in America inclined toward the French people after their sudden transformation into republicans, nor even when private persons in America supported the resistance of France by sending over arms and other materials of war. The war materials sent by the English were regarded with very different feelings, for in their case we beheld secret enmity, in the Americans only a mercantile spirit.

I must reluctantly pass over further proofs of Bismarck's attachment to America, which I regret the more, since they are highly characteristic of the Prince's tone of thought. Yet, before we turn to other considerations, it is worth while to mention the following fact: In the spring of 1873 I saw a framed portrait in the Chancellor's study, which was leaning against a chair until it should be hung up; and on coming close to it I recognized the features of President Grant. He was there in good company. Very few pictures adorned the walls of the room in which the Prince was working at the time, but they represented for the most part historical characters, and contemporaries of the highest repute; the Great Elector, Frederick the Great, the Emperor William, Victor Emanuel, and the Schlachtendenker, Moltke, looked down from their frames on those that entered the room.

Let us now consider the great Chancellor from another point of view, and inquire into the secret of his wonderful success. German dreamers, worthy people but not clear thinkers, have discovered that it is solely and altogether due to the popular spirit, the Volksseele. The whole scheme was devised and carried into execution by the Volksseele through popular agitation, directed by the sage judgment and the infallible counsels of professors, lawyers, and men of letters, who were its mouthpieces; through its associations and mass meetings, its Schützenfests, its Turnerfests, and its Sängerfests. Others have ascribed to chance and to a long run of good luck the events which have reconstituted Germany, and have raised her from a weak to a powerful state. Others, again, whenever he has come forward and carried into execution any grand scheme, have seen only the evidences of blindness, stupidity, or treachery among his opponents.

I am of quite another opinion, although I do not deny that a grain of truth may lie at the bottom of some of these explanations. These outgivings of the Volksseele were at best of secondary importance-mere sentiment and velleïté, oftentimes not even helpful. And here we are reminded that at the very beginning of his political career Bismarck said to Disraeli, "I wish to save Germany

from the professors." What is called good luck is for the most part capacity and energy in making use of circumstances. Frederick the Great, indeed, paid homage to King Chance, yet those who quote this saying should remember that it is accompanied by the remark, "Qu'un homme d'esprit dise un mot, cela suffit pour que mille vous le répètent." The blind stupidity of hostile princes and statesmen has involuntarily contributed to the success of many of the Chancellor's schemes, but it was impossible for him to calculate on such aid beforehand. And the treachery which is supposed to have helped him is only a delusion of the French, who, on the collapse of their assumed invincibility became so excited that, with all their natural intelligence, they were like people who imagine that they see a ghost, and they were ready to believe the most wonderful inventions. It is a legend which may be repeated by the present generation of our neighbors on the other side of the Vosges, but which will find no place in history, even in France, and which we Germans may at once reject in our attempt to account for our success.

I have, therefore, only to regard our Chancellor and his acts in the light in which they would probably be considered by the gifted author of "Heroes and Hero-worship "-that is, I am convinced that Prince Bismarck has really made himself and Germany great by the surpassing keenness of his political insight and by the strong will which have done such great things for Germany. He is a product of the slow development of the German nation, which began with Frederick the Great, and was accelerated by the war of liberation; a development which, as time went on, was concentrated, with all its legitimate aspirations, on a single personality, and in this concentrated form its power was so gigantic as to overthrow the foundations of the old world, and to construct a new and fairer building out of its ruins. In other words, he appears to those who know him most intimately to be one of the men ordained by Providence, one of the great geniuses or heroes who appear from time to time to direct the energy of their people into new and higher paths, by which they may attain to fuller activity and recognition, and may thus become, when rightly estimated and used, a blessing to their neighbors and to the whole civilized world. The Chancellor Bismarck, already regarded by many in this his historical aspect, will, when party spirit has subsided, and there are more abundant materials for the interpretation of his character, be more generally recognized as such a God-sent hero, endowed with divine genius.

It is, therefore, in himself that I seek, and believe to have partly found, the solution of the riddle of his astonishing success. Only in part, for while we can analyze his political method as it is expressed in acts and words, his genius is incapable of definition, since it is full of surprises, ever working with new expedients and in new ways, ever devising unexpected combinations. Like everything informed with genius, it falls into the sphere of that creative force and impulse which a German philosopher has designated as the unconscious. He has this quality in common with Shakespeare and Goethe. We can enjoy, admire, and analyze their works, yet no one can enter so closely into what moves and inspires their hearts as to equal them. A man must be born a Goethe or Shakespeare of the spirit of poetry, just as a Bismarck is only born of the spirit of history.

If, now, we consider the working of this genius, which acts unconsciously in his inmost being, and which therefore is veiled to all scrutiny, we discover as it were the symptoms of this innermost process an intellect that essentially, or, more properly speaking, that necessarily, naturally, and spontaneously aims only at what is attainable; a searching and penetrating insight into the means best fitted for reaching its ends; and a clear perception of the obstacles, whatever they may be, which might impede or arrest its progress toward its object. We find the same readiness in concession as in persistence, and a steady pursuit of the main lines of his enterprise through all the circumstances that occur. A nearer examination will show a delicate hand, never missing the right spot as it probes and handles all the personalities with which he has to do; the gift of always knowing the right moment at which to strike a decisive blow, or to defer action until the fitting hour arrives, and an extraordinary knack of insensibly leading his opponent to put himself in the wrong in the eyes of the world. We may also admire his singular impartiality with respect to liberal and conservative party warfare, his perfect readiness to accept facts, which, however, is accompanied by an attractive warmth and poetic illusion in his estimate of results; the great energy which shrinks from nothing which is expedient and necessary, and at the same time a moderation which only demands what is absolutely necessary, and is ready to sacrifice trifles in order to come to an understanding. He has worked with simple tools which have from their very simplicity been often overlooked and despised, and that not only once, like Columbus with his egg, but by combining in every great undertak

ing a cool head with a warm heart, by uniting Achilles with Odysseus in his own single person. Many will agree with me that this is an approximate solution of the problem of that success by which this extraordinary genius has surprised the world.

The Chancellor acted with wonderful skill during the years preceding the war of 1866, and still more surprising perhaps were the clear-sightedness and dexterity with which he was able to restrain the French in their thirst for "revenge for Sadowa" until the right time for Germany arrived, and we were able to meet their attack with decisive success; he caused the Emperor Napoleon to compromise himself again and again in the eyes of Europe, and was able to conduct the war so as to secure the neutrality of the other powers. With masterly art he acquired the good will of Russia, and gained over the south German states by his forbeararance; he induced Bavaria to undertake the task of restoring the imperial dignity, and in this way he crowned the edifice of the German Empire; he caused Alsace-Lorraine to be declared the joint possession of the German princes, so as to make its preservation the common interest of the empire, and thus forged a new bond to unite the north and south. He displayed his diplomatic talent as an "honorable broker" in his presidency of the Congress of Berlin; and finally when he accomplished the Austro-German alliance which, as he expressly declared, had been his object for years, and for which he had paved the way by skillful management.

But, in our opinion, the Chancellor's most brilliant act of statesmanship was that by which he first entered into the arena of foreign policy, and acquired Schleswig-Holstein for Germany. By the death of Frederick VII, the hereditary Prince of Augustenburg succeeded to the duchies to the north of the Elbe, in accordance with a title which was admitted by many adherents both in that country and in the rest of Germany, but which had been repudiated by Prussia and Austria in the London protocol. Public opinion in Germany called upon Prussia to withdraw from this compact, and to obtain the duchies for the Prince of Augustenburg. This appeared to be the best way of baffling the European coalition against Prussia which had been contemplated some months before, on the occasion of the Prusso-Russian convention held in Berlin, with the view of coercing the turbulent Poles. Bismarck's keen eye perceived this, and at the same time another way of attaining his object. He opened the campaign not against but for the London protocol. For Denmark had, contrary to her engagement, incorporated Schleswig with her

self. The tone in which the Minister declared it to be "the dictate of honor and prudence to throw no suspicion on our good faith" plainly shows his meaning in abiding by the London protocol. The Prussian delegates were too dense to perceive it, looking at the matter in a narrow, short-sighted way, and clinging to the title afforded by an old, yellow, worm-eaten parchment, while they were also blinded by their hatred for the Minister who opposed them. The secret of success, by renouncing the establishment of a right at the right time and in the right way, is only known to few. Europe could do nothing against a campaign in favor of the London protocol, and Austria was forced to take part in the war, since she could not allow Prussia to act alone in the affairs of Germany. In this way Bismarck obtained the duchies by right of conquest, and Denmark provoked a war with the two great German powers by her breach of the agreement.

Bismarck himself appears to regard this manœuvre and his subsequent action upon it as his most important achievement. One evening in the autumn of 1877 we sat together over the fire in the billiard-room at Varzin, discussing the issue of the war with France, and the Chancellor said: "When I was made a prince, the King wished me to take the arms of Alsace and Lorraine. But I would rather have had the arms of Schleswig-Holstein, for that is the diplomatic campaign of which I am most proud." The Legationsrath von Holstein, who was also present, asked whether he had intended to acquire it from the first. "Yes," replied the Prince, "directly after the death of the King of Denmark. But it was hard to accomplish. Everything was against me-Austria, the small states of Germany, the ladies of our court, the liberals, the English-all the world, as is well known. Napoleon did not oppose; he thought he thereby placed us under obligation. Even the King for a long while would not hear of it. We held a council of state at the time, at which I fired off the longest speech I had ever made, and repeated to my hearers things which must have appeared to them extravagant and impossible." He went on to give the substance of his speech (which, however, I will not repeat), and then continued: "To judge from their astonished air, they really supposed that I had taken too much wine at breakfast. Costenoble drew up the protocol, and, on looking at it, I found that the passages on which I had laid most stress were omitted, and it was on these that I chiefly relied. I remarked upon it to him. He said that I was right, but he thought that I should be