent up to the general legislature before they shall be permitted to operate?

Mr. MADISON considered the negative on the laws of the states as essential to the efficacy and security of the general government The necessity of a general government proceeds from the propensity of the states to pursue their particular interests, in opposition to the general interest. This propensity will continue to disturb the system unless effectually controlled. Nothing short of a negative on their laws will control it. They will pass laws which will accomplish their injurious objects before they can be repealed by the general legislature, or set aside by the national tribunals. Confidence cannot be put in the state tribunals as guardians of the national authority and interests. In all the states, these are more or less dependent on the legislatures. In Georgia, they are appointed annually by the legislature. In Rhode Island, the judges who refused to execute an unconstitutional law were displaced; and others substituted, by the legislature, who would be the willing instruments of the wicked and arbitrary plans of their masters. A power of negativing the improper laws of the states is at once the most mild and certain means of pre serving the harmony of the system. Its utility is sufficiently displayed in the British system. Nothing could maintain the harmony and subordination of the various parts of the empire, but the prerogative by which the crown stifles in the birth every act of every part tending to discord or encroachment. It is true, the prerogative is sometimes misapplied, through ignorance, or partiality to one particular part of the empire; but we have not the same reason to fear such misapplications in our system. As to the sending all laws up to the national legislature, that might be rendered unnecessary by some emanation of the power into the states, so far at least as to give a temporary effect to laws of immediate necessity.

Mr. GOUVERNEUR MORRIS was more and more opposed to the negative. The proposal of it would disgust all the states. A law that ought to be negatived will be set aside in the judiciary department, and, if that security should fail, may be repealed by a national law.

Mr. SHERMAN. Such a power involves a wrong principle-to

wit, that a law of a state contrary to the Articles of the Union would, if not negatived, be valid and operative.

Mr. PINCKNEY urged the necessity of the negative.

On the question for agreeing to the power of negativing laws of states, &c., it passed in the negative.

Massachusetts, Virginia, North Carolina, ay, 3; Connecticut, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, South Carolina, Georgia, no, 7.

Mr. L. MARTIN moved the following resolution :

"That the legislative acts of the United States, made by virtue and in pursuance of the Articles of Union, and all treaties made and ratified under the authority of the United States, shall be the supreme law of the respective states, as far as those acts or treaties shall relate to the said states, or their citizens and inhabitants; and that the judiciaries of the several states shall be bound thereby in their decisions, any thing in the respective laws of the individual states to the contrary notwithstanding."

Which was agreed to, nem. con.

The ninth resolution being taken up, the first clause, "that a national executive be instituted, to consist of a single person," was agreed to, nem. con.

The next clause, "to be chosen by the national legislature," being considered,

Mr. GOUVERNEUR MORRIS was pointedly against his being so chosen. He will be the mere creature of the legislature, if appointed and impeachable by that body. He ought to be elected by the people at large-by the freeholders of the country. That difficulties attend this mode, he admits; but they have been found superable in New York and in Connecticut, and would, he believed, be found so in the case of an executive for the United States. If the people should elect, they will never fail to prefer some man of distinguished character or services; some man, if he might so speak, of Continental reputation. If the legislature elect, it will be the work of intrigue, of cabal, and of faction; it will be like the election of a pope by a conclave of cardinals; real merit will rarely be the title to the appointment. He moved to strike out "national legislature," and insert "citizens of the United States."

Mr. SHERMAN thought that the sense of the nation would be better expressed by the legislature than by the people at large. The latter will never be sufficiently informed of characters, and, besides, will never give a majority of votes to any one man. They will generally vote for some man in their own state, and the largest state will have the best chance for the appointment. If the choice be made by the legislature, a majority of voices may be made necessary to constitute an election.

Mr. WILSON. Two arguments have been urged against an election of the executive magistrate by the people. The first is, the example of Poland, where an election of the supreme magistrate is attended with the most dangerous commotions. The cases, he observed, were totally dissimilar. The Polish nobles have resources

and dependants which enable them to appear in force, and to threaten the republic as well as each other. In the next place, the electors all assemble at one place; which would not be the case with us The second argument is, that a majority of the people would never concur. It might be answered, that the concurrence of a majority of the people is not a necessary principle of election, nor required as such in any of the states. But, allowing the objection all its force, it may be obviated by the expedient used in Massachusetts, where the legislature, by a majority of voices, decide, in case a majority of the people do not concur in favor of one of the candidates. This would restrain the choice to a good nomination at least, and prevent in a great degree intrigue and cabal. A particular objection with him. against an absolute election by the legislature was, that the executive, in that case, would be too dependent to stand the mediator between the intrigues and sinister views of the representatives and the general liberties and interests of the people.

Mr. PINCKNEY did not expect this question would again have been brought forward, an election by the people being liable to the most obvious and striking objections. They will be led by a few active and designing men. The most populous states, by combining in favor of the same individual, will be able to carry their points. The national legislature, being most immediately interested in the laws made by themselves, will be most attentive to the choice of a fit man to carry them properly into execution.

Mr. GOUVERNEUR MORRIS. It is said that, in case of an election by the people, the populous states will combine and elect whom they please. Just the reverse. The people of such states cannot combine. If there be any combination, it must be among their representatives in the legislature. It is said, the people will be led by a few designing men. This might happen in a small district. It can never happen throughout the continent. In the election of a governor of New York, it sometimes is the case, in particular spots, that the activity and intrigues of little partisans are successful; but the general voice of the state is never influenced by such artifices. It is said, the multitude will be uninformed. It is true, they would be uninformed of what passed in the legislative conclave, if the election. were to be made there; but they will not be uninformed of those great and illustrious characters which have merited their esteem and confidence. If the executive be chosen by the national legislature, he will not be independent of it; and, if not independent, usurpation and tyranny on the part of the legislature will be the consequence. This was the case in England in the last century. It has been the case in Holland, where their senates have engrossed all power. It has been the case every where. He was surprised that an election by the people at large should ever have been likened to the Polish election of the first magistrate. An election by the legislature will bear a real likeness to the election by the diet of Poland. The great must be the electors in both cases, and the corruption and cabal,