Baker v. Yorkshire Fire and Life Insurance Co. delivering any pleadings or taking any other steps in the proceedings, apply to that Court to stay the proceedings; and that Court or a Judge thereof, if satisfied that there is no sufficient reason why the matter should not be referred in accordance with the submission, and that the applicant was, at the time when the proceedings were commenced, and still remains, ready and willing to do all things necessary to the proper conduct of the arbitration, may make an order staying the proceedings."
And section 27 of the same Act provides that:
"In this Act, unless the contrary intention appears, submission means a written agreement to submit present or future differences to arbitration, whether an arbitrator is named therein or not."
Bailhache, for the appellant, tended there had been no submission on the part of the plaintiff. The question is as to the construction of sections 4 and 27 of the Arbitration Act of 1889 (52 & 53 Vict. c. 49). A written agreement within section 27 of this Act must be an agreement in writing, and signed by both parties to it. There may be an agreement here to refer to arbitration; but it is not a written agreement which it is submitted is necessary in order to comply with the Act. The Caerleon Tinplate Company v. Hughes (1) is an authority in point. In that case, which was an action for the price of goods sold, the bought-note signed by the defendant contained a provision for arbitration in case of dispute, whilst in the sold-note signed by the plaintiffs that provision was absent; and it was held that there was no submission within the meaning of the Act, and that an agreement to submit to arbitration must be in writing, and signed by both parties as their agreement. Denman, J., there said: "There can be no written agreement unless in writing, signed by the parties as their agreement, and that written agreement' means one in which the terms on both sides are reduced into writing."
(1) 60 Law J. Rep. Q.B. 640
[SMITH, J.-The Court in that case had to deal with a bought and sold note, which were not in the same terms, and therefore the parties to them were not ad idem.]
That which is most essential in an agreement is the signature of both parties thereto, which is wanting here-In re Lewis; ex parte Munro (2).
Jelf, Q.C. (Willes Chitty with him), for the respondents, were not called on.
LORD COLERIDGE, C.J.-I am of opinion that this appeal must be dismissed. This is an action brought upon a fire insurance policy containing a provision for a reference to arbitration of all disputes arising under the policy; and a dispute has arisen as to the amount payable in respect of part of the property insured that has been destroyed by fire. The plaintiff'sues on this policy, to which he is a party, and at the same time maintains that he is not bound by the proviso to refer contained therein. But he cannot disaffirm part of a contract on which he is suing. It is contended that the policy must be signed by both parties in order to bring it within the Arbitration Act of 1889. But that Act nowhere says that both parties must sign. The Caerleon Tinplate Company v. Hughes (1) has been cited to us as an authority for this contention; but I do not agree that it is. In that case we must look to the particular facts thereof. In that case, no doubt, it was necessary that both parties should sign. The parties there had never been ad idem, and there was no complete contract. The two notes that constituted the contracts in that case differed in material particulars, and therefore one of the parties, who was unwilling, could not be compelled to submit to arbitration. But that does not apply to this case at all. Here there is a perfectly good contract, one of the conditions of which is that all disputes arising under it shall be referred to arbitration. The plaintiff refuses to carry out that condition, and therefore I am of opinion that his action should be stayed. It is further said on
(2) 45 Law J. Rep. Q.B. 816; Law Rep 1 Q.B. D. 724.
SMITH, J.-I am of the same opinion. This is quite a novel point that is taken by the plaintiff. Section 11 of the Common Law Procedure Act, 1854, is well known, and it has been practically reenacted in the Arbitration Act of 1889. In this Act the first three sections deal with the submission; and section 4, after beginning with the words "if any party to a submission," goes on in practhat tically the same phraseology as employed in the Common Law Procedure Act. It is contended that under section 27, the interpretation clause of the Arbitration Act, the submission to refer disputes to arbitration must be an agreement in writing signed by the parties. I do not agree with this contention at all. As regards The Caerleon Tinplate Company v. Hughes (1), I think that the decision arrived at in that case depended entirely on the facts peculiar to that case. I am convinced that if my brothers Denman and Wills, who decided that case, were deciding
this, they would decide in exactly the same way as we are doing. The order made at chambers was quite right, and must be upheld.
Spottiswoode & Co. Printers, New-street Square, London.
[In the following Index (M.C.) denotes that the case is reported in the Magistrates' Cases Volume.]
Acceptance. See BILL OF EXCHANGE; SALE
OF GOODS.
Action-right of: statutory authority to levy
duties upon goods on barges: navigable river:
statutory remedy to detain barges for non-
payment: lien: cumulative remedy: right of
action to recover duties]-The conservators of
the river Tone, in Somerset, were empowered
by special Acts, 10 & 11 Will. 3. c. 8, and
6 Anne, c. 9, to levy duties upon goods in
barges navigating the river, and "in case of
non-payment the boats &c. to be stopped till
duty paid." A railway company, as successor
to such conservators, brought an action of
debt at common law to recover unpaid duties:
Held, by the Divisional Court (MATHEW, J.,
and WRIGHT, J.), that they were entitled to
do so on the ground that the remedy of the
detention of boats and barges given by the
Act must be taken as a cumulative, and not
an exclusive, remedy. Great Western Rail.
Co. v. Sharman, 600
Quare as to the liability of railway companies
owning canals to private persons for non-
repair of canal works. Ibid.
right of. See FRIENDLY SOCIETY;
SHERIFF; TRADE UNION.
Act of Bankruptcy. See BANKRUPTCY.
Adjudication. See BANKRUPTCY.
Administration-bond: condition to "well and
truly administer": non-payment of legacy to
infant breach of condition by administrator:
liability of sureties: probate act, 1857 (20 &
21 Vict. c. 77), 8. 81]-An administrator who
distributes the whole of the personal estate
of a deceased without retaining in his hands
a sum sufficient to pay a legacy left to an in-
fant on his attaining his majority, commits a
breach of the condition in an administration
bond given under section 81 of the Probate
Act, 1857, that he shall "well and truly ad-
minister" the estate, and the sureties to the
bond are liable in respect of such breach.
Dobbs v. Brain (App.), 749
Admiralty-jurisdiction. See COUNTY COURT.
Adulteration-milk intercepted under section 3
of Sale of Food and Drugs Act (Amendment
Act), 1879 (42 & 43 Vict. c. 30): sample
divided by inspector: one portion only for-
warded to analyst: Sale of Food and Drugs
Act, 1875 (38 & 39 Vict. c. 63), ss. 13, 14,
and 15: sufficiency of sample. Rolfe v.
Thompson (M.C. 134), 748
licence: refusal of licensing Justices to
renew Court of summary jurisdiction: ap-
peal to Quarter Sessions: notice of appeal, on
whom served: power of Justices to state
Case: 9 Geo. 4. c. 61. s. 27: Summary Juris-
diction Act, 1879 (42 & 43 Vict. c. 49), s. 31:
Summary Jurisdiction Act, 1884 (47 & 48
Vict. c. 43), s. 6: Interpretation Act, 1889
(52 & 53 Vict. c. 63), s. 13, sub-s. 11. Reg.
v. Justices of Glamorganshire; Reg. v. Jus-
tices of Pontypool (App.) (M.C. 169), 738
Licensing Acts: change of occupation:
grant of licence to "new tenant": jurisdic-
14.
tion of Justices: 9 Geo. 4. c. 61. s.
Baldwin v. Justices of Dover (M.C. 215), 826
licensing renewal of licence: occupier of
licensed premises holding temporary au-
thority to carry on business: notice of ob-
jection Licensing Act, 1872 (35 & 36 Vict.
c. 94), s. 42, sub-s. 2: 5 & 6 Vict. c. 44. s. 1:
Special Case stated by Licensing Justices:
respondent: Summary Jurisdiction Act, 1879
(42 & 43 Vict. c. 49), s. 33: 20 & 21 Vict. c.
43. s. 2. Price v. James (M.C. 203), 836
Amend-power to. See PARLIAMENT.
Appeal-leave of high court or judge: refusal of
leave by judge at chambers: appeal to court of
appeal: housing of working classes act, 1890
(53 54 Vict. c. 70), schedule 2, rule 26:
compensation: award of arbitrator: claimant
dissatisfied]-No appeal lies, either to the
Divisional Court from the decision of a Judge
at chambers, or to the Court of Appeal from
the decision of a Divisional Court, refusing to
grant leave to a claimant to appeal under rule
26 of schedule II. of the Housing of the Work-
ing Classes Act, 1890, from the award of the
arbitrator. The leave contemplated by the
rule is that of the High Court, and can be
equally granted or refused by the Court itself,
or by a Judge at chambers, who does not grant
his own leave, but that of the High Court, and
for the purposes of the statute is the High
Court. In re Housing of the Working Classes
Act, 1890; ex parte Stevenson and others
(App.), 492
by Board of Trade. See BANKRUPTCY.
See COUNTY COURT; HABEAS CORPUS;
PRACTICE; SEWERS.
Apportionment. See LOCAL GOVERNMENT.
Arbitration-clause. See FRIENDLY SOCIETY.
See ARBITRATOR; LOCAL GOVERNMENT;
PRACTICE.
Arbitrator-arbitration act, 1889 (52 & 53 Vict.
c. 49), s. 5 (b): submission: providing for
appointment of fresh arbitrator: jurisdiction
of judge: appointment by judge's order]—A
Judge has no jurisdiction to appoint an arbi-
trator under section 5 (b) of the Arbitration
Act, 1889, except where the submission is
silent, or the parties have provided no machi-
nery for such appointment. In re Arbitra-
tion between Wilson & Son and the Eastern
Counties Navigation and Transport Co., 237
Arrangement-scheme of. See BANKRUPTCY.
Attachment unqualified person acting as a
solicitor: detention of documents: disobedi-
ence to an order of court: jurisdiction of court
to attach]-An order had been made against
an unqualified person acting as a solicitor, on
the assumption that he was a solicitor, for
the delivery up of documents by him and for
an account. This order he disobeyed. Upon
an application for attachment,-Held (by
MATHEW, J., and COLLINS, J.), that the
Court had jurisdiction to make an order of
attachment against such a person, notwith-
standing that he was not in fact qualified to
act as a solicitor. In re Hulm and Lewis, 502
Attestation. See PARLIAMENT.
Attornment. See BILL OF SALE; LANDLORD
AND TENANT.
Bailiff-acts of. See SHERIFF.
Bailment injury to chattel by negligence of
stranger: action by bailee: measure of
damages]-The owner of a horse delivered it
to the plaintiff, an auctioneer, for sale, with
liberty to use it until sold. Whilst the horse
was being driven by the plaintiff's servant in
the plaintiff's carriage it was frightened by a
steam tramcar of the defendants, and fell,
with the result that both horse and carriage
were injured. At the trial of an action for
negligence brought by the plaintiff in the
County Court against the defendants, the jury
found that the accident was wholly due to
the defendants' negligence. The Judge
directed that the plaintiff could only recover
damages for the injury to his carriage, and
not for any injury to the horse or diminution
of its value:-Held, that the direction was
right, inasmuch as the plaintiff, in the absence
of negligence, was under no liability over to
his bailor, and he could not therefore recover
for any depreciation in the chattel under
bailment caused by the tort of a stranger.
Claridge v. South Staffordshire Tramway Co.,
Bankruptcy-action for dissolution of partner-
ship: order that accounts should be taken:
order for payment of costs up to trial:
"final judgment": bankruptcy act, 1883
(46 47 Vict. c. 52), s. 4, sub-s. 1 (g)]—
In an
action in the Chancery Division,
the plaintiff claimed that a partnership
existing between the debtor and himself
should be dissolved, and that the proper ac-
counts should be taken. At the trial the Judge
made an order that the partnership should be
dissolved, that certain accounts should be
taken, and that whatever should be certified
to be due from either of the parties to the
other should be paid within a month from the
date of the certificate; and he further ordered
that the defendant should pay to the plaintiff
his costs of the action up to and including the
trial, such costs to be taxed. The subsequent
costs were reserved :- Held, that the order as
to the costs of the action was a "final judg.
ment" within the meaning of section 4, sub-
section 1 (g) of the Bankruptcy Act, 1883,
and that a bankruptcy notice was properly
served on the debtor in respect of it. In re
Alexander; ex parte Alexander (App.), 377
Ex parte Moore (54 Law J. Rep. Q.B. 190; Law
Rep. 14 Q.B. D. 627) followed. Ibid.
act of bankruptcy: notice of intention
to suspend payment: bankruptcy act, 1883
(46 47 Vict. c. 52), s. 4, sub-s. 1 (h)]—A
letter sent by a debtor to some of his creditors
in the following terms: "Being unable to
meet my engagements as they fall due, I
invite your attendance at " (a specified place
and time) "when I will submit a statement
of my position for your consideration and de-
cision,"-Held, affirming the decision of the
Court of Appeal, to constitute a notice that
the debtor was "about to suspend payment
of his debts" within the meaning of the
Bankruptcy Act, 1883, s. 4, sub-s. 1 (h), and
to be therefore an act of bankruptcy. Crook
v. Morley (H.L.), 97
bankruptcy notice: judgment debt: money
paid on account: amount for which notice can
properly be issued: bankruptcy act, 1883 (46
&47 Vict. c. 52), s. 4, sub-s. 1, clause g]-Sec-
tion 4, sub-section 1, clause g, of the Bank-
ruptcy Act, 1883, does not entitle a creditor
who has obtained final judgment to issue a
bankruptcy notice for any larger amount than
that for which he could have issued a writ of
execution. If the circumstances of a case
are such that an execution creditor has ceased
to be entitled to issue execution for the whole
amount of his judgment debt, he has thereby
ceased to be entitled to issue a bankruptcy
notice for the whole. In re Child; ex parte
Child, 250
bankrupt in receipt of salary or income:
order for payment of part to trustee actor:
earnings under contract: agreement with em-
ployer to deduct part in repayment of advances:
bankruptcy act, 1883 (46 47 Vict. c. 52),
8. 53, sub-s. 2]-An actor was engaged by the
manager of a theatre under a written agree-
ment for two years at a salary of 30l. per
|