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commission of the peace are not entitled under that section to appoint a justices' clerk. In the case of boroughs having no separate commission of the peace, a justices' clerk cannot be appointed either by the mayor and ex-mayor, acting in conjunction with the county justices, usually acting for the petty sessional division in which the borough is situated, or by such county justices themselves, to perform solely the duties of clerk in matters arising within the borough; and if a petty sessions court be held in the borough, it must be held for the petty sessional division. The county justices of the petty sessional division in which such a borough is situated (including the mayor as a county justice under sect. 22 of the Local Government Act 1883) are the proper persons to appoint a clerk for that division; and, if they bring themselves within the provisions of sect. 5 of the Justices' Clerks Act 1877, by appointing more than one place for holding petty sessions in the petty sessional division, they may appoint a second clerk for that division; but the clerk or clerks so appointed are clerks for the petty sessional division and not for the borough; and the salaries of such clerks are payable by the county council, who are entitled to receive the unappropriated fines and fees imposed in petty sessions held within such borough. (Mayor, &c., of the Borough of Huntingdon and others v. Huntingdon County Council.) Bye-laws-Bye-law prohibiting wilful annoyance of passengers in the streets-Validity of bye-lawUncertainty.-A bye-law made by a municipal corporation for the good rule and government of their borough provided that "No person shall wilfully annoy passengers in the streets; and other bye-laws made at the same time dealt with particular kinds of annoyances in the streets. Held, that the bye-law was void for uncertainty. (Nash, app. v. Finlay, resp.) Local authority-Retainer of solicitor by resolution not under seal-Subsequent sealing of resolution -Sufficiency of retainer-Provisional order for extension of borough-Costs of local authority in opposing-Liability to pay.-The council of an urban district, by resolutions not under seal, resolved to retain certain solicitors to act for them as their solicitors for the purpose of opposing the confirmation by Parliament of a provisional order made by the Local Government Board for the extension of a borough, by which order part of the urban district was to be added to the borough, and the remainder to a rural district. These resolutions were communicated to the solicitors, who acted on the retainers and incurred costs in opposing the confirmation of the order. After part of these costs had been incurred the council resolved that their seal should be affixed to the previous unsealed resolutions retaining the solicitors, and such resolutions were sealed and copies sent to the solicitors. No contract was signed by the solicitors. The opposition to the order failed, and the order was confirmed by Parliament, and under it the urban council was to be abolished as from the commencement of the order. In an action by the solicitors against the borough for their costs: Held, (1) that the confirmation under seal of the earlier unsealed retainers was a sufficient retainer of the solicitors to satisfy the requirements of sect. 174 of the Public Health Act 1875 and of the common law; (2) that the costs in question, being the costs of opposing the order, were expenses which were authorised by sects. 297 and 298 of the Public Health Act 1875, which were incorporated by the Local Government Act 1888, and were not subject to the requirements of the Borough Funds Act 1872, by virtue of the saving clause in sect. 8 of the latter Act, and that, therefore, subject to taxation and to the sanction of the Local Government Board under sect. 298, the urban council, if it had continued to exist, would have been liable for these costs; and (3) that the liability to pay these costs, being costs incurred by the urban council after the date of the provisional order, was transferred, under art. 18 (2) (a) of the order, to

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the borough and rural district respectively in shares to be settled by agreement or by adjustment under sect. 62 of the Local Government Act 1888. (Brooks, Jenkins, and Co. v. Mayor, &c., of Torquay and the Rural District Council of Newton Abbot.). Transference of duties of clerk of the peaceReduction in fees-Existing officer-Compensation Not less salaries or remuneration."-By sect. 119 (1) of the Local Government Act 1888: " The officers and servants of the quarter sessions, or general assessment sessions, or justices, or any committee of such sessions or justices

785

who held office at the passing of this Act, and who by virtue of this Act become officers and servants of a county council (in this Act referred to as existing officers), shall hold their offices upon the same tenure and upon the same terms and conditions as if this Act had not been passed, and while performing the same duties, shall not receive less salaries or remuneration than they would have if this Act had not been passed." The plaintiff, by virtue of sect. 118 (10) of that Act, being clerk of the peace of Surrey, continued to be clerk of the peace at the quarter sessions held for the county of London at Newington, and for the purpose of the business at those sessions he was deemed to be clerk of the peace for the county of London. The Middlesex scale of fees, which by sect. 115 was that taken in the county of London by the clerk of the peace, was lower than the Surrey scale, and the Middlesex scale was further reduced by the standing joint. committee of the London County Council and the quarter sessions. Held, that the plaintiff was only entitled, as clerk of the peace for the county of London for Newington, to the fees payable under the reduced scale in Middlesex; but that, by virtue of sect. 119, he was entitled to receive not less remuneration, whether by salary or by fees, than that to which he was entitled at the passing of the Local Government Act 1888. (Wyatt v. 629 London County Council.)

LOTTERY.

Sale of chances-Proposal or scheme for sale of chances in newspaper-" Spot " competition in newspaper-Conviction.-1t was announced in an issue of an evening newspaper belonging to a limited company and sold for the price of one halfpenny, that for a certain period in certain issues of the newspaper spots of varying size and configuration would be printed in various parts of the issues. Some of such spots were distinguished as winning spots. It was also stated in the paper that on a specified day an announcement would appear in the paper showing the exact configuration of such spots as were declared to be winning spots; and it was stated in all the issues in question that the person who cut from the newspaper and sent to the offices of the same the portion of the newspaper containing any spot the facsimile of which had been declared to be a winning spot, would receive a prize. The winning spots were arbitrarily selected by the proprietors of the newspaper, and the winning of the prizes depended wholly upon chance. The appellant, the printer and publisher of the newspaper, was summoned under sect. 41 of the Lotteries Act 1823 (4 Geo. 4, c. 60), for unlawfully publishing a proposal and scheme for the sale of chances in a lottery. namely, the proposal and scheme called "spots," and was convicted under the section as a rogue and vagabond. Held, that the sale of the newspapers was the publishing a proposal and scheme for the sale of chances in a lottery, not authorised by any Act of Parliament within the meaning of the section, and that the appellant was properly convicted under the section. (Hall, app. t. McWilliam, resp.)

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MARRIED WOMAN.

Liability of separate estate for costs-Interpleader proceedings-Notice of claim by married woman-"Proceeding instituted”—County Court Rules 1889,

239

Order XXVII., rr. 1, 2, 4 (a).-A written notice of claim made by a married woman to goods taken in execution under a judgment recovered against another person and served upon the high bailiff of a County Court, in consequence of which an interpleader summons is taken out by the high bailiff and an interpleader issue is tried, is a "proceeding instituted" by the married woman within the meaning of sect. 2 of the Married Women's Property Act 1893, and therefore, if such interpleader issue is decided against her, the court has jurisdiction under that section to order the costs of the interpleader issue to be paid out of her separate estate subject to a restraint on anticipation, and to enforce such payment by the appointment of a receiver. (Nunn and Co. v. Tyson; Tyson, Claimant.)...

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MARTIAL LAW.

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State of war-Jurisdiction of civil courts.-Where a state of war actually prevails the civil courts, though they may be sitting in their ordinary course, have no jurisdiction over the action of the military authorities. (Re D. F. Marais.)

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MASTER AND SERVANT. Employment of salesman for fixed period-Fixed salary-Agreement to engage and employ' Obligation to provide work. The defendants agreed to engage and employ" the plaintiff as their "servant and representative salesman" for four years at a fixed salary, and the plaintiff agreed to devote his whole time to the business of the defendants. Held, that the only obligation of the defendants was to pay the agreed salary, and that they were not bound to permit the plaintiff to do any business or work for them. (Turner v. Sawdon and Co.)... Negligence-Carriage-Horse and driver hired by owner of goods-Goods in carriage in charge of owner's traveller-Driver leaving carriage unattended-Theft of goods-Liability for loss.The plaintiff, a manufacturer of jewellery, hired for the purpose of his trade, a carriage, horse, and driver, for 31. a week, from the defendant, a jobmaster, the defendant paying the driver. The carriage was regularly used by the plaintiff's traveller, who daily went round to the plaintiff's customers, having in the carriage a considerable quantity of jewellery. Upon one occasion the traveller locked the carriage up and left it in charge of the driver standing outside an hotel while he went into the hotel for luncheon. The driver then drove a short distance and went into a house to have his dinner, leaving the carriage unattended. While the driver was away from the carriage a thief drove it away and the jewellery in it was stolen. In an action by the owner of the goods against the jobmaster for the loss: Held, that, having regard to the price paid for the hiring, the value of the goods and the other circumstances of the case, the plaintiff's own traveller was the person responsible for the safety of the goods, and it was his duty to see that while he was absent the driver did nothing to endanger their safety, and that the duty of taking care of the goods was not imposed on the defendant, who was therefore not liable for the loss. (Abrahams v. Bullock.) Negligence-Hire of van and driver-Liability of general master-Control of driver-Construction of hiring agreement.-A carman entered into a written contract with an ironfounder for supplying vans, horses, and drivers to the ironfounder for use in the ironfounder's business. Under the terms of this contract the carman was to send to the ironfounder each working morning a van and horse with a capable man to drive and take charge of it, the man in the carman's employ, and all charges and claims whatsoever in reference to the van, horse, and man, being paid by the carman, and he to be responsible for the same; the ironfounder to be only responsible for the due payment for the van, horse, and man at a certain rate per annum. A driver sent by the carman to the

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ironfounder with a van and horse under this contract was directed by the ironfounder to load some iron girders on the van and deliver them at a certain yard. By the negligence of the driver in unloading the girders, one of them fell and injured the plaintiff. No one on behalf of the ironfounder interfered in any way with the driver in unloading the girders. Held, that, on the true construction of the contract of hiring, the driver was to remain under the control of the carman, so that the carman, and not the ironfounder, was responsible for the driver's negligence. (Waldock v. Winfield.)

(See SEDUCTION.)

MATRIMONIAL CAUSE. (See HUSBAND AND WIFE.)

METROPOLIS.

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Buildings--Building "used in part for purposes of trade and in part as dwelling-house "-Licensed beerhouse-Construction.-The district surveyor gave notice of objection to a proposed new building, intended to be used as a beerhouse, upon the ground that it would contravene the provisions of sect. 74 (2) of the London Building Act 1894, which provides that "in every building exceeding ten squares in area, used in part for purposes of trade or manufacture and in part as a dwellinghouse, the part used for the purposes of trade or manufacture shall be separated from the part used as a dwelling-house by walls and floors constructed or fire-resisting materials." The builder appealed against the notice, and the magistrate found as a fact "that the basement and ground floor of the said building was intended to be used for the purposes of the trade of a beerhouse, and that the part above the ground floor was intended to be used as a dwelling-house for the licensed occupier," but he held that the case was governed by the decision in Carritt v. Godson (80 L. T. Rep. 771), and overruled the objection of the district surveyor. Held, that the finding of fact, which could not be reviewed, was conclusive that the building came within the provisions of sect. 74 (2) of the London Building Act 1894. (Dicksee v. Hoskins, 205

Building bye-laws - Exemption-"Building used exclusively for the working of such mine.""Any building (not being a dwelling-house) erected or intended to be erected in connection with any mine, or intended to be used exclusively for the working of such mine," was not to be subject to certain bye-laws. Held, that the words used exclusively for the working of such mine were not to be confined to the getting of the minerals, but included putting such minerals into a deliverable state as a commercial product. They would not, however, cover buildings used for carrying on another business which the owner of the mine might carry on in addition to the mining in order to make the mine profitable. (Tylecote, app. v. Morton, resp.)

MORTGAGE. Collateral advantage to mortgagee-Clog on redemption-Mortgage of shares in company-Agreement by mortgagor to secure the employment of mortgagee as broker to the company-" Always hereafter"- Construction of document.-The defendant, who had a controlling number of shares in a tea company, mortgaged his shares to the plaintiff as security for a loan. The agreement for this mortgage contained a stipulation by the defendant that as a shareholder in the company, and in every other capacity, he would use his best endeavours to secure that the plaintiff should always thereafter have the sale of all the company's teas as broker, and in the event of any of the company's teas being sold otherwise than

692

through the plaintiff the defendant would pay to the plaintiff the amount of the commission which the plaintiff would have earned if the teas had been sold through him. The loan being subsequently paid off, a new transferee of the defendant's shares ousted the plaintiff from his position as broker to the company, and the plaintiff thereupon brought an action against the defendant claiming damages for breach of agreement. Held, that though the stipulation as to the appointment of the plaintiff to be the company's broker would indirectly have the effect of preventing the defendant from dealing so freely with the shares after redemption as he would otherwise be able to do, yet such indirect effect did not bring the stipulation within the doctrines of equity as to clogging an equity of redemption, so as to render the stipulation invalid. Heid also, on the true construction of the document, that the words 'always hereafter" should not be limited to mean the period during which the security remained in force. (Carritt Bradley and another.)

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Conditional sale-Redemption-Postponement period of Option to mortgagee within period to become partner with mortgagor in mortgaged property-Validity.-Under an agreement, dated the 23rd April 1896, the paintiffs advanced to the defendant 5000l., and the defendant executed in favour of the plaintiffs a legal mortgage of a ship to secure that sum. By the terms of that agreement the mortgage money was not to be paid or called in for two years from the 4th July 1896, and during the period of two years from the date of the agreement the plaintiffs had the option of entering into partnership with the defendant. In the event of the exercise of the option the plaintiffs were to release the mortgage debt, and the mortgaged property was to become partnership assets. On the 27th June 1898 an indenture was executed which recited that the plaintiffs had advanced to the defendant 2000l. which he covenanted to repay on the 27th Dec. 1898 with interest, and he conveyed to the mortgagees by way of security certain wharves subject to a proviso for redemption. This sum of 20007. was part of the above-mentioned sum of 5000l. On the 9th July 1898, the mortgage money being still owing, and the plaintiffs not having exercised the option, a further agreement was entered into by which the plaintiffs extended the period of the loan for five years. The agreement further provided that if, during the currency of the period of five years, the plaintiffs elected to enter into partnership with the defendant, then the debt of 50001. and interest was to cease to exist, and the ship and other property were to become assets of a partnership in which the plaintiffs and the defendant were to be interested in equal shares. On the 24th Feb. 1900 the plaintiffs elected to enter into partnership with the defendant. He refused to enter into partnership, alleging that the effect of the agreement of the 9th July 1898 was to render the property comprised in the mortgage irredeemable and was an illegal clog on the equity of redemption. Held, that there was nothing to show that the mortgage of the 27th June 1898 and the agreement of the 9th July 1898 were part and parcel of the same transaction; and that, therefore, the arrangement contained in the agreement being subsequent to the original bargain, it was not a clogging of the equity of redemption. (Lisle v. Reeve.) ... Priorities Interest Covenant Judgment Merger. By local Acts of Parliament passed in 1852 and 1862 power was given to the trustees of a market to borrow money upon the security of the tolls, and the later Act provided that "the interest on the sum authorised to be borrowed under the Act of 1852, and the interest on the sum authorised to be borrowed under this Act, shall be a first charge on the tolls." Held, that the interest on a mortgage effected under the later Act took priority over the principal of a mortgage effected under the earlier Act, notwithstanding

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that the prior mortgagee had recovered judgment for the amount due for principal and interest, and had obtained the appointment of a receiver. Where a covenant for the payment of interest in a mortgage deed is an independent covenant, and not merely ancillary to the covenant for the payment of the principal, it will not be merged in a judgment. A mortgage deed contained a covenant" that so long as the principal sum or any part thereof should remain unpaid" the mortgagors would pay interest thereon at the rate of 5 per cent. The mortgagors made default, and the mortgagees recovered judgment against them for principal and interest. Held, that the covenant did not merge in the judgment, and that the mortgagees were entitled to interest at the rate of 5 per cent. under the covenant, and not to 4 per cent. only on the judgment debt. (Economic Life Assurance Society v. Usborne and others.) Surety Judgment creditor-Right of suretyPriority. The right of a surety to claim the benefit of the security given by his principal is enforceable although the surely has not been call d upon to pay the debt. In Jan. 1894 a husband mortgaged his property to secure 2251. and interest. In March 1896 his wife mortgaged her property to the same mortgagee to secure 2751. and interest. In Aug. 1896 the husband and wife joined in a mortgage to the same mortgagee to secure 500l. and interest, and entered into a joint and several covenant with the mortgagee for the repayment of that sum. By the same deed the husband as to his property and the wife as to the property mortgaged by her in March 1896, charged those properties with the repayment of the 500.; and the wife mortgaged certain ther property to secure the sum of 500l. and also the sums of 2251. and 275l. owing on the prior mortgages. In Jan. 1899 judgment creditors of the husband obtained equitable execution against him, and took from the mortgagee a transfer of all his mortgages, having been informed that the wife joined in the mortgage of Aug. 1896 only as surety for her husband. The husband's property was sold for 3751. which was paid to the judgment creditors as transferees of the mortgage of Jan. 1894 in repayment of the amount due thereon; and they claimed to retain the balance amounting to 1307. towards satisfaction of their judgment debt against the husband. The wife took out a summons for the determination of the question whether the balance ought not to be applied in reduction of the debt of 5001. secured by the mortgage of Aug. 1896 which was prior in date to the judgment debt. It was proved that the wife joined in that mortgage only as surety for her husband. Held, that the balance must be applied in reduction of the 5007. secured by the mortgage of Aug. 1896, for which the husband's property was primarily liable. (Dixon v. Steel.) ...

NAVIGABLE RIVER. Powers of conservators-Licence to dredgeLicence to carry away and sell-Rights of owners of soil of river-Trespass.-The Conservators of the River Thames, purporting to act under the River Thames Conservancy Act 1894, granted a licence to dredge in a part of the Upper Thames by which they also authorised the licensee to sell the ballast raised for his own profit. Upon action brought by the owner of the soil of this part of the river to restrain the conservators and their licensee from dredging for sale: Held, that the conservators were not empowered by their Act to authorise the licensee to sell for his own profit, and that the dredging under the licence was not therefore authorised by the Act and was a trespass. (Palmer v. Conservators of the River Thames.)

NEGLIGENCE.

Fright - Personal injury resulting - Actionable wrong-Remoteness of damage. By her statement of claim A. alleged that while she was sitting

587

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537

behind the bar of her husband's public-house (she then being pregnant) B.'s servant negligently drove a pair-horse van belonging to B. into the public-house. A. in consequence sustained a severe shock which made her seriously ill and led to her suffering a miscarriage. Held, that the statement of claim disclosed a good cause of action against B. Per Kennedy, J.: Mere fright not followed by consequent physical damage will not support an action, but if it is followed by consequent physical damage, then, if the fright was the natural result of the defendants' negligence, an action lies, and the physical damage is not too remote to support it. Per Phillimore, J.: Where there is a legal duty on the defendant not to frighten the plaintiff by his negligence, then fright with consequent physical damage will support an action. (Dulieu v. R. White and Sons.)

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Injury causing death-Alien-Death of alien on foreign ship by collision on high seas-Negligence of British ship-Right of representative of alien to maintain action against English shipowner. The provisions of the Fatal Accidents Acts 1846 and 1864 extend to a case where the person in respect of whose death damages are sought to be recovered in an English court against the owner of a British ship was an alien, and was at the time of the negligent act which caused his death on board a foreign ship on the high seas; and therefore a foreigner, the widow of a foreign seaman killed on the high seas while on board a foreign ship by a collision with a British ship caused by the negligent navigation of the British ship, can maintain an action in England under these Acts against the English shipowner for the negligence of his servants in causing the death. (Davidsson v. Hill and others.)...

OYSTER FISHERY. Corporation-Fisheries-Short lease taken by corporation-Validity-Mortmain-Right of oyster fishery-Depositing oysters on foreshore as incident to right of fishery.-A corporation were by a local Act constituted undertakers for the regulation of the oyster fishery in their river, and they subsequently took a lease for fourteen years of certain parts of the foreshore to which the Act applied. The defendant had a right of oyster fishery in the harbour, and from time immemorial he and other fishermen were in the habit of depositing oysters, which had been taken from the sea, on a particular spot of the foreshore which had been roughly staked out. This depositing of the oysters was necessary to free them from contamination and to render them fit for use, and the acts of the defendant did not constitute any occupation of the spot by him, but were merely incidental to the fishing for oysters, and practically such storage was necessary for the oyster fishery. In an action by the corporation as such lessees for alleged trespass in so depositing the oysters on the foreshore: Held (as to the right of the corporation to sue), that neither the Mortmain Act nor sect. 107 of the Municipal Corporations Act 1882 prevented the corporation as such from acquiring a short leasehold, and as the acquisition of the leasehold afforded a reasonable facility for carrying out the purposes of their local Act, its acceptance was not ultra vires and they could sue under it. Held, also, that the right of depositing the oysters on the foreshore was a right which could be legally incident to the right of fishery, and that therefore, as such right has been established in fact, the defendant had committed no trespass in so depositing them. (Corporation of Truro v. Rowe.) (See SHIPPING.)

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PARENT AND CHILD.

Mother of illegitimate child-Duty to maintain and right to have custody-Agreement by mother to give up possession of child-Transfer of mother's duties and rights-Void contract.-The mother of

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Articles-Partnership continued after period fixed for determination - Dissolution - Pre-emption clause-Whether applicable to partnership at will. -In an action for a declaration that the partnership between the plaintiff and defendant was dissolved by the issue of the writ, and that the plaintiff was entitled to exercise the rights conferred by clause 25 of the partnership articles for the purchase of the interest of the defendant, it appeared that by the articles the partnership was fixed for ten years from the 1st Jan. 1889 unless sooner determined as therein provided. By clause 25 the plaintiff was to be at liberty to determine the partnership by giving the defendant six months' notice, and whether so determined or by effluxion of time she should have the right to purchase the share of the defendant at a valuation. Since 1st Jan. 1899 the partnership had been carried on on the like terms, as a partnership at will. At the hearing the defendant contended that the continued partnership was not a partnership at will, and that in any even clause 25 was now inapplicable. Held, (1) that such continued partnership was a partnership at will, under sect 27 of the Partnership Act 1890; and (2) that clause 25 was not inconsistent with a partnership at will, and that accordingly the plaintiff was entitled to the declaration as asked. (Brooks v. Brooks.) Debt-Assignment by one partner-Subsequent assignment by other partner by deed-NoticePriority-Invalidity of deed-Equitable assignment. Where there are two valid assignments of the same debt, the assignee who first gives notice to the debtor of the assignment to him is entitled to priority over the other assignee, although the assignment to the latter was prior in date. Though one of two partners is not as partner entitled to execute deeds on behalf of the partnership, yet an assignment by deed of a partnership debt by a partner is a good equitable assignment and binding on the partnership, though the deed is bad as a deed. (Marchant v. Morton, Down, and Co.)

(See SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE.)

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PASSING OFF GOODS. Colourable imitation-Evidence-Injunction-Function of judge.-On a proceeding for an injunction to restrain a trader from selling goods in packets got up as a colourable imitation of the plaintiffs' goods, if a fraudulent intent is not proved, it is necessary to show by positive evidence that some person has been deceived. It is not enough to call evidence that in the opinion of the witnesses purchasers might be deceived. (Payton and Co. v. Snelling, Lampard, and Co.) ...

PATENT.

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Where the

Prolongation Assignees Accounts. petitioners are assignees who have purchased the patent as a commercial speculation, and the accounts do not show clearly the profits made by the inventor or by the petitioners, a petition for the extension of the patent will be refused. Where the patentee has failed to push the invention in this country in the earlier part of the life of the letters patent, and foreign patents have expired, it will require a very strong case to induce the Judicial Committee to recommend a prolongation of the patent, though such circumstances are not in themselves conclusive against the petitioner. (Re Henderson's Patent.)

POOR RATE. (See RATING.)

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PRACTICE. Administration action-Real and personal estateCosts.-The Land Transfer Act 1897 has not altered the practice of the court as to costs of actions for administration of real and personal estate laid down in Patching v. Barnett (45 L. T. Rep. 292), viz., that the general costs of the suit are to be borne by the personal estate, and the costs, so far as they have been increased by the administration of the real estate, by the real estate. (Re Jones; Elgood v. Kinderley. Re Jones; Elgood v. Jones.) Appeal Court of Appeal-Jurisdiction "Criminal cause or matter "-Order to pull down building in London.-A magistrate convicted a person of having erected a building beyond the general line of buildings in a street in London, and made an order for the demolition thereof, under the provisions of the London Building Acts 1894 and 1893, and he refused to state a case for the opinion of the High Court. The King's Bench Division refused to grant a rule nisi for a mandamus to the magistrate to state a case, but a rule nisi was granted by the Court of Appeal. Held, that this was a criminal cause or matter" within the meaning of sect. 47 of the Judicature Act 1873, and that the Court of Appeal had no jurisdiction to entertain the application for a mandamus. (Rex v. D'Eyncourt.) Appeal-Final or interlocutory order-Summons for delivery and taxation of solicitor's bill of costs -Order LVIII., rr. 3, 9, 15.-The order made on a summons taken out by a client asking for the common order for the delivery and taxation of a solicitor's bill of costs is a final order, whether the order is made or retused, and consequently a notice of appeal from the order must be a fourteen days' notice. (Re Herbert Reeves and Co.) ... Bankruptcy-Offences against Bankruptcy ActReport by official receiver-Filing-Consideration by court-Prosecution of debtor-Directions -Where the official receiver makes a report to the court, under sect. 16 of the Debtors Act 1869 and sect. 164 of the Bankruptcy Act 1883, stating that in his opinion the debtor has been guilty of offences under the bankruptcy law, the report ought to be filed, although it has not been considered by the court. Where the official receiver has reported to the court, under sect. 16 of the Debtors Act 1869 and sect. 164 of the Bankruptcy Act 1883, that in his opinion a bankrupt has been guilty of offences under sect. 31 of the Act of 1883, it is the duty of the court to consider that report and determine whether it will or will not order the bankrupt to be prosecuted, although the official receiver has not reported whether or not, in his opinion, it is desirable that there should be a prosecution, and has not made a specific application for leave to prosecute. But the court is not fettered as to the time when, and the circumstances under which, it will consider the report, and may decline to make any immediate order for a prosecution. (Re Dunn; Ex parte Senior Official Receiver.) Companies-Debentures-Omission to register within prescribed time Accident - Rectification of register-Extension of time-Rectification without prejudice-Form of order.-Whenever there has been an omission to register a mortgage or charge created by a company, and the judge, being satisfied that the omission has been due to accident or inadvertence or some other sufficient cause within the meaning of sect. 15 of the Companies Act 1900, extends the time for registration, the practice in regard to similar applications under sect. 14 of the Bills of Sale Act 1878 ought to be followed, and the order should be expressed to be "without prejudice to the rights of parties acquired prior to the time when such [security] shall be actually registered." (Joplin Brewery Company Limited.) Company-Winding-up-Examination of witnessesPending action-Refusal of witness to answer questions. The pendency of an action commenced

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by the liquidator of a company, which is in course of being wound-up, against third persons, may be a good ground for postponing the examination of a witness under sect. 115 of the Companies Act 1862. But where the witness to be examined was a former manager of a company which was in voluntary liquidation, and the liquidator was simply seeking to obtain information as to the documents of the company which were in the manager's possession and also information as to how he had dealt with those documents, it was held that it was a proper case for the liquidator to put in force the powers conferred by the section, notwithstanding that the manager had improperly handed over some of the documents to a person with whom the company was in litigation. (Re London and Northern Bank; Ex parte Archer.) Costs-Payment into court with denial of liabilityJudgment for plaintiffs for less than amount paid in-Costs of issues found in plaintiffs' favourOrder XXII., rr. 1, 6-Order LXV., r. 1.-In an action to recover damages for injuries caused by the defendants' negligence, the defendants denied negligence on their part, alleged contributory negligence by the plaintiffs, and paid money into court with a denial of liability. At the trial the plaintiffs obtained a verdict for a sum less than that which the defendants had paid into court. Judgment was entered for the defendants with the general costs of the action, the plaintiffs to have the costs of the issues found in their favour. Held, that the two issues of negligence and of contributory negligence were distinct from the issue whether the sum paid into court was sufficient to satisfy the plaintiffs' claim, and that on these two issues the plaintiffs were entitled to their costs. (Wagstaffe and another v. Bentley and another.) Costs-Security for-Insolvent plaintiff-Assignment for benefit of creditors-Assignment of cause of action--Nominal plaintiff.-The plaintiff, being insolvent and having brought an action against the defendants, executed a deed whereby he assigned to a trustee for the benefit of his creditors all his property, estate, and effects (with one insignificant exception), consisting of the goodwill and assets of his business of a tile and mosaic merchant, including the stock and book debts of the business, and also all the beneficial interest and property in the action brought by him against the defendants, but the right, property, or interest of the trustee therein was not to arise until judgment had been obtained or the plaintiff had effected terms of settlement. The plaintif covenanted with the trustee to prosecute the action diligently against the defendants and not to arrange terms of settlement without the trustee's consent in writing, and also to settle the action, if occasion should arise, upon such terms as the trustee should consider fair and reasonable. Held, that the plaintiff was merely a nominal plaintiff suing for the benefit of third persons, and, therefore, that he must give security for the defendants' costs of the action. (Lloyd v. Hathern Station Brick Company Limited.) Costs-Taxation-Costs of separate issues-Libel-Justification-Privilege without malice-Issue of justification found for plaintiff-Issue of malice found for defendant-Judgment for defendant with general costs of action-Direction that plaintiff have costs relating exclusively to issue of justification. In an action of libel and slander the defendant pleaded (1) justification; (2) privi lege without malice. It was admitted that the statements complained of were made on a privileged occasion. The jury having found that the statements were not true, but that there was no malice on the part of the defendant, judgment was entered for the defendant with the general costs of the action. The judge, however, directed that the plaintiff should be allowed such of his costs as related exclusively to the issue of justification. On taxation of the plaintiff's bill of costs the taxing master disallowed the costs of all the witnesses called by the plaintiff on the issue of

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