If the nia may be free from a like situation, cannot be foreseen. principles and materials of our government are not adequate to the extent of these single states, how can it be imagined that they can support a single government throughout the United States? The only chance of supporting a general government lies in grafting it on those of the individual states. Dr. JOHNSON urged the necessity of preserving the state governments, which would be at the mercy of the general government on Mr. Wilson's plan. Mr. MADISON thought it would obviate difficulty if the present resolution were postponed, and the eighth taken up, which is to fix the right of suffrage in the second branch. Mr. WILLIAMSON professed himself a friend to such a system as would secure the existence of the state governments. The happiness of the people depended on it. He was at a loss to give his vote as to the Senate, until he knew the number of its members. In order to ascertain this, he moved to insert, after "second branch of the national legislature," the words, "who shall bear such proportion to the number of the first branch as one to." He was not seconded. Mr. MASON. It has been agreed on all hands that an efficien. government is necessary; that, to render it such, it ought to have the faculty of self-defence; that, to render its different branches effectual, each of them ought to have the same power of self-defence. He did not wonder that such an agreement should have prevailed on these points. He only wondered that there should be any disagreement about the necessity of allowing the state governments the same selfdefence. If they are to be preserved, as he conceived to be essential, they certainly ought to have this power; and the only mode left of giving it to them was by allowing them to appoint the second branch of the national legislature. Mr. BUTLER, observing that we were put to difficulties at every step by the uncertainty whether an equality or a ratio of representation would prevail finally in the second branch, moved to postpone the fourth resolution, and to proceed to the eighth resolution on that point. Mr. MADISON seconded him. On the question, New York, Virginia, South Carolina, Georgia, ay, 4; Massachusetts, Connecticut, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, North Carolina, no, 7. On a question to postpone the fourth, and take up the seventh, resolution, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, ay, 5; Massa chusetts, Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, no, 6. On the question to agree," that the members of the second branch be chosen by the individual legislatures," — Massachusetts, Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, Delaware, Maryland, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, ay, 9; Pennsylvania, Virginia, no, 2. * 139 *It must be kept in view that the largest states, particularly Pennsylvania and Virginia, always considered the choice of the second branch by the state legislatures On a question on the clause requiring the age of thirty years at least, it was unanimously agreed to. On a question to strike out the words, "sufficient to insure their independence," after the word "term," it was agreed to. The clause, that the second branch hold their offices for a term of "seven years," being considered, Mr. GORHAM suggests a term of "four years," one fourth to be elected every year. Mr. RANDOLPH supported the idea of rotation, as favorable to the wisdom and stability of the corps; which might possibly be always sitting, and aiding the executive, and moves, after "seven years," to add, "to go out in fixed proportion;" which was agreed to. Mr. WILLIAMSON suggests "six years," as more convenient for rotation than seven years. Mr. SHERMAN seconds him. Mr. READ proposed that they should hold their offices "during good behavior." Mr. R. MORRIS seconds him. Gen. PINCKNEY proposed "four years." A longer time would fix them at the seat of government. They would acquire an interest there, perhaps transfer their property, and lose sight of the states they represent. Under these circumstances, the distant states would labor under great disadvantages. 140 Mr. SHERMAN moved to strike out" seven years," in order to take questions on the several propositions. On the question to strike out "seven," Massachusetts, Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, ay, 7; Pennsylvania, Delaware, Virginia, no, 3; Maryland, divided. On the question to insert "six years," which failed, five states being, ay; five, no; and one, divided, Connecticut, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Virginia, North Carolina, ay, 5; Massachusetts, New York, New Jersey, South Carolina, Georgia, no, 5; Maryland, divided. On a motion to adjourn, the votes were, five for, five against it; and one divided, Connecticut, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Virginia, ay, 5; Massachusetts, New York, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, no, 5; Maryland, divided. On the question for "five years," it was lost, Connecticut, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Virginia, North Carolina, ay, 5; Massachusetts, New York, New Jersey, South Carolina, Georgia, no, 5; Maryland, divided. Adjourned. TUESDAY, June 26. In Convention. The duration of the second branch being under consideration, as opposed to a proportional representation, to which they were attached as a fundamental principle of just government. The smaller states, who had opposite views, were reinforced by the members from the large states most anxious to secure the importance of the state governments. Mr. GORHAM moved to fill the blank with "six years," one third of the members to go out every second year. Mr. WILSON seconded the motion. Gen. PINCKNEY opposed six years, in favor of four years. The states, he said, had different interests. Those of the Southern, and of South Carolina in particular, were different from the Northern. If the senators should be appointed for a long term, they would settle in the state where they exercised their functions, and would in a little time be rather the representatives of that, than of the state appointing them. 141 Mr. READ moved that the term be nine years. This would admit of a very convenient rotation, one third going out triennially. He would still prefer " during good behavior;" but being little supported in that idea, he was willing to take the longest term that could be obtained. Mr. BROOM seconded the motion. Mr. MADISON. In order to judge of the form to be given to this institution, it will be proper to take a view of the ends to be served by it. These were, first, to protect the people against their rulers; secondly, to protect the people against the transient impressions into which they themselves might be led. A people deliberating in a temperate moment, and with the experience of other nations before them, on the plan of government most likely to secure their happiness, would first be aware, that those charged with the public happiness might betray their trust. An obvious precaution against this danger would be, to divide the trust between different bodies of men, who might watch and check each other. In this they would be governed by the same prudence which has prevailed in organizing the subordinate departments of government, where all business liable to abuses is made to pass through separate hands, the one being a check on the other. It would next occur to such a people, that they themselves were liable to temporary errors, through want of information as to their true interest; and that men chosen for a short term, and employed but a small portion of that in public affairs, might err from the same cause. This reflection would naturally suggest, that the government be so constituted as that one of its branches might have an opportunity of acquiring a competent knowledge of the public interests. Another reflection equally becoming a people on such an occasion, would be, that they themselves, as well as a numerous body of representatives, were liable to err, also, from fickleness and passion. A necessary fence against this danger would be, to select a portion of enlightened citizens, whose limited number, and firmness, inight seasonably interpose against impetuous counsels. It ought, finally, to occur to a people deliberating on a government for themselves, that, as different interests necessarily result from the liberty meant to be secured, the major interest might, under sudden impulses, be tempted to commit injustice on the minority. In all civilized countries the people fall into different classes, having a real or sup posed difference of interests. There will be creditors and debtors ; farmers, merchants, and manufacturers. There will be, particularly, the distinction of rich and poor. It was true, as had been observed, (by Mr. Pinckney,) we had not among us those hereditary distinctions of rank which were a great source of the contests in the ancient governments, as well as the modern states, of Europe; nor those extremes of wealth or poverty which characterize the latter. We cannot, however, be regarded, even at this time, as one homogeneous mass, in which every thing that affects a part will affect in the same manner the whole. In framing a system which we wish to last for ages, we should not lose sight of the changes which ages will produce. An increase of population will of necessity increase the proportion of those who will labor under all the hardships of life, and secretly sigh for a more equal distribution of its blessings. These may in time outnumber those who are placed above the feelings of indigence. According to the equal laws of suffrage, the power will slide into the hands of the former. No agrarian attempts have yet been made in this country; but symptoms of a levelling spirit, as we have understood, have sufficiently appeared, in a certain quarter, to give notice of the future danger. How is this danger to be guarded against, on the republican principles; how is the danger, in all cases of interested coalitions, to oppress the minority, to be guarded against? Among other means, by the establishment of a body, in the government, sufficiently respectable for its wisdom and virtue to aid, on such emergencies, the preponderance of justice, by throwing its weight into that scale. Such being the objects of the second branch in the proposed government, he thought a considerable duration ought to be given to it. He did not conceive that the term of nine years could threaten any real danger; but, in pursuing his particular ideas on the subject, he should require that the long term allowed to the second branch should not commence till such a period of life as would render a perpetual disqualification to be reëlected, little inconvenient, either in a public or private view. He observed, that, as it was more than probable we were now digesting a plan which, in its operation, would decide forever the fate of republican government, we ought, not only to provide every guard to liberty that its preservation could require, but be equally careful to supply the defects which our own experience had particularly pointed out. 142 Mr. SHERMAN. Government is instituted for those who live under it. It ought, therefore, to be so constituted as not to be dangerous to their liberties. The more permanency it has, the worse, if it be a bad government. Frequent elections are necessary to preserve the good behavior of rulers. They also tend to give permanency to the government, by preserving that good behavior, because it insures their reëlection. In Connecticut, elections have been very frequent, yet great stability and uniformity, both as to persons and measures, have been experienced from its original establishment to the present time a period of more than a hundred and thirty years. He wished to have provision made for steadiness and wisdom, in the system to be adopted; but he thought six, or four, years would be sufficient. He should be content with either. Mr. READ wished it to be observed, by the small states, that it was their interest that we should become one people as much as possible; that state attachments should be extinguished as much as possible ; that the Senate should be so constituted as to have the feelings of citizens of the whole. Mr. HAMILTON. He did not mean to enter particularly into the subject. He concurred with Mr. Madison in thinking we were now to decide forever the fate of republican government; and that if we did not give to that form due stability and wisdom, it would be disgraced and lost among ourselves, disgraced and lost to mankind forever. He acknowledged himself not to think favorably of republican government; but addressed his remarks to those who did think favorably of it, in order to prevail on them to tone their government as high as possible. He professed himself to be as zealous an advocate for liberty as any man whatever; and trusted he should be as willing a martyr to it, though he differed as to the form in which it was most eligible. He concurred, also, in the general observations of Mr. Madison on the subject, which might be supported by others if it were necessary. It was certainly true, that nothing like an equality of property existed; that an inequality would exist as long as liberty existed and that it would unavoidably result from that very liberty itself. This inequality of property constituted the great and fundamental distinction in society. When the tribunitial power had levelled the boundary between the patricians and plebeians, what followed? The distinction between rich and poor was substituted. He meant not, however, to enlarge on the subject. He rose principally to remark, that Mr. Sherman seemed not to recollect that one branch of the proposed government was so formed as to render it particularly the guardians of the poorer orders of citizens; nor to have adverted to the true causes of the stability which had been exemplified in Connecticut. Under the British system, as well as the federal, many of the great powers appertaining to government-particularly all those relating to foreign nations were not in the hands of the government there. Their internal affairs, also, were extremely simple, owing to sundry causes, many of which were peculiar to that country. Of late the government had entirely given way to the people, and had in fact suspended many of its ordinary functions, in order to prevent those turbulent scenes which had appeared elsewhere. He asks Mr. Sherman, whether the state, at this time, dare impose and collect a tax on the people? To these causes, and not to the frequency of elections, the effect, as far as it existed, ought to be chiefly ascribed. Mr. GERRY wished we could be united in our ideas concerning a permanent government. All aim at the same end, but there are great differences as to the means. One circumstance, he thought, should -be carefully attended to. There was not a one thousandth part of |